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ABSTRACT
The impact of systematic and organised strategy on investment 
patterns is essential to an understanding of management 
development; an effective organisational strategy stimulates 
diversification of business house investments. There is a copious 
literature on management techniques which demonstrates its status 
as an intellectual discipline in its own right. In recognition of 
managers’ role as decision makers, this thesis investigates those 
factors which were the necessary and sufficient conditions for better 
managed organisational systems and how these two conditions when 
harmonised, enabled Pakistani business groups to diversify their 
investments from trading to primary and light-engineering goods 
production. Using the case study approach, this thesis attempts to 
isolate the external stimuli (the necessary conditions) which 
contributed to the initial formation of business houses from the 
internal stimuli (the sufficient conditions) provided by effective 
management policies, which directed business house investments 
from 1950-1988. The exogenous factors which directed the structure 
of investments in the short-term, were derived fi*om the groups’ 
relations with the State and access to discounted sources of finance 
from credit lending institutions. As organisations matured, the 
impact of their internal systems, which were a function of the 
prevalent management philosophy, superseded and replaced the 
original stimulus provided by State largesse for enabhng 
diversification; that is, the endogenous environment became 
increasingly responsible for the direction of future investments made 
by the managers of these groups. Endogenous organisational factors 
affecting long-term transition, were qualitative inputs such as the 
impact of training on employee skills and productivity. Where family 
managers consistently, although not necessarily consciously, applied 
the principles of the Systems Approach which are internal 
organisational factors, the business structures which so emerged 
were rationalised to produce a results-driven record of diversification. 
Management as a generic subject incorporates general concepts as 
well as specific techniques which mould the portfolio of business 
house investments. Management theory, in particular the tenets of 
the Systems Approach, focus on general concepts which have 
universal applicability as a problem-solving technique, which are 
tested on practical organisational situations. The principles of this 
approach are holistic and iterative since they deal with a general 
class of situations to which the methodology of the Systems Approach 
is applied to solve problems. A major premise of this approach is that 
those managers who viewed the form of a problem in order to develop 
a criterion to solve it, before addressing the content of the problem, 
(which was the domain of subject specialists such as engineers or 
economists), produced better managed organisational structures.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This study of post iudependence Pakistani business enterprise^ 
addresses management practices, from 1950 to 1988 in four private- 
sector business bouses.^ These business bouses were selected from 
three out of four provinces in the country.^ Each business bouse 
constituted of up to 30 registered firms which were legally separate 
companies, managed by common directors and equity bolding 
executives, functioning in different manufacturing and service 
industries. Records of over 80 companies were consulted to complete 
the analysis presented in this study. Cumulatively, these businesses 
embodied the leading sectors of industrial investment made by the 
pioneering entrepreneurs and so, formed appropriate units of 
observation. Investments in all business bouses ranged from trading 
in commodities to manufacturing of intermediate and in instances, 
light engineering goods. The business group profile includes private 
limited companies [unquoted] drawing equity contributed by family 
managers and their spouses, and public bmited companies drawing
^Pakistan gained independence from British India in 1947.
^Tbe year 1988 was taken as a watershed to conclude the analysis 
in this study, since it marked the end of President Zia’s eleven year 
rule.
^Tbe selected provinces were the Punjab, Sind and North West 
Frontier Province. Baluchistan was omitted from this study owing 
to the meagre scale of developed industry there.
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equity contributed through pubhc subscription of its shares. This is 
a pioneering study of Pakistani business groups’ management 
practices extrapolated largely from their unquoted company records.^ 
These pioneering entrepreneurs were a minority group of 
industrialists, empowered with the attendant economic and political 
privileges conferred on them by the State. The management 
practices and the investment structure of these companies which 
emerged, was initially a consequence of the distinctive position of its 
entrepreneurs.
The interest shown by business group entrepreneurs in this 
research was a significant factor which influenced the selection of 
business houses in this study. In 1968, three of the business groups® 
selected, the Wazir Ali, Crescent and Dawood Groups were among 
the ten largest, measured by the value of their net assets, and had 
moved up to rank among the five largest by 1988.® The fourth
"^ One definition of the characteristics of a business group is given 
by H. Strachan, ‘Nicaragua’s Grupos Economicos: Scope and 
Operations’, in S. Greenfield, et al, Entrepreneurs in Cultural 
Context, New Mexico, 1979, pp. 243-44. He assigns them with three 
characteristics: diversity, pluralist composition and kinship.
®In any case the term ‘business group’ in this study is used more 
for convenience to depict family behaviour and response through the 
decision-making criteria of its members, and it would be a misnomer 
to assume that any company within the group necessarily had any 
legally binding affiliations with others in the same group.
®A ranking of business groups by asset value is presented in, L. 
J. White, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power, 1974, 
Princeton, 1974, p. 60 and H. Haqqani, ‘Pakistan’s Top 22 Face New 
Challenges’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 May 1986, p. 77.
group, the Ghulam Faruque Group was a relatively late-starter; in 
1968, it was at forty-second position ranked by the value of its net 
assets and had moved up to thirteenth position by 1988/ The 
Crescent, Wazir Ali and Dawood Groups’ early history was traced 
from the late 1940s, whereas the Ghulam Faruque Group’s business 
records were accessible from 1964, when its owner made his debut in 
manufacturing industry.
From the early 1950s, manufacturing investment in a number of 
industries was spearheaded by these business group entrepreneurs. 
They were initially traders and moved on to the processing and 
production of primary commodities to light engineering goods. These 
products ranged from sugar, processed food, vegetable ghee,^ cotton, 
polyester and jute textiles, steel and cement in the manufacturing 
sector, and shipping, construction, banking and general insurance in 
the service sector.
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section One presents 
the sources of data used for this study. Section Two reviews 
previous research conducted on the behaviour of the industrial sector, 
which covers Pakistani industrialisation from a macro view where
^Vegetable ghee is vegetable oil which is solidified by the 
introduction of hydrogen gas in order to change its appearance and 
make its outward properties resemble those of clarified butter. The 
reason for doing this are cultural, based on unsubstantiated claims 
that clarified butter is more nutritious than vegetable oil. Ghee is 
also known by the alternate name of Vanaspati.
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financial viability is used as an indicator of efficiency. This is 
presented in a review of Altaf, Haq, Amjad and Papanek’s studies on 
Pakistani industrialisation® and the Chandlerian insight into 
emerging managerial hierarchies in the USA.^ ® This thesis also 
pioneers a significant input hy also improving upon and extending 
arguments presented in previous studies on Pakistani business 
groups. Section Three defines the approach used in this study for 
researching trends in management decision-making affecting 
business group investment. Section Four identifies the research 
issues that this study addresses. Section Five on the methodology 
of the Systems ‘Approach’/^ highlights its holistic, problem solving
®A considerable literature on Pakistani industrialisation is 
available in Z. Altaf, Pakistani Entrepreneurs, Croom Helm, 1983; Z. 
Altaf, Risk and Uncertainty in Industry in Pakistan, Croom Helm, 
1988; R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960- 
1970, Cambridge, 1982, and ‘Industrial Concentration and Economic 
Power in Pakistan’, mimeo. South Asian Institute, 1974; W. Falcon 
and G. Papanek (eds.). Development Policy II  - The Pakistan 
Experience, Harvard, 1971; M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic 
Planning, Oxford, 1963 and The Poverty Curtain, Columbia, 1976.
®^A synopsis of Chandler’s historical approach to organisational 
strategy directing the form of organisational structures is discussed 
in T. Gourvish, ‘British Business and the Transition to a Corporate 
Economy: Entrepreneurship and Management Structures’, Business 
History, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, October 1987, pp. 19-20.
^^Webster’s New International Dictionary, unabridged 2nd., ed., 
describes a system as, ‘An aggregation or assemblage of objectives 
united by some form of regular interaction or interdependence; a 
group of diverse units so combined by nature or art as to form an 
integrated whole, function, operate, or move in unison and, often, in 
obedience to some form of control; an organic or organised whole; as, 
to view the universe as a system', the solar system, a new telegraph 
system’.
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methodology, with a view to show how it can be used to improve 
internal organisational performance. This methodology sets the 
foundation for an empirical investigation of internal organisation 
factors which influenced the business groups’ transition from trading 
to the manufacturing of light engineering goods. Our aim here is 
two-fold. Firstly, to show that exogenous variables were not 
sufficient conditions for enabhng this transition over the long-term. 
Secondly, the sufficient conditions facilitating this transition called 
for the injection of endogenous organisational systems and 
procedures. Section Six concludes that State patronage when 
replaced by applications of endogenous organisational systems, led to 
consistent and planned expansion of investments in some of the 
business houses studied. Those businesses which were not 
afflicted by managerial inertia and adopted suitable organisational 
methods soon after their inception, made the transition to light 
engineering goods production in the long-term.
1.1 Sources of Data 
The data used in this thesis are derived from both private and 
public limited company documents. The inclusion of private 
unquoted companies provides a (more) empirical reflection of the 
causes which led to expansion of investments and also explains why
^^This approach of linking adoption of systems with long-term 
industrial development finds its merit in A. Hirschman, The Strategy 
of Economic development, 4th ed., Yale, 1963, p. 134n, ‘...historical 
studies of the conditions under which eftbrts at industrialisation have 
turned out to be abortive may yield more valuable lessons’.
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transition occurred in selected business houses. By including 
unquoted company data, this study also contributes to an 
understanding of the management of private limited firms and how 
it affected the groups’ portfoho evolution. Usually private hmited 
firms’ assets and decision-making criteria are concealed from public 
review. In Pakistan, this has in the past led to postulates on 
organisational policies in unquoted companies derived from secondary 
sources of data. This study is enriched to the extent that it was not 
handicapped by the absence of unquoted company records, which 
better uncovered the groups’ business strategy from their inception 
in Pakistan. The company documents which are used here, but 
previously were not available for research purposes include, ‘Minutes 
of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ and financial statements of 
unquoted companies, as well as official letters exchanged between 
government officials. Heads of State and the business group leaders. 
The empirical evidence used to evaluate the groups’ internal strategy 
from company documents, was one source of identifying the daily, 
monthly or annual decisions taken by its managers. This source was 
augmented by interviewing 40 family managers of the groups, along 
with their current and ex-employees, officials of government-owned 
financial institutions, management consultants and non-group 
managers. In instances, the information channels which were 
accessed differed across the groups, in that Board Minutes reflected 
business policy of a particular group and official letters and executive
13
committee reports served the same purpose for another group. 
However, both variety of sources generated data which lent itself to 
conclusive results.
1.2 Previous Analyses of Business Groups
Knowledge of managerial decision-making in private-sector 
corporations and the factors which influenced it is important to an 
understanding of how and when investments in hght engineering 
were a response to the internal organisational strategy. Yet, 
transition is not easy to measure and its determinants in a dynamic 
model are co m p l e x . T h e  pattern of transition in an organisation 
was a response to the sum total of decisions taken by its managers. 
The impact of these decisions was compounded when family 
managers were in control since they initiated the direction of future 
investments.
Earlier research by Amjad and White on Pakistani business house 
performance, also contributed to an understanding of how the 
financial acumen of business leaders affected long-term business
^^Dynamic enterprises are divisionalised and decentralised, as 
opposed to bureaucratised and centrahsed management structures. 
For literature on management structures, 1949-1973, see, H. 
Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organisations, Prentice Hall 
International, Inc., 1979, pp. 3, 9,14,162 and 286; also the definition 
of ^dynamic' provided by A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 
1990, p. 10, suggests it deals with definitions, concepts and 
generalisations of processes within the organisation.
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development/^ Their respective study focused on the financial 
viability of the private-sector firm, given a particular infrastructure 
with possible explanations for investment and profitability attributed 
to quantifiable factors in the macro environment/^ White relied on 
data from the private-sector, pubhcly quoted firms only/® Since 
White’s data base excluded the size of private hmited company 
assets, be postulated them by using indicators for scale, such as the 
number of spindles and looms used by other firms in the same 
industry/^ The analysis in this study, uses actual data on private 
[and pubhc hmited companies] of the business groups.
In another study on Pakistan’s industrial policy and its affects on 
business investment, Haq focused on industrial growth propelled by 
pubhc policy.^ ® He measured industrial growth using GNP as its
^^See R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960- 
1970, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 3 and 47-54 and L. J. White, Industrial 
Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan, Princeton, 1974, pp. 
175-84.
^®Growtb has usuahy been measured against criteria such as an 
increase in corporate size through diversification or backward and 
forward integration of functions, mergers and buyouts, a decrease in 
per unit cost, reduction in resource wastage or the causes for 
underutilisation of capacity. See A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, 
Harvard, 1990, p. 9, where be assigns organisational expansion from 
technological and organisational innovations and managerial 
hierarchies.
^®See L. J. White, Industrial Concentration, Princeton, 1974.
^^See L.J. White, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power 
in Pakistan, Princeton, 1974, p. 185.
^®Discussed in further detail in M. Haq, The Poverty Curtain, 
Columbia, 1976, pp. 88-95.
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main indicator. Therefore, his study aligned organisational success 
to causal factors in the exogenous environment. The key macro- 
economic factors influencing investment identified by Haq, were 
business confidence, expected rate of return on investment, 
availabihty of finance, labour supply, economic policies, political 
upheavals, level of foreign aid and related earnings, choice of 
technology, capital-output ratios, idle machine capacity and surplus 
labour and effective demand or capital formation in the economy. 
Haq assumed that a mix of such exogenous incentives provided the 
necessary and sufifident conditions for sustained industrial growth. 
His model neglected to address the detail, that such factors were not 
sufficient conditions for sustained business development in the long­
term. At this juncture, where Haq’s concluded his analysis, it is the 
application of appropriate managerial pohcies that sustain long-term 
business development after the impetus to early organisational 
growth provided by the environment suggested by him become 
redundant.
Altaf, in his study on Pakistani entrepreneurs, argued that 
successful businesses were those whose pioneers henefitted from the 
fiscal and monetary incentives conferred on them by the State, 
through import duty concessions on raw materials and access to
^®See M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, 
p. 58-66.
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discounted finance.^® Altaf s study provided an analysis of these 
business firms through gauging their performance in a given macro- 
economic environment and conducive business-govemment 
r e l a t i o n s . H e  assigned success factors for entrepreneurs, as 
emanating from their accessibihty to senior bureaucrats, who in turn 
had the power to oblige them on a reciprocal basis for favours. Altaf 
supported the view that the entrepreneurs’ risk depended on whether 
their pohtical views coincided favourably with those of the ruling 
regime. A favourable disposition provided currency for the issue of 
obtaining import licences, especially in times when their allocation 
was based on a partisan criterion. Altafs study on Pakistani 
business enterprise omitted an analysis of qualitative factors, such 
as effective or ineffective management practices which also affected 
the firm’s profitabihty and market share, independent of the macro- 
economic environment and financial climate in which it operated. 
Altaf dismissed all other risk factors faced by the entrepreneur as 
insignificant for business development, in that adversity could be 
overcome through the businessmens’ political leverage. That is, the 
greater was the entrepreneurs’ agility at manoeuvring bureaucratic 
bottlenecks, the higher were their chances of becoming beneficiaries
^°See Z. Altaf, Pakistani Entrepreneurs, Croom Helm, 1983, pp. 
24-25 and 30-35.
^^For an account of business-govemment relations, see Z. Altaf, 
Entrepreneurship in the Third World, Croom Helm, 1988, pp. 53-61.
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of State-sponsored industrialisation.^^ Our disagreement is not with 
Altafs correlation of State largesse encouraging business house 
investment, rather we argue that there were other equally compelhng 
factors which affected business development in the long-term.
Altafs research on the growth of firms in Pakistan has also 
apportioned the blame for their decline on Prime Minister Bhutto’s 
nationalisation policy of 1972.^  ^ Ten categories of large scale 
industry were nationalised, under the Economic Reform Order 
1972.^  ^ By assigning the blame to nationahsation alone, he omitted 
to analyse the contributory factors emitting firom weak management 
and control functions, regardless of nationalisation (ownership) or the
^^See Z. Altaf, Entrepreneurship in the Third World, Croom Helm, 
1988, pp. 198-99, where he assigns entrepreneurial success to the 
inroads made to the sources of credit used for project sanctioning and 
debt financing. These sources included government-sponsored, 
development finance institutions and commercial banks.
^^This is addressed in Z. Altaf, Pakistani Entrepreneurs, Croom 
Helm, 1983, p. 64.
^^ A study by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Taken-over 
Industries and the Need for Denationalisation, The Chamber of 
Commerce, 1979, pp. 20-44, lists ten holding corporations that were 
formed, cumulatively representing ten major industries of Pakistan. 
These holding companies were the Federal Light Engineering 
Corporation, for steel and engineering companies; Federal Chemicals 
and Ceramics Corporation; State Cement Corporation of Pakistan; 
Pakistan Automobile Corporation [which included farm equipment 
projects]; Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, [for 
industries which were not assigned to any of the other group] ; 
Pakistan Fertiliser Corporation Limited, [incorporating all pubhc 
sector fertiliser units]; Oil and Gas Units; State Heavy Engineering; 
Vegetable Ghee Industry, [for control of supplies, production and 
distribution of edible oils] and Shipping.
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political environment in which the businesses operated. Altaf ahgned 
the public-sector’s industrial performance with recurring 
inefficiencies because he argued that the public-sector could be not 
be efficient per He presented this as a vicious circle which 
reinforced itself perpetually. Further light on the myth of 
nationalisation disrupting private investment in Pakistan was 
provided by the fact that the growth rate dechned p r io r  to the 1972 
nationalisation decision by Prime Minister B h u t t o . T h e  annual 
compound manufacturing growth rate in 1965-70 decreased to 7.7 
percent, from an earlier high of 16.2 percent in 1960-64, which was 
mainly caused by a slowing down of investments forthcoming from 
private-sector initiative.^^ Since this decline was prior to 
nationalisation, it cannot be dismissed as the sole factor contributing 
to a dechne in industrial output. It also leaves room open for further 
research to test the hypothesis that nationalised industries can be 
efficient if they follow the basic principles of the Systems Approach 
and adopt its attendant managerial rigour. Hence, macro-economic
^^See Z. Altaf, Entrepreneurship in the Third Worlds Croom Helm, 
1988, pp. 56 and 84. For proponents of public enterprise as being 
efficient (given conducive management policies), see M. Ayub and S. 
Hegstad, ‘Public Industrial Enterprises, Determinants of 
Performance’, The World Bank, Industry and Finance Volume 17, 
1986, p. 5.
^®See D. Singhal, Pakistan, Princeton, 1972, p. 132.
^^Source: R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan 
1960-1970, Cambridge, 1982, p. 22; R.M.U. Suleman, ‘Manufacturing 
Industry Public and Private’, Pakistan and Gulf Economist, 
February, 25, 1978, p. 24 and the Economic Survey, various issues.
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indicators from 1965 to the pre-nationalisation period of 1970 to 
1971, point towards declining private investment when there was no 
imminent threat of the government’s take over of major industries.^®
In the 1980s, when General Zia introduced economic and fiscal 
measures to encourage forthcoming investments by privately owned 
capital, exports in chemicals, metals, electrical and non electrical 
machinery and transport equipment still registered an insignificant 
rise or absolute decrease compared with 1976 figures.^® This 
indicated that irrespective of ownership mostly vested in the private- 
sector (Zia’s industrial policy) or in the pubhc-sector (Bhutto’s 
industrial policy), private investment was impaired due to the 
omission of other factors which affected organisational performance. 
We argue that this factor is the internal management function in the 
organisation, and the Systems Approach its basic vehicle which 
directs effective strategy formulation.
Gerschenkron argued that in the initial stages of industrialisation, 
developing countries showed sudden spurts of growth by accessing 
sophisticated technology.®® There was an emphasis on 
manufacturing producer goods and a tendency for a centralised
S ource: R.M.U. Suleman, ‘Manufacturing Industry Public and 
Private’, Pakistan and Gulf Economist^ February, 25, 1978, p. 24.
®®This is presented in W. James, et al, Asian Development: 
Economic Success and Policy Lessons, Wisconsin, 1987, p. 60.
®®See A. Gerschenkron, pp. 357-58.
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structure of information dissemination. Wealth was preserved in the 
private-sector mainly through privileged access to government- 
sponsored financial institutions and financial benefits accrued from 
corrupt practices. Gerschenkron provided justification for State 
intervention based on technological and institutional factors.^^ 
State intervention was seen as a short-cut to industrialisation, and 
exploited by policy makers through the tools made available to them. 
Gerschenkron suggested that the later a country embarked on its 
development programme, the larger was the required savings base 
to feed it; and initially this could only be administered by State-led 
industrial financing and that stable economies could be pre­
industrial, with economic tensions rising as spurts of 
industrialisation occurred. He also suggested that less developed 
countries experienced growth in sudden spurts, only to return to a 
low again. He assigned this phenomenon to these countries opting, 
a t a point in time for the most sophisticated machinery available, 
leading to temporary growth, whereas their weak infrastructure 
could not support sustained growth over a longer period of time. 
Gerschenkron’s study also supported the view that injection of capital 
was a necessary condition to reduce idle machine capacity in the 
earlier stages of the firm’s growth. However, it was not a sufficient 
condition for sustained (transition) and growth, and successive 
injections of capital alone would be required in ever increasing
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quantities to maintain earlier levels of output.^^ His analysis on the 
mode of industrialisation adopted by developing nations in the effort 
to industrialise, was limited by the pre-conditions he imposed. Even 
if earlier levels of output were maintained by increased injections of 
capital, industrial development would remain retarded in long-term, 
if the endogenous input from effective management practices was not 
forthcoming. Given the merits of interventionist theory, this study 
steers away from it and focuses on the internal management 
function, and how its application in a given context, helps in 
contributing to our understanding of long-term business house 
investment in Pakistan.
Rostow’s stages of economic growth which began from the 
commodity producing sector, to secondary sectors, and the take-off 
stage of industrialisation provided one explanation of 
industrialisation through causal factors in the exogenous 
environment. He theorised that these stages followed a pre­
determined and sequential pattern of events.^^ Rostow’s view of
^^The prerequisites for development, presented by A. 
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, Harvard, 1966, were 
critically evaluated, once his path-breaking analysis on 
industrialisation had saturated economic thought in an historical 
context. This critique is given in, R. Sylla and G. Toniolo, 
introduction: Patterns of European Industrialisation During the 
Nineteenth Century’, in R. Sylla and G. Toniolo, (eds.). Patterns of 
European Industrialisation, Routledge, 1991, pp. 12-17.
^^See W. Rostow’s, The Stages of Economic Growth, 3rd. ed., 
Cambridge, 1990, pp. 4-9, for the prerequisites of the stages of 
growth and for how one stage of industrialisation precedes and 
merges into the next, see pp. 7-13. Also see A. Gerschenkron,
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encapsulating industrialisation into predetermined stages appeared 
simplistic and deterministic.^^ The time factor which delineates 
when an economy is ready to graduate to its next stage of 
industrialisation seems a convenient yardstick which planners and 
economists adopt in order to predict and satisfy political rhetoric. 
Rostow emphasised the macro-economic ‘when’ factors to invest, such 
as rate of capital backing and the level of savings as a percentage of 
GNP at a point in time.^ ® His argument on how to increase 
investment did not take into account how these preconditions could 
be met in an institutional setting, which is what this research 
attempts to address. Institutional factors affecting performance are 
the internal organisation functions, such as the training of personnel, 
institution building, and developing an effective communications 
system within the operating framework of the business. In doing so 
the managers first use the scientific, inductive form of reasoning as 
the methodology to collect data within the cells of the organisation, 
and then arrive at the generahst’s deductive approach to identify
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective^ Harvard, 1966, p. 
15.
critique of W. Rostow’s simplistic and deterministic approach 
at locating a stage in the economic growth of a nation, is available in, 
R. Sylla and G. Toniolo, op cit, (eds.), Patterns of European 
Industrialisation, Routledge, 1991, p. 4.
^®ln the political economy context, W. Rostow, The Stages of 
Economic Growth, Cambridge, 1990, p. 26, provide the predetermined 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the take-off of industry; pp. 9 
and 20, provide his macro-economic indicators of the nation’s position 
in its endeavour to industrialise.
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overall organisational problems which the manager has to redress. 
The solution to a problem may well lie in rectifying a different cell of 
the organisation. This decision making process updates managers’ 
knowledge through a closed loop system of assessment, which is 
applicable to even dramatically different business situations. That 
is why deductive reasoning enables the managers to grasp the form 
of the problem as a solution finding exercise in order to transmit the 
pervasive lessons leam t from one exercise, applied for solving other 
problems as and when they arise within the organisation. One-off 
exercises requiring immediate remedial solutions are those which fall 
in the domain of subject specialists, such as economists, technicians 
and engineers, which are not within the broad methodological 
framework of the Systems Approach.
Measures adopted to improve the management function form our 
prerequisites for continued quality and expansion of output in all 
functional areas of the enterprise. Such prerequisites include the 
correct choice and apphcation of technology, evolved through research 
and development activities within the firm and their linkages with 
other operating units. For example, such endogenous applications 
can reduce the production department’s dependence on labour, by 
reducing the time required for the processing of raw materials 
through better production scheduling. The control and execution of 
the management function is regarded as the most critical 
prerequisite for business development. For example, managers who
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linked the effects of organised and researched technology adoption 
with the larger interests of long-term development, made the 
transition as trades to light engineering goods producers. This 
argument finds its merit in the case studies which follow from 
Chapters Three to Chapter Six.
As Chandler argued, industrial growth was a function of both 
organisational and technological innovations^® within the business 
enterprise.®^ He also described modern businesses as having 
distinct operating units managed by salaried managers which 
provided a framework®® of the organisational strategy of US firms 
in the late nineteenth century. Chandler’s study also evaluated the 
effects of restructuring of departments on improved communication 
and control functions, by the increased reliance placed on the 
updating of accounting methods and a more precise definition of the 
duties of senior, middle and lower management. In achieving such 
objectives, salaried managers coordinated and monitored the 
production and distribution of goods more effectively and enabled
®®In his work on performance evaluation, capital budgets and 
financial forecasts in US firms, see A. Chandler, The Visible Hand, 
Harvard, 1977, p. 415. For US firms commencing operations from 
the late nineteenth century to pre-World War 1, they used the Return 
on Capital Investment (KOI) gauge as the norm to evaluate 
performance of the enterprise.
®^ For an account of these innovations, see A. Chandler, The 
Visible Hand, Harvard, 1977, pp. 80 and 240-44.
®®The success of the modem business enterprise and the zest for 
market share in the US is discussed in A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, 
Harvard, 1990, pp. 8-9.
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better utilisation of the company’s resources. Efficiency-oriented 
management practices included an effective communications network 
established within the firm or within a group of firms, to assist in 
monitoring and control of both employee and output performance. 
Chandler’s theory on the prerequisites for the growth of the 'modem 
business enterprise’ focused on distinct operating units managed by 
a hierarchy of managers However he neglected to assess some of 
the underlying reasons which contributed to the (initial), successful 
growth of these corporations, which included the privileged access to 
and ownership of relatively inexpensive sources of raw material from 
the firms’ overseas operations. However, Lieberman and 
Montgomery describe the privileges conferred on first-mover 
industries by virtue of the management’s foresight in accessing 
resources ahead of other contestants in the same i n d u s t r y T h e y  
also explain that first movers in industry may be disadvantaged by 
second mover, fi*ee rider contestants who benefit from not 
experiencing the teething problems of their predecessors.^^
As political and social isolation set the pace for a breakdown in 
lines of communication and common interests between the State and
^^The prerequisites for the formation of the ‘modem business 
enterprise’ are available in A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 
1990, pp. 18, 20, and 36-38.
^"See M. Lieberman and D. Montgomery, ‘First Mover 
Advantages’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, 1980, pp. 41-58.
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elite Pakistani entrepreneurs, those business leaders who had 
invested in organisation systems and procedures (whether consciously 
or unconsciously), found that their investments in the long-term paid 
off. At this juncture, systematic methods of organising their business 
became their insurance against the withdrawal of exogenous 
propellants to growth, a strategy which gave the Crescent and 
Ghulam Faruque Groups an edge over the Wazir Ali and Dawood 
Groups, where the focus remained on finding short-cuts to empire 
building.
1.3 The Approach Used in This Study
The observations which contribute to our understanding of 
business group transition, are the dynamic factors affecting the 
managing of organisations, since the static or stable factors, being 
deterministic cannot not account for entrepreneurial changes in a 
dynamic setting.^^ The dynamic approach accounts for the business 
strategy adopted by managers, which was a response to the 
endogenous factors affecting business development. This response 
(within a dynamic framework), entails a constant re-evaluation of 
objectives which have outlived their use, by using the Systems 
Approach to improve the quality of future decision. This re- 
evaluation process, wherever it was evident, changed the direction of 
business house investment. Such an approach is also in harmony
^^For static and dynamic approaches, see H. Mintzberg, The 
Structuring of Organisations, Prentice Hall, 1979, p. 286.
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with the ‘new economic’ and business history approach, to the extent 
that it integrates a specific theory to the latest research on company 
histories, so as to better understand more current organisational 
p r o b l e m s . T h e  more traditional approach used by historians 
emphasised the political, legal and social environment within which 
economic decisions were made. This study also draws what is useful 
from the traditional approach and combines these two approaches to 
provide an explanation of the structure of management decision­
making which led to the transition. This approach also extends 
human reasoning, just as digital computers extend the abihty to 
calculate. In dynamic models the time factor is important, such as
'^ ^The debate on the ‘traditional’ as against the ‘new economic 
[business] history’ approach, specifically, the role of institutions, are 
available in the literature; see D. North, et al, Growth Welfare in the 
American Past: A  New Economic History, 3rd. ed., Prentice Hall, 
1983 and in R. Ransom, et al, (eds.). Explorations in the New 
Economic History, Academic Press, 1982. The ‘evolutionary theory’ 
proposed by R. Nelson and S. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change, Belknap, Harvard, 1982, pp. 4-17, provides an 
alternate explanation of firms’ ability to survive and grow in the 
long-term, by responding to dynamic processes and by veering away 
from what conventional economic theory provides from formal 
theorising and using abstract concepts. D. Raff and P. Temin, 
‘Business History and Recent Economic Theory: Imperfect
Information, Incentives, and the Internal Organisation of Firms’, in 
P. Temin, (ed.). Inside the Business Enterprise, Chicago, 1991, pp. 7- 
35, suggests that business historians can make a more meaningful 
contribution to an understanding of the economics of industry, by 
revealing the costs of information retreival, information which is 
required to gain [greater] control over product markets. J. Yates, 
Control Through Communication, John Hopkins, 1989, explores the 
internal organsational channels of communication adopted by 
American giants such as Dupont and the Illinois Central Railroad in 
exercising control in the work place. Literature on Management 
Information Systems, its origins and usage is given in, H. Osterle, et 
al. Total Information Systems Management, John Wiley, 1993.
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in asking the (right) question whether the organisation should go in 
for higher production capacity now or after a few years. Dynamic 
principles also are adaptive since they draw connections in the 
system from more than one instance of occurrence (the Systems 
Approach), as against static principles where connections within the 
system are limited to one given instance of observation. A statically- 
oriented management structure can exchange with relatively less 
effort its small store of knowledge, but a larger build up of 
information handhng through a daily flood of communication will 
need changing methods to remain efficient. The measure the 
effectiveness of past decisions in an organisation requires a 
decentralised structure, where there is training and the absence of 
conflicting precedents in resolving problems for similar cases or 
frequent change of plans in the reporting structure. In addition, 
there should be a clear dehneation between staff and line functions, 
taking cognisance of both the sins of omission and commission, and 
in not having a punitive approach to the control function by showing 
flexibility to dissenting opinions, all of which leads to problem solving 
through the tenets of the Systems Approach.
The approach used in this study, to evaluate the causal factors 
within the endogenous environment which influenced business group 
transition, is both institutional and empirical. Being an applied 
study, one can hope to assess the proximate causes of corporate 
transition and development, for example, by examining the
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entrepreneurs’ power and influence as a contingency factor 
influencing transition in the short-term, and organisational systems 
and methods, here expressed in the methodology of the Systems 
Approach, influencing transition in the long-term. This thesis is 
source-driven and presents the organisation as a heuristic tool in 
explaining the phenomena of an increase in industrial assets^ 
through forward and backward integration by acquiring distribution 
networks and sources of raw material, updating of technology, 
application of systems and procedures, and an effective information 
retrieval and dissemination system, all of which generate endogenous 
organisational conditions conducive for long-term expansion. By also 
including source-driven, company specific studies to draw our 
generahsations, this study contributes to an understanding of the 
patterns of business development using a theoretical framework 
which has universal applicability to solving organisational 
problems.^® We have attempted to advocate case-specific
^^Industrial assets were used as an indicator of business group 
expansion in preference to using other indictors, such as an increase 
in sales or the rate of return of capital or investments. An increase 
in sales may not accurately reflect an increase when comparing a 
business group where its manufacturing unit is integrated, over 
another group which has separately registered companies selling 
their raw material to other companies within the group. The rate of 
return on investment may also not be a good indicator of performance 
because Pakistani industries were given protection through accessing 
discounted foreign exchange and raw materials.
^®The need for a sound theoretical framework preceding any 
analysis on individual company histories is reiterated in C. Harvey 
(ed.). Business History: Concepts and Measurements, Frank Cass, 
1989, p. 3.
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conclusions,'^® which can be reiterated in a different business 
environment through drawing together the strategy adopted by 
managers in different (comparative) groups and in the same 
industrial sectors, in a more meaningful manner/^ This is achieved 
by devising an approach which generates the elements of better 
organisational management regardless of ownership structures, scale, 
[industry] or the country-specific environment in which the business 
groups operated.^®
At first glance, the investment portfolio of the groups studied, 
appears to be the product of the institutional setting driven by 
factors in the exogenous environment. Upon closer observation of 
empirical data, howver a different setting emerges, its causes 
inherent in the management practices which shaped the business 
groups’ corporate history in the long-term. The exogenous, 
institutional settings were similar to those found in other developing
'^^Business history’s contribution to concept-building in an 
organisational situation, through empirical case study analysis is 
discussed in T. Gourvish, ‘Business History: in Defence of the 
Empirical Approach’, Accounting, Business and Financial History, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1995, pp. 3-16, (forthcoming).
^^The more recent literature on the constructs of the ‘new 
business history’ approach is discussed in S. Nicholas, ‘Locational 
Choice, Performance and the Growth of British Multinational Firms’, 
in C. Harvey, (ed.). Business History Concepts and Measurements, 
Frank Cass, 1989, pp. 122-123.
^®This approach incorporates the prerequisites which are the 
precursors to A. Chandler’s managerial hierarchies which engendered 
better coordination and control of functions in large-scale US 
businesses, [in Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, pp. 85 and 249].
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countries as were the consequences of adopting (or not adopting) 
systems and methods to expand the businesses. Since performance 
is difficult to measure, we rely on tools provided by management 
science, in particular the tenets of the Systems Approach, to 
highlight the value of adopting systems and methods in gaining 
maturity in business house investments, because management 
practices shape business development in the long-term. Initially, 
private investment in Pakistan was nurtured by State largesse 
directed at key industriahsts. Over time, management practices 
superseded the direction provided by the initial impetus given to 
industry from State largesse. It was then that differing investment 
patterns emerged, which either represented stagnation or expansion, 
depending on the management philosophy practised by the 
entrepreneurs.
The existing literature on management theory and the tools used 
by managers to sustain or expand businesses, mostly restate what 
was already proposed by the Systems Approach theory in the 1960s 
on the (endogenous) causal factors for business success.'^  ^ More 
recent studies on the causes of growth in business enterprise as
^Slee G. Hamel and C. Prahalad, Competing For the Future, 
Harvard, 1994; M. Hammer and J. Champy, Re-engineering the 
Corporation, A  Manifesto for Business Revolution, Nicholas Brealey, 
1993; P. Drucker, Managing For The Future, Butterworth-Heinmann, 
1992; M. Porter, Competitive Advantage, Creating and Sustaining 
Superior Performance, The Free Press, 1985 and M. Porter, 
Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and 
Competitors, The Free Press, 1980.
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proposed by Hammer and Champy, Porter, Drucker and Hamel and 
Prahalad are restatements of what was already proposed in the 
Systems Approach theory. They champion the causal factors (some 
presented as one-off factors and others as a theory) for successful 
businesses. Their respective study of corporate strategy has either 
built upon parts of what was already addressed in the tenets of the 
Systems Approach theory of the 1960s or have only ‘one off causal 
factors which propel organisational growth. For example. Porter®  ^
outlines generic strategies that different firms must choose to ensure 
their success. However, inspite of choosing the term ‘generic’, to 
define a management strategy, he then argues that strategies need 
to be changed with changing industrial structures. Therefore his 
strategy does not lend itself to one which has universal applicability. 
This quality of universal applicability is inherent in the management 
strategy proposed by the Systems Approach, whose tenets (look at 
the form of the problem) does not change with a change in industrial 
structures. Drucker’s study addresses the need for managers to 
adapt to change as a means to produce results, a change which he 
defines as derived from raising new questions (management by 
objectives) regarding problems of accountability, which economists 
cannot diagnose. His approach identifies itself with the behavioural 
school of management where output is maximised. This issue for 
managers to prepare for solving (ever changing) business problems
®°See M. Porter, Competitive Strategy, The Free Press, 1980.
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by asking new questions, is [already] addressed in the Systems 
Approach methodology. Specific parts of Systems Approach theory 
are also restated by Hamel and Prahalad [in the most recent 
literature on management] in their argument tha t business
expansion is dependent on managerial vision for future market 
needs. The Systems Approach theory has already proposed that 
managers should look at the generality of a problem so that their 
diagnosis of a current problem is applicable [iterative] to solving 
[other unknown] problems which may arise in the future. The 
management theory of‘business process re-engineering’, is described 
by Hammer and Champy as a tool for meeting the challenges of 
large-scale businesses. They argue that businesses need to reinvent 
their work procedures in order to cope with growing competition, by 
throwing away old procedures for new and by abandoning all that is 
outdated. They define ‘re-engineering’ as the ‘fundamental 
rethinking and radical design of business processes to achieve 
dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of 
performance’.^  ^ This approach of discarding outmoded procedures 
for new, is already part of the tenets of the Systems Approach theory, 
as explained in Chapters One and Two of this study. Broader generic
Hamel and C. Prahalad, Competing For the Future, Harvard, 
1994, and ‘Strategy as Stretch and Leverage’, Harvard Business 
Review, March-April, 1993, pp. 75-87.
^%ee M. Hammer and J. Champy, Re-engineering the 
Corporation, A  Manifesto for Business Revolution, Nicholas Brealey, 
1993, p. 32.
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organisational strategies are given in Chandler,®^ and in a more 
recent study by Porter.®"^  Chandler advocates the three-pronged 
approach to industrial growth and Porter supports that more 
forward-looking and dynamic industries were the ones which became 
more competitive. Porter advocates that a nation’s competitive edge 
comes from a mix of four factors, that is, the efficiency with which 
natural factors are deployed, the quality consciousness of the 
domestic market, the availabihty of supplier industries and the level 
of domestic competition.®^ Wherever recent studies deviate from 
what was already proposed in the Systems Approach theory, they 
align business success to causal factors in the macro environment or 
in the global conditions which permitted industries to operate or close 
down. These global conditions or constraints cannot lend themselves 
to a management theory which proposes universally applicable 
principles of effective management, regardless of the global or 
economic environment in which businesses operate. The universally 
applicable principles of effective management are proposed in the 
Systems Approach literature.®® This approach evaluates the
®®See A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990.
®^ See M. Porter, The Competitive Advantage o f Nations, The Free 
Press, 1990 and ‘Why Nations Win’, World Executive Digest, January 
1991, pp. 18-23.
^^Ihid,
®®The tenets of the Systems Approach are explained in, P. 
Schoderbek, {ed.). Management Systems, John Wiley, 1967; S. Optner, 
(ed.). Systems Analysis, Penguin, 1973; E. Warren, Long-Range
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managers’ role in relation to their reliance on internally generated 
information used for better decision-making. With information flows 
and systematic recording of transactions such decisions can then be 
made on the basis of quantifiable knowledge. A closed loop system 
of accountabihty ensures that departments can be identified by origin 
of information and senior management can allocate costs and make 
individuals accountable for their actions. The quality of past 
decision-making can be useful in limiting the uncertainty inherent in 
future decisions. Predictability of results calls for standardisation of 
skills which can be replicated in individual situations. This approach 
improves the manager’s proficiency in tackhng controversial 
organisational issues related to both employees and their functional 
responsibilities within the firm. At all levels within the firm, the 
emphasis on documented and systematised procedure of information 
accelerates effective managerial decision-making. Information being 
the key to timely and accurate decisions leads to effective managerial 
decision-making, especially when external and internal adversaries 
to development exist. Accurate information generated on a daily, 
monthly and annual basis is also a perquisite for the exercise of 
control. Effective management practices estabhsh linkages between 
the functional areas of the firm, such as production, marketing.
Planning, Prentice Hall, 1966; R. Ackofif and P. Rivett, A Managers 
Guide to Operations Research, John Wiley, 1963; R. Johnson, et al. 
The Theory and Management of Systems, 3rd. ed., McGraw Hill 
Kogakushu, 1973, and V. Hare, Systems Analysis: A  Diagnostic 
Approach, Brace and World, 1967.
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finance, sales, research and development and a computerised 
communications network so as to generate better control and 
management of information flows.
This research evaluates Pakistani business history with its own 
business structures presented as a model in the explanation of how 
consistent growth was maintained at a pace conducive to investments 
in the light engineering sector through adopting organisation 
systems. Businesses in the private-sector which were aborted by 
nationalisation are not included in this study. For those groups 
which continued to remain operational after nationahsation, a 
comparative study of their organisational systems is conducted. We 
determine whether the adoption of an effective management system 
was responsible for assisting the groups’ development in the long- 
run, in an economic environment which was initially encouraging and 
then inhospitable towards private enterprise. The transition made 
is evaluated irrespective of the political regime or the ownership 
structure of the industries on which this study is based. This thesis 
also attempts to show that any divergence away from adopting 
organisational systems, was a cause for a decline in business group 
investment in the long-term. For business group investment which 
continued across political regimes, this thesis rejects nationalisation 
as the first, most significant or sole cause for a declining investment 
portfolio. It identifies other (endogenous) causes of decline existing 
from the groups’ inception, which when rectified, whether prior to or
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after nationalisation, prevented further entrenchment of 
organisational malaise. These causes will include the significance of 
effective management, (or the lack thereof) in determining size and 
transition of these groups in the long-run. It is argued that in the 
long-term, business group expansion was not a function of factors in 
the exogenous environment, rather on investments made in 
endogenous systems and procedures which rescued it in times of 
a d v e r s i t y I n  certain instances, the ease^ ® with which some 
industrial enterprises were purchased by influential businessmen 
diverted them from later developing internally generated systems 
and procedures. Wherever such internal systems were adopted, the 
group was able to overcome obstacles to its own self-perpetuating 
growth. Where internal organisational systems were compromised 
by relying solely on exogenous factors in the run for the acquisition 
of net assets, such a strategy could not enable the transition to 
manufacturing light engineering goods in the long-term.®®
®^ See A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, pp. 144,147- 
49, where he identifies factors which led to the expansion of US 
businesses in the nineteenth century. From amongst them, three are 
given special emphasis: the organisation’s expansion emanating from 
organisational and technological innovations, and investment in 
management hierarchies.
®®See documented and quantified data in a study of the PIDC, 
‘The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation’, unpublished 
report, PIDC, 1989, p. 46.
®®See Chapters Three to Six, pp. 164-467.
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1.4 Research Issues and Methodology
The four groups studied provide a comparative analysis of business 
group expansion, initially propelled by factors in the exogenous 
environment (accessible to all) and from which all groups benefitted 
initially. Differences in business group investment patterns arose as 
a consequence of managers’ ability to react and adapt to changes 
which accompanied the initial surge. By the late 1960s, the 
exogenous environment became less significant as a contributory 
factor explaining business development. By not adopting internal 
organisational factors, it led to a reduction in light engineering 
investment in two of the business groups studied. However, the 
other two groups demonstrated expansion into the light engineering 
sector, through adopting a strategy directed at diversification and 
consolidation, which was maintained by its owners till the close of 
1988. We evaluate the proposition that the groups’ foray into the 
light engineering sector was a function of better managed 
organisation systems.
This study uses two types of measures. The first set of measures 
gauge the ingredients of an effective internal organisational system, 
which range from definition of objectives, the process by which they 
are achieved, and the validity of the rationale used to evaluate their 
effectiveness. The second measure gauges the transition from 
trading to light engineering manufacturing, which is a function of 
adopting the first set of measures. In businesses there are no right
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or wrong formulae for defining effective control, and precision for its 
own sake can generate uneconomical costs. Therefore we have 
chosen selected non-mathematical (qualitative) measures which can 
be conveniently gauged in a business environment. The first set of 
measures can be fitted into standard procedures of empirical testing 
(and are not proxies for any other model). This research will not use 
models; rather it relies on information gathered in an operational 
situation. In doing so, the conclusions veer towards generality, by 
trading-off more precision which can be achieved under controlled 
conditions but where solutions can apply to only that one situation. 
Since such precision generates one-off solutions only, hence the need 
to apply a methodology which generates conclusions with universal 
applicability, as are found in the tenets of the Systems Approach. 
Models manipulated by mathematical techniques such as linear 
programming, simulation and game theory do not address the 
philosophical issues in choosing appropriate criteria for improving 
overall organisational performance. Models also cannot be applied 
to complex systems as a whole because of the limitations inherent in 
them. They are mainly useful as tools to solve, rather than to 
identify and analyse problems.®  ^ Also, models in business situations 
are neither true nor false, rather they can either be useful or not
% ee  A. Moravec, ‘Basic Concepts for Designing a Fundamental 
Information System’, in P. Schoderbek, (ed.). Management Systems, 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967, p. 127.
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useful for making predictions in certain situations.®^ The Systems 
Approach-based methodology encourages discovery of new facts in the 
organisation rather than measurement of existing techniques. In any 
case a mathematical model cannot be a substitute for intuitive 
thought and since mangers are dealing with the human factor, the 
intuitive element or that learnt from experience cannot be 
underrated. In the Systems Approach, the workability of quahtative 
models is tested by incorporating the correct facts and the 
interchanging of parameters to see if they produce consistent results, 
rather than in just using a model per se. Managerial activity leading 
to options based on the correct choice, is the Systems Approach itself 
which is a broad and universal problem solving methodology 
addressing many variables affecting organisational performance, 
which generate alternative course of action which can then be 
adopted. The solutions provided by the Systems Approach lie in its 
ideas, approach and constructs rather than in formal mathematical 
apparatus. This normative approach explains how many sets of 
conditions (a system) affect a given case. It does not explain how in 
any one case you can change variables to generate an isolated and 
solitary conclusion. Development and conservation of a universal 
strategy relies on the problem solving methodology of the Systems 
Approach. The problem and its methodology produce a synergistic
®^A critique of models in business is in P. Schoderbek [in the 
preamble to the following section], in P. Schoderbek, (ed.), 
Management Systems, John Wiley, 1967, p. 325.
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condition with one catalysing the other to evolve and develop.
Endogenous factors influencing business group transition include 
measurable resources, such as man hours, money and equipment, to 
the more intangible organisational assets, such as education, 
training, skills and goodwill. It is the latter group of resources that 
constitute the form of the problems addressed in the Systems 
Approach rather than the content of problems. It was the 
management scientist who introduced to this approach the 
importance of the application of intangible resources (qualitative 
criteria) which influenced performance as much as their counterparts 
in measurable assets (mathematical models) in generating blue­
prints for long-term business expansion. The analytical nature of the 
Systems Approach involves viewing the organisation a t different 
levels to objectively evaluate change. In the West, management 
practices of the 1950s addressed manually operated systems when 
the scale of operations was limited and owner-managers did not 
favour delegation of their responsibilities. Such systems were 
localised’ and tended to generate batch information (procedures) 
relevant for a particular transaction only. Procedures are a series of 
clerical operations, reviewed manually when the scale of operations 
was small which only worked up to a point after which an increase 
in the scale of businesses warranted upgrading of management 
techniques because the division of managerial functions could not be 
administered single-handedly by the owner manager. Mechanisation
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of production led to a division of manual and managerial labour, so 
the need for functional managers arose. These managers then had 
to deal with a new class of problems, not hmited to a single 
discipline. The functional managers put into practice the review of 
performance variables against their action-oriented objectives in 
order to evaluate the results. They did this through the use of 
cybernetics®^ as a tool to ensure timely arrival of information. 
Performance variables which are part of the Systems Approach 
methodology include the training and education of personnel and 
continuous research and development (R&D) of hardware 
facihties.®® The economic benefits which accrue to the organisation 
from such applications, include more efficient production scheduhng 
and tighter materials control, decreased origination costs by 
recording payroll and labour distribution transactions, increased 
sales through better management of inventory, more profitable use 
of computer time and availability of more current information 
through the initiation of queries, development of speciahsed functions
®^ This phrase was coined by Norbert Winer, 1961 to ‘... describe 
the process for maintaining systems stability in electrical circuits, 
and later expanded to the more general phenomenon of control and 
communications in ‘animal and machine’ ’, cited from W. Mitchel, 
‘Relevant Neoscientific Management Notions’, in S. Optner, (ed.). 
Systems Analysis, Penguin, 1973, p. 318.
®®A review of performance variables are in J. Woodward, 
Industrial Organisation, Theory and Practice, Oxford, 1965, pp. 185- 
241, describing contingency factors which identify relationships 
emerging from differing organisation structures, such as small firms 
having standard structures.
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within the firm ranging from a distribution network, to raw 
materials supply, keeping ahreast of the accompanying technology 
adoption and upgrading of machines in a changing environment, 
systems technology, expansion in production functions, market share, 
size and the formation of managerial hierarchies®^ in the business 
group. The adoption of internal organisational systems generates a 
more efficiently managed organisation paving the way for graduated 
development of its investments in the long-term.®® These inputs for 
developing qualitative measures to improve organisational 
performance are elaborated below:
1. The profile of confirmed employees in a firm, to the number of 
probationary, contract and/or unconfirmed employees. The greater 
this ratio, the lesser the outflows accruing to the firm in payments 
such as, leave, medical, gratuity and provident fund emoluments. 
However a larger share of confirmed employees makes it incumbent 
on the employer to invest in their training which leads to 
standardisation of skills and creates professional managers. A 
system should be arranged to provide rewards for appropriate
®^ The debate on nineteenth century US companies and the 
formation of managerial hierarchies which generated the mass 
production and distribution of goods is given in, A. Chandler, Scale 
and Scope, Harvard, 1990, pp. 85 and 249.
®®These factors are the measures for effective management 
practices influencing long-term growth.
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behaviour based on unequivocal cues®® in harmony with existing 
company norms. In this study the related issues investigated will 
include the incidence (or lack of) training as a reflection of quahtative 
shift in the organisation; information flows which are the nervous 
system of the organisation; harnessing of technology as a condition 
for the management of change; the relationship between results and 
the structure of the organisation (emanating from the function of 
control and execution of decisions).
2. Whether the group’s monopoly power disguised inherent 
inefticiencies or distorted the firm’s performance through cross­
subsidisation. The group’s foray into light engineering could be a 
function of its monopoly power and successful tax evasion rather 
than its investment in systems and procedures. In such a case, the 
transition made would not be sustained. (It is the investment made 
in systems and procedures which can combat exogenous adversities 
such as nationalisation). Systems and procedures include support 
functions which ensure that the organisation’s housekeeping is in 
order. Similarly, law and order in society are merely hygiene factors 
(a support function), therefore they cannot ensure development even 
if they do permit development to take place. Housekeeping functions 
in an organisation do not recognise managerial hierarchies, rather 
cut across them both within and between different firms reporting to
®®Cues are recognised by adhering to employee prompts, outlined 
in A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard, 1970, p. 70.
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a common holding corporation. Within organisations, effective 
housekeeping is a function of employees’ reporting to a senior 
manager through work study methods, electronic data processing, 
procedure definition and implementation. An example is, when 
timely and accurate arrival of information is a critical factor for 
adjustments in inventory levels to the needs of distributors and 
consumers.
3. Whether expansion into related or other activities was sustained, 
and if the new management structures which ensued from an 
increase in the size of the business allowed for better control without 
direct supervision from the owner/family of the business group. 
Delegation of responsibilities is dependant upon procedures allowing 
built-in succession. Effective succession means not being individual- 
or protection-dependent for ensuring the sustained stability of the 
firm, but systems oriented, where the indispensability of individuals 
is not recognised.
4. Whether decisions were based on accurate information retrieval. 
Since managers handle information and make decisions, the quality 
and timeliness of information processing determines the quality of 
these decisions. A decision is a moment in a process, hence it is the 
process which influences the decision. The degree of availabihty of 
relevant information a t the time of decision making influences the 
accuracy of the results of such a decision, in a future which is 
unknown.
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5.Whether there was a disciplined reliance on investments made in 
R&D; the nature of technology employed which includes plant design 
and how accommodating was it to innovation and capacity expansion. 
Neglect of this area may lead to underutilisation of capacity, for both 
machines and labour®  ^ and also to inefficiencies in capital 
utilisation.
6. Whether wastage was reduced, particularly the kind emanating 
from delays in receiving energy supplies, raw materials, stored 
inventory and available technology.®®
7. Whether marketing strategies were designed in the Board room 
drawn from both informal and formal access to data in the market, 
or were based on non-scientific principles.
8. How apparent were organisational inefficiencies prior to the period 
of nationalisation and whether nationalisation was used as a 
scapegoat by the original owners in accounting for their declining 
portfolio investment.
9. Whether substantial economies of scale and scope accrued to the 
firm in adopting a systems flow, where goods and materials were 
transported a t greater speed through accessing channels of 
communication. This point addresses the operating culture of
®^ See M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, 
p. 38.
®®The distinctive factors which differentiated late nineteenth 
century US business enterprises through the co-ordination and 
control of fimctions, are given in, A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, 
Harvard, 1990, pp. 21-45.
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routinised operations, in particular the company guidelines, which 
affect all functional areas of business. In organisations the only 
stability is the process of change itself, whereas there is instabihty 
in the agents of change. Systems Analysis develops the orderly 
handling of shifting phenomena involving individuals and events. Its 
precision therefore lies in its application potential. The application 
potential is in the use of (orderly) diagrams, sequences, blocks and 
labels, which allow for the discovery of task relationships which 
otherwise may go undetected. The task analysis using flow diagrams 
also furnish an unambiguous basis for intra-company correspondence. 
It also forces a logical flow of a design where it becomes difficult to 
leave activity gaps and so has practical value, since its application 
can be used or imitated by other departments in the organisation. 
This is how the universal applicability or the iterative quality of the 
Systems Approach methodology helps to define management 
practices, a methodology which is more appropriate than 
mathematical modelhng techniques in evaluating managerial 
decision-making. The broad application potential of the Systems 
Approach, across departments and independent companies in the 
same group makes it easier for the Board of Directors or the 
executive management to assess goals, performance and solution 
finding activity against a consistent methodological framework.
10. Whether line and staff functions to delineate roles were 
recognised, introduced and implemented in the organisation.
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11. Whether the recurrence of bottlenecks, in marketing and 
production increased overhead expenses.®  ^ Bottlenecks are more 
damaging financially than idle capacity of machines, since they cut 
across all processes of production and their elimination depends on 
managers accurately recognising the form of the problem 
(bottlenecks), rather than just focusing on the deleterious afiects on 
its localised occurrence, (wherein lies the content of the problem).
Those business groups which implemented the methodology of the 
Systems Approach on the principles mentioned above, were able to 
devise a business strategy conducive to making a long-term 
transition firom trading to light engineering manufacturing.
1.5 The Methodology of Systems Analysis/Approach
Systems Analysis is a vehicle for technical problem solving 
articulated in the system design. A system design includes activities 
geared to retrieve information. Only that much information should 
be generated as is economically viable, or that which is sensitised to 
management needs. The Systems Approach methodology is holistic 
in its nature and its general principles borrow concept from every 
scientific era.^ ® Its application is a heuristic technique which
^^Systems and procedures address problems commensurate with 
increasing organisational size and its attendant time compression, 
through scientific principles given in M. Hasan, ‘Science, Technology 
and Administration’, mimeo. Ministry of Defence, 1978, p. 7, through 
a process which: ‘logically and clearly [uses] our faculties of logic and 
reasoning to be able to make observations, generate hypotheses, 
theories and then laws so that we are in a better position to apply
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provides insights into organisational problems so that the outcome of 
decisions bases on its technique produces the required results. 
Results can reflect a better organised budget or inventory system 
through a classification of project expenses and budget by its number, 
so that all project activities are accurately accounted. If there is a 
malfunction in the system, (which is a set of conditions), another 
route for achieving the same end has to be found. Decisions are then 
made on the basis of systematically recorded information and not on 
randomly selected criteria. For example, the Crescent Group's^^ 
records (which follow) depict a systematic inventory of decisions 
made by its entrepreneurs. However such applications cannot 
guarantee the best fit solutions to problems per se, since the decisions 
made are a function of the system design itself. For example, if 
(currently) used data bases were designed on the principles of an 
older manual ledger, then the inherent design of a (new) system has 
not changed. Nor can the apphcations of new systems solve problems 
any better than they did before. Therefore the effectiveness of the 
systems design is measured by the closeness of the fit of the data 
base with its system design. The following table outlines the 
structure of the Systems Approach:
something which matters which will help dehver the goods or 
produce the results’.
"'See pp. 261-343.
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Table 1.1
Functions of Systems Management, Systems Analysis and
Systems Engineering 
Systems Systems
Management Analysis
Systems
Engineering
Framework:
Nature:
Orientation:
Emphasis:
Methodology:
Operating
Level:
Approach:
Conceptual
Total System
Macro
Decision
Making
Integrative
Management
Eclectic
Logic/Reasoned Structured 
Analytical Developmental
Evaluative Task
Problem Solving Design and
Implementation
Application  
Level: Board
Training:
Skills:
Business
Management
Analytic
Staff
Scientific and 
Iterative^^
Situational 
( Ad hoc ) 
Management 
Science 
Conceptual
Engineering
Line
Practical
Particularised
Engineering
Technical
Source: M. Hasan, ‘Computerisation or Systematic Ways and Means’, 
mimeo. Seminar on Modern Approaches to Management 
Administration and the Computer, Lahore, 1971.
Systems engineering is the mathematical analysis of electronic 
controls and considered to be the second child of the industrial 
revolution. The same event or problem in an organisation is viewed 
differently by various subject specialists such as economists.
^^An iterative procedure is drawn from a process of successive 
approximation; a single iteration constitutes a process of problem 
solving and computation, leading to a result. This result becomes the 
point of departure for formulating another problem, and so the 
process continues. See E. Quade, ‘Military Systems Analysis’, in S. 
Optner, (ed.). Systems Analysis, Penguin, 1973, pp. 127-28.
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engineers or psychologists. They may each give a different solution 
to the same problem, but no one solution may successfully optimise 
the company’s resources. The systems analyst advises managers to 
look at the problem from the overall company’s objective and then 
suggests a solution which may lie in an area not visualised before by 
the subject specialists. A manager depicts foresight through 
reflection, by appreciating the limitations and potential of each type 
of service offered by subject specialists. The Systems Approach 
methodology itself follows a pattern addressing the form of problems 
by first using the inductive approach (as follows), only to use this 
approach to then derive generalisations which can be apphed to more 
than one business situation:^^
- Diagnosis of the problem and definition of objectives (the 
boundaries of the objective also define the boundaries of the system’s 
environment)
- Categorisation of objective/s through symbol recognition, such as 
flow charts or manuals allocated to cost centres in an organisation. 
This approach permits the flexible use of reports and extracts what 
is necessary from the departmental files and processes it for results 
which are then transmitted to other departments. Again this is 
possible if the form of the problem is given more attention than its 
content. The Systems Approach assigns particular emphasis on all
^^Source: S. Nikoranov, ‘Systems Analysis: A Stage in the 
Development of the Methodology of Problem Solving in the USA’, in
S. Optner, (ed.). Systems Analysis, Penguin, 1973, p. 147.
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departments’ conduct towards R&D in recognition of the total 
systems requirements and does not place disproportionate emphasis 
on any one sub system. This is the eclectic approach.
- Identification of constraints which are physical, financial, timing 
(length of time of data retention and scheduling of product delivery). 
Other constraints are policy related, such as the use of (outmoded) 
ledgers used for coding instructions which can no longer allocate 
budgets to those cost centres which have grown with the increase in 
size of the business.
- Elimination of constraints viewed from the totality of the problem.
- Analysis of possible company mission(s) and the approach used 
(informal or standardised procedures) for performance of tasks.
- Selection of the appropriate criteria which includes performance, 
timing, cost, risk and policy effectiveness.
- Generating output according to the mission plan and within its time 
frame.
- Synthesis of complex dynamic systems articulated in the movement 
of resources to meet the stated objective.
The above-mentioned sequence of events depicts a quahtative 
research model for which relationships in the system are defined, 
which are then shown to affect performance in accordance with the 
selected criterion. System designers evaluate options at every 
successive step in the Systems Approach which includes the 
redefinition of the company mission at different levels of decision­
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making. Therefore the Installation of a new system presupposes an 
intervention of the older order around which management policies 
initially evolved. The new order focuses on qualitative excellence 
such as the training of personnel and the documenting, instalhng, 
programming and testing of information. This approach is eclectic 
in nature and involves problem-solving viewing a situation in its 
totality and drawing upon common principles/lessons which can be 
leam t for transmission to other departments in the organisation 
(which is the iterative quality of this methodology).^^ This 
methodology reinforces the need for first inductive reasoning followed 
by deductive. The latter focuses on the form of the problem to 
identify common trends/problems so as to apply the same 
methodology of solutions to other problem areas regardless of their 
content. The content of a problem is left for functional area 
specialists to tackle, such as business design engineers, financial 
analysts, production managers and so forth. Form-based or 
deductive decisions are made on the basis of the company’s overall 
desirable goals. The optimal decisions are made with respect to a 
class of situations rather than the particular situation, just as one 
should be able to differentiate the wood from the trees. This model
^^For an understanding of the basic structure of systems, the tools 
of analysis of systems and workability of results using the Systems 
Approach methodology in organisations, see, S. Nikoranov, ‘Systems 
Analysis: A Stage in the Development of the Methodology of Problem 
Solving in the USA’, in S. Optner, (ed.). Systems Analysis, Penguin, 
1973, pp. 141-169.
54
is dynamic because it adapts with an increase in the inventory of 
knowledge, by updating the inputs which constitute a general class 
of situations. Updating instigates a re-evaluation of existing goals 
which may be subject to change, using social, economic and technical 
parameters. This in turn calls for constantly changing definitions of 
processes, concepts and generalisations. The fact that the form of 
problems can be similar across companies and groups is not 
incidental, since common patterns recur and can be identified by the 
Systems Approach methodology.
One of the most important characteristics of any methodology is its 
limitations including the Systems Approach methodology. The 
limitation itself is a function of the methodology, here used for 
solving problems originating at specific locations in the business 
enterprise. If the Systems Approach is a tool for ‘development’ then 
the term ‘development’ is itself arbitrarily acknowledged to mean the 
‘desired aim’. What constitutes a ‘desired aim’ is a relatively open- 
ended objective provided by manager s . F o r  this reason, the 
Systems Approach pre-supposes rational behaviour by managers who 
are seeking to identify and solve problems in the business arena, and 
the articulation of this rationality depends on developing effective 
channels of information feedback. The precision of this approach is
^^The limitations of Systems Analysis is discussed [in the 
preamble to the following section], P. Schoderbek, ‘Design of 
Management Systems’, in P. Schoderbek (ed.). Management Systems, 
John Wiley, 1967, pp. 109-11.
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also limited by the validity of the original objective along with its 
defined constraints, criteria and transmittance capability. Powerful 
methods for obtaining solutions are meaningless if problem 
identification is unsatisfactory. The symptoms of a problem should 
be separated from the disease, and this is where problem 
identification can err on the side of identifying only the disease, (a 
tendency reinforced when relying only on subject specialists to solve 
broader organisation problems). The Systems Approach starts from 
initial assumptions where the right questions need to be asked since 
the choice of initial assumptions affect the outcome. It is far better 
to get an incomplete answer to the right question than a neat answer 
to the wrong question. Similarly choosing the right objective is more 
important than the right means to achieve it, for choosing the wrong 
objective will produce unsatisfactory results and not solve recurring 
problems at all. Also, improperly selected criteria can overthrow the 
best technical solution. It is in doing otherwise, that the manager’s 
capability as an effective administrator is put to the test. All this 
combined, is why the use of the Systems Approach methodology is 
the nearest that brings management to being an exact science.
1.6 Conclusion
Initially, public policy directed at nourishing private industrial 
investment, and then internal management practices determined the 
direction of Pakistan’s industrialisation. In the 1960s, the new class 
structure which emerged largely contributed to and shaped the
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private-sector’s investment stalemate of the early 1970s. This was 
because President Ayub’s industrial policies provided easy money to 
investors, at a time when the class structure was forming in the new 
Pakistan. In undivided India the burgeoning business community 
constituted of Hindus. Most of the migrating Muslims constituted a 
transitional economy, with neither the attributes of the 19th century 
West, nor of traditional s o c i e t i e s . M o r e o v e r ,  they were 
inexperienced in commerce and weak educationally, while ownership 
of land in the new Pakistan was the paramount status symbol 
aspired. Therefore those without land and with the means, turned
^®See W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 
1990, p. 16, for a definition of traditional societies where the political, 
industrial and social value structure has not developed to its 
potential. Another explanation provided by J. Boeke, The Structure 
of Netherlands Indian Economy, 1942, in a social context is that 
traditional societies are also pre-industrial, that is they are tradition 
bound with considerable immobility of resources, an absence of profit 
seeking and a preference of speculative profit seeking. This 
explanation projects a society which is irrational owing to constraints 
it has no control over; another definition of traditional or pre­
industrial societies stem fi'om an economic or financial allocation of 
resources viewpoint, and for this, see B. Higgins, Economic 
Development, Principles Problems and Policies, Constable and 
Company, 1959, pp. 11-13 and ‘The Dualist Theory of 
Underdeveloped Areas’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
Issue 4, 1956, pp. 99-110; the concept of no-growth societies is 
reviewed by R. Zeckhanser, ‘The Risks of Growth’, in M. Olson and 
H. Landsberg (eds.). The No Growth Society, Woburn, 1975, p. 104, 
describes no-growth societies as ‘traditional’, with a low proportion 
of an affluent population, production and per capita income. These 
characteristics of no-growth societies limit the perspective on the 
debate of related criteria which influence development. The criteria 
omitted include non-tradeables which reduce value added, such as 
pollution costs, health hazards and less leisure time.
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towards a manufacturing base in the cotton textile industry/^ Once 
a critical point in the size of the business was achieved, the 
motivation to establish a corporate empire waned. The government 
became a crutch for the absence of an inner plan for the firm’s future 
expansion.
The high growth rates in manufacturing industry in the 1960s 
were achieved mostly through heavy protection and scant 
international competition. Once these exogenous props to increase 
industrial output were removed, a change occurred in the post 1960s 
environment which was to influence business practices in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The new business elite organised into business houses 
initially entered into rent-seeking contracts with the higher echelons 
in government which later discouraged some from simultaneously 
investing in internal systems networks. This was because the 
industrialisation pohcy did not articulate institution building within 
businesses. Ayub’s policy did not suggest that State-largesse should 
finance R&D or training of employees. This is not to say that 
government patronage was a cause per se for deterring the formation 
of endogenous organisational systems, rather its influence (on a few) 
in the Pakistani context was to postpone or not at all adopt them at
^^See G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Social Goals and 
Private Incentives, Harvard, 1967, p. 143, for a discussion on the 
bureaucracy rewarding individuals with clout, by issuing them with 
permits, in preference to those whose businesses were more 
productive. He states that this practice eventually lead to overall 
managerial inertia to devise methods to improve productivity.
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all. Decline set in for those groups where the rent-seeking activity 
was not replaced by developing internal organisational systems, 
while those groups which adopted such systems made a sustained 
investment in light engineering manufacturing. Managerial 
inefficiencies became apparent after the exogenous stimulus, (which 
had initially nurtured industry) was removed but not replaced. The 
next chapter provides a more in-depth historiography of Pakistani 
industrialisation, its initial partiality toward elite entrepreneurs 
which advantaged them in using their clout to direct flow of 
resources towards them and by solely relying on this, and in not 
adopting internal organisational systems how it proved detrimental 
to business house expansion in the long-term. The historiography 
and tenets of the Systems Approach are also provided in the next 
chapter, which when adopted equips us with an alternate explanation 
of the conditions required for business groups to make a transition 
to light engineering manufacturing.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS
Early industrialisation in Pakistan a t the outset took place as a 
result from State-directed policies, which provided a network of 
incentives targeted at the development of private enterprise. With 
the creation of Pakistan as an independent State, there was ample 
potential to tap into the countrys economic and financial resources.^ 
President Ayub’s vision for a new industrial structure was 
successfully orchestrated by the bureaucracy. This encompassed 
access to import licences, credit sources and overall support for new 
industrial ventures. These measures were the exogenous incentives 
which initially propelled private industrial investment to take off and 
from which all business groups benefitted equally.
The discussion in this chapter first identifies the exogenous factors
^In 1947 British rule ended in the Indian sub-continent, dividing 
the region into two separate nations, India and Pakistan. Pakistan 
inherited 23 percent of Indian territory, 19 percent of the Indian 
Hindu population and 62 percent of the Indian Muslim population. 
Pakistan’s economy was predominantly agrarian with cotton ginning 
and rice husking mills in the industrial sector. The province of 
Punjab called The granary’ of India was also divided between the two 
countries; the Pakistani Punjab produced 40 percent of undivided 
India’s long and medium staple cotton, on 22 million acres of 
irrigated land. Prior to partition, this region traded with [other 
regions in undivided] India, the latter supplying manufactured goods 
and receiving agricultural goods in exchange. In undivided India, the 
Indian railways were designed to transport industrial and 
agricultural raw material between the northern and southern 
regions. With partition, this transportation system was also 
disrupted, the loss of which was home equally by both countries.
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which contributed to the initial take-off in business group 
investment. This is followed by arguing that it were the investments 
made in endogenous organisation systems, which enabled the 
transition from trading to light engineering manufacturing.^ These 
issues are divided into nine sections. Section One provides an 
overview of the development of Pakistani industry. Section Two 
presents the industrial policy as an exogenous factor stimulating 
business development, through an account of the economic and 
financial incentives provided to private-sector industrialists by the 
Ayub regime. The discussion on the economic environment extends 
into the Bhutto and Zia eras of nationalisation and privatisation of 
industry respectively. Section Three focuses on the pattern of 
structural linkages which ensued from the industrial policies, in 
particular the ramifications of Ayub’s policies on initial business 
development. Section Four on interest group lobbying, reveals the 
links of business personalities with the Ayub regime of the 1960s 
(when the first industrial pohcy was implemented). Section Five 
discusses business group rent-seeking activities through accessing 
sources of finance and how this initially moulded business house 
investment. Section Six provides a historiography of the Systems 
Approach. The adoption of this approach within the micro- 
managerial firamework of the groups, is shown as a means to
^Transition is from trading in primary goods to that of the 
production of light engineering goods.
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introduce new internal organisational systems which when adopted, 
enabled a sustainable transition to light engineering manufacturing. 
We argue that only effective internal organisation systems, through 
adoption of the Systems Approach methodology alter the conditions 
which affect long-term business development in achieving the 
transition. Section Seven provides the managerial prerequisites for 
the successful implementation of internal organisational systems and 
its ramifications on business development. Section Eight on 
endogenous organisational measures, demonstrates how the Systems 
Approach can de applied in the business situation with the co­
operation and foresight demonstrated by managers. Section Nine 
concludes by reflecting on the effects of Ayub’s industrialisation 
measures on business group performance in the short- and long-term. 
In some business houses managerial inertia towards adopting the 
Systems Approach (the endogenous factors) led to a decline in light 
engineering investment in the long-term.^ Traditionally, the term 
‘engineering industry’ refers to the design and assembly of machines 
intended for industrial use. The light engineering sector includes the 
production of steel-based goods, such as construction equipment, 
home appliances and spare parts for machines. For purposes of our 
research, we propose that the transition made from trading to light 
engineering goods production was an outcome of the business groups’ 
management policy.
^Presented in the case studies on business groups, pp. 164-467.
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2.1 Patterns of Development: An Overview
Pakistan after its formation as a nation State, did not inherit an 
industrial base in the production of manufactured goods/ At the 
outset, Ayub’s industrial manifesto propelled industrialisation into 
taking off/ However, by the early 1960s the economy had not met 
with the preconditions of take-off, in that it lacked the institutional 
support, such as that was required to invest agricultural surplus into 
industry. Rostow and Gerschenkron’s stage models which defined 
the processes involved for an economy to make its transition from 
primary to capital goods production were not strictly followed in the 
Pakistani case, because the industrial structures which emerged did 
not conform to his ‘correct’ time of production. There were instances 
when business acumen flourished in a supportive environment of 
incentives and in doing so, by-passed Rostow’s incubatory period 
necessary to reach his ‘next stage of growth’. In less than a decade 
of the country’s formation, industrial capability and investments in 
the manufacture of primary,® intermediate^ and in certain
^Information on industries inherited by Pakistan are on p. 68.
®The effect on economic development by State interventionist 
policies is given in, P. Armstrong, A. Glyn, and J. Harrison, 
Capitalism Since 1945, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 63-67 and 146 and a 
critique on this debate is given in, J. Toye, Dilemmas of Development, 
Blackwell, 1987, pp. 117-120.
^Primary goods are sugar, rice, raw cotton, unprocessed textiles 
and leather, edible oil, paper and wheat.
^Intermediate goods are semi-manufactured commodities, such as 
cotton yam, leather and cement, industrial chemicals, fertihsers and
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instances, capital goods® were apparent. Therefore, Rostow’s 
demarcation of the 30-40 years incubation period for a nation to 
reach maturity in selected industries was negated. In the mid-1960s, 
manufacturing industry was approximately seven years old and was 
producing electrical engineering grids, chemicals and tools; products 
which Rostow aligned to the maturity stage in a nation’s economic 
growth.® The reason why the Pakistani case did not fit Rostow’s 
theory on the stages of growth was because the necessary and 
sufficient pre-conditions for take off (proposed by him) did not follow 
the particular chronological sequence of investments he envisaged 
and neither were his extraneous pre-conditions met for entering the 
next stage of economic growth. For example, where political support 
for industrialisation was forthcoming (Rostow’s sufficient condition 
for take-oflO, the landed interests were not replaced by the new 
industrial elite (this displacement effect was Rostow’s necessary 
condition for take-off).^®
petroleum refining products used for manufacturing producers’ goods.
^Capital goods are machines used in the production of primary, 
intermediate and manufactured goods, such as basic metals, 
electrical machinery, steel, shipbuilding industry and petroleum 
products, used to manufacture finished goods such as carpets, 
electrical grids and cloth.
®See W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 3rd. 
ed., 1990, pp. 9 and 52.
^®Further details on how Rostow has segregated socio-economic 
conditions peculiar to stages of growth in industrialising economies, 
see Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 4- 
16 and 26.
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Papanek suggested that sudden spurts of growth in developing 
countries were on account of resources directed to a few 
entrepreneurs which in effect created wastage and inefficient 
allocation of resources. The causal factors which led to wastage of 
resources was based on Papanek’s case study of P a k i s t a n . H i s  
analysis advocated that absorption and diffusion inefficiencies were 
generated in Less Developed Countries [when Import Substitution 
Industriahsation (ISl) was opted], owing to inefficient industrial 
production, low quality exports, and a less developed domestic 
m a rke t . H ow e ver ,  Pakistan circumvented the negative effects of 
wastage by achieving a high growth rate in 1965, albeit from a low 
base.^^
Haq’s work on Pakistan’s economic development in the 1960s, 
suggested that in order for industry to ‘take off, entrepreneurs in 
developing countries should have unequal opportunities in accessing 
sophisticated machinery. Only entrepreneurs employing capital 
intensive machines should be the ones provided access to them. In 
this way the economy could ‘take off, with the impetus coming from 
a few industrialists who created an environment of incentives for
^^Papanek’s explains gradual diffusion of inputs from one sector 
to another which is necessary for development, in data gathered on 
Pakistan, by G. Papanek and W. Falcon, ‘Pakistan’s Development: An 
Introductory Perspective’, in Papanek and Falcon, (eds.). Development 
Policy II- The Pakistan Experience, Harvard, 1971, p. 5.
^^See G. Papanek, Pakistanis Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 14.
^^The growth rates are presented in Table 2.4.
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gearing overall industrial growth. However in the long-run, Haq 
omitted to appraise that investments in new technology which were 
not supported by investments in research and development, and 
which led to inefficient utility of capital employed and 
underutilisation of labour. Haq argued that all developing countries 
in the early stages of growth, increased output in large doses with 
proportionately smaller doses of capital injections. Haq did not 
address the economic costs of industrial spurts, rather he centred his 
argument on the necessary environment conducive to initiating such 
s p u r t s . I n  Pakistan, one of the macro effects of the 1964-65 high 
rate of manufacturing growth was the inegalitarian distribution of 
income which ensued, articulated in student riots and dissent leading 
to the eventual overthrow of Ayub’s government. In the 1960s 
when Haq^ ® and Gerschenkron’s writings were published, the 
implementation of Pakistani industrialisation policy coincided with 
structural changes in its political economy. These changes were an 
outcome of the merging of Rostow’s two distinct phases (stages 1 and 
11) of industrialisation and to that extent also reinforced the 
Gerschenkronian possibility of sudden ‘spurts’ of growth evident in
^^Capital output ratios’ applicability as a performance indicator 
is discussed in M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, Oxford, 
1963, pp. 58-9.
^^See Table 2.4 for growth rates.
^®See M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, 
pp. 26, 36 and 58.
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developing economies/^ The framework for understanding the 
shifting structural relationships stemmed from the pattern of 
industrialisation which was pecuhar to the Pakistani case.
2.2 State Largesse, Industrial Policy and Business 
Development
An understanding of business development in the late 1980s 
springs from studying the nature of the industrial policies of the late 
1950s and early 1960s. The protagonists of industrial growth^® 
were a small group of families, the majority of whom belonged to 
minority communities that had migrated to Pakistan upon partition. 
These emerging industrialists belonged to a group of Muslims who 
were by tradition soldiers and farmers, with a sprinkling of 
craftsmen and traders, but produced few businessmen. The mass 
outflow of Hindu commercial castes was compensated by the mass 
inflow of Muslim trading communities from Bombay and Gujarat in 
India. The communities which emigrated to Pakistan were mostly 
traders who had to establish themselves in a new milieu. The 
country inherited a predominantly agrarian economy with limited
^^See A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, Harvard, 1966, 
pp. 6-7, on the nature of growth in developing countries.
®^In an economic context, there are different explanations 
provided for growth. For purposes of this research focusing on the 
business history approach, growth means expansion of industrial 
investments and its sustainability through effective management 
practices.
% ee G. Bsipainek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, pp. 41-
42.
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natural resources or modem industry, organised banking or 
commercial establishments.^® It also inherited seven million 
refugees, lost most of its skilled Hindu workers and experienced civil 
servants, businessmen and professionals. Only nine textile miUs out 
of four hundred were left in Pakistan, along with an electric 
furnace.^^ Pakistan appeared to be an economic monstrosity and 
many prophesied chaos and political disintegration as the new State’s 
inevitable future, ‘Pakistan [is] an economic w r e c k . . . T h i s  view 
stemmed from the fact that it was mainly the non-Muslim 
community who controlled trade and commerce, who emigrated to 
India in 1947. Most of industry which remained in Pakistan was in 
the primary goods sector, such as cash crops, handicrafts, and 
processed foods production. New industry was mostly concentrated 
in Karachi, owing to the city’s accessibility to officials^® who issued 
the export licences. In 1949, the Pakistani currency was not
more detailed analysis of Pakistani migrants and their trade 
is covered in R. Wheeler, The Politics of Pakistan, ComeU, 1970, pp. 
79-80.
^^For Pakistan’s economic and political history see D. P. Singhal, 
Pakistan, Prentice Hall Inc., 1972, pp. 3-4.
^^Source: Time, 8 December 1947.
^®In 1963, 40 civil servants were assigned Chief Controller of 
Imports and Exports, who were empowered with issuing import 
licences. A further 80 officers at the department of investment 
promotion were to ‘control’ investment. Other senior officials in the 
Ministry of Industries, Commerce, Finance and from the President’s 
Secretariat, could intercept decisions made by the civil servants, to 
issue import licences to investors.
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devalued, against pressure from India to do so.^ '^  The overvalued 
Pakistani currency made for cheaper imports of capital goods and 
machinery for Pakistan. The bulk of Pakistani jute was exported to 
India and the overvalued currency made jute imports to India a more 
expensive proposition for the latter. Thereupon, in 1949 the Indian 
government retaliated by ceasing trade altogether with Pakistan.
At partition, most private businesses in Karachi were owned by 
Hindus and Parsees as well as some Goanese Christians, with a 
limited amount of trade and commerce in Mushm hands. Two 
Muslim groups who practised trade and commerce were the Dawoodi 
Bhoras and Khoja Ismaihs.^® The Memon sect from Kathiawar in 
India, controlled one-fourth of investments in privately owned 
Muslim firms in Pakistan, in 1959.^ ® These sects were traders who 
had cash liquidity and experience with machines, which enabled 
them to make a transition from trade to manufacturing with relative 
ease. Modem industry at the outset was framed by these industrial 
entrepreneurs who were not of feudal origin and benefitted equally 
from an environment conducive to the realisation of entrepreneurial
^^The economic consequences to India, from its trade war with 
Pakistan are given in B. R. Tomlinson, The New Cambridge History 
of India, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970, III, 3, 
Cambridge, 1993, p. 170.
^^Ismaili Khojas were Muslims from Panjbhai in the Sind 
province.
^®The Dawood Group members were from a Memon sect 
originating from Kathiawar in India.
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talent in industry.^^ Investments in industry were supported by 
imported technology and thrived in an environment of incentives and 
opportunities and State intervention was seen as a desirable 
prerequisite for industrialisation based on import protection and 
subsidies. From this community of businessmen emerged private- 
sector initiative prepared to exploit profit making opportunities in 
industries such as cotton textiles, cement, engineering goods and 
steel. These communities also exploited cheaply available refugee 
labour, in a seller’s market in Pakistan, where they initially 
reinvested ‘surplus’ profits back into their businesses. Profits were 
used for further investment in metal-working, machinery and the 
construction industry, by those business groups which planned and 
structured their internal organisational strategy towards it. A 
summary of business houses by their geographical location, pre- and 
post 1947 is provided in Table 2.1:
^^The term feudal, denotes an economy where the traditional 
sector is predominantly engaged in peasant agriculture, handicrafts 
or in manufacturing within small-scale industry using labour 
intensive techniques of production. For this definition see Yujiro 
Hayami, ‘Peasants and Plantation in Asia’, in G. Meier (ed.). From 
Classical Economics to Development Economics, Macmillan, 1994, 
pp. 121-123; H. Rosovsky, ‘Japan’s Transition to Modern Economic 
Growth 1886-1885’, in H. Rosovsky, (ed.). Industrialisation in Two 
Systems, John Wiley, 1966, p. 115. The behaviour displayed by feudal 
and industrial entrepreneurs as a response to early industrialisation 
is discussed in Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, Harvard, 
1966, p. 39 and in D. North, et al. Growth and Welfare in the 
American Past, 3rd. ed., Prentice Hall, 1983, pp. 40-41, describes 
feudal societies as those with a lack of order, scarce labour, abundant 
land and differential military endowments.
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Groups
Table 2.1
Origin of Business Post-independence 
(pre-independence) location  
City City
Wazir Ali 
Crescent
Bombay/Bhopal
Madras
Dawood Bombay
Ghulam Fanique N.A.
Karachi/Lahore
Faisalabad/Karachi
Karachi/Lahore
Nowshera
 ^All group members were Muslims.
Source: Compiled from impubHshed company documents.
The Korean War commodity boom (1950-52) provided a relief for 
Pakistan’s depleting foreign exchange reserves, especially when 
Pakistani exporters captured the textile export markets of Korea. 
The ensuing export earnings from the niche made in Korean 
markets, enabled Pakistani businessmen to accumulate large foreign 
exchange cash reserves.^® This was demonstrated with in rate of 
industrial investment which tripled from 1950 to 1955, once the 
export earnings from the boom, materialised.^® The government
^®For the macro-economic policies in 1951-52 see G. Papanek, 
Pakistanis Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 16.
^®The economic consequences of the Korean boom are discussed 
in G. Papanek, Pakistanis Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 32.
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complemented this opportunity, by expediting applications for new 
industrial units which enabled industriahsts to make 50 percent to 
100 percent profits on their initial investments.^® The Planning 
Commission was formed in 1953, and replaced by the Planning Board 
in 1954, reviewed the allocation of foreign exchange, the screening of 
viable projects for investment and to relate annual budgets with 
proposed investments in the Five Year Plans. By 1954, the Planning 
Board’s supervised industrial expansion of Rs 170 million or US $ 34 
million, which also represented 7 percent of the value of industrial 
assets in the country. In 1956-1957 manufactured output increased 
in both intermediate and capital goods production and from export 
earnings.^^ By 1957, the depleting foreign exchange reserves from 
the rising import bills and declining manufacturing output from 16 
percent per year in the 1950s, to 11 percent in 1960-65, further 
reduced to 7 percent in 1965-70, mobilised the government to devise 
a strategy to increase exports in manufactured goods. This was 
demonstrated in not devaluing the currency in 1962 and in providing 
protection to manufactured goods through import controls.^^ The 
export duty levied on capital goods imports was removed. Since most
^®Source: R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment, Cambridge, 
1982, p. 169.
^^See G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. vi, 
in the Foreword by Mason.
^^See, Planning Commission, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70, 
Government of Pakistan, May 1965.
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of industrial investment was concentrated in the manufacturing of 
consumer durables till 1958,^  ^ the consumer goods sector was 
mainly affected by the quota imposed on the imported raw materials 
it required.^^ Customs duty and sales tax were removed on the 
import of raw materials for the manufacturing of engineering goods 
such as airconditioners and deep freezers. To finance the gap 
between excess supply over the lagging domestic demand, the 
government resorted to foreign aid, as documented in the following 
quotations:
‘ (a) Pakistan and the United States have signed an agreement 
which provides for the largest ever U.S. loan of $ 140 million 
[about Rs 670 million] to Pakistan. The loan will finance 
Pakistan’s import of iron, steel and other commodities 
necessary  for the coun try ’s overall in d u s tr ia l 
development... ’
‘The Government of Pakistan made a drawing of $ 16 million 
in pound sterling from the International Monetary Fund on 
January, 13 1965. Pakistan has a quota in the fund of $ 150 
million...
‘The World Bank has issued $ 200 million in bonds through a 
group of U.S. underwriters on 18 January 1965. This was the 
first World Bank issue in the United States since January,
^^Another measure to liberalise imports, was in the introduction 
of the ‘open general licence’ for the import of tractors, tires and 
vehicles. Eligibility for renewing a licence was on the basis of its 
retrospective ownership.
^^Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Bulletin State Bank o f Pakistan, 
January 1965, State Bank of Pakistan, 1965, p. 14.
^^Ihid., February 1965, p. 14.
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1962...?"
The military government from 1958 to 1968, led by General Ayub 
Kban as President, encouraged businessmen to come forth and invest 
in manufacturing industry. To achieve its objective of 
industrialisation, the government used both fiscal and monetary 
measures, such as import controls, an over-valued exchange rate to 
keep permissible imports of machinery cheaper for industrial 
producers, tax holidays and accelerated depreciation allowances for 
private-sector i n d u s t r y I n d u s t r y  in the mid-1960s, supplanted 
agriculture and trading as the most lucrative sector.^® Aynb’s 
period of incentives coincided with the formation of another 
propellent to early industrialisation; the Pakistan Industrial
^®In his study on these business famihes, see L.J. White, 
Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan, Princeton, 
1974, p. 121, where he discusses that the most significant condition 
for becoming a large manufacturer of goods in Pakistan was by 
obtaining an investment sanction, which was a necessary perquisite 
for then obtaining an import licence, used for importing capital 
equipment; also see the weekly, Pakistan News, London, 15 March 
1961, p. 5, for a list of items permitted as imports under Aynb’s ‘open 
general licence’ scheme.
^®The rate of return on industrial investment was so high that 
industrialists were able to recover their initial investments in a 
period of one to two years. The rate of economic growth in the early 
1960s was more than double the rate of population growth. See Z. 
Altaf, Entrepreneurship in the Third World, Croom Helm, 1988, p. 
103, for the industrial investment figures including both movable and 
immovable assets, with methods of evaluation differing widely, at 
times, on the discretion of the entrepreneur. At times, when 
immovable property was evaluated, it was valued and pledged 
against loans as collateral, and the evaluation figure was usually 
arrived at arbitrarily.
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Development Corporation, (PIDC)"^ ® in 1950/^ The PIDC was a 
public sector, semi-autonomous entity which undertook the task of 
investing in large-scale producers’ goods industry, in geographic 
areas and in industries where private-sector initiative was not 
forthcoming/^ The government’s objective was that once installed, 
these industries would be sold to the private-sector. The PlDC-led 
projects promoted industries that required large capital outlays, a 
long gestation period, high levels of technology, induction of foreign 
technicians, and industries where entrepreneurs were reluctant or 
unable to borrow large sums of credit from the govemment.^^ 
Another reason for the formation of PIDC, was initiate investment in 
less developed areas of the country, which did not attract private 
investors. The PIDC also benefitted from government patronage, in
^^The PIDC charter decreed State approval of sale of its units to 
private industrialists; in instances, PIDC was authorised to 
underwrite a portion or the entire share capital of a unit, if 
necessary. However PIDC was not permitted to divest its shares at 
a rate below the par value of its shares, unless the Central 
government sanctioned it. See PIDC, ‘Development Programme of 
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation’, unpublished report, 
PIDC, 1989, pp. 10-14.
^^See the PIDC charter under the ‘Act of Federal Legislation, No 
XLV of 1950’, 19 April 1950, [revised, 1962 by President Ayub], when 
certain industries were transferred by the PIDC to the provincial 
governments by ‘Ordinance No, XXXVl of 1962’, 1 June 1962.
^^See Sylla and Toniolo, (eds.), qpcfr. Patterns of European 
Industrialisation^ Routledge, 1991, for the role of the State on 
industrial progress, p. 17.
^See PIDC, ‘Development Programme of the PIDC’, unpubhshed 
report, PIDC, December, 1989, Annexture V, lists the manufacturing 
capacity created by its ventures from 1952 to 1988.
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that it was able to bring along with its location of industry, the 
necessary infrastructure required for the maintenance and fruition 
of its projects. These support functions included, power lines, gas 
supplies, and other amenities necessary for continuous plant 
operations. PIDC investment was mainly in coal mines, textiles, 
jute, sugar, paper and cement manufacturing, shipping and 
engineering industries. PIDC projects retained by the public-sector 
were the railways, roads, seaports, power and irrigation projects.
PIDC’s capital was underwritten as a development loan from the 
federal to the provincial governments.^^ The loan repayment was 
incumbent upon sale of the industries to the private-sector. 
Additional sources which financed its capital, were from Development 
Finance Institutions (DPI) and through foreign equity 
participation.^^ However, the actual sales were not tendered or 
advertised, rather acquisition made on the basis of the coalition of 
businessmen with the ruling regime or with senior PIDC officials.^®
The PIDC became the main agent of State largesse with a select 
group of industrialists becoming its beneficiaries. On a more 
practical level, the State took on the role of the entrepreneur because 
of a lack of a well developed capitalist class who would take over the
p. 29.
^®Source: A division of the value of equity contributed by other 
institutions is available in Finance Division, Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Budget, 1976-77, Government of Pakistan, 1976.
^®This assertion finds its merit in the case studies, pp. 164-467.
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economic institutions left behind by the British colonisers. 
Industrialisation was not forthcoming from the landowning class 
whose capital accumulation was seen as acquired in collaboration 
with the colonisers. Therefore, State intervention to promote 
industrialisation was originally seen as legitimate hy the aspiring 
industrialists."^^ Ayuh’s policy of economic incentives and trade 
liberalisation supplemented by the economic proceeds from the 
Korean War commodity hoom, provided a platform for our four 
business groups to accumulate foreign exchange. These reserves 
were initially accumulated from trade proceeds and were invested in 
cotton trading, which led to the high profit concentration in the 
hands of these few industrialists. However, this prior accumulation 
of capital (from trade proceeds) as a precursor to industrialisation in 
the 1960s, did could not sustain intermediate and capital goods 
production in the long-term. The common denominator between 
business group investors was that they all either initiated as cotton 
textile traders or commenced production in a cotton-based industry. 
Cotton, as Pakistan’s staple cash crop and the back bone of its 
exports led to pioneering investments made in textile trade, ginning.
^^In Latin America the success of State-led industrialisation 
during its ISI period (the interwar years), produced new social 
coalitions and alliances between the incipient industrialist class and 
the urban working class which challenged the landed oligarchy. This 
is given in, A. Hirschman, A Bias for Hope, Essays on Development 
and Latin America, Yale, 1971, p. 97, with reference to Latin 
America’s ISI phase of industrialisation. Hirschman updates his 
discussion in. Essays in Trespassing, Economics to Politics and 
Beyond, Cambridge, 1974, p. 143.
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spinning, weaving and finishing processes.
Aynb’s trade control measures^® were complemented vdth another 
catalyst of industrialisation. In 1959 a subsidy was provided to 
exporters in the form of export bonus vouchers which were targeted 
to increase exports.^® The bearer of these vouchers could purchase 
foreign exchange equivalent to the value of goods he had exported. 
This foreign exchange (which was available from 10 to 40 percent of 
the value of goods exported) was meant to finance imports of raw 
materials and machinery used in manufacturing exported 
commodit ies.These vouchers were also transferable, which meant 
that they could be sold by those exporters who had earned them, to 
anyone who was prepared to pay a premium for acquiring them. 
Owing to their scarcity, they fetched an 80 to 180 percent premium 
in the ‘black’ market. This artificially raised their price and in effect 
contributed to a dual exchange rate system for accessing foreign 
exchange. The following table provides the share of vouchers issued:
^®For a more detailed discussion on Pakistan’s export and import 
policies see, G. Hufbauer, ‘West Pakistan Exports: Effective Taxation, 
Policy, Promotion, and Sectoral Discrimination’, in W. Falcon and G. 
Papanek (eds.). Development Policy -II- The Pakistan Experience, 
Harvard, 1971, pp. 56-114.
^®Further discussion on foreign resource inflow and the 
implications of this scheme, see R. Amjad, Private Industrial 
Investment, Cambridge, 1982, p. 19.
®®With the grooving market for textiles, Pakistani cotton and jute 
exports comprised up to 35 percent of exports by the late 1960s as 
discussed in R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment, Cambridge, 
1982 p. 19.
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Table 2.2 
Rs millions
Year Realisation^ Vouchers^ Aver;
Issued of Bo
A B
1959/60 653.6 137.3 21
1960/61 691.3 141.6 20.48
1961/62 717.5 161.3 22.48
1962/63 845.6 188.8 22.32
1963/64 1079.2 254.9 23.61
1964/65 1198.3 296.1 24.71
1965/66 1524.5 368.0 24.13
1966/67 1778.3 426.4 23.97
1967/68 1891.0 574.2 30.36
1968/69 2335.6 798.3 34.17
1969/70 2676.5 890.7 33.29
 ^The value of exports of goods and services for which bonus vouchers 
were issued.
 ^Face value of vouchers.
" B/A X 100.
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Bulletin: State Bank of Pakistan, 
State Bank of Pakistan, Department of Research, State Bank of 
Pakistan, Central Directorate, issue nos; July 1965, pp. 64-65; July 
1966, pp. 74-75; July 1967, pp. 74-75,; July 1968, pp. 74-75; July 
1969, pp. 74-75; July 1970, pp. 74-75.
Amjad has compiled a cross section of Pakistani exports in the 
1960s.^^ He shows a growing market in textiles, cotton and jute 
exports which comprised 35 percent to 69 percent of total exports by
®^ The linkages between investments and structural changes in the 
economy are discussed in R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment, 
Cambridge, 1982, p. 168 and G. Papanek, Pakistanis Development, 
Harvard, 1968, p. 198.
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the late 1960s and 1 9 8 0 s T e x t i l e s  remained the single major and 
most significant exports as a group for the period covered by this 
study. Therefore the pioneering capitalised on this hy initiating 
textile-based trading and manufacturing. Only those groups which 
adopted internal organisational systems were able to make the 
transition from textiles to steel manufacturing.
In spite of the export incentives provided by the bonus voucher 
scheme, there was no significant increase in exports in the early 
1960s owing to tariffs and quotas imposed by importing countries on 
Pakistani exports. The bonus voucher scheme did not significantly 
boost exports, since the export base was already high before the
52 Exports by Major Economic Category
(Rs millions)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Textiles as % of all 66 59 66 69 66
Cotton:
Primary Product 4383 1464 6823 7992 8144
Semi-Manuf. Yarn 3489 2785 4286 5971 5949
Manuf. Fabric 8013 5877 4529 6708 5841
Manuf. Garments 2630 2837 3114 6237 4897
Rice 5051 4738 4332 5035 5227
Leather 1503 1856 2529 3351 3930
Carpets 2090 2158 2085 3137 2619
Petroleum Products 753 355 581 398 742
Total 27912 22070 28279 38829 37349
Source: Statistical Bulletin of Pakistan, Federal Bureau of Statistics, 
Islamabad, 1988.
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introduction of this s c he m e .H ow ever  it did contribute towards 
the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few industrialists who 
were the main beneficiaries of this scheme, all of whom are 
addressed in this study. This was particularly evident in the 
Crescent and Dawood Groups’ profits in jute and paper 
manufacturing.^^ In 1964, Pakistan’s production of jute was valued 
at Rs 503 million or 48 percent of the world’s production, and the 
Crescent Group’s jute exports were at Rs 50 million or 10 percent of 
Pakistan’s jute e x p o r t s .T h e  initial industrial take-off in the 1960s 
in textile and jute manufacturing was from State largesse and not 
from efiiciently designed internal organisation systems. The 
following table lists exports under the bonus voucher scheme:
®^ An analysis of exports by sectors is presented in A.R. Kamal, 
‘Sectoral Growth Rates and Efficiency of Factor Use in Large-Scale 
Manufacturing Sector in West Punjab’, Pakistan Development Review, 
Winter 1976, Vol. XV, No: 4, p. 349.
^^See Table 2.3 for exports in jute manufacturing.
^^World and Pakistan’s jute production figures are available in. 
State Bank of Pakistan, Bulletin: State Bank of Pakistan, January 
1965, State Bank of Pakistan, 1965, p. 14; ibid., July 1966, pp. 62-63.
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Table 2.3
Exports Under Bonus Voucher Scheme 
Rs millions
1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69
Percentage increase 
of total exports over
the previous year 27 17 6 24
Primary Products 203.0 181.5 193.0 79.6 145.3
Cotton Manufactures 222.1 206.9 290.5 375.3 451.2
Jute Manufactures 296.3 541.3 618.8 546.1 662.7
Other Manufactures 253.1 281.5 382.3 450.7 544.1
Invisibles^ 42.1 54.4 51.5 129.0 79.3
Home Remittances 181.7 258.0 242.2 310.3 453.0
Total 1.,198.3 1,524.5 1,778.3 1,891.0 2,335.6
 ^Includes earnings from supplies to Water and Power Development 
authority, ship repairs, shipping, hostels, aircraft repairs, salvage, 
and literary journalists’ fees - all items included as invisibles in the 
balance of payments.
Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Bulletin, State Bank of Pakistan, 
State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi: Department of Research, State 
Bank of Pakistan, Central Directorate, issue nos: July 1965, pp. 64- 
65; July 1966, pp. 74-75; July 1967, pp. 74-75,; July 1968, pp. 74-75; 
July 1969, pp. 74-75; Jidy 1970, pp. 74-75.
In 1962, import restrictions were relaxed; importers no longer 
required registration and the time restriction on the validity of 
import certificates was removed. This diluted the privileged status 
that past importers enjoyed through owning bonus vouchers, and 
gave way for new importers spread over a larger base of industry. 
Opportunities for capital accumulation were also fuelled through
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foreign exchange payments made to overseas suppliers of imported 
goods. In the 1960s such payments were shown to be illegally higher 
than the actual price at which they were imported.®® The 
differential between the real (lower) purchase price and the higher 
amount (declared in Pakistan) as the value of imported goods, was 
the foreign exchange deposited by Pakistani importers in their 
overseas accounts. This was arranged in connivance with the 
overseas sellers.®  ^ Papanek who was a member of the Harvard 
Advisory group to Pakistan on economic restructuring in 1960, 
commented:
‘Tax evasion was widespread: many industriahsts kept three 
sets of books- one for the tax collector, one for partners or 
relatives and one for themselves. [One person claimed that 
sometimes there is a fourth set- to show the tax collector when 
he comes the second time insisting that he be shown the ‘real 
books’ ].®*
®®This is corroborated by G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, 
Harvard, 1967, p. 109.
®^ In stating the objectives of the Pakistani Constitution, R. 
Wheeler, The Politics of Pakistan, Cornell, 1970, pp. 131-32, states, 
‘The Constitution sought to strike a new balance between the 
bureaucracy and the political world by curtailing the privileges of the 
former while hmiting the scope for pressure or ‘interference’ by the 
latter. The result was to decrease the bureaucracy’s responsibility to 
the puhhc, increase its dependence on its official superiors, and 
heighten the sense of political frustration among those who felt that 
only through corruption could the administration be successfully 
influenced’ ’.
Quotation emphasis for ‘influence’ has been reproduced as is in the 
original text.
®®See G. Paipdin.ëk, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 109.
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Haq, the Chief Economist in Ayub’s government stated:
‘Income-tax is paid by one-tenth of one percent of the total 
population, the narrow coverage of income-tax thus robbing 
the State of any automatic means of having a rising share in 
the increase in national income’.^®
The mid-1960s was an economic watershed, since Aynb’s pohcy for
industrialisation had successfully doubled the value-added in
manufacturing (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5).®® The following table shows
the increase in manufacturing growth rates, from 1955-70:
Table 2.4
Pakistan- Annual Compound Growth Rates and Value of 
Manufacturing at 1959-60 factor cost
Year Growth Rates Value of
% Industrial Output
Rs millions
1955-60 9.3 4,358
1960-65 16.2 9,284'
1965-70 7.7 22,250^
 ^Further detail on how the rate of manufactured output increased in 
intermediate and capital goods production from an enlarged base in
1965-66, is given in G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 
1967, p. vi.
 ^Value of industrial output is for 1969-70.
Source: R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960- 
1970, Cambridge, 1982, p. 16.®^
®®See M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, 
p. 23.
®®Most of the value-added was contributed by the textile sector 
discussed in. Ministry of Industries, Industrial Policy Statement, 
Government of Pakistan, June 1984, p. 6.
®^ For an increase in annual growth rates in manufacturing and 
in the consumer, intermediate and investment goods sectors, 1951-71, 
see S. Guisinger, ‘Trade Policies and Unemployment: The Case of
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From 1960-1965 Pakistan’s growth rate increased at a pace which
did not go unnoticed internationally. The New York Times, on 18
January 1965, reported:
‘Pakistan may be on its way towards an economic milestone 
that so far has been reached by only one other populous 
country, the United States’
In 1960-1965, Pakistan’s large-scale manufacturing sector, fuelled 
by private-sector capital, led to a growth of 16.2 percent, compared 
with 9.3 percent in 1955-1960; Table 2.5 provides an estimate of the 
value of private industrial investment in Pakistan, from 1960 to 
1969:
Pakistan’, in A. Krueger et al, Trade and Employment in Developing 
Countries, Chicago, 1981, p. 301.
®^ This citation was taken from G. Papanek, Pakistan's 
Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 1.
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Table 2.5
Estimates of Private Industrial Investment 
(constant prices)^
Year Rs (millions)
1960-61 805.1
1961-62 810.0
1962-63 640.5
1963-64 1025.6
1964-65 1106.22
1965-66 974.8
1966-67 880.1
1967-68 895.8
1968-69 836.8
1969-70 922.2
 ^Based on a price index of industrial investment, (1959- 
60)=100.
 ^Also see Table 2.6 on Index of Industrial Production, 1955-69.
Source: R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan 
1960-1970, Cambridge, 1982, p. 22.
The drive behind the increase in manufacturing output was 
provided by private industrial investment. The incentives provided 
to industry initiated a process of transition where entrepreneurs who 
were originally traders with merchant capital became venture 
capitalists. The rate of return on industrial investment was so high 
that industrialists were able to recover their initial investments 
within one to two years lead time from initial investment. In the 
early 1960s, the rate of economic growth was more than double the 
rate of population growth. The following table provides the
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manufacturing index of industrial production, 1959-69:
Table 2.6
Pakistan- Index of Industrial Production^
(Base Year: 1959-60)
Year Value Index P e r c e n t a g e
increase/(decrease) 
over previous year
1959-60 100.0
1960-61 123.4 23.4
1961-62 139.0 12.6
1962-63 161.9 16.5
1963-64 184.2 13.8
1964-65 210.6 14.3
1965-66 234.4 11.3
1966-67 274.5 17.1
1967-68 310.8 13.2
1968-69 355.7 14.4
 ^For an index of money wages, cost of living and real wages, 
see S. Guisinger, ‘Trade Policies and Employment: The Case 
of Pakistan’, in A. Kreuger et al, Trade and Employment in 
Developing Countries, Chicago, 1981, Table 7.13, p. 324. The 
lower the fluctuations in commodity prices, the more stable the 
economy, whereas inflation and deflation are indicators of the 
opposite.
Source: Central Statistical Office, Index of Industrial 
Production- Pakistan, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1969.
The industrial spurt of 1964-65, was a follow up of capital 
accumulation which occurred in the previous decade. To set up 
industry, capital was required to produce producers’ goods as against 
consumer goods. Since this capital was not voluntarily forthcoming.
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it was generated by proxy State industrialisation, through the 
creation of the PIDC and financial institutions, which opened up 
credit markets for industry. Local currency capital could be 
purchased by our business groups from the organised sector at 
interest rates of 6-8 percent.®  ^ State-supported subsidies in turn 
ensured that capital formation remained low which led to a vicious 
circle, inhibiting production of capital goods. The index of 
manufacturing output averaged at 2.3 percent during 1970-77, 9.9 
percent during 1977-82 and 8.3 percent in 1983. The consumer goods 
sub-sector showed a steady decline but if the share of textile is 
excluded from it then its growth rate improves. The intermediate 
goods sector also showed, growth rates except fi*om 1978-82 with 
fertiliser and petroleum production being the major catalysts. From 
1981-88 the growth in the automotive industry was the result of the 
government’s investment policies which favoured investments made 
in the light engineering sector.
All business groups studied in this research were initially from a 
nascent entrepreneurial class which emerged as a response to Ayub’s 
economic incentives,®"  ^ which facilitated the transition from
®®See M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, 
p. 41.
®^ See A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, Harvard, 1966, 
p. 326, where he describes that the finality of migration in an 
entrepreneurial class reinforces its zest for stability in a new milieu. 
The migrating communities to Pakistan adopted industrial 
investments as a vocation, through a frenzy of acquiring resources, 
especially when Ayub’s partiality to them was forthcoming.
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merchant to industrial capital.®  ^ The factors Initially fadUtated 
this, were removed once Ayub’s regime was overthrown. By the close 
of the 1960s, a series of events emerged, largely economic with their 
attendant political constraints which created difficulties for the 
interventionist State model to continue. Ayub’s policies accentuated 
the economic difference between the newly emerging capitalist class 
and the urban proletariat.®® The anti-Ayub movement was also 
fuelled by the increase in prices®  ^ after a period of relative price 
stability.®® Once the political consensus which buttressed the 
interventionist regime started to break down, policy-makers found it 
increasingly difficult to mediate the growing conflict between the
®®This is discussed in further detail in the study on the Crescent 
and Ghulam Faruque Groups, Chapters Four to Five, pp. 261-412.
®®The Gerschenkronian view on how the old order is threatened 
by industrialisation is discussed in Sylla and Toniolo, (eds.), opcit, 
The Patterns of European Industrialisation^ Routledge, 1991, p. 7.
67 ,The general price index in the 1960s moved as follows:
1959/60 100.0 1965/66 117.5
1960/61 103.1 1966/67 133.9
1961/62 105.9 1967/68 128.6
1962/63 104.8 1968/69 136.1
1963/64 104.6 1969/70 140.0
Source: Central Statistical Office, Twenty-Five Years o f Pakistan in 
Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1972.
®®H. Feldman provides an in-depth analysis of Ayub’s psyche, first 
as a military ruler to that as President of Pakistan. [In From Crisis 
to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, pp. 237-271], Feldman provides an account of 
the events which led to the dismissal of the Ayub regime, with the 
decline in real wages after 1965, as a contributory factor, which is 
discussed in S. Guisinger, ‘Trade Policies and Unemployment: The 
Case of Pakistan’, in A. Kreuger, et al, Trade and Employment in 
Developing Countries, Chicago, 1981, p. 325.
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State and the elements of dissent within it. Since the State had not 
developed anticipatory responses to the changes which ensued, it led 
to an increased resistance from interest groups, which provided the 
impetus for the revival of the left wing political economy which was 
to form a few years later. In 1968, Ayub’s government was 
overthrown after a period of student unrest and dissent from the 
urban professional and industrial labour class, mainly because of his 
policies which favoured capital accumulation for a few famihes.®  ^
An interim period of two years featured the return of Martial Law 
which initiated a dampener effect on private investment, reinforced 
by the economic climate fostered by Bhutto, who acceded to power in 
1971 ."^
In 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was elected Prime Minister of a 
dismembered Pakistan; East Pakistan had seceded and became 
Bangladesh. Bhutto reneged on Ayub’s industrialisation incentives 
by implementing his socialist manifesto,^^ through abolishing the
®^ See, R. Amjad, ‘Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960- 
1970’, Ph.D. thesis. University of Cambridge, 1977, p. 10.
^^Martial Law was imposed by General Yahya Khan who initiated 
the reversal of a number of economic incentives provided to 
industrialists in the Ayub era, recorded in a government document, 
as the ‘Bulletin, State Bank of Pakistan’. For a reversal of Ayub’s 
economic policies during 1969-71, see. State Bank of Pakistan, 
Bulletin, State Bank o f Pakistan, July 1971, State Bank of Pakistan, 
1971, p. XXV.
^^The objectives of the Pakistan Peoples Party are given in its 
Election Manifesto, Pakistan People’s Party, 1972, pp. 3-53.
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managing agency system^^ and by nationalising key industries. 
Initially 31 industrial units were nationalised in 1972 and their
^^The managing agency system was introduced by the British in 
undivided India to further their economic stronghold over the newly 
annexed territories to the Empire. The initiation of this system was 
by forming merchant houses [in British India] for representing the 
interests of the foreign direct investors; these merchant houses were 
then developed in to a managing agency system, with the 
introduction of a sales branch which was ultimately replaced by 
managing of a production facility. This description of managing 
agencies is available in S. Nicholas, ‘Locational Choice, Performance 
and the Growth of British Multinational Firms’, in C. Harvey, (ed.). 
Business History, Concepts and Measurements, Frank Cass, 1989, p. 
131. In India, this system was originally designed to separate 
ownership from control, where managers optimised group objectives 
even if it meant that its shareholders’ interests were made 
subordinate to it. This is discussed in the economic context of British 
business administrators in India in, B.R. Tomlinson, ‘British 
Business in India, 1860-1970’, in R. Davenport-Hines and G. Jones, 
(eds.), British Business in Asia Since 1860, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 96- 
99. Also see, B.R. Tomlinson, ‘Writing History Sideways: Lessons for 
Indian Economic Historians from Meiji Japan’, Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1985, p. 695, for the changing role of 
managing agencies in early nineteenth century undivided India. 
After 1947, in Pakistan the spirit behind the managing agency 
system had altered, in that it was essentially a business entity 
administered by a managing group in whom were vested powers to 
contribute to the equity of and to receive commission from the sale 
proceeds of the produce of subsidiary companies. The decision­
makers in the managing agency system were usually the same 
entrepreneurs who managed other units in the group, and so 
exercised partiality in decisions which were commensurate with the 
larger interests of the group. Effectively, a 15 percent share 
ownership vested with the managing agents gave them practically 
100 percent control over the decisions made for the entire group; 
however managing agents usually owned 51 percent shares in all 
subsidiaries of the groups. These were the views of Razak Dawood, 
a senior industriahst of the Dawood Group, interviewed, 26 October 
1991. Also see Z. Altafs [study on] Pakistani Entrepreneurs, Croom 
Helm, 1983, p. 103, where he cites a feudal entrepreneur’s estimate 
that managing agents ‘siphoned-off profits, which ranged between 
2.5 percent and 7.5 percent of a company’s annual profits.
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management entrusted to a Board of Industrial Management 
(BIM)/^ a public-sector entity which managed 10 holding 
corporations in industries such as the iron and steel, heavy 
engineering, motor vehicles, heavy electrical equipment, fertihser, 
shipping, petroleum distribution, heavy and basic chemicals including 
petro-chemicals, pubUc utilities such as electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution, cement, natural gas and oil refining, 
vegetable ghee and insurance/^ In 1974 another spate of 
nationalisation of industry followed, targeted at commercial and 
agricultural banks and the shipping industry/^ The spate of the 
1972-74 nationalisation of industry had a dampener effect on private 
industrial investment. The following table depicts this trend:
^^The management structure and powers assigned to the BIM are 
given in, Naveed Hasan, Fertiliser Production in the Public Sector, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, 1987, LBS case # 14-041- 
87-1, pp. 4-6.
"^^ These changes were given legal form through the Managing 
Agency and Election of Directors Order, 1972, also known as the 
Presidential Order No: 2/72, 1972.
^®This was nationahsed under the ‘Pakistan Maritime Shipping 
[Regulation and Control] Ordinance, 1974’.
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Table 2.7
Incremental Private Industrial Investment
Year Value
(Rs millions)
1971 1426
1972 1235
1973 964
1974 970
Source: R.M.U. Suleman, ‘Manufacturing Industry Public and 
Private’, Pakistan and Gulf Economist, February, 25, 1978, p. 
24.
To meet the need for specialised credit for the new industrial 
amalgam under the nationalised mode, new Development Finance 
Institutions (DFl) were established. The National Development 
Finance Institution (NDFC) was one such lending institution formed 
in 1973.^ ® During Bhutto’s rule, these institutions did not service 
a significant share of the private-sector’s credit needs. It was during 
the Zia regime that the DFl’s role matured, as financiers of private- 
sector industry.
In 1977, General Zia assumed power as President, through a 
military coup d'etat which overthrew Bhutto.^^ Zia’s new industrial
^®The NDFC was established under the National Development 
Finance Corporation Act, 1973, [Act No. Xlll of 1973], as a wholly 
owned government lending institution, with an initial share capital 
of Rs 100 million and with a further Rs 30 million contributed by the 
Federal government as the paid-up capital.
^^The economic and political factors which led to the dismissal of 
the Bhutto government are available in the Government of Pakistan, 
White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Mr Zulfeqar
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policy engendered the return of business confidence in private 
industrial investments/® His aim was intended at shifting the 
emphasis away fi'om State control of industry and towards private- 
sector entrepreneurship to flourish. Zia’s policy of privatisation was 
manifest in the partial deregulation of State-owned industries to its 
original owners, albeit executed at staggered intervals. In 1977, the 
cotton ginning, rice husking and wheat milling mills were 
denationalised. In order to restore the investors’ confidence, the 
government also introduced ‘The Protection of Rights in Industrial 
Property Order, 1979’, whereby private industrial investment would 
not be arbitrarily acquired by the government, except where justified 
by the law to do so in the larger interest of the puhhc good. In 1978, 
machinery imports for Balancing Modernisation and Replacement 
(BMR) schemes were abolished and the permissable imported value 
of goods raised from Rs 5 million to Rs 10 million.^® The Uqaili 
Commission Report of 1979, extended the justification for 
denationalisation, by listing the factors which had previously 
contributed to the deteriorating production and financial performance
Ali Bhutto, His Family and Associates, Headquarters of the Chief of 
Army Staff, Vol. 1, 1979.
^®See Ministry of Industries, Industrial Policy Statement, 
Government of Pakistan, June 1984, pp. 5-32 and Zia’s speech. 
Government of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of 
the Army S ta ff and Chief Martial Law Administrator, Address to the 
Nation, Headquarters of the Army Staff, 25 June 1978, p. 10.
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of the nationalised industries.^® The release of this report was 
followed by further denationalisation of a portion of the taken-over 
industries during the Bhutto regime. This new emphasis on 
privatisation was apparent in new investments made in the capital 
intensive, investment goods sector, such as assembly of automobiles 
and tractors and erection of new steel-based and cement plants. 
Producers of locally manufactured machinery were also made eligible 
for obtaining finance from the State Bank of Pakistan. The intent 
was to encourage deletion of imported components in favour of 
producing them locally. The State Bank of Pakistan’s ‘Locally 
Manufactured Machinery Scheme’ provided concessionary rates of 
credit a t 3 percent compared to the normal bank lending rate of 14 
percent.
The government’s strategy for investment also embraced large- 
scale manufacturing and trade in public-sector enterprise with its 
intended spin off effects in the private-sector. The private-sector 
responded to these incentives by financing investment in new 
industry through DFI loans rather than from capital generated from 
other companies within the business groups.®  ^ DFIs provided
®®The Government of Pakistan appointed a commission on 31 
October 1977, led by N.M. Uquaili, [who was also the chairman, of a 
government lending institution, PICIC], to review the status of State 
enterprise, with regard to the problems faced by the management of 
nationalised industries, in order to suggest remedial measures.
®^ This is explained in Stephen R. Lewis Jr., Pakistan 
Industrialisation and Trade Policies, London, 1970a, p. 8.
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medium- and long-term finances to industry, by underwriting new 
issue of shares, provision of debentures and bridge financing. They 
also acted as intermediaries attracting other sources of finance used 
for forthcoming investment. This was achieved by conducting project 
appraisals and supervising the fabrication of industrial units. The 
project assistance provided by DFIs was intended to lead to better 
scrutiny of capital, production and marketing costs and in improving 
the financial structure of the recipient units.
In the 1980s, the DFIs were a significant contributor to financing 
a package of incentives offered to investors. Zia’s industrial policy 
also changed the Bhutto government’s stipulation that DFIs could 
only extend credit as working capital loans for public-sector 
industrial projects to also include extension of credit to private-sector 
enterprise. In 1980, a bank for industrial development. Banker’s 
Equity Limited (BEL) was formed drawing its equity from the State 
Bank @ 40 percent, with the remainder 60 percent financed by the 
Pakistan Banking Council and the (still) nationalised hanks. BEL’s 
provided local and foreign currency loans to finance the equity of 
private industrial units. BEL’s criteria for loan extension to 
businesses was closely monitored by other DFIs, since the latter 
financed a portion of all BEL credit extended to industry. BEL’s loan 
disbursements to industry increased from Rs 52 million in 1981 to 
652 million in 1986 and through its syndication with the DFIs, was 
able to arrange disbursement of a further Rs 28 million in 1981 to Rs
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244 million in 1986.*  ^ By 1987, the Industrial Development Bank 
of Pakistan (IDBP) had also revised its credit policies, in prioritising 
extension of working capital loans for the engineering and export-led 
industries. Its equity was wholly subscribed by the government and 
its controlled institutions.
With the expansion in the credit base emanating from the new 
industrial policy, the DFIs were given a new lease of life after the 
turbulent Bhutto years. These changes concerning credit extension 
were formally organised under the Banking Companies (Recovery of 
Loans) Ordinance, 1979 and the Banking and Financial Services 
(Amendments of Law) Ordinance, 1984. This reiterated the Zia 
government’s intent to propel development of key industries in the 
chemicals, automobiles, petrochemicals and in the light and heavy 
engineering sectors which till then had remained neglected by the 
State. DFl loans to the private-sector were extended on relatively 
low rates of interest, which were meant for financing locally 
manufactured machinery. These interest rates ranged from 3 to 6 
percent per annum, compared with 11 to 13 percent per annum 
charged by the commercial scheduled banks on loans meant for other 
categories of investments. By 1986 there were twelve DFIs involved
^^See S.M. Ghayasuddin, ‘New Priorities for Industries, Increased 
Sanctions’, Dawn, 28 March 1987, p. II.
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in credit extension to industry.®^ The government also eradicated 
the need for prior investment sanctions for the fertiliser, cement, 
heavy mechanical and electrical plants, petrochemicals, ships, 
aircraft, basic steel, metal and alloys.^ In 1986, import duty was 
exempted on machinery purchased for use by the fertiliser, ready­
made garments, hosiery, towel and textile processing units. 
Concessionary rates of duty were provided to locally assembled 
automotive vehicles such as, buses, trucks, station wagons, jeeps, 
pick-ups, motor cycles and auto rickshaws. If the produce was 
intended for export any raw material imports were also exempted 
from payment of import duty, under the ‘Bonded Manufacture 
Scheme and Temporary Import Scheme’.®® Any industrial venture 
requiring machinery imports as its only imports, were permitted to
®®These were the (a) Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, 
(b) Banker’s Equity Limited, (c) Equity Participation Fund, (d) 
Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, (e) Investment 
Corporation of Pakistan, (f) National Development Finance 
Corporation, (g) National Development Leasing Corporation Limited, 
(h) National Investment Trust, (i) Pak-Libya Holding Company, (j) 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation, (k) Pak- 
Kuwait Investment Company, (1) Regional Development Finance 
Corporation, (m)Pak-Saudi Industrial and Agricultural Investment 
Company and (n) Small Business Finance Corporation.
®^ See N.A. Memon, ‘Industrial Investment on the Rise’, Pakistan 
and Gulf Economist, 5-11 March 1988, p. 13.
®®The need for rationalising of the economic incentives package 
offered by the Zia government to investors, see, R.H. Syed, 
‘Incentives for Industrial Development’, Pakistan and Gulf 
Economist, 10-16 May 1986, pp. 17-23.
^^Ibid.
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do so without seeking permission from the government, made 
possible under the ‘Non-Repatriable Investment Scheme’. The 
Deregulation Commission also approved the removal of price 
subsidies on sugar and wheat hour in 1986.®^
Additional sources of financing industrial investments were from 
the resources of the NDFC. By 1986, the NDFC grew to be the 
largest DFl in terms of its asset size which were then valued at Rs 
9.4 billion.®® A possible reason for its increase in assets stemmed 
from its tax fi^ ee status up to 1986 and funds accumulated from its 
deposit mobilisation strategy.®® By 1988, it was made [by the 
Economic Coordination Committee of the Federal Cabinet], the 
official window through which power generation projects owned by 
the private-sector were financed.
Other factors which restored the private-sectors’ confidence in 
forthcoming investments was provided in the reorganisation of three 
exogenous factors; a) the removal of‘direct’ controls for market forces 
to regulate foreign trade and industrial investment, b) an increase in 
foreign aid, particularly of US origin and c) a change in the fiscal and
®^ An article by R. Jabir, ‘Deregulation’, Pakistan and Gulf 
Economist, 25-31 January 1986, pp. 14-15, focuses on the impact of 
the Zia regime economic package on investment.
®®Source: A column article by a staff reporter in Dawn, 31 March 
1987.
®®Sources of funding of DFIs from 1972-76, is available in an 
article by D.M. Qureshi, ‘Financial Institutions in Pakistan’, Pakistan 
Economist, 8 March 1978, p. 26, Appendix I.
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monetary exchange policy, which favoured e x p o rts .H o w e v e r, 
industry was protected as such, and so retarded spontaneous reaction 
to international competition. This depicted a comeback of the ISI 
climate reminiscent of the 1960s. From 1978 to 1982, the per annum 
growth rate in manufacturing was 9 percent, of manufactured 
exports 8 percent and private investment in the large-scale 
manufacturing (LSM) sector was 12 percent. The export performance 
was enhanced since exporters were allowed a refund of import duties 
paid for raw materials used in the manufacture of exported goods 
which indicated a return of business confidence in the government’s 
commitment to protect industry. The import policy from 1987 to 
1988 declared a ban on the import of transformers, switch gear, 
cranes, pumps and generators on the grounds that they were being 
locally produced.®^
According to James, Nay a and Meier, the differences in GDP 
growth in Pakistan in the early 1980s, was not a function of the 
difference between the savings and investment rate, rather were a 
result of the types of investments made.®  ^ They assign such
®®The taxation structure during Zia’s regime is available in 
Ministry of Finance, Taxation Structure of Pakistan, Government of 
Pakistan, 5 June 1976, pp. 1-51.
®^ See article by S.M. Fazal, ‘Engineering Industry: Victim of 
Neglect by Policy Makers’, Pakistan and Gulf Economist, 25 February 
1989 - 3 March 1989, pp. 14-16.
®^ See W. James, S. Naya and G. Meier, Asian Development: 
Economic Success and Policy Lessons, Wisconsin, 1987, pp. 75-76.
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investments as the contributory factors which made Pakistan achieve 
a real GDP growth rate in the early 1980s, nearly twice that of 
India’s, with an investment rate that was only two-thirds as much as 
the latter’s.®^ Other exogenous factors which propelled economic 
growth in the 1980s, were the overseas workers’ remittances to their 
families in Pakistan; these registered a rise from US $ 339 million in 
the financial year (FY) 1976 to US $ 2.8 billion in the FY 1983.
However, in spite of Zia’s commitment to enhance private
investments, two decades after Pakistan’s first industrial spurt, the
development of the industrial structures had stiU not undergone a
radical change. In the 1980s, industrialists were still doing the
wrong things efficiently, namely successful tax evasion and in not
reinvesting in internal organisational systems. A senior industrialist
Muhammad Faruque, of the Ghulam Faruque Group claimed that:
‘underinvoicing of exports in yam  makes money ... US $ half 
to one million is creamed off overseas [by underinvoicing] on 
a 14,500 spindles mill [on average]...Given [that there are] 
13,500 textile mills in the country, [which means that] US $ 
3 billion a month [is the loss to the government as illegally 
tran sfe rred  income to overseas accounts from 
underinvoicing]
Therefore imports were once again officially overstated, and it was 
the inefficient importer who enjoyed monopoly profit and power.
^^Interview, 15 March 1992.
95 /’Corrupt methods adopted by importers are highlighted in G. 
Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, pp. 16 and 113; for 
overinvoicing see, G. Winston, ‘Overinvoicing and Industrial
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A weak infrastructure nurtured the tendency to avoid investing in 
internal organisational support fruictions, which was evident inspite 
of the State’s assurance that entrepreneurial effort would be 
rewarded. The incentives provided by the bureaucracy to encourage 
entrepreneurs were in areas where the multiplier effects and the 
value-added were relatively low.^ ® This led to a dechne in 
manufacturing value-added during the 1 9 8 0 s . T h i s  was owing to 
investment sanctions provided to those industries as perceived by 
bureaucrats to have demand for its products in excess of its supply. 
The rationale for this perception was based on informal channels of 
feedback from randomly selected sources than on rehable data 
obtained from market intelligence reports. Usually industrial 
feasibility studies were contracted out to consultants who were 
protected under a pohtical umbrella which made it incumbent for 
credit-lending institutions to adopt their recommendations. 
Feasibility studies funded by the World Bank and the USAID were 
particularly prone to this rationale of partiality, which at times 
inaccurately reflected an unviable industrial project as worthy of 
receiving credit from the DFIs. One effect of the inconsistent 
criterion for provision of investment sanctions was reflected in the
Efficiency’, in K. Griffith, and A. Khan, (eds.). Growth and Inequality 
in Pakistan, Macmillan, 1972, pp. 169-187.
®®For further insights into partiality in industrialisation, see Z. 
Altaf, Entrepreneurship in the Third World, Groom Helm, 1988, p. 3.
^'^Ihid.
102
fluctuating machinery imports for industrial use from 1983-87 as 
follows:
Table 2.8
Import of Industrial Plant and Machinery 
Rs (millions)
Description 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 % 1986-87 %
Power Generation
Machinery 1,285 2,826(119) 2,738 (-3) 2,282 (-17)
Machinery for
Specialised Industry 6,168 6,671 (8) 6,881 (3) 7,524 (9)
Metal Working Mach. 233 291 (25) 674(132) 491 (-27)
Machinery & Equip. 2,236 2,486 (11) 2,753 (11) 2,687 (-2)
 ^Figures in parenthesis represent a percentage increase or decrease 
over the previous year’s imports. Consumer price inflation was 
1985=7.5 %, 1986=4.8 %, 1987=3.9 %, 1988=6.3 %, ElU, [Economist 
Intelligence Unit Country Report, Pakistan and Afghanistan,, No. 4, 
1989].
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
Government of Pakistan, issue nos: July 1984, Vol., 32, No. 6, pp. 
146-176; July 1985, Vol., 33, No. 7, pp. 148-180; July 1986, Vol., 34, 
No. 7, pp. 174-210; July 1987, Vol., 35, No. 7 pp. 242-272.
Investment sanctions involved a lengthy discourse with red tape 
orchestrated by the bureaucracy. To specify a few factors, permission 
to sanction a factory involved, the approval of the provincial 
government to install gas, electricity and telephone connections, and 
the procurement of labour; an agreement with the financial 
institutions for debt financing;^® the approval of the chief controller
^^Finandal Institutions were all those banking and non-banking 
institutions which provided or assisted investors to access short- and
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of imports to finance machinery; the approval of the Security 
Exchange Corporation of Pakistan, and the permission for supply of 
energy fi*om the Water and Power Development Authority, a State 
monopoly generating and distributing water and electricity for 
private- and public-sector consumption. The multiple steps leading 
to approvals encouraged abuse of powers vested with officials in 
connivance with the approval-seekers. At times, documents 
authorising a credit facility, originally charged at 6 percent under the 
Export Finance Scheme, were resold in the local market in collusion 
with the customs and excise staff.
In 1988, the government’s apparent attempt to restore business 
confidence in private industrial investment was again articulated, on 
this occasion through the formation of a National Disinvestment 
Authority. The shares of fourteen loss-making public sector 
corporations were offered for sale to the pubhc at a price less than 
the par [face] value of its shares. The share value of these units 
stood at Rs 2 bilhon in 1986.^ ® The par value of its shares was Rs 
10 per share and the price offered for privatisation was @ Rs 9.32 per
long-term loans to industry. Non-banking financial institutions could 
not lend from their own reserves by law, rather they acted as a 
conduit to access finance from banks which was then lent to 
industrial users under the guidance and discretion of the directors of 
the non-banking financial institution.
®®See R. Jabir, ‘Deregulation’, Pakistan and Gulf Economist, 25-31 
January 1986, pp. 14-15, p. 14.
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s h a r e . I n  spite of this lucrative offer, the 14 loss making units 
identified by this unit for re-sale to the private-sector met with 
unsuccessful results at their disposal. Their loss-making status along 
with the predominantly labour-intensive mode of production were 
disincentives for forthcoming private capital investment in these 
units. In spite of the government’s commitment on paper to assist in 
the divestiture of public enterprise in favour of the private-sector, the 
rise in the share of the latter in total investment, (1979-88) remained 
low. The divestiture policy remained essentially a mix of re-sale of 
government-sponsored corporations to the private-sector through sale 
of 49 percent shares to its employees and the remainder disposed off 
through public subscription. Eglin stated, that in spite of Zia’s 
incentives, growth remained slow owing to a weak infi*astructure, 
energy constraints and recurrent devaluation of the currency. He 
elaborated, that after 1977 the delimitating factors were from 
increased government capital expenditure which in constant prices 
remained one-third short of the target planned in the Fifth Five Year 
Plan.^°^ Reasons given by Eglin for this shortfall in 1983, were a 
reduction in foreign aid, and construction projects falling short of 
their completion targets, and only 14 percent of the labour force
^°°The Zia regime’s disinvestment policy is critically analysed in 
A.H. Khan, ‘Disinvestment’, and Gulf Economist^ 10-16 May
1986, pp. 15-16.
^®^ See D R. Eglin, ‘The Economy’, in Richard F. Nyrop, (ed.), 
Pakistan, A  Country Study, The United States Government, 1983, p. 
141.
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employed in industry, as against 55 percent in agriculture/®^ The 
Zia government attempted to treat the budget deficit shortfall by 
raising revenue from issuing government bonds. Owing to their 
appeal to the public the incidental success of these schemes did 
result in growth occurring in pockets in an overall period of slow 
investment. The following table shows a relatively low but more 
consistent level of private investment made during the Zia regime 
compared to its relatively unstable performance in the Bhutto era:
^®^ See M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, 
p. 62, for an evaluation of the factors which reduce government 
expenditure. Government expenditure depends on its revenue from 
saving schemes, cash deposits, taxation and other income from taxes 
and duties on imports and exports. Haq suggests that if the saving 
rate declines then government income should be augmented by 
taking recourse to foreign assistance in the form of loans and grants. 
If such aid is not forthcoming, it reduces the government’s income as 
well as expenditure.
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Table 2.9
Trends in Private Investment (Base year,1959-60=100) 
Year Percentage Share in
Total Investment GDP
1960-61 57.9 7.6
1965-66 54.8 9.7
1970-71 50.1 7.0
1974-75 32.1 4.6
1970-71 50.1 7.0
1974-75 32.1 4.6
1979-80 39.3 6.3
1980-81 39.3 6.1
1981-82 36.4 5.6
1982-83 38.4 6.0
1983-84 40.4 6.1
1984-85 41.4 6.2
1985-86 41.2 6.1
1986-87 40.7 6.3
1987-88 42.1 6.2
Source: Economic Survey, various issues.
Zia’s deregulation policies were intended to restore business 
confidence which led to private industrial investment gradually 
picked up after 1982. The incentives for industrial investment were 
realised in an increase in the absolute rate of investment from Rs 
3,332 million in 1973-77 (Bhutto era) to 8742 milhon in 1978-80, 
(portion of the Zia era), registering an increase of 162 percent.
Zia’s industriahsation policy also generated an investment climate 
which was reminiscent of Ayub’s incentive structure of the 1960s. To 
recapitulate a few points, post-tax profit increased with the
^^^Source: Q. Raza, ‘Industrial Revival in Pakistan’, Pakistan 
Economist, 16 August 1980, pp. 27-31.
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introduction of five-year tax holidays for new industries located in 
specified districts, the partial exemption of custom’s duty on imported 
machinery, and the réintroduction of accelerated depreciation 
allowance in 1977-88, albeit with a difference; the trend was [then] 
on encouraging private investment in the light to heavy engineering 
industries. Imports were encouraged if they were intended as raw 
materials used in exported goods. This provided investors with an 
opportunity to once again overstate imports in order to access foreign 
exchange, as had occurred during the Ayub regime. Therefore, 
private industrial investment did not depict structural changes of the 
kind that concurred with four decades [except the six years of 
Bhutto’s rule] of policy orchestrated at industrial development.
2.3 Structural Changes and Linkage Effects of the 
Industrial Policy
The economic incentives of Ayub were conducive to new 
investments for industry, and provided a base for nurture capitalism 
to flourish. Such incentives to accumulate wealth in the 1960s made 
it easier for existing business houses to entre new domestic and 
export markets. The PIDC-led investments in producers’ goods was 
part of the ISI pohcies of the 1960s. These investments in the capital 
goods sector were made when domestic demand and infrastructure 
supported production of consumption goods. Therefore PIDC 
investment, reduced the lead time required for industry to bridge the 
gap between production of consumption goods to that of intermediate
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and capital goods production/®^
It was the government’s liberal policies of the late 1950s that pre­
empted the high rate of economic growth in the mid-1960s. State 
largesse in the 1950s was directed at promoting consumer goods 
production and not investment goods. The increase in intermediate 
and capital goods productivity of the 1960s was a follow-up from the 
trend set in 1956-59, when almost half of trading returns were 
reinvested in manufacturing industry. State largesse in the 
1960s was evident by introduction of fiscal and monetary measures, 
such as an over-valued exchange rate, import controls on consumer 
goods, and tax holidays to industry. Prices of manufactured goods 
were kept artificially high through heavy protection. Prices increased 
for intermediate goods such as fertiliser, along with food and tobacco 
in the consumer goods industry. Prices for direct inputs to 
agriculture such as machinery and seed were kept low, with this 
subsidy also benefitted the textile industrialist. The increase in 
productivity in the intermediate and capital goods sector in the 1960s 
was a saving grace from the unsuccessful attempt to increase 
manufacturing output in 1956-57. The businesses which invested in 
manufacturing units in the early 1960s, contributed to and
104/phis occurrence again challenges Rostow’s pre-determined 
stages of growth as described in W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic 
Growth, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 6-13.
®^®See G. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 
198.
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benefitted from an increase in demand of its machines in the 
agricultural sector.^ ®® The overall effect in the 1960s, was an 
increase in value added in the economy, achieved through protection 
and after its removal there is a decline in value added in the 
producers goods sector. By 1962, the main industries on the 
government’s development agenda were in the intermediate and 
capital goods sectors, such as the cement, metalworking, paper and 
chemical. From 1963 to 1970, growth in manufacturing induced from 
the ISl policies alone, increased output in the investment goods 
sector by 26 percent. In the same period, consumer goods growth 
in manufacturing from ISl adoption, increased output by 15 
percent.^®® Therefore the investments initiated in intermediate 
goods were not entirely a function of market forces, rather the 
outcome of proxy industrialisation. There was a mix whereby both 
consumer and intermediate goods production occurred simultaneously 
in spite of industrialisation not having reached maturity.
®^®For theoretical literature on the stages of growth and 
industrialisation, see P. A. David, ‘The Mechanisation of Reaping in 
the Ante-Bellum Midwest’, in H. Rosovsky (ed.). Industrialisation in 
Two Systems, John Wiley, 1966, p. 5.
^^^Source: S. Guisinger, ‘Trade Policies and Unemployment: The 
Case of Pakistan’, in A. Kreuger, et al. Trade and Employment in 
Developing Countries, Chicago, 1981, p. 303.
^^Hhid,
^^^For further readings on levels of protection and the trade 
regime, see S. Guisinger, ‘Trade Policies and Unemployment: The 
Case of Pakistan’, in A. Kreuger, et al. Trade and Employment in 
Developing Countries, Chicago, 1981, pp. 312-314. In 1963-64 the
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Rostow’s maturity stage indicates industrial take off after 20-25 of a 
nation’s formation, yet in Pakistan investments in chemicals and 
electrical equipment were apparent just 15 years after the nation was 
formed/^® A peculiarity of these industries was their high capital 
investment per unit of output and an extended lead time for 
production. The paper and chemicals industry employed economies 
of scope where common raw material and distribution costs were 
shared by jointly produced products.
Ayub’s trade liberalisation policies distorted resource allocation^ 
by favouring sale of PIDC units to key industrialists and import and
highest rate of eftective protection in the consumer goods sector was 
for textiles @ 733 percent, in the intermediate goods sector was for 
wood and lumber @ 1150 percent and in the investment goods sector 
was for basic metals @ 525 percent.
“ °See W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 
1990, p. 9.
^^^Economies of scope capture production efficiencies which divide 
costs by allocating them to jointly produced and related products, see 
an explanation in A. Chandler, in Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990,
p. 18.
^^^Anti-interventionist theories advocated wastage of government 
resources and the inability of the bureaucracy to monitor the 
behaviour of the private sector and Ayub’s regime was culpable on all 
such counts. For a debate on the effect of the bureaucracy on 
economic institutions, see W. Niskanen, Bureaucracy: Servant or 
Master'^ Lessons from America, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973, 
pp. 16-17 and 39-40, and C. Rowley, ‘The Political Economy of the 
Public Sector’, in R.B. Jones, (ed.). Perspectives on Political Economy, 
Frances Pinter, 1983, pp. 17-63 and R.B. Jones, ‘Perspectives on 
International Political Economy’, in R.B. Jones, (ed.). Perspectives on 
Political Economy, Frances Pinter, 1983, pp. 190-91. These theories 
also find support in Gerschenkronian thought which recognises the 
role of the State in promoting [or failing to promote] industrialisation 
depending on the particular ‘mix’ it adopts.
I l l
export licences which were not awarded on planned criteria such as 
evaluating production levels as a percentage of installed capacity; 
Authority to provide licenses rested with junior officials who abused 
this authority by awarding import licences to those who approached 
them through conduits of nepotism, influence or b r i b e r y / A l s o ,  
industrial sponsors (not included in this study) whose political 
sympathies fell on the wrong side of the bureaucracy, were invariably 
denied flnancial assistance required for pioneering investments/^^ 
The import hcences were not awarded on economic rationale, such as 
comparative advantage, economies of scale, external economies or 
marginal saving rates in the intended industry; rather they were 
based on the discretion of the awarding party and a t times awarded 
to technically unviable p r o j e c t s . T h i s  abuse of authority 
postponed development in the intermediate and capital goods 
industrial sectors. Also, there were no extenuating reasons to 
voluntarily direct profits made from consumption goods sales to be
^^ ^See G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development^ Harvard, 1967, p. 122 
which provides the scenario where the import policy was imbued in 
inefficient practices.
^^^Criteria for funds mobilisation in favour of protected 
industrialists is discussed in an article by D.M. Qureshi, ‘Financial 
Institutions in Pakistan’, Pakistan Economist, 8 March 1978, p. 21.
^^^Similar criteria in sanctioning of licences to favoured 
industrialists occurred in Japan in 1955 under different categories of 
permissable investments. This point is expanded upon in P. 
Armstrong, et at, Capitalism Since 1945, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 136- 
150.
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invested in producing machines used to manufacture producers’ 
goods. The leakages in the system also encouraged ‘hlack’ market 
sales of imported machinery permits originally allocated to larger 
producers who resold them to smaller (ineligible) producers. 
This was one of the reasons why the gains from the new industrial 
policy did could not sustain the unfettered maturing of business 
house investment through those entrepreneurs who originally gained 
from the licensing system. The protected industries became 
oligopolistic because the ISl policies did not produce the gains from 
trade, that too for a domestic market with limited purchasing
117power.
In the 1960s, growth was from supply-led 181 by PIDC sales, since 
the lagging domestic demand was a delimiting factor in developing 
the investment goods industry; one cause being that there were no 
mitigating factors to change the distribution of income and 
consumption patterns which was reflected in the product oflerings 
aimed at those who could afford to buy them.“ ® For a country in
^^ ®See G. Papanek, Pakistanis Development, Harvard, 1967, pp. 
122-23, for further analysis on the drift of resources towards 
inefficient producers, which originated from corruption economic 
systems. To preempt import restrictions, the industrialists would 
stock pile imported inventory, and create further blockages in the 
system.
“ ^See p. 120, for the cartel hoard and monopoly commission.
^^ ®For linkages between taxation and the duty structure which 
structurally changed the economy see M. Haq, The Strategy of 
Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, p. 24.
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the early stages of industrialisation, the absorptive and diffusion 
capacity was slow and the rapid increase in investment could not be 
sustained. Early industrialisation was closely supported and 
monitored by the government with the larger entrepreneurs 
operating in a near monopoly e n v i ro n m e n t . A ls o ,  foreign staff 
recruited as technicians left after initialisation of projects, setting up 
the machines and identifying and training local staff. These factors 
retarded the development of secondary import substitution in the 
intermediate and capital goods s e c t o r s . A n o t h e r  cause for low 
capital formation in the capital goods sector was that the financial 
markets were not sufficiently developed. The limited number of 
companies quoted on the stock exchange inhibited the reallocation of 
profits towards financing the capital goods industry. In 1960 there 
were only 63 publicly quoted manufacturing companies, which 
increased to 70 companies in 1961 and by 1962, there were 75 
publicly quoted manufacturing c o m p a n i e s . A  substantial 
representation of publicly quoted companies suggests a proportionate 
amount of encashable [marketable] securities. The greater their 
number, the greater the willingness of banks to extend credit, since
119'Ibid.
^^ ®For further discussion on structural investment distortions 
arising from Ayub’s industrial manifesto, see R.M.U. Suleman, 
‘Manufacturing Industry Pubhc and Private’, Pakistan and Gulf 
Economist, 25 February 1978, pp. 21-26.
^Source: Dawn, 5 January 1960, 5 January 1961 and 5 January 
1962.
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the mortgage in encashable securities provides substantial cover for 
the banks on long-term loans. This also leads us to the question of 
size; initially business development in two business groups 
where internal organisational systems were not adopted, led to a 
shrinkage of its marketable securities and so retarded its pattern of 
future growth.
The LSM sector growth rate accelerated during the first half of the 
1960s when increased foreign aid and more liberal trade pohcies 
induced strong export-led growth. This positive environment was 
reinforced with concurrent PL 480 aid inflow and government 
subsidies on fertiliser. The Indo-Pak war of 1965 caused a slow 
down in foreign aid [PL 480 aid was suspended by the USA] and the 
emphasis on capital goods intensive manufacturing shifted in favour 
of export-led growth. There was an overall resource constraint and 
to some extent a reversal of the import hberalisation pohcies of the 
first half of the 1 9 6 0 s . T h e  capital goods sub-sector only 
registered high growth rates from 1960-71. During this period, the 
bias against the engineering production component of this sector with
^^^hese were the Wazir Ah and Dawood Groups.
^^ ^See Table 2.4 on Annual Compound Growth Rates, 1959-70.
^^^For PL 480 (Pubhc Law 480) food aid, which mainly comprised 
of wheat seedlings as an agricultural input, provided by the United 
States government to Pakistan, see M. Haq, The Strategy of 
Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, p. 28.
^^ ^See Table 2.4 on Annual Compound Growth Rates.
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its negative rates of protection contributed largely to its lack of any 
significant growth. These events also coincided with a two year 
drought. Cumulatively, these factors caused per annum growth rate 
in LSM to decline from 17 percent from the first half of the 1960s to 
10 percent during the latter half.^ ^® Ayub's fragile ruling coalition 
also ran into trouble from the reduction of foreign aid after 1965 
which caused an external shock to the system. Therefore in 1968, 
hoarding of both wealth and information led to the demise of his ten 
year rule. It was short-sighted of the Ayub to introduce import and 
export trade controls without addressing the inegalitarian income 
distribution patterns which were simultaneously emerging. Exposure 
of the facts which caused a decline in investments and an increase in 
wealth for a few, could have created the extenuating circumstances 
which made incumbent industrialists accountable and perhaps 
avoiding the political onslaught which occurred. These disparities led 
to the overthrow of the Ayub govemment^^^ and imposition of 
Martial Law in 1969.
The economic policies of Bhutto in the 1970s had a dampener effect 
on private investment in the LSM sector. From 1971 to 1974, the 
LSM sector grew at only about 2 percent and production declined in 
real terms. Several major factors account for this dechne, namely the 
sharp dechne in investment levels after the Indo-Pak war, the
^^ ®See Table 2.4 on Annual Compound Growth Rates.
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creation of Bangladesh in 1971; the devaluation of the Rupee in 1972, 
which increased the cost of investment; the abolition of the Export 
Bonus Voucher Scheme which had subsidised this sector; 
reinforcement of the risk averse, entrepreneurial bent in initiating 
medium-size projects, the nationalisation of private industry, finance, 
shipping and the first oil price shock and the subsequent recession 
which ensued. This affected trade in that manufacturing imports 
were 63 percent and exports were 4 p e r c e n t . F r o m  1970 to 1977, 
the commodity producing sector also faced virtual stagnation. 
From 1971 to 1977, growth rates in aU sub-sectors declined, with the 
decline in the capital goods sector being the greatest.
When General Zia assumed power as President in 1977 through a 
military coup d'etat, there was a revival in the LSM sector which 
averaged 9 percent in real terms from 1977 to 1986. Its improved 
performance was initially due to the resurgence of the private-sector 
from its depressed state in the 1970 s .H ow ev e r ,  the value-added 
in LSM in 1983 was well below 1977 levels, since private investment 
in 1983 was 50 percent greater in real terms than in 1977, yet it was
our ce: S. Guisinger, ‘Trade Policies and Unemployment: The 
Case of Pakistan’, in A. Kreuger, et al. Trade and Employment in 
Developing Countries, Chicago, 1981, p. 304.
^^nUd.
^^ ®ln 1977, Zia initiated a reversal of Bhutto’s nationalisation of 
industry by returning a portion of nationalised industries to its 
original owners, safeguarded under the ‘Protection of Rights in 
Industrial Property Order of 1979’.
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only 80 percent of the peak it reached in 1965. Its cause was the 
government’s public investment programme financed mainly from 
external borrowing and increased domestic credit facihties. 
Investments in jute production increased and textile production 
decreased in the consumer goods sector.
Another feature of Pakistan’s economic development since 1950 
(except for the period 1971-77) was the relatively high growth rate of 
the large- and medium-scale manufacturing sector. The relatively 
rapid growth of the LSM sector fi*om 1947 to 1988 generated 
structural linkages. Its share in GDP increased from 2.2 percent in 
1950 to 14.5 percent in 1986, inspite of the delinking of the Rupee 
from the US $ in 1982, when a similar level of investment in real 
terms produced a much smaller absolute level of investment. The 
share of all manufacturing in GDP in 1986 was 19.9 percent. 
Though some sectors grew faster during some sub-periods for the 
period as a whole the LSM sector growth rates were higher than for 
all other sectors (except electricity and gas), which generates 
evidence that the LSM sector has been the leading sector in 
Pakistan’s economic development since independence, and merits 
further study from the point of view of business house investment in 
this sector.^®^
^^%ee Table 2.15 on Net Manufacturing Assets: three business 
houses captured the first ten positions [interchangeably], from 1968- 
88, measured by the value of its net assets.
118
2.4 Interest Group Lobbying: Control Networks
In undivided India the burgeoning business community was 
predominantly Hindu. Industry which vested with the Muslims was 
mainly owned by Dawoodi Bhoras and Punjabi Chiniotis. Their 
liquidity from trade enabled them to make investments in 
industry. The Memons controlled one-fourth of Muslim private 
investment. In Pakistan, by the late 1950s both Chiniotis and 
Memons became prominent in non-traditional manufacturing of 
consumer goods. The Yusfzai Pathans from the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP), also became owners of large-scale modem 
industry. It is from these communities that our business group 
entrepreneurs emerged.
This section addresses the interplay of political and economic 
power which played a key role in the dynamism of capital 
accumulation. Control networks were the influence and power 
wielded by these business personalities for acquisition of resources, 
empowered to do so by their association with Ayub. The bureaucracy 
supported and liaisoned with key industrialists providing the latter 
with the economic and financial benefits for establishing initial 
industry. This haison demonstrated itself in a mechanism of control 
networks employed by business leaders to direct the country's
^^^For kinship factors affecting selection of trade, see G. Papanek, 
Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 55.
i33The Ghulam Famque Group belongs to this Muslim sect.
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economic resources towards the Initiation of their businesses.
Benefits included access to import and manufacturing licences, tax
holidays, bonus vouchers, and discounted foreign exchange. The
military government of Pakistan established by Ayub in 1958,
pronounced its overwhelming commitment to economic development
and industrialisation. In the early 1960s key business
personalities emerged, who enjoyed the favour and became the
confidant of Ayub who declared at a 1965 reception in Karachi,
Tt has been the policy of my government to associate 
representatives of industry and commerce with all agencies of 
Government deahng with their problems and no major decision 
of policy is taken by Government without taking into account 
the views and interests of the business community’.
In the Pakistani case, the ineffective antitrust laws in the 1960s 
assisted the emerging industrialist to amass wealth. The only three 
known monopoly check inquires were conducted by the Credit Inquiry 
Commission (1959), The Cartel Study Group Report (1963), a private 
study by Professor Louis Loss of the Harvard Business School (1964), 
and the Monopoly and Control Ordinance of 1969. None of these 
were seen to be enacted upon, in spite of Ayub’s assurances to the 
contrary, when he said:
^^^he National Economic Council (NEC), was given charge of 
policy formulation. President Ayub was its Chairman along with a 
team of governors, the deputy chairman, of the Planning Commission 
and senior ministerial staff.
Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
unpublished speech of President Ayub at a federation reception held 
on 29 January 1965, in Karachi.
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‘It will be our firm policy, therefore, to prevent excessive 
concentration of income and wealth in the hands of a 
few...’.^ ®^
The after effects of the Ayub-sponsored power group which 
benefitted from fiscal and monetary measures, affected the 
bureaucratic, industrial and feudal structures. The Dawood, 
Crescent, Wazir Ali and Ghulam Faruque Groups had cultural and 
economic characteristics which enabled them to re-establish and 
resume their business interests in Pakistan after migration. Prior to 
immigrating, they were experienced textiles traders. After 
immigrating, they continued to trade in cotton, the country’s major 
export commodity. They were inexperienced in manufacturing 
industry and ownership of land was an economic status symbol 
aspired for in the predominantly feudal territories of Pakistan. 
Therefore, those without land but with the economic means, turned 
towards a manufacturing base in the cotton textile industry. 
This is apparent in the initial investments of all groups studied. 
Since they were one of the first groups in Pakistan to venture forth 
in the textiles business, the Wazir Ali and Dawood Groups’ 
management felt they had a head start over other contestants in 
acquiring industrial licences and so subordinated the need to reorient
^^®Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70, Karachi: 
Government of Pakistan, 1965.
^^ ^See G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 
143, for a reference of rewarding of those individuals who had clout 
with permits over and above those who were more productive. This 
too could lead to managerial inertia.
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its internal organisational procedures on systematic principles. 
These groups were the prime beneficiaries of the government 
licensing system, along with the Ghulam Faruque and Crescent 
groups. By 1962, most of the PIDC units were purchased by at least 
ten business houses, which constituted one-third of total private- 
sector investment in industry. Ghulam Faruque, an industrialist 
who was PIDC’s chairman personally approved PlDC-owned projects 
to be sold to other leading industrialists, such as in the Dawood and 
Crescent groups.
By 1959, PIDC investment amounted to Rs 600 milhon or US $ 120 
million, with its manufacturing assets valued at Rs 850 million or US 
$ 170 m i l l i o n . B y  1960, PIDC had sold Rs 95 milhon or US $ 20 
million of its equity in industrial undertakings to the private- 
sector. However, in spite its claim that the management of its 
units was independent of the private-sectors’ influence, the PIDC 
officials did initially raise equity for one of its projects from the 
Crescent G r o u p . A  further fourteen private-sector entrepreneurs 
supervised the management of PIDC projects worth Rs 189 milhon, 
which were later sold to these i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . Wi t h  the sale of
^^ ®See PIDC, ‘Development programme of the Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation’, unpublished report, PIDC, 1989, p. 17.
p. 17.
p. 23.
"^^ T^he role of private-sector interests and its influence on the 
management of the PIDC is discussed in R.M.U. Suleman,
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PIDC units to industrialists, the private-sector also inherited 
external economies such as trained labour, and pre-constructed 
railways, roads and h a r b o u r s B y  1970, FIDO’s management had 
completed 58 industrial and mining projects at a capital cost of Rs 
1178 milhon, including Rs 248 million contributed by private-sector 
investment in shipbuilding, sugar, textiles, chemicals and paper and 
board mills. These sales to private-sector industrialists were not open 
to the public and those with the contacts and means, acquired 
them.^ ^^
Ahmed Dawood was the founder and doyenne of the Dawood Group 
and his proximity to Ayub paid dividends in his group’s initial 
investments. In 1959, the Dawood Group purchased the Kamaphuli 
Paper Mills from the PIDC and the Burewala Textile MiUs from the 
Ministry of Industries, Government of P u n j a b . T h e  former was 
purchased for Rs 65.9 million with a paid-up capital of Rs 46 miUion, 
and constituted 17 percent or the second largest PIDC sales made in 
terms of value of assets. In 1962, Ayub became increasingly
‘Manufacturing industry: Public and Private’, Pakistan Economist, 25 
February 1978, pp. 21-26.
^^%ee M. Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, Oxford, 1963, 
pp. 33-34.
^^^For more information on PlDC’s criteria for sales is given in R. 
Amjad, Private Industrial Investment, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 188-208; 
also see PIDC, 1989, Annexure 1, p. 63 and Annexure 11, p. 65, for 
PIDC sales to the Dawood and Crescent Groups.
^^^he Dawood Group is discussed on pp. 413-467.
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dependent on the financial resources of wealthy businessmen to fund 
the 1964-1965 e l e c t i ons wh i ch  led to chosen businessmen getting 
political appointments. In 1964, Siddique Dawood, a senior member 
of the Dawood Group was elected to the National Assembly and later 
appointed treasurer of Aynb’s political party, the Mushm League as 
well as the Finance Secretary of its Karachi division. Herbert 
Feldman and Stanley Kochanek in their review of Aynb’s political 
party, the Muslim League, accord it as a carefully controlled devise 
through which he coordinated patronage and co e r c i o n . Ay u b ' s  
son, Gohar Ayub was inducted into business by Ahmed Dawood, who 
assisted Gohar in establishing an automobile assembly plant called 
Ghandhara Indus tries. This proximity to Ayub was also 
replicated in and paid dividends for the initial investments of the 
Wazir Ali, Crescent and Ghulam Faruque Groups.
^^^Ayub gained power in 1958 through a military coup d'etat, and 
changed the validity of his power base from müitary-rule to 
Presidential rule by holding the 1965 elections. For the legitimacy 
of this act see the debate in, H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, 
Oxford, 1972, pp. 68-84.
^^ ®For Aynb’s inroad into the political arena through party 
support, see H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, p. 55. 
A critique on Aynb’s methods of obtaining the political favonr of 
bnsinessmen, is given in S. Kochanek, Interest Groups and 
Development, Business and Politics in Pakistan, Oxford, 1983, pp. 192 
and 204.
^^ ^See H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, pp. 305-6, 
Appendix B, for wealth acquired by Gohar Ayub while his father was 
the President of Pakistan; also see Ibid., p. 235.
^^ ®To quote S. Kochanek in Interest Groups and Development in 
Pakistan, Oxford, 1983, p. 271, to quote, ‘By the late 1960s, however
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Muhammad Amin, a Punjabi Sheikh, and the co-founder with 
Muhammad Bashir of the Crescent Group, was a beneficiary of 
FIDO’s sale of a jute mill. The Crescent Group purchased Crescent 
Jute Products from the PIDC in 1962,^ ^® for Rs 20 million, which 
had a paid-up capital of Rs 12.50 million, representing 5 percent of 
PIDC sales made in 1962. This was purchased firom profits 
generated and availed by the group from the bonus voucher scheme 
in jute manufacturing.^®® Unlike any other group, in 1959 Crescent 
were the first in approaching the PIDC to assist in setting up one of 
its on-going projects. This was a sugar miU, Crescent Sugar Mills 
and Distillery Limited, which the group later purchased from PIDC 
in 1964.
By virtue of their business acumen and comparative advantage. 
Crescent were also able to assimilate and maximise their returns on 
business investments with more ease than those groups which did 
not adopt organisation systems. Collectively, these groups were also 
first movers in acquisition of existing means to enhance their assets 
by acquiring PIDC units and as recipients of licences to encourage 
industrial i n v e s t m e n t . T h e  economic edge which Crescent
business had become so closely identified with Ayub that when the 
regime came under attack, so did the business’.
^^ ®The Crescent Group is discussed on pp. 261-343.
'®®See Table 2.3.
^®^ The investment behaviour of first movers in industry are 
discussed in greater detail in M.B. Lieberman and D.B. Montgomery,
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enjoyed over other industrial contestants was matched by the 
comparative advantage of Dawood, Wazir Ali and Ghulam Faruque 
in having the ear of a series of Presidents and Prime Ministers of 
Pakistan, an association which benefitted their businesses 
financially/®^ Among other important appointments, Amjad Ah, 
the grandson of Wazir Ah, was appointed Pakistani ambassador to 
the US and also was the Minister of Economic affairs in the 
Washington embassy. He was also a PIDC director in 1952-53. His 
brother, Wajid Ah was the public relations representative of his 
group, and was recognised by both local and foreign dignitaries as 
being one of Pakistan’s business leaders.
Ghulam Faruque, chairman of the Ghulam Faruque Group, was 
made the first chairman of PIDC, a position retained by him from 
1952 to 1959. He was one of five PlDC’s directors, and remained 
instrumental in advising senior businessmen to purchase PIDC units. 
As chairman, he had the latitude to take decisions without consulting 
others on the Board, and through his commanding role in industrial 
licensing was able to float his own group of companies in 1964.^ ®^
‘First Mover Advantages’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol, 9, 
1988, pp 4-58.
^®^ See M.B. Lieberman and D.B. Montgomery, ‘First Mover 
Advantages’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol, 9, 1988, pp. 4-58; 
also see H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, pp. 60,170- 
71, on contacts of Ghulam Faruque the entrepreneur, with different 
Heads of State of Pakistan.
^^^Further details on this group are on pp. 344-350.
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While his appointment lasted as PIDC’s chairman, he purchased the 
Sarhad bank from the NWFP government. The bank had Rs 20.2 
million in deposits, and had extended Rs 7.1 million in loans and 
advances and had a paid-up capital of Rs 5 million. Ghulam Faruque 
later became the chairman of a State monopoly which was the 
country’s largest supplier and generator of electricity, the Water and 
Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The following table 
summarises business group share in PIDC investments, prior to their 
sale to the private-sector:
Table 2.10
PIDC Investment in Completed projects (1962)
Name of project/ Paid up Capital:
Group PIDC Private
ownership  
Rs (million)
Crescent Jute Mills Ltd.
/Crescent 5 12.50
Kamaphuli Paper Mills Ltd.
/Dawood 46
Source: PIDC, Annual Report, 1962.
Ayub also reinforced his political support by rewarding the new 
entrepreneurial class with senior positions in government-controlled 
companies. Those industrialists who did not fall under the purview 
of Ayub’s industrial policy, (not included in this study) were 
marginahsed from obtaining financial assistance needed for
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industrial accumulation/®^ The following table shows number of 
private-sector industrialists as directors in government-controlled 
companies:
Table 2.11
Membership on the Boards of Directors o f Government- 
Controlled Companies by the Leading Industrial Families,
1968
Total Number Number of 
of Directors Directors
From Leading 
Families
Pakistan Industrial Credit 
and Investment Corporation 
Pakistan Insurance Corporation 
State Bank of Pakistan 
National Bank of Pakistan 
Bank of Bahawalpur 
Zeal Pak Cement (WPIDC)
Hamai Woollen Mills (WPIDC)
National Shipping Corporation 
Pakistan International Airlines 
Pakistan House International 
Pakistan Services 
Platinum Jubilee Jute Mills 
National Investment Trust
Source: I, Haideri and A. Khan, Stock Exchange Guide of Pakistan, Economic 
Publications, 1968 & Stock Exchange Year Book 1968, Economic Publications, 1968.
These privatisation measures were precursors to the high growth 
rates of the early 1960s spurred by monopoly house investments in 
textiles, paper and sugar mills. As in the USA or Europe where 
assessments for acquisition and viabihty of new businesses are 
preceded by feasibility studies, such criteria was not used for sale of
21 7
9 6
13 2
12 3
10 3
9 4
4 0
9 1
7 2
14 7
18 10
5 0
13 6
^®^Partiality in industrialisation is given more footage in, D M. 
Qureshi, ‘Financial Institutions in Pakistan,’ Pakistan Economist^ 8 
April 1978, pp. 17-21.
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PIDC mills. This was because any official procedure involved in the 
sale of a FIDO unit, could he superseded through the directive of its 
chairman or managing director. These sales, which decentralised 
ownership in favour of the private-sector, enabled the autonomous 
managing of large-scale industry and assured temporary expansion 
in the capital goods industry. However over the long-term, the 
profits generated from the endowment of State hcences to private- 
sector businesses were usually not ploughed back into their 
businesses. A causal factor was bounteous State largesse which 
Papanek described as the rewarding of individuals who possessed 
clout, with licences, in preference to others who did not have 
influence but operated more productive businesses.^®® This is 
discussed in the next section.^ ®®
2.5 Power, Influence and Control: Rent Seeking Activity
In all the business houses studied, businessmen sought economic 
rents by obtaining political appointments and as financiers of 
political movements which reaped for them financial rewards. Time 
and resources were allocated by them to obtain import licences, 
bonus vouchers which were then sold in the ‘black’ market and used
®^®See G. Papanek, Pakistanis Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 
143.
^®®Several studies have tried to analyse the causes of the increase 
in the growth rate during this period. Both W. Falcon and J. Stem, 
‘Pakistan’s Development: An Introductory Perspective’, in W. Falcon 
and G. Papanek, (eds.). Development Policy II, Harvard, 1971, p. 2, 
and R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment, Cambridge, 1982, p. 
190, presents a detailed analysis.
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to boost private investment. These groups exercised control over the 
States’ credit lines for which there was no independent spokesman. 
This was the main conduit through which control networks worked 
in the favour of select industrialists.
Rent-seeking benefits first accrued to select industrialists in the 
1960s. The concept of rent, developed by Kreuger asserts that the 
State assists businessmen in creating entry barriers for resource 
acquisition. These lead to standard deadweight welfare loss as well 
as additional ‘wastage’ fi'om expenditure on ‘unproductive’ political 
activities which are intended to influence the State in is capacity as 
the creator of entry barriers and property r i g h t s . D e a d w e i g h t  
losses may include transfer of income from industriahsts to 
bureaucrats or fi*om businessmen financing political campaigns 
expecting reciprocity of favours from politicians. In such a case, the 
State becomes a predatory agent maximising revenue rather than 
social w e l f a r e . T h e  role of the State in aiding rent-seekers is 
articulated through rent accruing to individuals through diverting 
national resources, which lead to windfall gains for a few. The 
deleterious effects of rent-seeking would be ameliorated if these gains
more detailed explanation of how businesses in India and 
Turkey sought rent-seeking privileges, and as a result the loss in 
output to society, see A. Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent- 
Seeking Society’, The American Economic Review, Issue 64, June 
1974, pp. 291-303.
^^ ®The role of the State as a catalyst of change is discussed in D. 
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge, 1990, p. 128.
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were used to benefit society in a more direct way, rather than expect 
that through their voluntary benevolence, rent-seekers would 
indirectly pass on their benefits to society. The State has to ensure 
that through the machinery at its disposal can limit the windfall 
gains from returning to the private bank accounts of businessmen 
and increase the benefits ploughed back into society.
In the 1950s, government restrictions were imposed on economic 
activities which in fact encouraged aspiring industrialists to compete 
for privileges through the process of rent-seeking. Through this 
route, the pioneering entrepreneurs accumulated wealth through 
channels denied to other less influential businessmen. Knowing that 
the State condoned the by-passing of competitors’ access to the same 
privileges, entrepreneurs maximised rents by whichever means were 
at their disposal. This aspect of collusion prevented the development 
of checks and balances, which led to hoarding of information and 
restricted administrative accountabihty, both in a business or 
political situation. In Pakistan, it was under such conditions that its 
industrial base was set.
Ayub’s industrial policies provided easy money to investors, at a 
time when class structure was forming in the new Pakistan. By the 
early 1950s, there were 3000 industrial firms, with 500 large firms 
having minimum assets of Rs 1 million or US $ 200,000. These firms
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contributed towards 85 percent of value added in the country 
Sixteen families controlled one-quarter of all manufacturing sales. 
In a country with a population of 100 million, they were a noticeable 
number. The organisational structures which reflective of the social, 
cultural and kinship patterns within them, which exerted leverage 
over other factors in determining expansion. The following table 
provides the sources of asset financing in industry, 1959:
^^%ee G. Papanek, ‘Pakistan’s Industrial Entrepreneurs, 
Education, Occupation, Background and Finance’, in W. Falcon and 
G. Papanek, (eds.). Development Policy II- The Pakistan Experience, 
1971, pp. 237-64.
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Table 2.12
Sources of Financing for Industrial Assets which  
Existed in 1959 (at cost)
Rs (millions)
l"Imtial" investment to establish particular units
a) Indigenous Private Investment
Pre-partition industry owned by Pakistani 
citizens 260
Trade import 250
Trade export 130
Trade-internal and Govt, contracting 250
Agricultural land and real estate
sale or income 70
Commercial banks and other creditors 330
Other sources 80
Sub-total, indigenous private enterprise 1370
b) Government and Foreign Investment
Government equity investment (through PIDC or 
directly) 550
Government credit (through PIFCO, PIC 1C) 10
Indian citizen’s-pre-partition industry 120
Other foreigners 110
Sub-total, government & foreign 790
Sub Total, initial investment 2160
2.Later expansion from outside industry for
expansion or modernisation of existing units 630
3. Industrial earnings reinvested in industry
2210
Total Assets 5000
Source: Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 195.
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By the late 1960s, the heneficiaries of Pakistan’s import 
liberalisation policies had emerged. Thirteen families (including the 
four groups included in this study) were among those able to access 
Rs 30 million or US $ 6 milhon for investing in private industry. 
The other groups (not included here) accessed another Rs 200 million, 
or US $ 40 million. By 1961, the country’s total industrial assets 
were Rs 6,000 million of which Rs 85 million were financed by loans 
provided by the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation (PICIC), and a further Rs 75 million financing of net 
assets was through IDBP financed l o a n s . W h i t e ’s study on 
industrial growth in Pakistan revealed that in 1968, 42 families or 
monopoly house controlled 98 of the 197 non-financial companies 
listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. The 1960s addressed a more 
prosperous and acquisitive class of businessmen, as owners of leading 
industries and financiers of political groups. Such business houses 
also enjoyed the personal patronage of Ayuh. As an example, the 
Dawood Group along with three other groups controlled 20 percent 
of the total industry a s s e t s . T h e i r  combined wealth was
®^®See G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 
102.
^®^ The 1960s also marked an increase in foreign aid to Pakistan, 
which was a major cause for the formation of PICIC and IDBP. See 
G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 89.
^®^he reason why profit levels were not included as a gauge of 
effective or ineffective organisational systems was because in 
Pakistan they were usually understated to avoid paying higher levels 
of corporate tax.
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estimated between US $ 10 and $ 20 million by 1969/®  ^ Total 
manufacturing and industrial assets in these industries were Rs 8405 
million in 1968, of which the groups included in this study 
collectively owned almost eleven percent. These financial 
institutions were formed to furnish the private-sectors’ capital 
requirements, a resource fully maximised by investors. With publicly 
quoted companies there was a requirement that 50 percent of its 
share ownership be vested with government-owned financial 
institutions, such as the National Investment Trust (NIT) and 
Investment Corporation of Pakistan (IGF). The NIT formed in 1963, 
was not an independently trust since it had a few businessmen on its 
Board of Directors, in whose companies the NIT had invested its 
shares. This led to an overlap of interests demonstrated in loans 
raised from NlT’s resources (approved by its directors) and then 
extended to business group entrepreneurs. The following table 
provides business group share in NIT and IGF investments.
^%ee S. Kochanek, Interest groups and Development, Oxford, 
1983, pp. 203-206, for further readings on Ayub-led, patronage of 
business communities' success at accumulating wealth.
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Table 2.13
Business Groups’ Share in Investments of 
NIT I.C.P.
Group 1970 %
Crescent 1.81 0.6
Dawood 6.95 26.3
Wazir Ali 0.96 17.1
Ghulam Faruque 1.43
Source: National Investment (Unit) Trust, Director's Report 
and Statement of Accounts', 1st, July 1969 - 30th, June 1970, 
National Investment Trust, 1970; Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan, Fourth Annual Report, 1970, Investment 
Corporation of Pakistan, 1970.
In 1970 NIT’s portfolio was Rs 142 million of which our groups’ 
owned 0.96 percent to 1.81 percent of its shares. The above 
percentages of business group shares in NIT and ICP investments 
was substantial compared with other business groups’ (lesser) share 
in NIT and ICP shares. In 1970, the overlap of business group 
entrepreneurs holding NIT directorships, showed conflict of interest 
with 13 NIT directors, one of whom was from the Dawood Group. 
This director, Ahmed Dawood played a dual role of simultaneously 
representing NIT’s interests in Dawood Group investments (as a NIT 
director from 1965 to 1988)^ ®® as well as himself being an equity 
holder in Dawood Group investments. Therefore this group’s 
eligibility for NIT’s credit line was not necessarily preceded by an
^®®Source: NIT Annual Reports, 1965-88;
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objective evaluation of Dawood Group investments. This was another 
instance of State largesse promoting early industrialisation in 
business group investments and from 1958 to 1968, the Dawood 
Group did not follow it up with developing internal organisational 
systems.
Of further importance were the links that these monopoly houses 
had with the Board of Directors of PICIC, one of the main financial 
institutions extending credit in foreign currency to investors.^®® 
PICIC was established in 1957 to disburse foreign exchange loans to 
and participate in the equity of business group investments. PICIC’s 
policies were more amenable than the IDBP’s policies towards 
assisting a select number of venture capitalists in the allocation of 
foreign exchange. The appeal for acquiring PICIC foreign currency 
loans was that they were extended at the official (and cheaper) 
exchange rate, usually at 1/2 percent lower interest rates than other 
financial institutions.^®^ This favourably effected the recipient 
group’s investment expansions. The main beneficiaries of PICIC’s
®^®The Chief Economist, Mahbub ul Haq in a news report 
published in the daily. Morning News, 29 March 1973, Karachi, is 
quoted to have said, ‘For all practical purposes, the 22 families had 
become by 1968 both the planning commission and the ministry of 
finance for the private sector. They preempted most investment 
permits, import hcences, foreign credits and government patronage 
because they controlled or influenced most of the decision-making 
forums, handing out such permissions. They had virtually 
established a strong hold on the system and were in the position to 
buy out any new entrepreneurs’ ’.
®^^ See State Bank of Pakistan, Bulletin, State Bank o f Pakistan, 
State Bank of Pakistan, August 1971, p. LXXII.
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credit extension were Dawood and Crescent; a categorisation of credit 
allocation follows:
Table 2.14
Foreign Exchange Loans Obtained by Business Groups
1958-1970 
(Rs millions)
Group PICIC % of IDBP % of
Total Total
Dawood 123.58 13 3.37 0.90
Crescent 117.76 13 0.68 0.18
Wazir Ali 23.64 3 3.56 0.95
G. Faruque 13.84 1.5 -
Total loans 
disbursed
(1958-70) 911.43 374.55
Source: R. Amjad, ‘Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, I960- 
1970’, Ph.D. thesis. University of Cambridge, 1977, p. 263.
PICIC’s credit allocation criteria required researched and justified 
loan application proposals from potential investors, such as detailed 
projections of Return on Investment (ROl). The Crescent Group 
became its main beneficiary fi*om among the groups studied here. 
PICIC was established for financing the credit needs of industries 
with known profit centres such as textiles, food and sugar industries, 
whereas the Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation (PIFCO) and 
IDBP provided credit to a wider base of industry. PIFCO and IDBP 
were more amenable towards lending to a larger industrial base, both
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small- and large-scale industries, in order to prevent industrial 
concentration and control of wealth in the hands of a hmited 
clientele. However since the absolute amount disbursed by them was 
relatively smaller than PICIC’s credit line, it defeated the purpose of 
reducing industrial concentration, in the long-term. Another 
revealing factor was that directors from Dawood and Crescent also 
represented PICIC directorships. Ahmed Dawood (Dawood Group) 
remained a PICIC director from 1958 to 1988, and Muhammad 
Bashir (Crescent Group) from 1962 to 1971, followed by Zahid 
Bashir’s directorship (Crescent Group), from 1972 to 1988.^ ®® This 
presents a link between the financial institutions’ decision-makers 
allocating the highest percentage of its credit to businesses owned 
and controlled by its directors.
Throughout the 1960s, the concentration and ownership of capital 
and industrial wealth were issues having far reaching political 
consequences.^^® In all the groups these factors predominantly 
directed initial investments. The government’s liberal credit line to 
a few industrialists helped in substantive, if temporary capital
^®®Source: PICIC Annual Reports, 1958-88.
®^®See PICIC, Annual Report, 1970.
^^ ®The Chief Economist to the Planning Commission, Government 
of Pakistan, Mahbub ul Haq is quoted to have said a t a 1968 
convention of the Pakistan Management Association that ‘...22 
families control 66 percent of the entire industrial capital, 97 percent 
of the total insurance, and 80 percent of the total banking assets of 
the country’ ’.
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formation. The following table provides details of the proportionate 
value of net assets in the business groups included in our study:
Table 2.15
Net Manufacturing Assets (Publicly and 
Privately Quoted Companies)
(Rs millions)^
Group 1968 1974 1985 1988
Dawood 558 (1)" 767.8 (1) 800 (2) 3,432 (3)
Crescent 200 (9) 201.7 (2) 435.9 (3) 4,217 (2)
Wazir Ali 179 (10) 87.6 (5) 271.2 (5) 2,220 (5)
G.Faruque 37 (42) 38.1 (30) n.av." 1,313(13)
 ^ Consumer price inflation, 1985=7.5 %, 1986, 4.8 %, 
1987, 3.9 %, 1988, 6.3 % [ElU, Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Country Report, Pakistan and Afghanistan, No. 4, 
1989].
 ^ Numbers in parenthesis denote the position of the 
group, as per value of business house net assets in the 
year under consideration.
 ^Figure not available for this year.
Source: Balance Sheets of all groups; N. Husnain et al, 
(eds.), BukharVs 101, Khadim Ah Shah Bukhari and 
Company Limited, 1991; H. Haqqani, ‘Pakistan’s Top 
22 Face New Challenges’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
22 May 1986, p. 77 and L. White, Industrial 
Concentration and Economic Power, Princeton, 1974, p. 
60.
The Dawood, Crescent and Wazir Ali Groups captured the first ten 
positions measured by the value of their assets, interchangeably from 
1968-88, with Crescent and Dawood occupying up to the first three 
positions after 1974. Dawood’s asset position slipped from first in 
1974 to third by 1988. Crescent’s acquisition remained more steady
140
at second position in 1974 and by 1988. In 1988, it asset value was 
23 percent ahead of its closest rival, the Dawood Group. Wazir Ah’s 
assets decreased by -51 percent in 1974 over 1968 and increased by 
719 percent in 1988 over 1985, and maintained its fifth position from 
1974 to 1985. In 1988, Crescent, its closest rival ranked by the value 
of its net assets were 90 percent higher than the Ali Group, a 
substantial difference considering the large base tendered by the Ali 
Group. Ghulam Faruque made the most rapid increase in the value 
of its net assets, which was ranked at forty-second position in 1968; 
by 1988 it had moved up to thirteenth position.
The transient nature of capital accumulated, stemmed from proxy 
State industrialisation using exogenous economic propellants to 
develop businesses. These propellants separated authority from 
responsibility in organisations and only propelled industrialisation 
into taking off. It was through the adoption of endogenous 
organisation factors, that sustained transition was possible through 
redefining organisational strategy in light of growth in the size of 
businesses. For those businesses that chose to do so, the ‘one off 
economic favours of the government were gradually but effectively 
replaced by a sound organisational strategy more conducive to 
buoyant expansion.
141
2.6 Systems Management: A Historiography
Systems Analysis as a discipline was inherited by the USA from 
Britain after the Second World War. It was first termed Operations 
Research after the Second World War when its was used in military 
applications in the 1950s. A system is a network of related 
procedures (set of conditions) developed according to an integrated 
plan for performing a major activity of business. Its earliest business 
applications in 1956 were influenced by time and motion studies, 
plant layouts and work methods of industrial engineering, introduced 
by Frederick W. Taylor. At that stage it was difficult to visualise 
its parallel applications in other functional areas of business, such as 
marketing, production after sales services and research and 
development. This approach became a tool for systems 
management, when over time and with a rise in the scale of business, 
managers received feedback on the product design and its output 
from various departments.
^^^ The merits of employee management through Taylor’s ‘machine 
bureaucracy’ and methods study, as practised in British firms, is 
given in, R. Fitzgerald, British Labour Management and Industrial 
Welfare 1846-1939, Groom Helm, 1988, pp. 6-7 and 12; also see S. 
Optner [in the introduction], in S. Optner (ed.). Systems Analysis, 
Penguin, 1973, p. 11.
^^%ee S. Optner, [in the introduction], in S. Optner, Systems 
Analysis, Penguin, 1973, p. 10, explaining that Systems Analysis 
borrows ‘...from every scientific era, even from the Greeks of the fifth 
century B.C’ ’.
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In 1965, the publications of the Operations Research Society of 
America and the Institute of Management Science had articulated 
the use of systems in business app l i ca t i ons . These  publications 
along with the support received from business applications, granted 
Systems Analysis a legitimacy as a problem solving technique with 
wide practical abihty. Its normative methodology expressed 
qualitatively did not change the methodology used in mathematical 
models. This study accepts the value of quantitative models (for 
subject specialists to formulate) only in a defined condition. 
Formal models using game theory are adopted as the point of 
departure a fte r  professional managers have applied the tenets of the 
Systems Approach to develop a basic philosophy of management. 
This philosophy builds the foundations upon which future models are 
developed. Therefore, if this philosophy (of the Systems Approach) 
is in any way deficient in its application, it will alter the beneficial 
effects of building models upon it, and also allow inefficiencies in 
management structures to develop in a growing order of magnitude. 
The operational setting [departments], when used as a data base, 
provide us with greater range of variation within/amongst variables 
and so is more plausible for generality. Controlled or model-based
^^^This is given in the introduction of, S. Optner, Systems 
Analysis, Penguin, 1973, p. 13.
Harvey (ed.). Business History, Concepts and Measurements, 
Frank Cass, 1989, p. 2., reiterates the value of quantitative models 
used in the business history approach.
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experiments maybe more precise but can predict results derived from 
only that one experiment and not generalise its results for universal 
applicability. That is why this research focuses on the Systems 
Approach to explain the business groups’ ability to make its foray (or 
the lack thereof) in the light-engineering sector of industry, by 
addressing their internally generated goal-seeking activities. To 
illustrate, the use of the normative methodology in a business 
situation, when in order to increase output the organisational system 
has to be changed. Normative systems can be an interface of man to 
man, man to machines or machines to m a c h i n e s . T h i s  includes 
adoption of training and review of a sequence of events entailed in 
this methodology as illustrated in Joan Woodward’s contingency 
theory.
Prior to the adoption of the Systems Approach discipline, when 
problems arose in businesses they were solved by subject specialists 
from differing disciplines, whose diagnosis became the point of 
departure for problem solving methodology to emerge. The solutions 
proposed by subject specialists merely increased an understanding of 
a particular discipline but did not fill in the loop holes evident in 
their solutions. The existence of loop holes led to an increasing
^^ ®See P. Schoderbek, [in the preamble to the next section], in P. 
Schoderbek, (ed.). Management Systems, John Wiley, 1967, p. 137, for 
normative systems in the business organisation.
^^^Training as a function of improving the structure of 
organisations is given in J. Woodward, Industrial Organisation: 
Theory and Practice, Oxford, 1965, pp. 78-79.
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demand to measure and project needs on a rising scale of magnitude, 
in an environment with limited resources. Managers’ attempts to 
address these loop holes led to auxiliary functions which forced them 
to identify methods to solve problems. The recognition of these 
limitations vdth a view to rectify them, led managers to eventually 
gravitate towards adopting the Systems Approach.
The 1970s saw the emergence of the value of information as a 
saleable commodity. The availability of information put managing 
back into the hands of m a n a g e r s . T h i s  was the advent of 
Management Information Systems (MIS) which provided a shift away 
from systems theory. Information is the measure of the value 
(worth) of a message to a decision maker in a specific situation. The 
value of information is related to its timeliness of conveying the 
information for the organisational level it is intended for. 
Information by way of MIS support services led to centralisation of 
information, when decision-making was already decentralised. The 
quality of such decisions depended on the quality of the information 
received. Decentralisation reduced the discretion exercised by senior 
management in routinised decision- making. The purpose of a 
system was to carry the information to the decision-maker and the 
complexity of information increased the higher up in the hierarchy
^^^Management systems are discussed in R. L. Martino, ‘The 
Development and Installation of a Total Management System’, in P. 
Schoderbek, (ed.). Management Systems, John Wiley, 1967, pp. 121- 
126.
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the decision maker was placed. Once the information was sent to its 
recommended destination the involvement of management (or its lack 
thereof) in the delegation of their duties, made for successfully or 
unsuccessfully managed companies.
The most frequent users of the Systems Approach in industry, were 
the larger organisations in the West, which adopted this approach by 
looking inwards to address the complexities which arose with 
increasing size. Increasing size of operations led to divisionalisation 
of functions with many units reporting to a manager. This loosened 
senior management’s control over decision-making and so more 
dynamic management structures emerged. Dynamic structures led 
to flexibihty in seeing the form of a problem and to use the scientific 
approach, and so steered business away from antediluvian methods 
of problem solving. Pakistani businesses which took cognisance of 
this (new) approach and demonstrated it accordingly, succeeded in 
making a transition towards light-engineering manufacturing. 
Dynamic management structures emerged with the expansion of 
information requirements and generation of voluminous records, in 
the marketing, purchase, maintenance, store-keeping functional 
areas. Therefore practical considerations in industry gave rise to the 
need for application of systems in order to cope with the growing 
volume of data. The management scientist showed the way to 
maximise these resources in the future in line with mission objectives 
of the departments or sub-system objectives, such as research and
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development of product lines. The measure of performance of the 
sub-system was linked to the measure of performance of the overall 
system. After all, the overall system could only be the sum of its 
parts which together constituted the business organisation. The 
Systems Approach drew its strength from the extent that all sub­
systems were consistent with the overall mission objective of the 
organisation. This very consistency reinforced the foundations of this 
approach. All sub-systems united in this approach to solve problems 
by collectively borrowing knowledge which no single individual could 
have visualised. The advantage of collective knowledge or vision was 
that those variables could be suppressed which were not vital for 
finding the solution for the problem at hand. This approach focused 
mainly on alleviating the presence of negative variables. Once the 
Systems Approach was adopted by managers, it produced better 
rather than just optimal solutions, by phasing out the old system to 
make way for the new one. The sub-system addressed the different 
levels within an organisation and defined the reporting channels for 
each. A description was then provided of the functions located at 
different levels and identification of the links which tied together the 
overall flow of information. In organisations where the Systems 
Approach was not in use, there was a recurrence of learning and 
relearning cycles related to the same issues. This was because 
outmoded reporting cycles and historical information was not 
replaced by a new planning strategy to meet the changing conditions.
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Outmoded systems were incapable of generating recognisable data 
patterns for problem solving in other departments of the business 
unit. That is why this approach tests the motives behind 
interpretation of messages which lead to their actions and 
explanations. This approach is tested on the management practices 
of the four groups studied here, whose management adopted 
divergent strategy to expand their business, where some accounted 
for changes in implementation of methods and procedures and others 
did not. Procedures were a series of clerical operations involving one 
or more persons in one or more departments. In the West, 
management practices of the 1960s addressed manually operated 
systems where the scale of operations was limited and owner- 
managers did not favour delegation of their responsibilities. These 
methods could only work up to a point after which an increase in the 
scale of businesses warranted upgrading of management techniques. 
The division of managerial functions could not be administered 
single-handedly by the owner manager. Mechanisation of production 
led to a division of manual and managerial labour, so the need for 
functional managers arose. These managers then had to deal with 
a new class of problems, not limited to a single discipline. Wherever 
this was not recognised, it became a constraint on expansion of the 
businesses and eventually lead to a decline in its investments. This 
decline manifest itself in the splintering of the certain Pakistani 
business groups and their inability to diversify, which arose from
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liquidity restrictions or investments made in unrelated fields because 
of the unstructured pattern of planning and managing of the 
businesses. There was a positive correlation between the structure 
of an organisation and the results achieved. An example being the 
separation of ownership from those in control; a factory manager 
employed at the site reporting to a functional manager (most likely 
an engineer) who reviews his performance or output, while based at 
an alternate location. This is a situation where the 
organisational structure promotes abdication, rather than delegation 
of responsibihty.
The Systems Approach methodology is articulated when the 
manager receives a flood of messages which have to be arranged and 
filtered for further processing (outlined in the Chapter One). For the 
required information to make its timely appearance on the managers’ 
desk there needs to be a system which ensures this happens fairly 
automatically. Again the automatic dissemination of information 
pre-supposes rational behaviour exercised by employees. If everyone 
complies with the system’s commands which the Systems Approach 
delineates, then we can say that the ‘system’ is working. That it is 
producing results according to its methodology and fulfilment of its 
own prerequisites. The managers’ role in implementing the systems 
methodology follows.
^^^he debate on decentralised corporations’ management 
practices is available in Jo Anne Yates, Control Through 
Communication, John Hopkins, 1989, pp. 3-4 and 11-14.
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2.7 Management Prerequisites: The Institutional Setting 
For Effective Systems Implementation
The Systems Approach pre-supposes the existence of a finite entity, 
which in our research is the business organisation managed by 
common directors constituting a business group. A business group 
has multiple companies which have specific content, structure, 
communication and control systems. It also includes the existence of 
hardware facilities such as computers used for processing system 
inputs and their subsequent translation into output, for the business 
entity and its constituent parts. The organisation is taken to be the 
total system being studied and its boundaries are defined by the 
researcher. In our study, the boundaries are that of the business 
group and its sub-systems which have structured and functional 
firms operating within it. A system in our terminology means that 
which solves the problem. This involves the discovery of a problem, 
an assessment of its relevance, selection of criteria, determining the 
structure of existing systems, and how it hinders or abets the 
achievement of the desired objective and whether the new criteria 
addresses the (new) problem appropriately. It also includes 
structuring of alternatives which should lead to solution finding, 
choosing the right model for adoption of objectives, evaluating 
whether it in fact fulfils the original objective and the evaluation of 
results after implementation. In other words, the system is an agent 
of change that can be described, manipulated, analysed and
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empirically studied.
The Systems Approach broadly deals with problems of choice under 
uncertainty. Exercising the choice under uncertainty (strategic 
decisions) is done by adoption of a system. Uncertainty can be 
reduced by testing one set of assumptions for results through a 
qualitative model. A system is adopted if there is a need for it, and 
if its initial and long-term installation costs justify anticipated 
returns both in the short- and long-term. This definition of a system 
can be extended to the application of the ‘scientific method’ to 
problems of economic choice in business organisations. The Systems 
Approach integrates applied scientific knowledge by using the 
inductive method to provide solution to problems, based on raw data 
gathered by getting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses to existing systems. 
Through investigation, data are accumulated to recognise 
relationships and formulate hypotheses, to then look for variances in 
the predicted outcome of such hypotheses. The deductive method 
merely transfers the question of validity of our deductions to then 
question the validity of the premises on which they were originally 
tested.
The know-how to solve a variety of problems is also a definition of 
technology. Technology adoption also enforces loyalty to the 
organisation rather than to individuals. Its application spurs 
scientific discovery which results in development by additions made 
to the incremental inventory of achievements. That is why this
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approach has practical applicability and is not only a theory; every 
instance of the Systems Approach presupposes its practical 
applicability otherwise those observations are not relevant to this 
discipline. Its significance lies in remodelling managements’ thinking 
on logical lines. Technology is an aid towards closing the 
management gap rather than the other way around. This is achieved 
by developing new problem solving know-how for commercial, 
industrial, administrative and technical information.
The applications of the Systems Approach also generate the 
professionalisation of k n o w ledg e w hi ch  propels productivity by 
provision of training. Training also provides exposure which 
increases the adaptiveness necessary for bringing about change. The 
need for training is self-assessing and self-regulatory in a closed-loop 
assessment system which lends itself best to system variations. 
Training of individuals is particularly important when with 
increasing communication needs there arose a concurrent qualitative 
shift in handling organisational problems. Qualitative shifts include 
development of communication, and research and development
^^^Professionalisation of knowledge is a continuous process where 
the validity of training and skills are questioned and addressed by 
sending employees for training. On-the-job skills are measured by 
observations specific to the job at hand and the experience gained 
form the inductive ingredient of the job. However, the manager may 
succumb to repeating the same experience over again and that too, 
on a number of occasions, without increasing his incremental 
inventory of knowledge. This can be rectified by sending the 
managers to develop their skills through training programmes. This 
closed loop system of constant review, professionalises knowledge 
obtained by the manager.
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methods which require qualified personnel to recognise the need for 
research in developing products in the organisation.
2.8 The Initiation, Usage and Implementation of the 
Systems Approach in  Business Applications
The impetus for introducing systems in organisations originates 
from managers who recognise a problem which warrants a solution. 
The management is involved in overall goal-setting in relation to the 
organisation’s environment, resources and sub-systems. One of the 
most important tasks for senior management is to create a process 
for solution attainment and observation of its proper functioning. 
This process is part of the managers’ executive functions created by 
the segmentation of management. The executive function is an 
integrating function, that is, it integrates operations of many 
departments reporting to a manager, who rationalises them against 
the organisation’s overall objective. Effective management practices 
encourage the initiation of queries rather than just responding to 
them. It is a complex function because of the conflict of interest 
which arises between units coordinated by the manager. The conflict 
may be from environmental variables, which effect the system 
directly and alter the performance or degree of fulfilment of the 
objective. Exogenous constraints emanate from State intervention of 
business group activity and may include intangible issues, such as 
the manager’s abihty to influence a bureaucrat to issue licences and 
permits. These variables can be turned to their advantage if these
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approval-seeking managers are also represented on political 
platforms. This in turn influences the internal dynamics of the 
organisation, which in our study had a major impact on the initiation 
of business group activity in Pakistan.
Organisational performance can be gauged by the time spent on 
evaluating the importance of and conflict between the multiple 
objectives involved in every manager’s decision. These objectives 
could either be of minimising or maximising output. The technique 
of successive approximation and the wilhngness of management to 
try new approaches are vital to the dynamic process of determining 
system requirements. This is implemented through successive 
approximations by evaluating information gained at one point which 
necessitates a réévaluation of previous conclusions.^*®
Out of the proliferation of functional management the growing data 
bank of information provides an integrating medium. Information 
about endogenous variables can be provided by interviews which are 
effective means for obtaining research information on innovative 
skills, administrative and executive accountability and an operating 
system governing work flow at lower levels where the physical 
transactions take place. Any changes in the system can then be 
successfully brought using the managers’ innovative skills. It is now
*^®For a description of the dynamics of management systems see, 
Thomas Gians, et al, Management Systems, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc., 1968, pp. 289-306.
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recognised that the latent skills of employees are also a company’s 
intangible assets which dominate its performance in the long- 
term^ ®^  and their training is an essential element for retaining 
them as the organisation’s intangible asset. Intangible company 
assets generate qualitative shifts which arise with the rising number 
of workers and productivity. These qualitative shifts include the 
need to reassess training, coordination, evaluation, planning and 
methods of acquiring information. Disagreements between employees 
can occur not just because people are bound to differ but from lack 
of information which can be adjusted for by adequate training.
Endogenous organisational factors influencing business group 
performance also include measurable resources measured by man 
hours money, equipment, education to the more intangible assets 
such as education, training, skills and goodwill. It is the latter group 
of resources that constitute the form of the problem rather than its 
content and their application can generate the desired (system) 
solutions. Seeing the form of a problem, by taking an independent 
view before addressing its content, is a more accurate descriptor of 
existing relationships between functions, methods, objects and system
^®^ 0n the debate on training as an intangible asset of an 
organisation, see R. Ackoff and P. Rivett, A Managers Guide to 
Operations Research, John Wiley, 1963, p. 64.
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properties and structure. Through a process of diffusion, the form of 
solving one problem maybe the same form as applied to solving 
another problem even if the two situations appear to be dramatically 
different. The form of a problem can be the need to reduce 
production capacity restrictions, which specifically address the 
inventory management systems (which is where the content or 
location of the problem exists). The decision to adapt inventory levels 
to the required demand would be taken by the planning managers. 
Similarly the form of a problem may be low capacity generation of 
machines, which can be rectified by locating the content of the 
problem: in this instance the need to replace the machine. The 
decision to replace it is the responsibility of the maintenance 
manager. The advantage of (first) looking at the form of a problem 
is that it provides an integrated rather than a locahsed solution. It 
also provides a logic of handling information and problems from a 
higher threshold of knowledge which produce better results, because 
the short-term solution implementation works within the framework 
of the long-term.
In organisations where the Systems Approach is operational, a 
logical flow of methods follows which is initiated by its senior 
management. This approach deals with the diagnostics of 
hierarchical decision-making and the separation of specific tactics 
(which lie in the domain of subject specialists) fi*om the strategy of 
problem solving (which the Systems Approach addresses). Strategy
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is formulated by the staff functions through tactics or procedures 
which are then implemented by the line managers. The Systems 
Approach is analytical in nature and involves viewing the 
organisation at different levels to objectively evaluate change. It is 
in its procedures that the foundations of an effective management 
system exist and should accordingly be addressed or changed to the 
growing demand for information. The economic benefits which 
accrue to the organisation fi*om the application of this approach 
include more efficient production scheduling and tighter materials 
control, (since the manually operated system are ‘localised’ and tend 
to generate batch information relevant for a particular transaction 
only), a decrease in costs by recording of payroll and labour 
distribution transactions, an increase in its sales from better 
management of inventory control, more profitable use of computer 
time and availability of more current information.
The concept of cybernetics^®  ^ or the science of systems of control 
is a powerful tool in the arsenal of administrators which feeds on the 
timely arrival of information, its processing and feedback cycles. 
Management policy exerts control over system processes by 
permitting or prohibiting certain actions. Once the desired results
®^®See W. Mitchel, ‘Relevant Neoscientific Management Notions’, 
in S. Optner, (ed.). Systems Analysis, Penguin, p. 318.
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are made known by the management to the employees, the former’s 
response in rewarding the individuals concerned should occur with 
minimum delay. If corrective action is taken while the process is on­
going, then there is an effective time control system. Systematised 
design principles produce better control systems, and a management- 
oriented system caters for the system design, installation and its 
maintenance appropriately. The complexity of the systems structure 
is a function of the involvement of people with machines and the 
former’s performance evaluation by the management in a controlled 
environment.^®'^ The need for performance evaluation by the 
management enables them to act promptly to meet the future’s 
(unknown) conditions and this is made simpler if information arrives 
when corrective action can yield the desired results. Control systems 
in business enterprise provide its managers with reports generated 
under the titles of Planning, Control or Operating reports etc. 
Planning reports evaluate the company’s position in industry; control 
reports reveal the operating performance against budgeted targets 
and operating reports evaluate functional responsibilities against 
goals set out for managers. A pre-condition for the effectiveness of 
such reports lies in clearly defined objectives, criteria for evaluation 
of performance, corrective action and a feedback system to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the corrective action.
^®^ See H. Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organisations, Prentice 
Hall International, Inc., 1979, p. 221.
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The manager also has to account for data generated which could 
be subject to tampering by employees from fear of exposing their own 
performance/misdemeanours, such as in the handhng of customer 
complaints or product quality faults. That is why it is necessary that 
the new system satisfies the requirements of each user. If each user 
were to evolve his/her own system^^ it would defeat the purpose of 
a central data base and delay the generation of accurate data bases. 
This would eventually lead to the collapse of a recognisable system 
which in turn can prevent identification of viable alternate areas for 
investment or integration of existing investment portfolio. Decision­
making itself is the outcome of managers assessing, comparing and 
monitoring such situations. The manager is the recipient of a flood 
of messages and his effectiveness depends on how he manages to 
filter or arrange it. Decision-making from available information 
should take into account user requirements rather be considered just 
an academic exercise for comparing and contrasting the strengths 
and weaknesses of men versus computers. It is information provided 
to the manager which enables him/her to measure task performance, 
which in turn is dependent on the technology available, economic 
conditions, the natural environment, management pohcy and the 
customs of the organisation. This measurability factor provides for
^^^Systems which were adapted to individual preferences and 
affected management strategy in accordance with the entrepreneurs’ 
impulses, are evident in the case study chapters which follow, in 
particular on the Wazir Ali Group, pp. 164-260.
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evaluation and effectiveness of the problem-solving activity. This 
entire activity is repetitive and generates the identification of 
methods in the business entity. For example, repetitive generation 
of sales statistics can provide meaningful information for the 
accounting sub-system. It is important to see what use this 
information is then put to, within the organisation’s structure. (This 
is analysed in the case study chapters which follow).
The Systems Approach enables managers to apply finite 
boundaries or delineate the boundaries of a dilemma which can then 
be converted into a cognisant problem requiring a solution. A good 
plan initiated by a manager must also have the strength of a good 
argument since procedures get moulded to the shape they are 
contained in. The logical steps towards its implementation should be 
documented to maintain its usefulness to others. Not all constraints 
are imposed, rather some are introduced by the designer, such as 
restricting the type of data gathered for processing. Data may also 
be screened for one product fine or just for large-scale orders. Then 
the manager has to has define the structure and evaluation of the 
alternatives along with the constructs of its solutions. Once these 
solutions are accepted by the executive management it sets in motion 
the process of solution implementation. Such knowledge of system 
properties should be swiftly disseminated to all employees because 
it improves their performance more so than before. Again, 
qualitative criteria such as training of personnel or making multiple
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use of reports generated by a single department are part and parcel 
of the solution implementation process. Monitoring this activity is 
the management of the solution implementation process, especially 
if the organisation is multi divisional.^®®
In business management, the Systems Approach can be used to 
explore and probe aspects of the methodology used for long range 
planning, through determining appropriate choice of technology and 
technology development and in generating solutions emanating from 
a systematic methodology. The effects measured by the Systems 
Approach are not arbitrary because its regimen can be applied to 
more than one managerial situation by repeating its methodology.
2.9 Conclusion
The protagonist of industrial growth in Pakistan were not passive 
recipients of State largesse, rather formulated government policy and 
actively condoned and administered it. The striking feature of the 
corporate environment in the 1960s was the concentration of 
ownership of industrial assets by a small number of business groups, 
who initially acquired them through accessing sources of credit. 
Industry was heavily protected as such, and so retarded spontaneous 
reaction to international competition. The indirect controls initially 
benefitted the more influential industrialists equally, all of whom are 
addressed in this study.
®^®See M.D. Mesarovic, et uZ, ‘An Axiomatic Approach to 
Organisations From a General Systems Viewpoint’, in S. Optner, 
(ed.). Systems Analysis, Penguin, 1973, p. 296.
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One of the major premise of this research is to contrihute towards 
an understanding of business group investment as directed by 
internal management practices in the long-term. In the larger 
context we look at the political, bureaucratic, economic and financial 
system within which these businesses initially operated and which 
shaped their initial investments. More specifically, we then separate 
the external factors to focus on the internal design and development 
of new systems and the improvement and evaluation of existing 
systems which carved a différent future for those businesses which 
chose to adopt them. For example as the business organisation 
became larger and more complex, communication channels grew 
longer, slower and more difficult to manage. Within some groups, 
managers realised that supervision of the various segments was not 
possible by continuing with conventional structures and systems. 
This is where the adoption of systems may have upgraded techniques 
commensurate with the changing t i m e s . T h e  adoption of systems 
circumvented the decline in business group investments in light 
engineering goods in the long-term for those businesses where its 
managers chose to adopt them. Such systems rely on systematically 
recorded information and not on ad hoc criteria. Information 
retrieval is also made easier if the business group has an 
organisational memory of transactions and skills obtained through
^^%ee AT. Spaulding, Jr., Ts the Total System Concept 
Practical?’, in P. Schoderbek, Management Systems, John Wiley, 
1967, p. 149.
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training its employees. Managers and entrepreneurs appreciating 
the need to look at problems from a wider base and scope can only do 
so if they are looking long-distance into the future and not bmited to 
only resolving one-off or sbort-term problems. Trained management 
consider and treat such problems carefully, especially when the 
system’s domain is multi-departmental. This requires commitment 
from the senior management to re-examine long standing corporate 
cliches. Wherever this was recognised and implemented in the 
organisation, the group’s portfolio expanded in accordance with a 
strategic plan.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE WAZm ALI GROUP
Introduction
This chapter provides a case study of the Wazir Ali Group, 
henceforth called the Ali Group. This chapter investigates the extent 
of the liaison between the group’s business personalities with key 
political and bureaucratic figures. This liaison benefitted the group’s 
initial investments but were insufficient conditions for sustaining 
business development in light engineering investment over the long­
term. Long-term expansion depended on internally generated and 
institutionalised procedures, and by not adopting them, it lead to 
erratic patterns of growth for the Ali Group. They were erratic 
because growth took place incidentally rather than as a consequence 
of planned strategy.
The companies established by the Ali Group in the 1960s and 
1970s were the consequence of its owners actively accessing State- 
privileges; management did not review problems to remain abreast 
of changing conditions within the group and diversification and 
integration remained low key compared to the potential opportunities 
made available to the pioneering entrepreneurs. For this group, 
foregone industrialisation was a consequence of not adopting systems 
to cultivate foresight, a prerequisite for designing future expansion.
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By the close of 1988, the group’s turnover [sales] were Rs 450 
million/
The organisation of this chapter is discussed in the following order. 
Section One outlines the formation and business development of the 
Ali Group. Section Two is a summary of selected company histories 
which represent the manner in which initial organisational 
structures of the group emerged. Government concessions as 
exogenous factors explain the direction of the initial of investments 
made by the group. Having established the group’s origins with 
reference to individual company histories, Section Three on 
external relations highlights the group’s philosophy, focusing on the 
aspirations of its decision makers, their links with key politicians and 
how this interaction influenced group investments in the short-term. 
This liaison which was initially beneficial for setting the foundations 
for industry was not followed up with injecting new methods to 
consolidate and diversify the business in the long-term. The 
entrepreneurs tapped into sources of industrial credit and received 
ministerial appointments, as part of the State’s patronage of business 
leaders. This led to the short-lived monopoly capitalism in 
manufacturing for Ali. In most instances this group was a first 
mover in the varied industries it ventured into and by virtue of its 
entrepreneurs’ influence on industrial policy was able to maintain its
^Given in, H. Sanotra, ‘Coming into Their Own’, Business Today, 
22 March to 6 April, 1992, p. 46.
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status as sole producer and supplier of some key consumer and 
industrial goods from 1950-88. Section Four discusses the 
management strategy of the group. Section Five focuses on 
interlocking directorships and share ownership structure of members 
of the Ali Group in selected companies, with a view to establish their 
financial and managerial control over the group’s resources. Its 
repercussions for the group will he discussed. In light of the evidence 
studied, Section Six concludes that the absence of organisational 
systems was an effect of not developing a planned strategy for growth 
at a time when the returns from adopting it could have left an 
indelible mark on the business landscape.
The absence of this system led to a reduction of trained permanent 
manpower, market share, profits and size. To avoid relative decline 
the organisation needed internally generated, routinised and a closed 
loop reporting system whereby cause and effect relationships could 
be identified, analysed and responsibihty for decisions appropriated 
to departments and their managers.^ Diversification of production 
functions were not issues given priority by members of the Ali Group,
^See Board Minutes of the Ah Group companies; Ah Automobiles 
Limited, Board Minutes, 21 October 1970; Abbassi Textile Mills, 16 
June 1971; Wazir Ah Industries Limited, Board Minutes, 31 March 
1971 and Sind Oil Mills Board Minutes, 10 September 1952, indicate 
reference and discussion of issues pertaining only to operations at the 
factory site, which faU within the domain of subject speciahsts. The 
management lacked the approach of analysing, addressing and 
resolving strategic issues, by looking at the generahty of the 
situation.
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as is evident from the Board Minutes of its companies,^ which 
indicate reference and discussion of issues pertaining to operations 
at the plants which fall within the domain of subject specialists. No 
evidence was seen of an analysis of addressing and resolving 
strategic issues, by looking at the generality of the situation. Better 
feedback from units to head office would have enabled this group’s 
management to expand capacity and divert excess production 
towards vertically integrated product lines.^ Till organisational 
systems existed in its initial years, the group’s expansion followed a 
predictable course, reflecting the company strategy.®
3.1 Business Development: 1948-88
The Ah Group’s origin was in pre-partition British India, when its 
pioneer, Wazir Ali became the suppher of canteen contracts 
to the British Armed Forces.® In 1949, after Wazir Ali’s death his 
son Muratib Ali migrated to Pakistan and formed a partnership
^Given in, Ali Automobiles Limited, Board Minutes, 21 October 
1970; Abbassi Textile Mills, 16 June 1971; Wazir Ali Industries 
Limited, Board Minutes, 31 March 1971 and Sind Oil Mills Board 
Minutes, 10 September 1952.
^See Alfred Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, pp. 146- 
47, for an explanation of how better managed companies generate 
excess capacity which can be used for producing economies of scale 
through vertical integration.
®See [undated] letter of B 0  S Stevenson, managing director of 
Ford Motor Company India to Amjad Ali congratulating him on the 
successful operations of the company in Pakistan.
®This information is available in D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, 
Croom Helm, 1978, p. 246.
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concern under the banner of Syed A & M Wazir A li/ This was the 
holding company which initiated business by trading in razor blades 
and supplying railway carriages to the State railw ay/ As in the 
USA, towards the close of the 19th century most trading associations 
were transformed into holding companies, the same transformation 
took place with Syed A & M Wazir A li/ Muratib Ali with his 
brother Ahsan Ali, initiated the group’s foray into trading which was 
then taken over by their respective sons. A list of the group’s hsted 
firms and activities are presented in the following table:
^For their status as canteen contractors, see letter from Wajid Ali 
to the Military Services Section, Office of the High Commissioner of 
United Kingdom, Karachi, 9 January 1951 where he has lodged a 
claim for 1 milhon outstanding in heu of canteen supphes to the 
British officers of Her Majesty’s Forces in undivided India, who owed 
money to Syed A & M Wazir Ali; also see partnership deed of Syed 
A & M Wazir Ali, drawn by J  B Kanga on 25 November 1949, stating 
their profession as canteen contractors to the British Armed Forces 
in undivided India.
^Indicated in a letter firom Muratib Ali, Managing Partner, Syed 
A & M Wazir Ali, West Wharf, Karachi to the Divisional 
Superin tendent, N orth W estern Railway, Karachi, # 
SMS/GS/AMW02/10042, 1 June 1952.
^The structure of ownership in late 19th century American 
companies is in A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, 1990, p. 75.
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Table 3.1
Entity Nature of 
Business
I.Hyderabad Sind Vegetable Oil & 
Allied Industries Limited
2.Sanghar Cotton and Ginning 
3.Sind Oil Mills (Pvt) Limited
4.Treet Safety Razor 
Corporation (Pvt) Limited 
5.Saba Soap (Pvt) Limited 
G.Sadiq Vegetable Oil & Allied 
Industries Limited 
7.Abbassi Textile Mills Limited 
S.Sadiq Soap Company (Pvt) Limited 
9.International General Insurance 
10.Packages Limited
I I .Ali Automobiles (Pvt) Limited 
12.Wazir Ali Engineering (Pvt) Ltd. 
IS.Milkpak Limited
14.Tetrapak (Pak) Limited
Year
Estb.
1948Vegetable Oil/Ghee 
Processing.
Cotton Ginning. 1948
Oil seeds, debnting 1948
& Milling.
Safety Razor Blades 1948
Manufacturing.
Soap Manufacturing. 1949
Vegetable OiUGhee 1950
Processing.
Cotton Spinning. 1952
Soap Manufacturing. 1952
Insurance Services. 1953
Paper and Board 1959
Manufacturing.
Motor Car, Television 1963
& Scooter Assembly.
Hollow Plate Bridge & 1963 
Mechanical Engineering. 
Milk, Fruit Juice, 1978
Cream & Butter 
Processing.
UHT/Tetrapak 1985
Packaging Material.
Source: Ali Group, unpubbshed company documents; no year.
It was in 1945 that Amjad Ali, son of Muratib Ali purchased two 
ghee plants of vegetable oil or cooking fat, meant for erection at 
Bhopal and Bombay (which remained in India after partition). These 
plants were purchased for Rs 2 milbon.^^ In 1947, the machinery 
for these vegetable oil manufacturing plants intended for installation 
in India, were diverted to Pakistan. Both plants were relocated; the
^®See Amjad Ali, Glimpses, Jang, 1992, p. 148.
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Bhopal-intended was erected at Rahim Yar Khan, (in the province of 
Punjab in Pakistan) for which the plant’s entrepreneurs collaborated 
with Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited and became partners with the 
Unilever G r o u p . T h e  Bombay-intended plant was relocated to 
Hyderabad (in the Sind province) and remained under the control 
and management of the Ali Group.
By 1948, Syed A & M Wazir Ali’s partners were extended to 
include a few third generation members of the group, namely four 
sons of Muratib Ali: Wajid, Amjad, Afzal and Babar Ali, and a son of 
Ahsan Ah, Akhtar Ahsan.^^ It was this third generation which, 
with the profits accumulated from the Second World War canteen 
supplies, matured into industrial entrepreneurs.^^ This generation 
was leader-oriented and started actively participating in the family 
business. Being a profitable business, by the late 1940s they were 
able to accumulate enough wealth to invest in manufacturing 
industry.
In 1948, the group acquired the Sind Oil Mills (SOM) and 
Hyderabad Sind Vegetable Oil and Allied Industries Limited 
(HSVOAIL), as subsidiary concerns of the company Syed A & M
“ See D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Croom Helm, 1978, pp. 
246-251, for Lever Brothers (Pak) and the Ali Group partnership, 
from 1947 to 1964.
^^The members of the Ali family are also identified in D. 
Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 246.
Interview with Masood Hasan, 16 January 1994 in Lahore.
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Wazir Ali. The Sind Oil Mills was purchased (by the group as 
refugees consequent to partition), from Sir Mohan Lai Saskeria, a 
Hindu who emigrated to India. In 1949, the group also purchased 
the Saba Soap Company from him which was followed by the 
purchase of the Sadiq Vegetable Oil and Allied Industries 
Limited (SVOAIL), located at Rahim Yar Khan, from the same 
seller. SVOAIL was acquired by the Ali Group in partnership with 
Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited in 1950. It was managed by the 
of Bahawalpur. This was followed by another partnership 
of Ali with Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited in the formation of the 
Sadiq Soap Company, in 1952. Both SVOAIL and Sadiq Soap 
Company were formally managed by Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited 
and were officially listed as their investments in Pakistan. The 
partnership share holdings were as follows:
^^Amir is a title conferring leadership of an (e)state within 
Pakistan.
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Table 3.2 
Equity Structure (1947)
Sadiq Oil Mills & Sadiq Soap 
Allied Industries Ltd. Company Ltd.
Unilever 45.43 % 70 %
(Commonwealth Holdings. Ltd.)
Bahawalpur State 36.66 % 20 %
Amjad Ali 15.00 % 5 %
Sir William Roberts 3 % 5 %
Source: D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 250.
Even though Ali had shareholdings in the above Lever Brother 
(Pak) Limited’s investments, in effect the two parties were competing 
for the same share of the market for soaps and vegetable oil in 
Pakistan. This was because the HSVOAIL and the SOM were 
formally part of the Ali Group, which also manufactured soap and 
vegetable oil as did Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited’s manufacturing 
units in Pakistan. An anomaly arises in that Fieldhouse lists the 
above shareholdings as those for Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited. Then 
why did Levers’ management include equity contributed by their 
competitors and why did the Ah entrepreneurs accept this offer? A 
plausible reason is that Levers Brothers (Pak) Limited, in Pakistan 
needed the support of the Ali family in accessing the necessary
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licences for purchase of machinery and equipment for Sadiq Soap 
Company and SVOAIL. Both these companies were located in 
Bahawalpur State which was owned by its Amir, who was a personal 
friend of Amjad Ali. His share in the ownership of Lever’s 
investments (listed above) ensured that any necessary licences for 
initiating business were easily made avai lable .Then,  Sir William 
Roberts was also a personal fiiend of Amjad Ali, owned tracts of 
agricultural land cultivating cotton and cotton seed, a necessary raw 
material for vegetable oil production.^® Both the Amir and Sir 
William Roberts had equity contributions made in other Ali 
c o m p a n i e s . T h e  Amir, and Sir Wilham Roberts were introduced 
to Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited by Amjad Ali. In fact, it was on 
account of the Ah Groups’ advantageous position to influence 
bureaucrats and politicians, that conditioned Lever Brothers (Pak) 
Limited to form a partnership with them.^® This was an unusual 
step taken by the Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited, since they did not 
encourage majority share-holdings by third parties in any of their
^®See D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 
246.
^^Ibid, p. 249.
^^These were the Abbassi Textile Mills Limited and Ali and 
Robertson (Pvt) Limited.
^®The Ali family’s leverage with politicians, attracted the attention 
of the management of Levers Brothers (Pak) Limited, who thereafter 
formed a partnership with the Ali Group. This is documented in D. 
Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Croom Helm, 1978, pp. 246 and 249.
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overseas investments/^
Machinery for a fourth plant meant for razor blade production was 
purchased from Treet (USA) and installed in Hyderabad in 1948, 
called the Treet Safety Razor Blade f a c t o r y T h i s  machinery lay 
idle for six years before production commenced in 1954, when the 
company was renamed the Treet Safety Razor Corporation (Pvt) 
Limited. This company was later incorporated as part of Wazir Ali 
Industries Limited (WIL), the flagship company of the group. All 
these manufacturing facilities were set up in Hyderabad, Rahimyar 
Khan, Karachi and Lahore. Another plant for manufacturing cotton 
textiles was established in Rahim Yar Khan, called the Abbassi 
Textile Mills Limited. It was the first textile mill established in 
the country. The foundation stone of the Abbassi Textiles Mills 
Limited was laid before partition and the machinery order placed for 
installation intended at Rahim Yar Khan in 1946. The mill was 
made operational in 1952 in Rahim Yar Khan after its machinery lay 
idle for six years. The mill was inaugurated by Amjad Ali. The Amir 
of Bahawalpur owned Rs 150,000 of its shares, which represented 50 
percent ownership through share-holding. The Ali family and Sir 
William Roberts owned a further 50 percent s h a r e s . T h e  mill had
^®This is given in D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Groom Helm, 
1978, p. 245.
^^Ibid, p. 149.
^^For share ownership, see letter from J. Tomkins, Managing 
Agent, The Bahawalpur Agencies, The Sadiq Vegetable Oils and
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a spinning capacity of 50,000 spindles and a total equity of Rs 2 
million. The income statement of Abbassi Textile Mills for 1950 
showed that its textiles exports through trading were 39 percent of 
the country's exports. Abbassi Textiles Mills Limited registered 
exports of 2,90,000 cotton bales from the country’s total export of 
7,50,000 in 1950. Cotton remains Pakistan’s staple cash crop and is 
the back bone of its economy. By erecting the Abbassi Textile Mills 
Limited in Rahim Yar Khan, the Ah Group tried to establish a base 
in textiles. Owning agricultural land and manufacturing textiles 
showed respectability of profession.^^ In doing so they tried to 
emulate the income and life-style of the land owning class in as close 
a manner as possible. Another agricultural investment by Ah was 
evident in two farms which they owned in pre-partition India called 
the Palakmati Farms Limited and Gohar-i-Taj Industrial and 
Agricultural Farms L i m i t e d Later, in 1971, the group was to 
invest in a poultry farm with 30,000 birds. The farm was jointly
Allied Industries Limited, Katrak Mansion, Machi Mian Road, P.O. 
Box 220, Karachi, to Syed A & M Wazir Ah, 140, Bunder Road, 
Karachi, 14 March 1952.
^^In Pakistan the association of land cultivation denoting an 
honourable profession, is discussed in M. Ashraf, ‘Dairy Industry in 
Pakistan’, Dawn, 11 March 1990, p. 7.
^See details of these farms in letters from the Custodian General 
of India to Syed A & M Wazir Ah, 18 October 1959 and 25 December 
1959, informing them of the farms having been confiscated under the 
Evacuee Property Status Act.
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owned by four Ali brothers with a s i s t e r .W a j i d  Ali also purchased 
sheep from a prominent landlord, Khizar Hayat Tiwana.^®
In 1949, Amjad Ali joined Pakistani pohtics and obtained the Ford 
motor dealership from the USA in the 1950s. Through this 
dealership, the third generation of the Ali Group made its foray in 
the engineering sector and formed Ali Automobiles (Pvt) Limited 
for the assembly of Ford motor cars, trucks, vans and televisions in 
addition to the manufacturing of Lambretta scooters under licence 
from its parent company o v e r s e a s . A s s e m b l y  of motor cars 
commenced in 1963 in Lahore. In 1964 when the country’s first 
television station was formed, the Ali Group pioneered locally 
assembled television sets. The first brand introduced in the domestic 
market was the Nippon Electric Company (NEC) television sets, 
assembled at Ali Automobiles (Pvt) Limited.
This Ford motor dealership was managed by Ali Automobiles (Pvt) 
Limited’s management, and was the progressive assembly of motor 
cars in which 34 percent of the imported parts were replaced by 
manufacturing them locally. Additionally, other vehicles were 
assembled by this company, such as, vans, trucks, air conditioner
^^The details of the partnership deed for this farm was in Wajid 
Ali’s open ended letter to ‘all’ shareholders, 25 June 1971.
^^Evidence of this is in Wajid Ah’s request for the same from 
Khizar Hayat, in a letter, 19 July 1971.
^®Lambretta scooter’s parent company was Innocenti located in 
Italy.
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assembly units and related engineering works. Ali Automobiles (Pvt) 
Limited became Awami Autos when it was nationalised by Bhutto in 
1972, and this marked the close of Ali Group's investment in the 
light engineering sector.
Another first for this group was a joint venture partnership with 
Akerlund and Pausing, two Swedish brothers who helped the Ali 
Group in setting up a paper and high grade board conversion mill in 
Pakistan; Packages Limited was formed in 1959, and production 
facihties were housed on its premises. The Swedes agreed to 
contribute to Packages Limited’s equity and machinery, along with 
providing technical support for installing and managing the 
packaging unit. A major source of Packages Limited’s equity was 
drawn from the International Finance Corporation, a subsidiary of 
the World Bank, on the latters’ acceptance of a feasibility study on 
Packages Limited prepared by Masood Hasan, a non-family 
managing director at WIL.^  ^ The Paper and Board Manufacturing 
Mill was annexed to Packages Limited in 1964, in order to provide 
the raw material for downstream conversion of packaging material. 
Packages Limited’s management also diversified its skills iu paper 
manufacturing when the company commenced with the 
manufacturing and marketing of facial paper tissue. This was sold 
under the brand name of Rose Petal with its production facilities also 
located within Packages Limited. The facial tissue plant was the
^^Interview with Masood Hasan, 16 January 1994.
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first locally manufactured product of its kind when introduced in 
1981.
Another attempt to diversify the group’s portfolio was realised in 
1979 with the purchase of more agricultural land for a dairy farm 
called Kabirwala Dairies. This supplied fresh milk for processing 
at another Ali concern, called Milkpak.^® The packaging material 
for milk processed at Milkpak was produced at Tetrapak (Pak) 
Limited, initially a subsidiary of Packages Limited which was also 
located on its premises. Under the Development Finance Institution 
(DFl) stipulation, the National Development Finance Institution 
(NDFC) was requested by the Ministry of Finance, Government of 
Pakistan, to prepare a report justifying the virtue of packaged milk 
in favour of (more) pure, non-packaged milk. The results of the 
report were accepted by the DFl’s management and Tetrapak 
benefitted by financing its equity through loans extended by the 
NDFC and the World Bank. It was formed as a partnership concern, 
in technical collaboration of Ali with the Akerlund and Pausing 
company of Sweden to manufacture and store UHT milk and fresh 
fruit juices in tetrahedral cartons. Akerlund and Pausing owned the 
worldwide patent for manufacture of tetrahedral packaging material.
^®Milkpak obtained firesh milk firom the dairy farm owned by 
Packages Limited. It then processed the milk at Ultra High 
Temperature (UHT), and sent it to Packages Limited for packaging 
it in tetrahedral paper. Additionally, Milkpak processed and 
marketed fruit juice, sterilised cream and dairy butter, all of which 
had an extended shelf life.
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which aseptically packaged UHT milk and fruit juices. Packages 
Limited’s shareholders were also shareholders in Tetrapak (Pak) 
Limited which was the first venture of its kind in Pakistan. In 
Pakistan, Tetrapak, with the Ah Group as its leading partners, had 
the sole licence to manufacture the specialised nature of its 
packaging material.
Ah also underwrote general insurance services to the public 
through its insurance company. International General Insurance. 
The following table provides the value of the Ah Group’s assets from 
1968-1985:
Table 3.3 
Ali Group Net Assets 
(Publicly and Privately Quoted Companies) 
(Rs millions)
1968 1974 1985 1988
179(10)" 87.6(5) 271.2(5) 2,220(5)
-51 % +210 % +719 %
" Numbers in parenthesis show the position of the assets of the 
group.
Source: a) For public limited companies: Balance Sheets of all 
groups; N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), Bukharis 101, Khadim Ah 
Shah Bukhari and Company Limited, 1991; H. Haqqani, 
‘Pakistan’s Top 22 Face New Challenges’, in Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 22 May 1986, p. 77 and L. White, 
Industrial Concentration and Economic Power, Princeton, 
1974, p. 60. b) For private hmited companies: ‘Minutes of 
Meeting of the Board of Directors’, of various Ah companies 
and company correspondence.
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In terms of the value of its net assets, Ali’s position fluctuated from 
tenth in 1968, which lowered to and then maintained itself at the 
fifth position from 1974 to 1988.^  ^ The group’s assets remained at 
fifth position, in spite of the first mover advantages it had over other 
contestants in industry.
3.2 Selected Company Histories
This section encapsulates the formation and management 
practices of five Ah Group companies, registered as public hmited 
and private hmited concerns. It highlights the proposition that, in 
most fields the Ah Group were first movers in industry, but over the 
long-term encountered production and marketing bottlenecks owing 
to ineffective management practices. In the long-term, the potential 
for expansion in terms of backward and forward linkages of 
functions, was not exploited owing to the management pohcy of the 
group. This is explained by first examining management policies at 
Syed A & M Wazir Ah and WIL.
^^Business house positions by the value of their asset ownership, 
are provided in L.J. White, Industrial Concentration and Economic 
Power^ Princeton, 1974, pp. 60-61; H. Haqqani, ‘Pakistan’s Top 22 
Find New Challengers’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 May 1986, 
pp. 74-78.
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3.2.1 Syed A & M Wazir Ali (Pvt) Limited and Wazir Ali 
Industries Limited (WIL)
Syed A & M Wazir Ali initially constituted four companies, the 
HSVOAIL and the Sind Oil M ills ,a n d  since black bar soap was a 
by product of edible oil production, the group integrated forwards and 
formed the Saba Soap Company. The Treet Safety Razor Corporation 
(Pvt) Limited was inducted as part of Syed A & M Wazir Ali in 1954. 
In 1958, the management decided to formally incorporate and 
amalgamate these companies as a pubbc hmited company, under the 
banner of Wazir Ali Industries Limited (WIL).
These companies constituted the group’s first manufacturing 
business venture after partition and the owners began recruiting 
non-family managers with a new vigour for the functional 
management of all companies in this set. The production facilities 
at the HSVOAIL and the Sind Oil Mills were managed by a team of 
professional managers. They were given autonomy of operations and 
reported to family managers such as Muratib Ali and bis three sons 
Wajid, Amjad and Babar Ali. The professional managers were Zaka 
Rabmatullab, the marketing manager, and Masood Hasan and 
Imtiaz Mebdi alternating every three months as production and
^^Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited originally had majority 
shareholdings in these companies, which were later divested in 
favour of Ali.
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commercial m a n a g e r s .This team also formed a troika of a three- 
member executive committee which also doubled up as the ‘Managing 
Directors’ of WIL.^^
The induction of professional managers at WIL introduced the 
training of managers as an intangible asset of a company, which 
directed planned growth through adopting the Systems Approach. 
Commensurate with this philosophy, in 1950 Masood Hasan was sent 
for training to Olympia Oil and Cake Mills at Selby, York and 
Warrington in the UK. In 1951, Imtiaz Mehdi followed for training 
to Lever Brothers, at Port Sunlight (UK) and Olympia Oil and Cake 
Mills at Whirlpool and Selby in the UK. This team was later 
increased after the ‘Managing Directors’ decided to enhance the 
designed production capacity of WIL. Amongst others, Khawaja 
Naseeruddin, a marketing consultant was inducted by WIL’s 
management in 1961.
^^For the credentials of Zaka Rahmatullah as a professional 
manager, see the recommendation for employment a t Ford Motors, 
Karachi, by his employer, E O Austin [Sales Department of Ford 
Motors at Bombay, India], in a letter addressed to Wajid Ali, 4 
February 1950; Masood Hasan brought along with him to WIL, his 
professional experience gained in employment with Jos E Seagrams 
in the USA, Unilever UK (1949-50), also having served at Crosfields, 
Warrington; Watson, Leeds; Christopher Thomas’, Bristol and Van 
den Burgh and Jurgens margarine plant at Purfleet; Imtiaz Mehdi 
also served at Unilever (UK), with time spent at Selby and Port 
Sunlight. He was inducted in, at WIL on account of being a 
grandson of Ahsan Ali [who in turn, was Wazir Ali’s son], but within 
a short space of time, developed into a professional manager.
^^Interview with Masood Hasan, 16 January 1994; this 
management troika is also mentioned in Amjad Ali, Glimpses, Jang, 
1992, p. 290.
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The combined efforts of this team produced bench mark results for 
WIL and for the group as a whole. The production of edible oil at 
WIL increased from 2,000 to 12,000 tons per annum over a period of 
five years from 1957 to 1962.^  ^ Their strategy also created a niche 
in the market share of soap and edible oil sales of their main 
competitor, Unilever, [part of Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited] who 
began producing and marketing ghee in Pakistan in 1952.^  ^ By 
1961, fifty percent of the latter’s branded oil and soap market was 
captured by WIL.^ ® At the same time, the decline in Unilever’s 
share of the edible oil and soap market is corroborated in the 
following table:
^^Interview with Masood Hasan, 6 November 1992 in Lahore.
^^Given in, Nudah Hasan, Dalda, Lahore University of 
Management Sciences, LBS, case # 04-810-90-1, 1990, p. 1.
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Table 3.4
Pakistan: Unilever’s Volume of Sales 1957-65
Year Concern share of Concern Share of
Vanaspati market Soap market
% %
1957 15 10
1958 16 11
1959 16 17
1960 23 18
1961 22 18
1962 19 21
1963 14 21
1964 13 19
1965 11 16
Source: D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 254. 
a) Vanaspati is alternately known as edible oil/ vegetable oil/ 
vegetable ghee\ b) the table is a condensed version of the original, 
[the omitted figures were for imports of edible oils or soap].
The above table shows that for Vanaspati (vegetable oil), 
Unilever’s market share registered a increase of seven percent in 
1960 over the previous year. Thereafter, the rising trend did not 
recur. The market share for vegetable oil decbned from one percent 
to five percent over successive years from 1961-65. It was at this 
juncture that WIL’s marketing strategy for edible oil sales made 
inroads into Unilever’s share of the market. Unilever’s market share 
for soap also declined after 1963. It is evident that competitors’ 
strategy to dip into Unilever’s soap market share was succeeding. It 
was a t this juncture that WIL’s professional managerial strategy to 
dip into Unilever’s edible oil and soap market worked to the former’s 
advantage.
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The reasons assigned by Unilever’s management for their declining 
market share for the soap and edible oil market are documented by 
Fieldhouse. He reports that Unilever’s management placed the 
blame on having chosen the wrong location and ‘partners’, for the 
wrong reasons.^® Therefore Unilever realised, too late, that taking 
on (influential) competitors as equity holders in Unilever’s 
investments was not a wise strategy in the long-term. Initially, 
Unilever needed the political and economic umbrella provided by Ali 
to establish a manufacturing base in edible oil and soap 
manufacturing, but when these competitors dipped into Unilever’s 
market share, Unilever reversed their argument and said that they 
had chosen the wrong partners. The Ah management’s investment 
in hiring professional managers at a critical juncture had worked to 
its advantage, and its share-holdings in Unilever investments became 
subordinate to the larger interests from the gains to be made from 
their own group’s investment.
The WIL team also tackled another competitor, the local Seth, The 
Seths employed illegal tactics to manoeuvre the share of soap sales 
to their advantage. They manipulated the amount of excise duty 
payable to the State and in doing so succeeded in undercutting the 
existing sales price of soap. According to WIL’s (ex) director, Masood 
Hasan:
^®See D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 
254.
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‘The Seths provided unethical competition for WIL because 
they avoided paying excise duty on every alternate 35 lbs. bulk 
pack for edible oil. In this way the Seths' cost of production 
was lower than that of WIL, which enabled them [Seths] to 
undercut the sales price of oil and to pay less when raw 
materials were in scarce supply. To rectify this imbalance in 
prices we started selhng oils in smaller branded consumer 
packs. We lowered our technical process losses and we 
avoided competing with the Seths' edge in the sale of bulk 
packs’.^ ^
In the above case the apparent problem was the undercutting of 
sales price on bulk packs by a competitor. In seeing the situation 
from an overall stance, the management decided to change their 
product by introducing smaller packs. In doing so, the Seths' product 
no longer competed with WIL in the market. This decision produced 
successful results because the form of the problem had been 
addressed rather than its content. The form of the problem was that 
the product needed to be changed rather than trying to enforce 
ethical practices on to the Seths to make them declare the correct 
duty (which was the specific content of the problem).
Later, Masood Hasan served at the WIL regional office at Lahore. 
There he managed WIL edible oil sales in the northern areas of 
Pakistan as well as advised Ali Automobile’s management on the 
assembly of‘Carrier’ air-conditioners for which they held an agency. 
He left WIL in 1964 to form the first computer software consultancy 
service in Pakistan, and was followed by the departure of Imtiaz 
Mehdi in 1975. This management troika succeeded in
^^Interview with Masood Hasan, 6 November 1992.
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professionalising the management function which was also 
demonstrated in the number of managers they trained.
In 1973, the oil section of WIL was nationahsed by Prime Minister 
Bhutto. By then WIL’s fourteen (out of sixteen) non-family managers 
had left to become leading executives in their respective fields. This 
was due to the training in the Systems Approach and methods study 
they had received at WIL which enriched their managerial skills, 
which they replicated at their new appointments. These skills in 
management were recognised by their potential employers. The 
following WIL employees who left for more senior positions in the 
ghee and automobile industry were as follows.
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Table 3.5 
In WIL employment
l.Hiimayun Mufti, assistant 
accountant
2.S.M. S alar, chief engineer, 
(1955-65), Treet Safety 
Razor Corporation Limited
S.Gert Lorenz-Bergmann, 
German electrical engineer, 
SOM 
4.Masood Hasan,
‘Managing Director’ WIL; 
Board of Directors, WIL 
5.Imtiaz Mehdi,
‘Managing Director’ WIL; 
Board of Directors, WIL
New Designation
Managing director of the 
nationalised Ghandhara Industries 
Limited; later progressed to become 
the chairman of the Federal Light 
Engineering Company Limited, a 
holding company for all the 
nationalised light engineering units 
in the country.
Managing director of the 
nationalised. National Motors; 
later progressed to the Managing 
directorship of the 
Automobile Corporation of 
Pakistan, a holding corporation 
which managed the nationalised 
Ghandhara Motors Ltd., Hinopak 
Motors Ltd., and Al-Futtaim Ltd. 
The latter was a joint venture 
between the Pakistani and Japanese 
governments and the Al-Futtaim 
group.
Managing director, and on the 
Board of Directors of AEG 
Telefunken in Germany.
Federal Defence 
Secretary, (Production).
Chairman, Board of 
Management, (BOM), Sind &
BOM of all nationalised ghee 
and sugar mills in Sind.
Managing director of a nationalised 
ghee company.
Managing director of a nationalised 
ghee company.
Managing director of the 
nationalised Burmah Oil Mills and 
E.M. Oil Mills Limited.
9. Afzal, personnel department Managing director of the
nationalised EMI Mills Limited.
10.Waheed Zuberi, marketing Managing director, A & B.
11.Khawaja Mushtaq, engineer Managing director, Treet 
Treet (Pvt) Limited (Pubhc) Limited.
12.Mohammad Shaft, Managing director of
production manager WIL after it was nationalised.
Source: Interview with M. Hasan and 1. Mehdi, 16 Januray 1994.
6. Malik Iqbal, chief chemist
7. Hassanji
8. M. Anwaruddin, personnel 
manager.
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Some members from the above team also organised sales and 
production strategy for the Treet Blades Safety Razor Corporation 
(Pvt) Limited, which enabled it to capture ninety percent of the 
country’s razor blade market in the 1960s. The company enjoyed a 
monopoly in blades production till competition came from the Gillette 
Razor Blade Company provided competition, set up in the late 1980s. 
This early tradition of employing professional managers at WIL with 
the attendant delegation of authority was not emulated by other 
companies in the group, which led to different patterns of growth. 
The first example of this deviation away from using the Systems 
Approach in managerial pohcy was observed at Packages Limited.
3.2.2 Packages Limited
This company was formed in 1959 as a private limited concern for 
a packaging unit using imported raw material (paper and board). It 
was the second mill set up, (after the one owned by the Adamjee 
Group at Nowshera), to convert pulp to paper, and then into 
packaging material. Initially the Ali family owned 77.31 percent 
shares and the Swedish partners, a further 22.69 percent. The 
Swedish share was given in exchange for technical and managerial 
assistance in operating the imported machinery. A contract for 
continued technical assistance gave the Swedes an additional US $
35,000 annually up to 1976. About 22 Swedes stayed on during the 
first three years of the company’s initiation.
The debt equity ratio at Packages Limited was 70:30, on an initial
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investment of Rs 50 million, therefore the owners only invested in its 
equity @ 30 percent, that is, Rs 15 milhon in 1959. The remaining 
capital was raised by obtaining foreign currency loans for purchase 
of imported equipment. This included an International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) loan of US $ 6 million, which was approved on the 
basis of a feasibility prepared by Masood Hasan. Other professional 
managers who assisted in setting up Packages Limited and who were 
previously employed at WIL, were Zaka Rahmatullah and Imtiaz 
Mehdi.
The raw material for producing paper, was pulp and particle board, 
using wheat straw, which was then processed to make high grade 
board and paper which was then converted to make packaging 
material. Initially, Packages Limited had a capacity to produce
35,000 metric tons of board. Rotogravure and lamination machines 
provided more sophisticated flexi packaging material for the food 
industry.^® The packaging unit was the main revenue earner and 
note books and stationery sales were subordinate products produced 
and marketed.
In 1964, the management generated sub-production assembly 
economies of scale by integrating backwards in a paper and board 
mill to feed the paper conversion unit. Till then Packages Limiteds’ 
management purchased paper and board from a competitor. This
^^Pakistan Packaging Institute, ‘Evolution of Packaging Industry 
in Pakistan’, Dawn, 8 January 1991, pp. 5-6.
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new mill was set up as a result of a decision to integrate backwards 
to ensure that the requisite quality and quantity of material for 
conversion to finished packaging material was available when 
needed. At the same time the company went public, in order to raise 
capital for the additional finance required to implement this 
backward integration. The public subscription of the company’s 
shares fetched 12.98 percent from the general public and 6.62 percent 
from financial institutions.^® The Ali family, its companies and 
associates owned 47.12 percent; Akerlund and Rausing with its 
associates another 20.38 percent and the International Finance 
Corporation 12.9 percent.
The paper and board mill commenced production in 1965 with an 
annual production capacity of converting 24,000 metric tons of paper 
and board, increased to 42,000 metric tons per annum by 1978. This 
gave Packages Limited a third of the market supply in paper and 
converted board. The remaining two-thirds capacity was met by the 
Adamjee Paper Mills Limited established in 1954 as a (Pakistan 
Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) project and sold to the 
Adamjee Group in 1963, and the Crescent Board Mills Limited, 
established in 1969 as another PIDC project which was purchased 
later by the Crescent Group. In setting up its own paper and board
®®However since government-owned financial institutions also 
constitute the ‘public’, about 25 percent shares of the ‘pubhc’ shares 
were subscribed by financial institutions, such as National 
Investment Trust (NIT), and National Investment Corporation (NIC).
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mill, Packages Limited was the first to do so without FIDO’s 
patronage. About 80 percent of its output was consumed internally 
by the packaging unit for manufacturing paper. The finished product 
was then sold as containers and packaging material to other 
industrial consumers. Packages Limited’s largest customer was the 
Pakistan Tobacco Company (PTC). Other large customers were the 
Tetrapak Company, tea, cigarettes, food and beverage, soap and 
detergents, safety match, textile and hosiery, shoe, pharmaceutical, 
bulb manufacturers and the Defence Services. The following table 
summarises Packages Limited’s key financial performance indicators, 
1968-88:
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Table 3.6 
Packages Limited Pre-tax Profits
Rs (millions)
Year Sales Pre-tax
Profits
1968 55.7 2.1
1969 57.3 2.2
1970 79.6 12.4
1971 76.6 8.4
1972 94.1 8.3
1973 118.6 15.4
1974 149.2 29.6
1975 150.0 18.01
1976 159.8 12.3
1977 212.7 34.5
1978 241.3 39.2
1979 290.0 49.0
1980 352.0 59.6
1981 406.6 69.0
1982 432.3 70.8
1983 465.3 77.0
1984 499.4 82.6
1985 574.1 68.1
1986 632.6 65.4
1987 745.0 36.0
1988 875.0 78.6
 ^By 1975, Akerlund and Rausing’s share in Packages Limited 
was down to 14 percent. By 1976 new flotations on the Stock 
Exchange reduced Akerlund and Rausing’s shareholdings to 14 
percent, and increased State-owned and Ali Group shares to 40 
and 27 percent respectively.
Source: Packages Limited, Annual Reports, 1969-1989.
In 1974, Babar Ali relinquished daily operating control of the 
business for four years. Further insight into senior management’s 
policies through Babar Ali’s decisions show a variegated style of 
management. In Western economies the modem industrial 
enterprise transformed businesses because the zest for market share
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drove them to become m u ltin a tio n a lsH o w ev er, in 1974-76 the 
foreign collaborator’s shareholdings in Packages Limited were 
reduced and this period also coincided with a reduction in the 
company’s profits. By 1974, two decades after its inception. Packages 
Limited was still not a mature multinational. It neither had any 
direct foreign investment or subsidiaries overseas. (Since 1969, it 
had exported a small proportion of its packaging material to the 
Middle East). With its Swedish heritage it had the makings of a 
tough competitor; especially since Packages Limited had innovated 
a production process to create a new industry in tetrahedral 
packaging material. In 1974, Babar Ali was offered share holdings 
in an Indonesian paper mill in exchange for technical input meant to 
be provided by Packages Limited. This offer was based on the 
Norwegian partners of the Indonesian concern being impressed by 
with Packages Limited’s engineers, who had turned implemented a 
factory turnaround in under three months.^^ However, Babar Ali 
turned down the offer on the grounds that he would only accept if he 
was given full control of its operations.'^^ Thereupon the
^®See A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, on pp. 4-9, 
discusses that in order to maintain market share the management 
was pressurised into specialising and diversifying their product 
range.
4i<Turnaround’ signifies closure of a factory in order to exercise 
maintenance and modernisation of the plant.
^^See Carlos Cordiero, Packages Limited, [case written under the 
direction of Professor Louis T Wells Jr.], President and Fellows of 
Harvard College, Harvard Business School case # 390-095,1990, p.7.
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Norwegians withdrew their original offer. Here was an opportunity 
for Babar Ali to make an international foray, and by refusing an offer 
which did not give him total control he preferred to opted for 
foregone industrialisation.
Packages Limiteds’ company culture favoured a paternalistic
approach which directed employee tenure. This approach included
the non-development of individuals which led to a high turnover of
its personnel. Graduates were recruited with the intention of
grooming them as part of the company’s culture. For those who did
not conform, eventually left Packages Limited. Justifying this trend,
the marketing manager, Javed Aslam commented:
‘The management prefers to train sales personnel for six 
months and if they decide to leave, the company does not 
object’.
This attitude was an inherent ingredient of the company culture 
which discouraged non-family members being groomed to take on 
senior management positions. It also portrayed an indifference to 
loss of human resources which are a company’s intangible assets. In 
1974, the total workforce levelled at 2,872 employees of which 77 
percent were on the shop floor and as supervisory junior staff in the 
technical and production departments. Middle management 
represented 22 percent of personnel and senior management the
^^Interview with Javed Aslam, 26 March 1992 in Lahore. See 
Appendix A for questions asked in the interview.
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remaining one percent.^^ The directors preferred to hire those with 
minimum work experience to encourage maximum absorption of the 
company culture. Most of Packages Limited’s employees in middle 
and senior management positions who had decided to continue were 
there for there for at least 20 years. From within their ranks, they 
had not been able to produce other than one person to take on senior 
management positions. This exceptional case, where a non family 
manager occupied the combined positions of a senior director and was 
represented on the Board of Directors as well as being the general 
manager of Packages Limited was Tariq Hameed. Tariq Hameed’s 
strength originally drew from his personal links with the raw 
material suppliers for Packages Limited.
The tendency for the non-development of individuals to accept 
responsible positions in the Ali Group, was exemphfied when a 
vacancy arose at Milkpak Limited, for a managing director, This 
position was initially offered by Babar Ali to an employee of Packages 
Limited, who had twenty years of service there, to his credit. 
However, the latter declined on the grounds that the ‘real action’ was 
taking place at Packages Limited.^^ Therefore, even when the 
opportunity arose. Packages Limited’s long-term employees had lost 
the initiative to better themselves professionally, which was an
'^^Given in Ali Group, unpublished company documents.
^^Given in, Eugene Salorio, Selecting a New Manager at Milkpak, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, LBS case # 08-075-87-1, 
p. 3.
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attitude in harmony with their company’s philosophy.
Managerial inertia was evident again from the following example. 
An incident occurred which reflected the lack of co-ordination 
between the ink factory and costing departments at Packages 
Limited. The discord involved the inspectors of the ink factory who 
lacked formal qualifications for operating and monitoring the 
production quality. The only training provided by the company was 
on-the-job, which lasted for three months. The ink factory and 
costing departments had adopted different formulae for assigning ink 
production costs which then produced differing results. The latter 
were accused by the ink factory manager of pricing ink at (higher) 
imported prices which no longer applied and using too much colour 
to mix the ink.
On the issue of colour, another related incident occurred. The 
quality control of ink was the basis of another problem which arose 
at Packages Limited. In 1987 the production manager, Rafi Ahmad, 
was faced with a rejected customer shipment for an order for 
medicine display cards. The reason provided by the customer was 
the inferior quality of ink. The quality control lapse had occurred 
due to a lack of coordination between the ink factory and planning 
departments. The planning department obtained the customer 
specifications and sent them on to the production department who 
then coordinated operations with the ink factory. For this particular 
order, the batch of medicine display cards had unacceptable colour
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variations which violated the customer’s specification. Underlying 
this event was the absence of an organised computing system to 
monitor consistency of colour output. Quahty checks were conducted 
visually and at random. At times instead of the quahty control 
personnel conducting the checks, the ink factory manager and its 
operators or supervisors were executing them. In effect, the 
company’s management were economising on hiring qualified 
technical staff, and therefore putting its ink quality in jeopardy, by 
over-utihsing the services of its manager who was involved in 
supervisory checks of quality where a trained chemist was really 
required. The ink factory manager’s line responsibilities were 
enhanced with staff functions in addition to conducting quahty 
checks himself such as, production planning and management, 
quahty control and laboratory operations, recipe development and 
human resource development. Stan Hooper, consultants to Packages 
Limited had suggested that the minimum number of chemists 
required to support the quahty checks was four; at the ink factory 
there were none.^ ®
In 1988, the financial loss to the company from delays in decision 
making which led to lost orders due to unacceptable quahty of its
Ahmed Bilal, Mohammad Abid and Usman Babar, ‘Strategic 
Decision for Diversification into Printing Ink’, unpublished report, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, 30 April 1990. [This 
report is available with the author].
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ink, stood at Rs 4.5 million.^^ This loss was is in spite of the high 
profits earned by Packages Limited in the same year. In the above 
example the form of the problem was the disorganised management 
at the ink factory whereas the specific content of the problem was the 
poor quality of the ink.^ ® The permanent solution lay in addressing 
the form of the problem so that such an instance where a customer 
rejected an order did not recur. The content of the problem could 
have been solved by a subject speciahst, such as a chemist, as was 
recommended by Stan Hooper consultants who could have 
recommended adoption of new equipment design in order to generate 
printing economies of scale in ink manufacturing. However, this 
would only resolve the problem at that particular moment and not 
when a new (dramatically different) problem arose in the ink factory. 
Therefore, it was all the more necessary to address the form of the 
problem which meant that a re-evaluation was necessary, of the roles 
played by the planning and production departments and its 
interaction with the ink factory, in fulfilling customer requirements.
In 1977, Babar Ali and Aezaz Hussein, a computer specialist set up 
a sofkwEire consultancy and hardware providing company, named 
Systems (Pvt) Limited. Its equity of Rs 550,000, was equally shared
^^Given in, Ahmad Bilal, Mohammad Abid and Usman Babar, 
‘Strategic Decision for Diversification into Printing Ink’, unpublished 
report, April, 1990, p. 19.
'^ ^See p. 156, for the methodology recognising the form as against 
the content of problem solving.
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between Babar Ali and Aezaz Hussein/^ In spite of Babar Ali’s 
commitment to promote the business of Systems Limited, he was 
unable to replicate his intentions by not providing Packages Limited 
with a main frame computer. An incident which follows, which also 
exemplifies Babar Ali’s managerial inertia to adopt internal systems 
at Packages Limited. In 1987, the technical and planning managers 
a t Packages Limited had expressed their discontent a t the lack of an 
in-house computing system which led to delays in printed results 
arriving at their desks. When the information did arrive, it was 
already redundant and the report had lost its usefulness as a tool to 
make predictable decisions. Wherever computerised reports existed 
they were oriented more towards number crunching rather than 
generating information useful for analysis and decision making. Also 
whenever the technical manager requested the senior management 
to instal a system which rectified this problem^ he was rebuffed with 
the view that the company had neither the need nor the expertise for 
computerising its operations.
The following views were presented by Aezaz Hussien, the 
managing director of Systems (Pvt) Limited, who was recruited to 
evaluate the need for a new computer system at Packages Limited:
Given in, Javed Hamid, Systems Limited (A), Lahore University 
of Management Sciences, 1987, LBS case # 08-168-87-1, p. 3.
®^ For a critical account of the drive towards computerisation at 
Packages Limited, see Munazzah Naqvi, Packages Limited (A), 
Lahore University of Management sciences, LBS case # 18-008-88-1,
p. 16.
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‘In my opinion the proposal has become a cost cutting device 
rather than a strategic enhancement device. They are not 
analysing the reasons for granting a machine. The 
management at Packages has never been convinced of the 
strategic usefulness of computers. Moreover they are 
concerned that technology is a must but not concerned with 
the details’
After 28 years of running the organisation without a centralised 
reporting system, the management invested in an in-house 
computerisation system in 1987. This system was still not geared for 
absorbing data from all departments stored in a centralised data 
base. Rather it amounted to replacing the drill of accounting and 
memo writing vdth instalhng desk top computers to do the same job. 
This still left senior management unable to access a centralised data 
base to monitor interdepartmental activities and flow of information. 
They were also unable to assign responsibility to individuals and so 
blocked any feedback which could have improved existing 
malfunctions. In 1987 Aezaz Hussein’s earlier opinion was reinforced 
when Tariq Hameed vetoed his proposal to invest in an in-house 
computing system based on IBM technology and instead opted for a 
microprocessor based system. The microprocessor system relied on 
using personal computers, rather than a more sophisticated in-house 
system which was offered by IBM, to accommodate higher memory 
capacity at a faster speed. Cost was not the issue which detracted 
Packages Limited’s management from adopting the IBM proposal, 
rather an inability to appreciate sophisticated technology which in
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any case would have reduced costs over the long-term.
Twenty two years after its inception, Packages Limited no longer 
held a monopoly in the production of paper and board. There were 
13 other paper and board manufacturing facilities.®^ The total 
installed capacities of these units is 294,600 tons per annum, of 
which Packages Limited owned 42,000 tons. By 1988 the packaging 
unit serviced 14 percent of the country's domestic market needs for 
packaging material.®^ The largest paper mill, Pakistan Paper 
Corporation was established in 1971 at Charsaddah with a 
production capacity of 45,000 tons per annum.®^ This indicated that 
the pioneer’s competitive advantage remained only in producing 
packaging material and not in paper and board manufacturing. This 
advantage was gained from the protection received by Packages from 
the Akerlund and Rausing company, articulated through the 
Pakistani government. This meant that the patent to manufacture 
Tetrahedral cartons rested only with the Ali Group, and in doing so 
the quality conscious industrial consumer became its assured 
customer. Also the packaging industry flourished because it did not 
require installation or demonstration of how to use its output and
®^ See N. Memon, ‘Paper and Paper Board Industry’, in Pakistan 
and Gulf Economist, Vol 3, September 23-29, 1989, p. 36.
^^Ihid; also see an article by Pakistan Packaging Institute, 
‘Evolution of the Packaging Industry in Pakistan’, Dawn, January 
1991, pp. 5-6.
®^Pakistan Packaging Institute, ‘Evolution of the Packaging 
Industry in Pakistan’, Dawn, January 1991, pp. 5-6.
202
neither were after-sales services expected by its customers. However, 
in an economic environment dominated by cotton textiles production, 
Packages Limited stood out in forging an identity of its own in an 
unfamiliar area.
3.2.3 Milkpak Limited (Milkpak)
Milkpak was set up in 1978, as a public limited company, at the 
initiative of its chairman, Babar Ab. Milkpak processed fresh milk 
then sterilised it by subjecting it to UHT processing. It was the first 
company to start production and distribution of milk by modem 
methods. Milk was then packaged in Tetrapak brick-shaped and 
tetrahedral (triangular packs) by another Ali subsidiary, Tetrapak 
(Pak) Limited. It was then distributed to consumers outside the 
traditional channels by making it available at grocery stores and 
supermarkets. A traditional channel for supply of milk was from the 
local milkman, who delivered fresh milk from bis personal dairy to 
bouses on a door-to-door basis. The quality of such milk was 
inconsistent depending on the buffalo’s lactation period and the 
adulteration of milk with water by the milkman.®^
In 1982, the services of a Danish dairy consultant, the Danish 
Turnkey Dairies, were employed by Milkpak’s management to assist 
local farmers on the care and vaccination of their cattle. The Danes 
provided a number of support services, namely the formation of a
Adulteration of milk by adding water to it, is a common practice 
among milkmen in Pakistan.
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village milk collection enterprise which ensured a milk purchase 
market for farmers throughout the year, stationing at six different 
locations, 10 veterinary graduates and 15 stock assistants augmented 
by a mobile veterinary and vaccination service, provision of improved 
seeds for fodder to farmers on demonstration plots, advisory services 
for livestock management and encouraging cross breeding of cows 
with high milk yielding v a r ie tie s .T h e se  services, combined with 
the aseptically packaged milk, ensured consistent milk quality and 
also extended its shelf life.
Management practices at Milkpak were also subject to Babar Ah’s
style of management. When the position of managing director at
Milkpak became vacant, Babar Ali decided not to hire a Packages
employee for managing Milkpak on grounds that:
T did not want to use anyone from Packages because 1 needed 
them all [there]
This comment was inconsistent with Babar Ali’s earlier attempt to 
convince an employee of Packages Limited, (who had served twenty 
years at the company), to assume the managing directorship of 
Milkpak. Babar Ali then approached Aftab Ahmad to occupy the 
position of Milkpak’s managing director. Aftab Ahmad was a 
chemical engineer who was also the managing director of the
®®In, M. Ashraf, ‘Dairy industry in Pakistan’, Dawn, 11 March 
1990, p. 7.
®^Given in, Eugene Salorio, Selecting a New Manager at Milkpak, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, LBS case # 08-075-87-1, 
p. 3.
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National Fertiliser Corporation Limited. In 1978, Aftab accepted the
new job offered by Babar Ali. Babar Ali justified the offer on the
following grounds:
‘A number of people considered him [Aftab] as a potential 
future candidate for the chairmanship [of the fertihser 
company]. I thought he was very competent and of the highest 
integrity. So 1 hired him as managing director of Milkpak .
Babar Ali’s decision was clouded by his family’s tendency to 
base decisions on extraneous opinions rather than on the merit of an 
individual. He was soon to regret this decision. In 1982, there was 
a turnover in the management of the company. After four year’s of 
Aftab Ahmed’s tenure, Babar Ali terminated his services along with 
those of his management team. The grounds provided for dismissal 
were misuse of company facilities, a four year delay in commencing 
milk processing (from the time of Aftab Ahmad’s appointment in 
1978) and the resulting decline in company profits, (in 1981, they 
were 1.7 percent lower than the profits for the previous year and in 
1982 they were 5 percent lower than the profits for 1981). This 
contradicted Babar Ali’s former opinion of Aftab Ahmed when he was 
offered the job. Babar Ali justified the dismissal of this team with 
the comments:
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‘The problem with bringing public-sector mangers into the 
private-sector is that they’re more concerned with explaining 
why things went wrong than with making them go right’.®®
Therefore, Babar Ali admitted (by implication) that his earher
criterion for choosing the candidate was a faulty one. However
Masood Hasan thought otherwise of the reason which led to this
Aftab Ahmad’s dismissal:
‘The real reason was because of the Packages mafia. They 
created problems’.®®
This indicated that even though Milkpak was a separately 
registered company, its management was still subject to Babar Ah’s 
influence, articulated by exercising his group’s philosophy on the 
management practices of Milkpak Limited. The decision to hire 
Aftab Ahmed was proved erroneous to the extent that he did not 
demonstrate managerial skills in this appointment, a potential factor 
which was not visualised by Babar Ali when he recruited him. There 
was also no long-term investment in retaining skilled labour at 
Milkpak. The company strategy did not value retention of both 
skilled and executive manpower in that there was no workers’ 
participation fund till 1987. Such factors, cumulatively contributed 
to the change over of management at Milkpak, particularly when 
there was incongruity between the personnel performance and the job
®®Given in, Eugene Salorio, Selecting a New Manager at Milkpak, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, LBS case # 08-075-87-1,
p. 1.
®®lnterview with Masood Hasan, 16 January 1994.
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requirements. It was Babar All who was instrumental in the 
execution of daily decisions and so could not absolve himself as being 
a non-performing participant in the misdemeanours which occurred 
at Milkpak Limited.
In 1988, an exogenous factor contributed to the improved 
performance at Milkpak. The Nestle food company of Switzerland in 
agreement with Milkpak, extended its support through providing 
technical assistance and collaboration with them, to manufacture 
powdered milk at Milkpak under Nestle’s brand name, Nido. The 
following table shows the pre-tax profits and (losses) a t Milkpak:
Table 3.7
Milkpak Pre-tax Profits and (Losses)
Rs Millions 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Pre tax profits (1.7) (5.0) 6.0 8.9 5.7 5.3 5.0 5.1
Source: Milkpak, Annual Reports, 1982-89.
The technical input provided by Nestle was accompanied by the 
appointment in 1988 of Yawar Ali, as Milkpak’s managing director. 
Yawar Ali was Babar Ali’s nephew and his appointment was 
approved by the latter even though he did not consider Yawar to be 
an effective manager.®^ The anomaly lay in Babar Ah taking
®^ This was conveyed to the author in an interview with Ahsan 
Raza, 30 March 1992, in Lahore [in his capacity as a non-family, ex- 
managing director of Kabirwala Dairies, who was selected and
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cognisance of a manager’s ineptitude and still recruiting him for 
managing a company. This anomaly was consistent with the Ali 
Group’s inward-looking policies which led to their managerial inertia. 
The policy not to train individuals from within the company, had left 
Milkpak with no eUgible or qualified candidates to assume its 
managing directorship. The position should have been offered to a 
manager with professionalisation of experience®^ especially since a 
foreign company was collaborating with Milkpak. However, the 
reigns of power were offered by default to a family member. There 
was also no indication by the close of the 1980s that this tendency 
was about to change.
3.2.4 Ali Automobiles (Pvt) Limited (Ali Autos)
This company was set up in 1950, led by Wajid Ali.®® The head 
office and assembly unit were based in Karachi with five branch 
offices a t Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar^ Rawalpindi and Quetta. Till 
the mid-1960s, WIL remained the flagship company of the group but 
thereafter it was Ali Autos by which the group’s corporate identity 
was recognised. This was because when Ali Autos was formed, it was 
a rarity for entrepreneurs to produce or assemble motor vehicles. 
The group’s first mover position in this industry enabled it to obtain
appointed for this post by Babar Ali]. See Appendix A.
®^ This concept is explained on p. 152.
®®See agreement signed by Wajid Ali and Babar Ali, with the 
former accepting his responsibihty as the managing director of the 
company, 3 February 1969.
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a licence from Ford (USA) to assemble its vehicles in Pakistan. This 
enabled the Ali Autos’ management to replace a number of imported 
raw material parts for vehicle assembly with indigenously 
manufactured ones. The deletion content for Ford cars was 28 
percent and 40 percent for Lambretta Scooters.®'  ^ Armed with their 
arsenal of contacts made with the Ford company (USA), through 
Iskander Mirza’s benediction, they were presented with no obstacles 
in obtaining the relevant licences from the Ayub government.®^ 
Assembly began with the production of 2,500 assembled Ford motor 
cars per year.®® In 1950 the cost of production for a Ford 158" 
wheel base (WB) was Rs 10,580 and for a General Motor’s Chevrolet
161.2 inches WB was Rs 10,350. In 1951 the market price for Ford 
cars in Pakistan fetched Rs 10,481.18.®  ^ Given the small profit 
margin derived from the difference in cost and selling price, the year- 
end profits in 1950 were Rs 9,850 or approximately equivalent to the 
sales price of one car.®® Other agencies owned by Ali Autos were for
®^ For these figures see, Amjad Ali, Glimpses, Jang, 1992, p. 116.
®®lnterview with Zia Shafi Khan, Personnel Adviser, Habib Group, 
24 November 1992 in London.
®®The production capacity is indicated in a letter from Wajid Ali, 
Ali Automobiles Limited, West Wharf, Post OfiSce Box, 1130, Karachi 
to Major-General A. Whiteside, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, 
Pakistan, 3 February 1950.
®^ See letter from Wajid Ali invoicing a buyer, M. Shoaib Esqr. of 
203-B, E.l. Lines, Frere Street, Karachi, 2 February 1951.
®®Given in. Statement of Sales and Expenses at Ali Automobiles 
Rawalpindi, from October 1949 to 31 March 1950.
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the assembly of Ford trucks, tractors, NEC television sets. Carrier 
airconditioners, English Electric refiigerators®® and Lambretta 
scooters. By 1971, 34 percent of television set parts (by volume) were 
indigenously manufactured at Ali Autos. This demonstrated, a 66 
percent deletion component for assembly of television sets.^ ®
The bulk of Ford cars were sold to the Defence Ministry.^^ 
Obtaining the Defence Ministry contract, was made possible from 
earlier links which Muratib Ali bad with the Commander-in-Cbief of 
the Indian Armed Forces, Sir Claude Aucbinleck, and later those of 
Amjad and Wajid Ali with General Iskander Mirza. In 1969 the 
agency for sale of pre-assembled Lambretta scooters was given to the 
Ali Group by its parent company, Innocenti in Italy. When Innocenti 
set up their unit, the Ab family felt that expansion into motor vehicle 
assembly represented little competition. However, the general 
manager of Ali Autos, Mohammad Mobsin was not considered 
competent by Innocenti’s chairman, Bonelli to conduct business on
®®See deed appointing Ali Automobiles as sole agents for supply 
of refrigerators of the English Electric Co. Limited, signed by E. 
Lewis, manager, Bombay branch, 20 October 1949. Also see a letter 
W.J. Orange, The English Electric Company, Mackinnons Building, 
McLeod Road, Karachi, to Amjad Ali, 18 Victoria Road, Karachi, 21 
March 1951.
^^Deletion means the process of replacing imported spare parts 
with locally manufactured ones.
^^See offer of sales letter, from Wajid Ali to Gbulam Abbas, 
Financial Advisor, Ministry of Defence, Karachi, 7 March 1950, 
offering 35 Mercury and 15 Ford cars to the government.
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Lambretta’s behalf/^ Thereupon, Innocenti withdrew its 
investments in Pakistan in 1971 at a time when the environment 
was conducive for developing the automobile industry. This was 
another instance of foregone industrialisation in engineering, faced 
by the group, owing to their inept management practices.
By 1970, and prior to nationahsation, motor car sales at Ali Autos 
declined.^^ This happened at a time when a government financial 
institution, the Investment Corporation of Pakistan (ICP) had 
financed the company’s equity through a loan, which represented 16 
percent of its credit extension to all private industry in 1970. All 
through this study there was also no evidence of a computerised 
record-keeping and monitoring system since accounts were manually 
prepared using the old ledger system. Before the Ali Group could 
consolidate their position, the automobile manufacturing industry 
was nationalised by the Bhutto government in 1972. Like the Treet 
Corporation (Pvt) Limited and Packages Limited, this company also 
followed an inward system of management, in order to keep costs 
low. This was reported by Nosher Mama, a non-family managing 
director of Ali Autos from 1960 to 1979, who was the only other 
exception to the Ali family’s convention of recruiting family managers
^^See letter sent by Mohsin to Bonelli, 4 December 1969.
^^ A letter fi*om R.N. Conn, the Direct Markets, operations 
manager for European Sales Operations at Ford Europe to Wajid Ali, 
3 March 1970, diplomatically reprimanding Wajid Ali on loss of their 
sales market in Pakistan.
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at senior positions/^
Mama reported that in the course of time Wajid Ali had turned 
down an offer from Japan’s Toyota company for a joint venture offer, 
to assemble motor cars in Pakistan/® This decision was another 
example of foregone industriahsation for the group. The Japanese 
offer was an exogenous factor affecting expansion, and had it been 
accepted it could have sohdified the groups’ base in engineering, 
especially in the wake of nationahsation, this base could have had its 
spin off effects with Ali establishing other engineering facilities.
Wajid Ali’s involvement with the Employees Federation at Karachi 
and Geneva indicate his interest in employer-labour relations.^® 
Any labour conflicts which emerged at Ah Autos were personally 
resolved by Wajid Ah. However Wajid Ah did not differentiate 
between line and staff functions when delineating and accounting for 
the employees’ performance; Decisions made by any non-family 
managers were effectively made redundant, since they were over 
ruled by Wajid Ali’s final veto power on them. The organisation was 
also centrahsed without diversifying into other product hnes such as
^"^Interview with Nosher Mama, ex-managing director Ah Autos, 
18 January 1992 in Karachi. See Appendix A.
Wajid Ali’s status as an influential figure in labour management 
on a national level is evident from a letter of invitation for a meeting, 
addressed to him fi*om the Secretary, West Pakistan Labour Advisory 
Board, 105, Upper Mall, Lahore, 3 March 1967, to Wajid Ali, 
chairman. Labour Committee of the board.
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manufacture of spare parts and paint, which were related products 
of the automobile. Such an extension would have reduced the effects 
of nationalisation and continued the Ah Group’s interests in light 
engineering.
3.2.5 Treet Safety Razor Blades Corporation (Pvt) Limited 
(Treet)
The group’s foray in blades manufacturing commenced in pre­
partition India; where they were appointed the sole agents of the 
American Safety Razor Corporation of New York, USA.^  ^ The latter 
had a 50 percent share in the equity of this company.^® However, 
owing to a disagreement between the two parties on the magnitude 
of expenses incurred by the Alis, the American Safety Razor 
Corporation pulled out a portion of their shareholdings by seUing 
them to Ali in 1947.^ ® In 1948 Treet was incorporated as a private 
limited trading concern with a paid up capital of Rs 1.5 million.*®
^^This is mentioned as an historical introduction of the Ali 
Group’s interests in blade manufacturing, in a letter from Wajid Ali 
to G. Faruque, secretary. Ministry of Industries, Pakistan, 25 March 
1952.
*®See letter from Wajid Ah to Ghulam Faruque, Secretary, 
Ministry of Industries, [of the Ghulam Faruque Group], 25 March 
1952, informing him of the significance of this company in being able 
to meet the country’s entire demand of 30 million razor blades 
annually.
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The same year it sales from trade were 30 million razor blades.®  ^
The company augmented its sales capacity by importing blades from 
the USA.®^  Blades manufacturing was dependent on imported raw 
material. Most of the raw material, mainly strip steel was imported 
and processed before selling it as razor blades. Since India was a 
major buyer of its blades the company was still able to draw 
overdraft facilities by 1949, from the Mercantile Bank of India 
Limited (incorporated in England) up to Rs 500,000 l i m i t . I n  
1948, sales to India were made for 22 million blades and within 
Pakistan 8 million blades were sold. With a average selling price of 
Rs 0.036 per blade, its combined sales to both countries, fetched Rs 
one million in 1 9 4 8 . The cost of production for the same quantity
®^ See Statement of Sales of the Treet Safety Razor Blades 
Corporation Limited, 2 August 1948.
®^ See open ended letter from Robert Alfredson of the Pal Blade 
Company, 43rd West, 57tb Street, New York, 19, USA, 8 April 1952, 
to an Ali company, stating their desire to appoint the Alis as their 
agents in Pakistan; also see a letter from Wajid Ali, to J. L. Mailman, 
Esq., Pal Blade Company., Inc., 43 West 57tb Street, New York, N.Y., 
3 June 1950, in which Wajid Ali advised Mailman that bis query bad 
been mediated by Wajid Ali, which bad drawn a response from 
Gbulam Faruque, as Secretary Ministry of Industries, and 
subsequently conveyed to Mailman; also see letter from Wajid Ali to
G. Faruque, 10 May 1950, requesting him to resolve the procedures 
involved in the import of Pal Blades from the USA.
®^ See letter from the manager of the Mercantile Bank of India to 
Wajid Ali, 21 June 1949, and from the chief accountant, Kemp and 
Company Limited, 88 C, Old Parbbadevi Road, Bombay 28, India to 
the parent company.
®^ See Statement of Sales of the Treet Safety Razor Corporation 
Limited Karachi, Pakistan, 2 August 1948.
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amounted to Rs 0.044 per blade or Rs 1.3 million and so the plant 
was operating at a trading loss of Rs 300,000 in 1948.®®
The initial installation and operation of equipment was handled by 
technicians recruited from Germany. In the mid 1950s, Mr Mead an 
American was appointed the general manager at the Hyderabad 
plant of the Treet. In 1951, the compands foreign partner, the 
American Safety Razor Corporation of New York which still had 50 
percent investment in Treet’s shares, sold its entire share holdings 
in favour of Ali. This was owing to delays in commencing production 
since Wajid Ali was trying to dispose off the plant to potential buyers 
in Australia.®® His attempts proved unsuccessful owing to the 
asking price to be economically unviable for the Austrahan buyers.®  ^
By 1952, the plant had not fetched a buyer and thereupon the 
brothers decided to invest in production facilities at Treet, in order 
to make it an economically viable venture. To this effect they formed 
a strategy to liaise with those institutions which were formed to 
promote industry, a liaison which was to yield mutually beneficial 
favours. An illustration of such reciprocity was established in a
®®For a detailed report of the company’s Income Statement, see 
company documents, 2 August 1948.
®®This is evident in the document on the ‘Transfer of Shares held 
by the American Safety Razor Blades Corporation and Mutual 
Release’, prepared by Qadeeruddin Ahmed, Advocate, and sent to 
Wajid Ali Esqr., Ali Automobiles, West Wharf, Karachi, 24 October 
1951.
®^ See letter from Commercial Secretary for Pakistan at the 
Pakistan High Commission in Austraha to Wajid Ali, 21 June 1951.
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letter dated 30 May 1952 from Amjad Ali to an employee of the 
Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation (PIFCO), a Mr Havelicek.®® 
Havelicek’s assistance was sought in assisting Treet to obtain credit 
from PIFCO.®® There appears to be a hnkage between expediting 
this credit facility requested by Amjad Ali, for financing Treet and 
Amjad Ali’s simultaneous offer to act as PIFCO’s agent for import of 
machines from Britain. These machines were required by the PIFCO 
for an independent project that its management intended to finance. 
In a letter dated 7 April 1952, the UK branch of WIL confirmed their 
assistance in obtaining the requisite machines for PIFCO.®® To 
capitalise on this favour, a week later Wajid Ali sent another letter 
to the managing director of PIFCO reiterating his need for credit, 
this time for modernisation of the vegetable ghee plant at 
Hyderabad.®^
In 1954, Treet was made part of WIL and commenced production 
of razor blades in Hyderabad. Its head and regional offices were
®®The PIFCO was set up in 1949 to provide mortgage finance to 
running business concerns at a time when the scale of business was 
relatively small. When PIFCO was merged with the IDBP in 1961, 
it took under its umbrella a commitment to also finance medium 
sized firms.
®®See Wajid Ali’s letter to V. Havelicek Esq., of the PIFCO 
instructing him to expedite a loan application for Treet, 30 May 1952.
®®See letter from Sir John R. Abercrombie, managing director, 
Wazir Ali (G.B) Limited to Amjad Ali, 7 April 1952.
®^ See letter from Wajid Ali to the managing director, PIFCO, 19 
April 1952.
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located in Karachi and managed by Wajid Ali’s nephew, Asad Ali. 
In 1984, the blade manufacturing facilities were increased by the 
installation of a second factory at Lahore. This extension was made 
with the assistance of a Rs 30,000 loan personally extended by Amjad 
Ali.®^  The Lahore plant and head office management was delegated 
to a third generation member of the group who was Wajid Ali’s son, 
Shahid Ah who was made its executive director. Before becoming the 
executive director, Shahid Ali had served at the Lahore plant as its 
administration manager, and resident director. Commenting on his 
career track he said: ‘We have to prove ourselves’.®^ However he did 
not provide an example where style of management this was 
demonstrated.
Wajid Ah’s personalised style of management was also emulated 
by Shahid Ah at Treet’s office in Lahore. The company’s production 
manager was transferred to the Lahore plant from the Hyderabad 
unit after serving there for 27 years. The Lahore plant had 530 shop 
floor workers. Shahid Ah claimed to have introduced promotion of 
employees on merit rather than based on their seniority. At the 
same time he perceived his company’s culture to be along 
patemahstic hnes which to him was one of the main reasons for the
®^ See the agreement between Amjad Ah and Treet, 25 September 
1948.
®^lnterview with Shahid Ah, 6 February 1992 in Lahore. See 
Appendix A.
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growth of the c o m p a n y T h e  financial performance of the 
company, 1977-88 follows:
Table 3.8
Treet Safety Razor Blades Corporation (Pvt) Limited 
Pre-tax Profits and (Losses)
Rs millions
Year Sales Pre-tax
Profits & (Losses)
1977 30.3 4.1
1978 44.7 6.2
1979 51.1 5.5
1980 61.5 9.3
1981 71.5 10.9
1982 82.5 8.1
1983 98.2 9.9
1984 107.6 7.5
1985 116.3 1.9
1986 125.2 (2.1)
1987 152.6 (3)
1988 191.4 (1829)
Source: Treet Safety Razor Blades Corporation (Pvt) Limited, Annual 
Reports, 1978-89.
Profits of the company started to decrease significantly after 1984, 
and turned into loss from 1986-88. Reasons provided by the 
management for the losses incurred in 1986 were owing to machine 
obsolescence and stiff competition from competitors. The sources of 
competition included those emanating from imports and locally 
manufactured razor blades with the advent of the Gillette Razor
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Company in Pakistan.®® The same reasons were extended by the 
management for further losses incurred hy the company in 1986- 
87 96 colossal losses incurred by the company in 1987-88 were 
acknowledged in the director’s statement as emanating from the 
increase in the competitor’s market share and form an unforseen 
expense to repay dues to a government-lending institution, the 
Investment Corporation of Pakistan.®^
The company’s inward looking policies included the absence of 
investment in research and development expenditure for 
technological improvements, in an industry, which according to 
Shahid Ali, was highly competitive.®® Their initial advantage of 
being the first in razor blades manufacturing, allowed them to make 
inroads when their market was not quality conscious. Treet, after 
remaining for 34 years in the business, lacked investments in blade 
technology improvement, which gave an edge to its main competitor, 
the Gillette Razor Blade Company which was estabhshed in Pakistan 
in 1987.®® In Pakistan, the latter had spent Rs 250 million on
®®Mentioned by the director, S.A.Q. Haqqani and the chief 
executive, Wajid Ah’s statement in Treet’s, director’s report to 
shareholders. Annual Report, 1985-86, p. 5.
®®Mentioned by the director, Manzoor Ahmad and the chief 
executive, Asad Ah’s statement to shareholders in Treet, director’s 
report. Annual Report, 1986-87, p. 4.
®^ See Treet, director’s report. Annual Report, 1987-88, p. 4.
®®Interview with Shahid Ah, 6 February 1992.
®®76W.
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improvements in the blades manufacturing process. Shahid Ali 
described his company’s strategy as being ‘risk averse’ in order to 
keep costs low. At the same time he accepted that the razor blade 
industry required sophisticated steel technology. Therefore a risk 
averse strategy was obstructing technological improvements in razor 
blades production at Treet.
Members of the Ah Group were pioneers in this industry, yet they
failed to maintain its market share in blades, with the entry of
competitors. The owner-managers at Treet did not develop
professional managers to see the company through its next
generation. According to Ahsan Raza:
‘Shahid Ah is anti-professional management,... he says that 
professional managers are too expensive’.
The entry of the Gillette Razor Company in the local market 
removed the monopolistic edge which Treet enjoyed for 33 years. 
Had Treet’s management invested in internal organisational systems 
from the company’s inception, they would have been better equipped 
to meet with the changed environment which competition presented 
to them. Also the fact that the job for the executive directorship at 
the Lahore plant was given to a family member again reflected the 
group’s inward looking inertia, not to professionalise its management 
function and have built-in succession within the companies of the 
group.
^°°lnterview with Ahsan Raza, 30 March 1992.
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3.3 External Relations
Members of the Ali Group, spanning three generations used their
network of controls to further themselves, politically, economically
and financially. Their contacts primarily benefitted their pubhc
image, and any benefits which accrued to the group’s initial
expansion, remained incidental to their larger interests of
maintaining influence and power. One of their first investment in
the Abbassi Textile Mills Limited and Sind Oil Mills largely
benefitted fi'om the Amir also investing in its shares. On this,
Fieldhouse reports:
‘Under the promoter’s agreement the Nawab [Amir] was to 
assist the Alis in obtaining licences, import permits, sanctions 
for the issue of shares and the highest priority for the import 
of machinery, plant etc’.^ °^
The Ali Group was one of the pioneers in manufacturing industry
in Pakistan. Fieldhouse reports again:
‘Amjad Ali, the effective head of the family business, was a 
leading Muslim industrialist who saw the opportunity created 
by partition and used his family wealth and political influence 
to build up an intensive industrial and commercial empire in 
West Pakistan in the later 1940s’.
Amjad Ali’s political influence began in the late 1940s. In the 
1950s, when Unilever (Pak) invested in Pakistan, it was quick to 
capitalise on his contacts, as articulated by Fieldhouse:
^^^Givenin, D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Groom Helm, 1978, 
p. 246.
p. 249.
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‘After partition the Ali family seemed- though this is 
impossible to demonstrate from the records-to have provided 
valuable contacts with the government and clothed the 
otherwise naked foreignness of this British Company’/®^
In the above quotation, when Fieldhouse was compiling the 
company history of Unilever in Pakistan, he mentions that he could 
not substantiate his assertion, from the documents at his disposal, 
that the Ali family enjoyed leverage with politicians. However, those 
documents were accessed by the author of this study and provide 
considerable wealth of information validating this study’s assertion 
that the Ali Group had access to the senior-most politicians and 
bureaucrats, in Pakistan and in instances overseas.
Amjad Ali had direct access to different Prime Ministers and 
Presidents of Pakistan, from the first Prime Minister elected in 1951 
to seven successive ones up to 1971, a liaison which was rephcated 
to a similar degree in other business groups studied here. In most 
instances, these contacts provided the Ali Group with a head start in 
the acquisition of new businesses over other aspiring contestants. 
This edge manifest itself in Ali investment in the consumer, 
intermediate and capital goods industries. However since these 
investments were not part of a preconceived business strategy their 
occurrence did not generate linkages within the group and led to its 
eventual splintering. Plausibly, this was because of external factors
p. 253.
®^^A11 referenced documents are with the author.
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which initially prompted a particular investment, given the conducive 
financial and political backing from influential decision makers and 
which were not followed up with internal systems. It was in this 
lack of sufficient internal impetus that led to a dechne in Ah’s 
investment in light engineering in the long-term.
Key personahties in the Ali Group estabhshed a camaraderie with 
the higher echelons in Pakistani politics enabling the former to 
(initially) access venture capital with the support and blessings of the 
bureaucratic m a c h i n e r y . T h e s e  networks paid dividends, in 
particular, to Muratib, Amjad and Wajid Ali.
Muratib Ali, son of the group’s pioneer Wazir Ah was made a 
director of the State Bank of Pakistan in 1948.^ ®® In 1951, his close 
association with the Prime Minister, Liaqat Ah Khan was evident 
from a letter in which he extends a personal invitation to the 
Premier for a meal.^^  ^ Muratib Ah was also an associate of Field 
Marshal, Sir Claude Aucbinleck, ex- Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces in British India.
lo^For patronage in Pakistani industrial policy, see pp. 77-83.
^®®Highlighted in a congratulatory letter to Muratib Ah firom the 
director of the State Bank of India, C.D. Desghmukh to Muratib Ah, 
No: D.O. No. Sy 32, 20 July 1948.
^®^ See letter from Muratib Ah to Liaqat Ah Khan, 26 March 1951.
^°%ee letter from Wajid Ah to Field Marshal Sir Claude 
Aucbinleck, C/0 Messrs Grindlays Bank, London, 3 October 1951, 
informing him that his personal bearer in Pakistan would he 
provided with a quarter [room] and that all canteen dues were 
settled. [The dues from the Ah Group’s business of supplying the
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Wajid Ali also took after his father in maintaining personal contact 
with senior ministers and four Pakistani heads of State, in 1959- 
1971. The Heads of State included Ghulam Mohammad, who was 
the Governor-General of Pakistan in 1954-55. A few months later, 
in 1955, Mohammad ALL was sworn in as the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan. During his tenure as Prime Minister, he sent a letter to 
Wajid Ali acknowledging his input on American Aid to Pakistan. 
This letter indicated two things, firstly that the Prime Minister had 
personally acknowledged and responded to Wajid Ali’s views and 
secondly, the latter’s involvement at a high level on Pakistan’s policy 
on receiving American Aid. In 1962, when Ayub was the President, 
Wajid Ali also accessed him by sending a letter to his Military 
Secretary reminding him to provide a date suitable for the President 
to dine with Wajid Ali.^ °^ Another occasion was in 1970 when the 
then President General Mohammad Yahya Khan, granted Wajid Ali 
an i n t e r v i e w . I n  another letter signed by Yahya to Wajid Ah, the 
official relationship is complemented with a more personal note, one 
in which he thanks him for the condolence message received upon the
British army with food].
^°%ee letter from Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali to 
Wajid Ali, # 505-PMH155, 18 January 1955.
i^See letter from Wajid Ali to Brig. Nawazish Ali Shah, TQA, 
Military Secretary to the President of Pakistan, President’s House, 
Rawalpindi, 23 November 1962.
^^ ^See letter fi*om S.N. Rizvi, Private Secretary to the President, 
to Wajid Ali, 13 July 1970.
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death of the President’s sister/
Wajid Ali’s brother, Amjad Ali also enjoyed a personal fnendship 
with President Aynb.“  ^ These contacts with various Pakistani 
Heads of State were not just in an official capacity. There is 
evidence that if the two parties met in an official capacity, there are 
just as many occasions when they met as personal friends, dining at 
the Karachi residence of the Ali family. Amjad Ah’s links with the 
higher echelons were cemented when his son, Asad Ali married the 
daughter of the serving President of the country, Iskander Mirza in 
1959. The personal aspect cemented the Ali Group’s ties with the 
higher echelons which did not go unnoticed internationally.
Amjad Ah also did full justice to his family’s penchant for 
remaining in the limelight. His career in politics began as an 
Honorary Secretary to the Muslim delegation to the Round Table 
Conference on the constitutional reform of India in 1931. In 1937 he 
was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly and later represented 
Pakistan in its diplomatic mission to the USA. Further evidence of 
his position as an industrialist with leading contacts was in his 
appointment as one of the four members of the Education Committee, 
of the Ministry of Education and Industries in 1950. From there on
^^ ^See letter from the President, General Agha Muhammad Yahya 
Khan, H. Pk, H. J., President’s House, Rawalpindi, to Wajid Ah, 18, 
Victoria Road, Karachi, 30 December 1970.
Amjad Ah, [in Glimpses^ Jang, 1992], mentions a lunch 
arranged by him at his residence in Karachi which was attended by 
the President on 8 October 1958.
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his career went from strength to strength. In 1950-51, he was made 
Minister of Economic Affairs at the Pakistan Embassy in Washington 
as well as the leader of the Pakistani Delegation to ECOSOC of the 
United Nations. The latter designation was conferred on him in 1950 
by the Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad. With the passage of 
time, Amjad Ali’s familiarity with Ghulam Mohammad was to pay 
him dividends. When Ghulam Mohammad became the Governor- 
General in 1954-55, he immediately appointed Amjad as the 
Pakistani Ambassador to the USA, a position he occupied from 1953 
to 1955.^^  ^ In 1954, Babar Ali’s marriage, in Washington D.C., 
USA, was attended by the then Vice President of the USA, Richard 
Nixon.^ ^® A few months later, Ghulam Muhammad’s regime was 
overthrown. Amjad Ali returned to Pakistan to another high level 
appointment awaiting him; he was made the Minister of Finance and 
Economic Affairs (1955-58) by the new Prime Minister, Mohammad 
Ali. As a Minister vyith experience on Pak-American policy he 
exerted influence on the government’s expenditure on subsidising 
wheat imports under the PL 480 aid from the United States. He 
negotiated an exacting issue of convincing the US government to 
release Rs 72 million in favour of Pakistan government, in lieu of the 
sale proceeds from the wheat aid.^ ^®
“ ^See Amjad Ali, Glimpses, Jang, 1992, p. 188. 
^^^Interview with Masood Hasan, 16 January 1994. 
^^ ®Given in, Amjad Ali, Glimpses, Jang, 1992, p. 200.
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Amjad Ali was also consulted by senior officials both at home and 
overseas on financing business development projects in Pakistan. 
His involvement with economic policy framed by the World Bank on 
credit extension to developing countries was indicated in a letter sent 
to him by the President of the World Bank, USA, Eugene R 
B l a c k . A m j a d  Ali was also the Governor, Ambassador and
Minster of Finance representing the country for the 6th to 13th
Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Washington, D.C., from 1951 to 1961. In 1962, he was appointed the 
chairman of the main vehicle for promoting private investment in 
Pakistan, the Investment Promotion Bureau (IPB). The IPB dealt 
with private-sector applications for foreign exchange loans, which 
were meant to be approved by the Ministry of Industries. This 
appointment was another instance where the Ah Group took the lead 
in exerting their influence and power over the country’s financial 
structure.
Amjad Ali’s position internationally is exemplified when the 
Secretary General of the UN, U Thant wrote to him:^ ^®
^^ ^See letter from the office of Eugene R. Black, President, 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington 
25, D C., USA to Amjad Ali, 17 December 1951.
^^%ee letter firom U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, 
New York, # FI 315/1, addressed to ‘His Excellency’, Amjad Ali, 11 
December 1969.
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‘I take pleasure in informing you of your re-appointment as a 
member of the Committee on Contributions for a three-year 
term beginning on 1 January 1970, and enclose the relevant 
resolution (A/RES/2515 [XXIV]) adopted by the General 
Assembly on 25 November 1969. I would like to take this 
opportunity to congratulate you on your re-appointment and 
to express my personal appreciation of the service rendered by 
you to the United Nations and the general Assembly through 
your continued membership of this important Committee’.
Amjad Ali’s tour itineraries would be distributed to select Pakistani 
Embassies and High Commissions abroad along with Ministries 
relevant to industry in Pakistan. When the Chinese Prime 
Minister Chou-en-Lai visited Pakistan in 1964, he visited the Treet 
Blades plant in Hyderabad.
Amjad Ali also enjoyed the personal friendship of Nelson and David 
Rockefeller in the USA. In a letter addressed to David Rockefeller 
he acknowledged ‘the beautiful casket of cigars’ sent to Amjad Ali as 
a gift.^^  ^ In another letter, this time, to Nelson Rockefeller, Amjad 
Ali updated him on the findings of the International Development 
Advisory Board and how its report affected the future of business in 
P a k i s t a n . T h e s e  letters were examples of the business and
“ ®See letter from U Thant, Secretary-General, United Nations, 
New York, # FI 315/1, addressed to ‘His Excellency’, Amjad Ali, 11 
December 1969.
^^°Tour itinerary prepared and circulated by the chairman. 
Investment Promotion and Supplies, Karachi, 2 September 1962.
^^^Given in, Amjad Ali, Glimpses, Jang, 1992, p. 301.
^^%ee letter from Amjad Ah to David Rockefeller, 3 April 1951.
^^ ^See Amjad Ali’s letter to Nelson Rockefeller, Terry Town, New 
York State USA, 13 March 1951. Amjad Ali conveyed his approval
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personal links of the Ali family with senior industrialists and policy 
makers overseas.
Wajid Ali complemented Amjad Ali in promoting the group’s public 
r e l a t i o n s . H e  too was recognised by both local and foreign 
dignitaries as being one of Pakistan’s business l e a d e r s . T h i s  is
of the recommendations made by the International Development 
Advisor Board’s recommendations for underdeveloped countries. 
Nelson Rockefeller was chairman of this Board. In the same letter 
Amjad Ali alluded to bis conversation with Nelson’s brother David 
Rockefeller, reminding him of bis and the UN General Assembly’s 
commitment to assist these countries to achieve full employment, 
effective demand and a democratic way of life; also see Amjad Ali, 
Glimpses, Jang, 1992, p. 314.
^^^Company documents of the Ali group time and again show 
Wajid Ali’s close baison with senior members of the bureaucracy. 
One such gathering was a dinner at the Intercontinental Hotel in 
Rawalpindi which bad a guest list of 30 select government 
Secretaries, Ministers and the Commander in Chief of the Army. 
One such letter indicating this is from an employee, H R. Cbagla to 
another colleague, Ghulam Rasool at Ali Autos Limited (Rawalpindi), 
10 November 1970.
^^ ®For an overview of Wajid Ali’s public stature see personal 
letters received by him from: U Thant, Secretary General of the UN, 
August 1, 1969; and Margaret, Duchess of York, 3 November 1969; 
the extent of the Ah Group’s liaison with Pakistan’s political and 
business affairs is exemplified by correspondence received by Wajid 
Ali from beads of State and senior officials as follows: Prime
Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s letter to Wajid Ali, 23 
August 1971; the President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
government, Mohammad Iqbal’s letter to Wajid Ali, 22 September 
1971; the Commander-in-Cbief of the Pakistani army. General Yahya 
Khan to Wajid Ali, 11 November 1954; the Chief of Air Staff and 
Commander-in-Cbief of Pakistan’s Air Force, Air Marshal Asgbar 
Khan’s letter to Wajid Ali, 21 March 1961; the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan, Justice Cornelius’ letter to Wajid Ah, 8 April 1968; the 
Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaque Khan’s 
letter to Wajid Ah, 13 September 1973; International Organisation 
of Employers Geneva, latter from Raphael Lagasse to Wajid Ah, 4 
March 1968; and International Labour Office Geneva, firom ILO
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exemplified when he was requested by the Ministry of Industries, 
Government of Pakistan to act on behalf of other industrialists in 
submitting their demands to the Ministry. The Ministry awaited his 
response as the necessary feedback in order to plan for the required 
c a p i t a l . T h i s  was when the government planned to set up an 
Industrial Development Bank, to meet the future credit needs for 
industry. This issue was raised in a forum called the 
Recommendation of the Council of Industries [Third Session] 
supervised by the Ministry. In a letter to Wajid Ali, the Council 
summoned him to a ‘high level conference’ on short- and long-term 
finance needed by industrialists and the nature of assurances the 
Ministry should extend them in order to accelerate industrialisation. 
The letter was sent to Wajid Ali and only nine other officials all of 
whom were senior ministers or Secretaries to the Federal 
government. The following letter marked ‘secret’ and addressed 
to Wajid Ali from Abdul Qadir, Central Directorate, State Bank of 
Pakistan states:
Principal Deputy Director General, C.W. Jenks to Wajid Ali in the 
latter’s capacity as President Employers Association of Pakistan, 10 
April 1968.
These letters are available with the author.
^^%ee letter # N&P-2(52)/54, from M. Yasin, Officer on Special 
Duty, Ministry of Industries, Government of Pakistan to Wajid Ali, 
16 February 1955.
^^ ^See letter fi*om the Council for the Recommendation on 
Industries, no: MS-40/3.B(7)/5187-54,16 December 1954 to Wajid Ali 
where he was consulted by senior State Bank officials on the viabihty 
of setting up an Industrial Development Bank in Pakistan.
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‘....I enclose a copy of a circular which has been issued to 
leading industrialists and a few capitalists. In order to assist 
industrialisation and development of Pakistan, it is essential 
for our institutions to participate in the organisation of
industrial credit in this country I hope you will put this
matter before your Board of Directors and intimate the extent 
of investment your company will make in the Industrial 
Bank’.'"®
In 1961, another letter titled ‘confidential’ was sent to Wajid Ali 
from the Central Directorate of the State Bank of Pakistan, which 
briefed him on the credit policy and constraints that a new Industrial 
Development Bank would impose on industrial investors. This was 
prior to the official inauguration of the bank and Wajid Ah was kept 
updated before the information was committed to pubhc 
k n o w l e d g e . B y  1973, his association with policy-makers at the 
State Bank and the Industrial Development Bank had matured and 
this was reflected in Wajid Ali being the only businessman offered a 
directorship of the Industrial Development Bank.^^° He was also 
an equity contributor to it, along with the State Bank and an 
appointed member of a special committee to study and make 
recommendations on industrial policy matters.
There was no independent institution which monitored influence
^^ ^See letter fi*om the Central Directorate, State Bank of Pakistan, 
Karachi to Wajid Ah, 15 December 1954 and letter fi*om S.L. Haider, 
State Bank of Pakistan, Central Directorate, Karachi, # D.O. no: 
3153/71-61 to Wajid Ah, 21 November 1961.
^ °^See letter from the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, 
Ghulam Ishaque Khan to Wajid Ah, 13 September 1973.
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and power accruing to a particular individual, demonstrated in Wajid
Ali being privy to secret State documents, evident from the following
extracts from a copy of a letter sent to him:
TELEGRAM SECRET
FROM: PARE? PARIS 
TO :F0RE1GN KARACHI 
9th November, 1957.
From President for Sardar Rashid Chief Minister West 
Pakistan Lahore repeated to Prime Minister Pakistan.
Under Constitution we are compelled to call session of 
Assembly at Dacca before December 31st. King of Afghanistan 
coming from 10th to December 20th....Any adverse reaction 
will be reflected in general elections....On behalf of your party 
I have given my word to the Prime Minister that Republicans 
in the National Assembly vsdll support a bill ushering in 
separate electorate and hope you will help me to your utmost 
to see my word is honoured to the hilt’.
In the above text the President was Hussain Suhrawardy and the 
text clearly shows that Wajid Ali was privy to such a confidential 
document. Wajid Ali’s status as an industrialist of consequence was 
reinforced when he was asked to attend a conference of the 
representatives of Provincial Governments and States to advise on 
policy for the textile industry. Another instance was when his 
advice was solicited by the Ministry of Works and Commerce, 
Commerce Division on how to design and establish a non-official 
agency to issue capital stock for joint-stock compan i e s . Wa j i d  Ali
^^ ^See letter addressed to Wajid Ali from Assistant Secretary 
Ministry of Industries, Karachi, 12 July 1950.
^^^Letter addressed to Wajid Ah by M Junaid, Deputy Secretary 
Ministry of Commerce, Works and Education, Commerce Division, 25 
November 1950.
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was also one of four individuals on the Ministry of Education and 
Industries’ Establishment of the Commercial Education 
Committee/^^
Wajid Ali also maintained close ties with Gohar Ayub’s father-in- 
law, Lieutenant General Habibullah, another leading industrialist. 
General Habibullah’s daughter was married to President Ayub’s 
son.^ '^^  Another letter sent by the General to Wajid Ali signified 
the latter’s influence over Pakistani industrial policy. General 
Habibullah addressed the letter in his capacity as chairman of the 
National Press Trust inviting Wajid Ali for tea to meet other some 
p u b l i s h e r s . W a j i d  Ali’s senior position as an industrialist was 
again reflected when he was chosen as one of the ten senior officials 
(most of whom were Federal Secretaries) to meet with Desmond 
Donelly.^^® Desmond Donelly was a Member of the House of 
Commons in London who visited Karachi in November 1954.
On the foreign front Wajid Ali enjoyed personal meetings with and 
wielded influence over senior industrialists and pohcy makers, which
^^ ^See open document of the Ministry, 8 September 1950.
^^^Gohar Ayub’s stake in Ghandhara Industries is documented in
H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, pp. 305-306.
^^^This letter was sent on 29 October 1970 with an attached guest 
list of 72 other invitees, all of whom were either the managing 
director or chairman of their respective business groups.
^^ ®See letter from Hamid Nawaz Khan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Commonwealth Relations, Karachi # D.7905-P(ii)/54, 15 
November 1954, to Wajid Ali advising the latter of Donelly’s tour 
itinerary.
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was illustrated in the following letter addressed to him by Mildred
Hughes, Executive Vice President of Rockefeller’s Far East-American
Council of Commerce and Industry Limited in New York:^^^
‘...The purpose of this meeting is to bring together leading 
executives in industry, finance and commerce fi*om both sides 
of the Pacific and officials of the Governments of Asia and the 
United States for a series of intensive discussions on current 
conditions in Asia and an authoritative look at considerations 
bearing on future requirements and prospects in Asia-United 
States economic relations...As one of the business leaders in 
your country, we feel that you can contribute much to the 
deliberations of this important Conference. We know that too 
that you would find this meeting informative and profitable in 
every wa .^^^®
Wajid’s finks with key political figures was not limited to those in 
the United States. In Britain he had friends who were politically 
prominent. For example on 22 June 1970, Wajid Ali sent a telegram 
to a former Prime Minister of Britain, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, which 
read as follows
‘Please accept my heartiest felicitations upon your 
appointment as Foreign Secretary stop May Allah Almighty 
bless your endeavour with success stop Please convey my 
sincerest regards to Lady Home stop Regards’.
A week later on 28 June 1970, Sir Alec Douglas-Home responded 
to Wajid’s congratulatory telegram in a letter worded in formal 
jargon, to which he added a handwritten postscript which read as:
^^ ^See letter from Mildred Hughes to Wajid Ali, 17 August 1961.
^^%ee telegram from Wajid Ali to Sir Alec-Doughlas Home, 22 
June 1970.
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...‘It was nice to hear from you. Poor Iskander. I miss him a 
lot, With Love, Alec’.^ ^^
The informal ending to this letter confirmed the personal 
friendship between the two and lent credibility to the proposition 
that Wajid Ali shared influence and power with foreign political 
personalities as well. The reference to Iskander in Home’s letter is 
on the demise of Iskander Mirza, Pakistan’s President fi*om 1958 to 
1959.
Wajid Ali also represented Pakistan to the UNIDO in 1959. His 
position as President of Associations included the Cotton Exchange 
Board, Employers’ Federation of West Pakistan, Gulah Devi Hospital 
and Institute of Islamic Culture. One of the most prominent 
designation for Wajid Ali was as the Pakistani representative to the 
International Labour Organisation Governing Body a t Geneva and 
League of Red Cross Societies, as their Executive Member. He was 
also the Pakistani representative to the Executive Body of the 
International Olympic Committee in Geneva. Another letter 
highlighting his role in policy making at an international forum was 
when he was asked to address a meeting of the International Labour 
Organisation at Geneva in his capacity as a Member of its Governing 
Body.'"'
'"'Letter fi^om Sir Alec-Douglas Home, K.T., M.P., House of 
Commons to Wajid Ali, 18 Victoria Road, Karachi, 28 June 1970.
'"'See letter addressed to K.S. Ahmad, Secretary Employers 
Association of West Pakistan by Wajid Ali’s Private Secretary, 17 
November 1976.
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In the group’s formative years, both Wajid Ali and Amjad Ah’s 
international and domestic connections benefitted their businesses. 
Wajid Ali’s contribution to the group’s initial take-off was firom bis 
liaison with the Ford company who were Ali Auto’s Principals, 
and with Pakistan’s Defence Secretary, Iskander M i r z a . T h e  
cordial relations with the Principals which led to a long-term 
partnership between the two parties was also evident from the time 
that Amjad Ali served as Ambassador and adviser to the Pakistan 
Embassy in Washington D.C.^ ^® In 1963, it was Amjad Ali who 
was expedient in obtaining the Ford motor dealership and forming 
Ali Autos for the assembly of motor cars, vans, trucks and the 
manufacture of Lambretta scooters. The leg work for obtaining the 
requisite licences was done by the two brothers much earlier. 
According to Zia Shah Khan,^^® a director of another monopoly 
group, the Habib Group, commented:
The Alis set up Ali Autos because of their close associations
with Iskander Mirza’, [in the early 1950s].
^^ A^ Principal is the founding company located overseas.
^^See letter from Wajid Ali to Iskander Mirza, 25 March 1950 
and 26 March 1950, requesting his assistance to purchase Ford 
Vehicles for the Defence Services of Pakistan; also in a letter to the 
same, 24 June 1950.
^^ ®The Principal-subsidiary relationship is evident in a letter from 
Kamal Ali, managing director of Ali Autos to the Deputy Controller, 
Foreign Exchange, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi, 17 July 1950.
^^®lnterview with Zia Shah Khan, 24 November 1992.
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Wajid Ali’s links with Iskander Mirza were established in a 
professional capacity when the latter was the Secretary Defence in 
1950. Syed A & M Wazir Ali supplied motor vehicles to the Defence 
Services and Iskander Mirza was responsible for accepting their 
delivery. These hnks were to pay dividends for the Ali Group 
when Iskander Mirza became the President of the country in 1958.
There are other instances where Wajid Ah’s connections directly 
benefitted his group’s businesses. At times he would resort to 
pressure tactics to coerce government officials in awarding him with 
the requisite licences needed for company investments. One such 
letter was sent to a senior official for the country’s imports and 
exports with a request for Wajid Ah to export cotton seed.^ ^® When 
Wajid Ah sensed that the request was not forthcoming he addressed 
a second letter to Karamatullah, the Chief Controller of Imports and 
Exports, Karachi reprimanding him on permitting the import of 
unauthorised quantities of alcohol in the country. The content 
of this letter was on an issue unrelated to Wajid Ali’s business. 
However, the text shows that Wajid Ah had put on record a 
misdemeanour committed by Karamatullah. In order to obtain his
'^^ ®This is evident in a letter from Wajid Ah to Iskander Mirza, 
Secretary Defence, Government of Pakistan, 26 March 1950.
^^^ See letter firom Wajid Ah to Karamatullah Esq., of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Education seeking his permission to export cotton 
oil seed as the first manufacturers to do so from Pakistan, 25 March 
1950.
^^%ee letter of Wajid Ah to Karamatullah, 25 March 1950.
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cooperation in not exposing this revelation, Wajid Ali was in fact 
coercing Karamatullah to provide him with the requisite licence.
Another letter indicating Wajid Ali pressurising officials was in a 
letter to the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Refugees and 
Réhabilitation, Government of Pakistan, Karachi into allotting him 
industrial land for a vegetable ghee plant at Hyderabad in the larger 
interest of establishing the country’s first such mill.^^  ^ A host of 
letters were sent to various ministries and one was strongly worded 
by Wajid Ali highlighting his designation as chairman Cotton Board 
to coerce the Deputy Secretary in granting him a licence to export 
cotton seed oil.^ ®^  In 1952, Wajid Ali became the chairman of the 
Pakistan Refugees Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and therefore 
became more senior to the Deputy Secretary mentioned above. This 
finally enabled him to obtain the licence for buying industrial land 
at Hyderabad.
The group’s senior management devoted their energy towards 
reinforcing their political networks. In the short-term, these 
networks assisted first time investments for a number of industrial
^^^ See letter from Wajid Ali to the Deputy Secretary, Department 
of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 5 June 1951; also see a similar open- 
ended letter sent by Wajid Ali to the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (Food) Division, 8 May 1952 and a third letter followed 
on the same issue, sent by Wajid Ali to Naseer Ahmad Esq., Ministry 
of Industries, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 10 February 1952.
^^%ee letter from Wajid Ali to Karamatullah Khan, Ministry of 
Commerce and Education, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, 10 
January 1952.
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investments of the group. However the group members did not 
follow it up with developing a long-term institutionalised strategy of 
consolidation and diversification. This policy of omission of company 
an effective strategy, had its deleterious impact within the 
departments and subsidiaries of the group. For most effective 
results, institutional improvement can best be brought about in the 
initial stages of business investment. Senior members of the Ali 
Group could have concurrently developed long-term strategy and 
structure while tapping into their political contacts and accepting 
ministerial appointments, but they chose not to do so then or at a 
later date.
3.4 Management Strategy
Wajid Ali’s penchant for new investments and acquisitive acumen 
in business, did not lead towards pioneering modem management in 
the country at a time when the opportunity to do so was ripe. His 
drive towards reinforcing political contacts was not replicated in the 
long-term development of ideas for his businesses. This group was 
a first mover in locally manufactured vegetable oil, razor blades, 
paper and board conversion, facial tissues, UHT milk, tetrahedral 
cartons and the assembly of motor vehicles, refidgerators, vans, 
scooters and televisions. Its foray in all these industries was not by 
design or as a consequence of management’s long-range strategy. 
However, given these investment opportunities which were at their 
disposal, also called for continuous planning and consolidation of
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functions, if the group was to sustain their investment in light 
engineering in the long-term. Most first movers in the USA gained 
scope advantages by cultivating production processes, patenting their 
product and incurring enormous expenditure on advertising and after 
sales service.^®  ^ These activities were not evident in the Ali Group.
Once Ali made its foray in the vegetable oil and engineering, 
systems applications were needed to sustain long-term business 
development. A network of related procedures developed according 
to an integrated plan was then required for the effective 
implementation of new internal organisational systems. Such a plan, 
exacted the need for detailed feedback sent to senior managers, 
especially on product design, marketing strategies and research and 
development operations required to remain abreast of technological 
changes. The group’s investment in vegetable oil and the steel were 
investments made in the consumer- and light engineering sectors, 
which required managerial dexterity in resolving problems which 
occurred on a rising scale of magnitude. This was only possible if 
managers had foresight to project into the needs of the future. In 
such a situation, one of the tools for solving problems which occurred 
on a rising scale of magnitude was by training employees which was 
a qualitative measure of performance. Such trained manpower would 
have been better equipped with handhng problems that occurred with
^^^Discussed in A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, p.
35.
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investing in dififerent industries simultaneously. This was 
particularly relevant since the group’s investment in engineering was 
not the outcome of product rationalisation, rather was incidental to 
a long-term strategy developed by the group’s managers. 
Obtaining the Ford motor agency pushed the group into engineering 
not from a conscious policy to diversify by forward or backward 
integration. Within one scoop the Ali Group was assembhng 
scooters, motor cars, trucks, televisions and hollow plate bridges. 
This was a rare opportunity to in fact consolidate its base in 
engineering at a time when no other few businesses had the 
comparative advantage to do so. However this one-off, first mover 
enterprise lacked the necessary dynamic leadership to sustain this 
advantage over the long-term.
The Ali Group records show little evidence of any problems which 
were resolved using a systematic methodology. Management took 
decisions as and when they arose. Since each situation generated an 
equally unique decision, it was all the more necessary that the 
decision-makers followed guidelines which were applicable to all 
unique business situations. Guidelines of such a nature which the
^^^Rationalisation as defined by A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, 
Harvard, 1990, is a reduction in family control, where new entrants 
who aspire for shareholdings in another company [of the group], do 
not need to purchase its shares, instead are made to surrender a 
larger portion of their stock held elsewhere for a smaller share in the 
new firm. Rationalisation in production processes means a large 
number of production units kept under a small number of locations 
and monitoring the flow of raw material from supplier to the end- 
user, 76jc?., p. 80.
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Systems Approach methodology provides. If these guidelines were 
continuously updated and applied to recurrent problems, then the Ali 
management could have become sufficiently trained a t differentiating 
the form of a problem weighed against its content to then enable 
diversification of its products. Certain instances where a decision 
was to be taken and the manner in which management resolved an 
issue are now discussed. Ali’s senior management had a tendency to 
appoint family members to manage their companies. On its own 
merit, this would not have prevented effective management practices, 
but for the fact that this proclivity for appointing family managers 
dominated the group’s history firom its inception to 1988, indicated 
a lack of faith in adopting professional management. The following 
example demonstrates the deleterious affect of not having built-in 
succession within an Ali company. In 1971, Ali Auto’s management 
required a new director to manage its local and overseas market for 
assembly of Ford vehicles. No individual from within the company 
was likely to be appointed owing to lack of training. The choice 
facing the management was to either hire a professional manager or 
induct another family member. The bias for favouring the latter 
option prevailed. Wajid Ali’s nephew, Kamal Ali accepted the 
position of the new director in 1971.^ ®^  Kamal Ah did not have an 
inchnation for managing businesses or the requisite qualifications or
®^^ See agreement signed between Wajid Ah, Managing Director, 
Ali Automobiles Limited, and Kamal Ah, 1 January 1971.
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experience to justify his appointment. In fact he was an artist who 
spent his time in painting. His only credential was that he was 
from the Ah family and that sufficed as a reason for his appointment. 
At this juncture, Ali Autos had remained in business for over twenty 
years. If method study had been implemented (that is on how to 
improve upon or eliminate a process or procedure, which when it is 
implemented means that a methodological approach has been 
applied), or if the principles of the Systems Approach were part of 
the company’s operating philosophy, then the proposed candidate 
would have emerged from its own hierarchy of managers. However, 
owing to lack of training and foresight there was no eligible person, 
which led Wajid Ali to appoint his nephew, Kamal Ali as the new 
director. In this situation, the content of the problem was that no 
employee from within the company was eligible for filling in the 
vacancy for a director of a motor vehicle assembly plant. The form 
of the problem lay in the overall lack of training which led to this 
predicament. According to the Systems Approach methodology, the 
problem identification lay in addressing the form of the problem; in 
this instance the lack of training which could not produce the right 
person from within the company. The right person would have been 
a qualified engineer with sufficient professionalisation of experience, 
to occupy a senior management position. However Wajid Ali’s did 
not follow the above criterion for choosing a new manager, rather he
^^ I^nterview with Ahsan Raza, 30 March 1992.
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appointed a family member.
This attitude finds its parallel in other decisions taken by Wajid 
and Babar Ah, where the form of the problem remained the same, 
although in dramatically different situations. A similar choice was 
exercised in 1988 by Wajid Ah. His son, Shahid Ah was appointed 
the executive director of Treet’s Lahore plant. All managerial 
decisions were under his control. Before becoming managing 
director, Shahid Ah had served as the administration manager and 
the resident director, successively at the Lahore plant, prior to which 
he was working for Packages Limited. This was another instance of 
a family appointment prevaihng over the option to select a 
professional manager at Treet.
When Ah Autos was nationahsed in 1972, the group’s potential in 
developing linkages in the engineering sector also perished. This was 
because they had not diversified in the engineering industry at an 
earlier point in time when it was possible and lucrative for them to 
do so. Policies which lead to diversification required a certain degree 
of foresight and the abihty to view situations from an overaU point 
of view. To gain proficiency in this, management needed to view 
business problems in their overall form and not be detracted in doing 
so by resolving only problem content, which arose on a daily basis. 
In the long-term, such a strategy would have generated economies of
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scale as well as scope for the g r o u p I n  turn, these economies 
would have made for a stronger base in engineering and a strong 
base can weather turbulence more effectively than a weaker one.
Wajid Ali’s inertia to capitalise on rare investment opportunities 
is also replicated in Babar Ali’s management style at Packages 
Limited. Ahsan Raza, an ex- managing director of Kabirwala Dairies 
commented:
‘Have you seen any young Ali worth his salt. Now look at 
Babar Ali. He is the doyenne of management in Lahore. Now 
Babar Ah’s company [Packages Limited] is twenty-five to 
thirty years old and they have only produced one man by the 
name of Tariq Hameed and no one else... They cannot produce 
any man. Not in General Management nor in Financial 
Management. Now such a big company such as Packages, and 
they need a finance manager and they have to advertise this 
in the paper. Packages has centralised decision-making. 
Babar Ali is like a shadow on them. He has very peculiar 
ideas and he inflicts them on the company. Those ideas 
include the non-development of individuals including those 
from his family’s next generation. Packages should have been 
the unofficial producer of modem management in Lahore. 
There should have been ex-Packages people all over the 
place’.
^^ ^See A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, pp. 17-34, for 
economies of scope defined as the joint production and distribution 
of more than one product which reduces overhead costs and improves 
human skills common to for both commodities. Specifically these 
may include an improvement of plant design, and improving 
production processes. The nature of such reforms are part of viewing 
business problems fi'om a distance [identifying the form of the 
problem]; this also provides a linkage with the methodology of the 
System’s Approach, and for this see, R.L. Ackoff and P. Rivett, A  
Manager's Guide to Operations Research, John Wiley, 1963, p. 64.
^^^Interview with Ahsan Raza, 30 March 1992. After leaving the 
Ali Group, Ahsan Raza was managing his own private school and did 
not have any remaining working links with the Ali family.
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Ahsan Raza’s opinion on Babar Ali was lent credibility when be
interacted (as the managing director of Kabirwala dairies) with
Babar Ali, on a labour issue which be narrated as follows:
‘In 1982 the labour was threatening the top management that 
it will go on strike if its demands were not met. 1 was 
appointed by Babar Ah and Yawar Ali to negotiate with the 
workers and to arrive at an amicable settlement. Faced with 
this scenario the negotiations commenced on an aggressive 
note whereby the workers threatened to go on strike if their 
demands deadline expired. To this, 1 responded that if the 
deadline expired the management would shut down the plant 
so that the deadhne could in fact not expire. While the 
arbitration was proceeding, I presented Babar Ah with an 
invoice for Rs 135,000. This represented what Kabirwala 
Diaries owed to me in heu of their violation of a clause in my 
employment contract. On this Babar Ah’s responded and told 
Yawar Ali ‘This is not on, change that contract... 1 know you 
can do it’.
However the employees at Packages Limited were convinced of the
effectiveness of Babar Ali’s pohcies. The marketing general manager
at Packages Limited Javed Aslam, when asked to comment on the
training pohcy in his company said:^ ®^
‘...its a training ground for people. We do not force them 
back...in fact prefer it [if they leave]...its a teething problem’.
Teething problems are associated with the formative years of a 
business enterprise. The fact that after thirty three years of the 
company’s formation, it still viewed problems as ‘teething problems’ 
is in itself an indication that management had failed in the 
developing skills of its employees. The existence of such problems
^Interview with Ahsan Raza, 30 March 1992.
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remained one of the reasons that Packages Limited did not diversify 
into a larger, better managed structure with globahsation of its 
business activities when the opportunity to do so presented itself to 
Packages Limited’s management.
A comment follows by a manager at NDFC, Talat Behzad, who had
scrutinised the working philosophy of members of the Ali Group:
‘Packages’ senior executives may have made good decisions but 
somehow you will feel they are not giving you the right 
information. For example a Ph.D. employed at Packages for 
researching the conversion process of the eucalyptus tree bark 
to make pulp for paper manufacturing, was unable to supply 
any information pertaining to the same’.^ ®^
Talat Behzad continued his criticism of the Ah Group’s
management style, in particular that directed by Babar Ali:
‘The management does not seem to be interested in their 
employees. They are still operating in the 17th century’.
Talat Behzad concluded, by stating that Lever Brothers (Pak) 
Limited, (which was a competitor of WIL, in the manufacturing and 
marketing of soap and edible oil), had a Domestic Research Bureau 
which tested the pre- and post-launch of their soap sales. However, 
neither WIL nor Treet (which marketed the soap) contained a 
counterpart cell, and instead requested their advertising companies 
to prepare research and development reports on soap consumption in 
the country. This scenario depicted Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited’s
^®^ Interview with Talat Behzad, 19 January 1994 in Karachi.
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superior position by 1981; in its marketing strategy which was not 
emulated by the management at WIL and Treet. This strategy would 
have enabled WIL and Treet’s management to adopt more 
professional methods of determining its market share (as was the 
case in the 1960s, when WlL’s management were practising 
professional management when the team had captured 50 percent of 
it’s competitor, Lever Brother (Pak) Limited’s branded soap market). 
From Talat Behzad’s information. Lever Brothers (Pak) Limited’s 
soap market in the Punjab in 1981 was more than ten fold that of 
WIL.^ ®^
Instances where companies within this group showed favourable 
performance, was largely because they were monopohes. One such, 
the Tetrapak company had the sole licence to manufacture UHT 
packaging material in agreement with the Swedish Tetrapak 
organisation. Other milk and fruit juice producers remained 
unsuccessful, over time in obtaining a licence from the government 
for the production of similar tetrahedral cartons. The Tetrapak 
company was originally formed as an extension of Packages Limited 
and enjoyed a monopoly in the manufacture and sales of its cartons. 
This automatically provided Tetrapak with a niche in the sale of milk 
available in tetrapak cartons. Tetrapak cartons were also sold to 
other milk and fruit juice suppliers in the market. However the lead 
time for providing other suppliers with the empty cartons was at
^® l^nterview with Talat Behzad, 19 January 1994.
248
least two weeks. In a market such as Karachi’s with a demand for 
200,000 litres of milk per day in 1988, a two week lead time for 
obtaining cartons automatically gave Tetrapak an edge in the 
packaged milk market. At this juncture Tetrapak’s packaged milk 
sales would increase by the same proportion as competitors’ sales 
decreased. Tetrapak’s edge in the packaged mük market was not an 
outcome of sound managerial policy rather was attained through its 
monopoly position. This circular scheme of events led the milk 
manufacturers to lobby with the government to put pressure on the 
separation of Tetrapak’s management from Packages Limited. The 
main justification for the demand was that all other milk 
manufacturers were operating on only 30 percent of their installed 
capacity. These demands were conceded to by Packages Limited’s 
management and Tetrapak (Pak) Limited became a legally separate 
entity in 1987. This separation also reduced the costs charged to 
milk manufacturers and suppliers by visiting Tetrapak officials, 
when the latter inspected the former’s milk packaging facilities.
Over the long-term, an inventory of misdemeanours committed by 
members of the Ah Group by not adopting or implementing the 
Systems Approach methodology, led to a change for the worse. From 
the 1960s-1980s, this attitude was the cause for the relative decline 
in the group’s investment portfolio when compared with the progress
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made by other groups in the same era/®® In neglecting to address 
issues promoting long-term growth, the owners sowed the seeds of 
their organisation’s decline. Since these businessmen were first 
movers in certain industries and also enjoyed the benefit of close 
access to Heads of State as well as their senior ministerial and 
diplomatic postings, they were initially in a privileged position. They 
were more often than not absorbed in policy firaming and became 
flippant towards adopting systematic methods essential in spurring 
and maintaining growth and particularly in helping to promote and 
motivate professional managers.^®® In spite of their high level 
connections, which could have assisted in accessing foreign 
technology, members of the Ali Group used their contacts to project 
their personality and charisma. They could just as easily have used 
their contacts to develop overseas branches of their manufacturing 
facihties. The absence of changing managerial strategy with 
expansion was also evident from the agenda developed in the Board 
meetings of the group; that is the low priority given to resolving 
internal problems of the firm which was to have far reaching
®^®See Table 2.15 on the value of net assets of the Ali Group from 
1968 to 1988.
®^®For more details on this see L.J. White, Industrial 
Concentration and Economic Power, Princeton, 1974, pp. 150-55 and 
FIDO, ‘Development Programme of Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation’, unpublished report, PIDC, 1989, p. 4.
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consequences.^®^ An example of this is a letter from Amjad Ali to
Wajid Ali on the appointment of a new general manager at Ah Autos,
which reads as:^ ®®
‘Father and myself strongly disagree proposal appointing 
technician as general manager...we should have someone [for 
general manager] who is entirely dependable’.^®®
This message was followed by another letter sent to Sir Wilham 
Roberts by Amjad Ali on the same date as the one written above. 
The issue raised was on the appointment of a general manager for 
the Abbassi Textile Mills Limited. Amjad Ali advised Sir Roberts 
that a technical person was inappropriate to manage a mill such as 
theirs. The reasons provided by Amjad Ah were that:
‘...anyone ...who may have the technical knowledge will not be 
conversant with local conditions...The experience we have had 
is, that technical people don’t take the same amount of 
interest which they used to years ago, and the result is 
everything slows down. Moreover they also do not keep an eye 
on expenditures which results in spending more than is 
necessary’.
Both the above mentioned letters indicate that an employee with 
a technical background was not a qualified candidate for
^®^ These board minutes are from the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the 
Board of Directors’, of Ali Automobiles Limited, 1, West Wharf Road, 
Karachi, held on 21 October, 1970 at 2.30 P.M.
^®®Letter sent by Amjad Ali to Wajid Ali, 31 July 1950.
^^ ®See letter from Amjad Ali to Sir William Roberts, Northern 
Bank Limited, Grafton Street, Dublin, Ireland, 31 July 1950.
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spearheading an organisation, which runs counter to Alfred 
Chandler’s support of professional management enabling group 
diversification and consolidation.
Members of the Ali Group also did not evince any interest to move 
their base away from the urban centres of Karachi or Lahore. That 
is why they did not develop the textiles sector of their portfolio since 
it would have required at least some family members to relocate their 
base to Rahim Yar Khan, (a small village) in order to manage the 
textile mill. In not doing so they missed out on developing an 
industry where other business groups were developing their 
comparative advantage, in a predominantly agricultural economy.
3.5 Interlocking Directorships and Kinship Patterns
The ownership of share capital, determined the controlling power 
of the Ali Group. There was a tendency for family members to 
finance capital for new subsidiaries in the group as well as appoint 
themselves on the Board of Directors and other senior managerial 
positions within the group. In one instance when Amjad Ali loaned 
Rs 30,000 to the Treet Corporation, the agreement mentioned that in 
case of Treet Corporation defaulting in its repayment, its property 
(other than the factory), would be liquidated to meet its obligation to 
the lender. Thereafter the terms of repayment of the loan were 
made on soft terms @ 4 percent interest annually, approved by family
^^%ee, the agreement between Amjad Ali and the Treet Safety 
Razor Blades Corporation, 25 September 1948.
252
consent.
Wajid Ali was the managing director of Ali Autos, WIL, Packages 
Limited and Wazir Ali Engineering (Pvt) Limited. He was also a 
partner with Muratib Ali and Ahsan Ali in Syed A & M Wazir Ali. 
For non-group firms, his directorship extended to Pakistan Services 
Limited, Adamjee Jute Mills Limited, Zeal Pak Cement Factory 
Limited, the National Steel of Pakistan and the Imperial Chemical 
Industries, a British multinational. There was only one steel mill in 
the country and Wajid Ali’s directorship stemmed from his equity 
contributed to this venture.
The Memorandum and Articles of Association of WIL indicate that 
there were interlocking directorships among the individuals of the 
group. At WlL’s inception, Wajid Ali was its managing director with 
Syed A & M Wazir Ah as its managing partner. Its three 
directors were from the Abbassi Textile Mills Limited, Karachi 
Cotton Association Limited and the National Bank of Pakistan 
Limited. Another instance of a family member investing in shares 
of another group company is that of Abid Hussain a brother-in-law 
of Wajid Ali. Abid Hussien owned 50 percent shares in Abbassi 
Textile Mills indicating a reinforcement of family control.
^^%ee Partnership Deed of Syed A & M Wazir Ali.
^^%ee letter fi'om Wajid Ali to Abid Hussain, 9 May 1951 
explaining the shareholding.
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In 1959, when Packages Limited was a private limited concern, the 
Ali Group’s share holdings in it were 77.31 percent, with 22.69 
percent owned by the Akerlimd and Pausing family. The Swedish 
share holding was given in exchange for their technical and 
managerial assistance and for arranging the import of European 
machinery required for start-up. In 1964, when Packages Limited 
floated its shares to the pubhc, 50 percent of its shares became 
vested with the public. However, since government-owned financial 
institutions also constituted the ‘public’, about 25 percent shares 
were owned by these institutions, such as National Investment Trust 
(NIT), and National Investment Corporation (NIC). Packages 
Limited obtained loans from these institutions at attractive interest 
rates. Packages Limited also had ten directors of which three were 
representatives from public financial institutions, and a further two 
were represented by the Ali and Pausing family. An additional three 
executive directors represented the Ali family, namely Wajid Ali who 
as a family member worked with two non-family executive directors.
Milkpak was another joint venture of Ali with Akerlund and 
Pausing, the latter owned 8.6 percent of Milkpak’s shares by 1988. 
The Pausing family was the supplier of technology. Additionally, 
Milkpak shares were owned by Packages Limited @7.1 percent, with 
International General Insurance, another Ali company owned 5.7 
percent shares and the International Finance Corporation owned 5.7 
percent. The public owned 45.7 percent and the remainder 11.3
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percent was divided between foreign firms who were advisors to local 
farmers on cattle health and milk quality. The Ali family owned 15.7 
percent shares, in exchange for providing Milkpak with dairy farming 
and milk processing facilities through its 100 percent owned 
subsidiary, Kabirwala Dairies. The latter was originally owned by 
Fakhar Imam, (Wajid Ali’s nephew) and this company was later 
merged with Milkpak. Packages Limited also owned and managed 
the Shiekhupura farms near Lahore, jointly associated with Cattle 
Breeds Limited in Shah Jewana, district Jhang. These farms raised 
imported cattle for milk which was sold to Milkpak for further 
processing.
These interlocking directorships stood in good stead in the group’s 
formative years. With mainly family presence dominating the 
shareholdings they exhibited a risk averse attitude to business. This 
attitude was not just reflected by limiting share-holdings within the 
family but in the reluctance to employ professional managers. In the 
long-term, the family presence on different company Board of 
Directors made the group’s collective vision even more myopic. The 
repercussions of not adopting internal organisational strategy left the 
Ali group with scattered investments vvdthout any links binding them 
to build the foundations of a cohesive business dynasty.
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3.6 Conclusion
Members of the Ali Group used various tactics to acquire 
businesses in Pakistan. By manoeuvring jointly held share-holdings 
in favour of the family, they reinforced their network of controls over 
their own businesses and sought the favour of the State in obtaining 
investment licences to initiate their business. This assisted them in 
the group’s initial expansion. However sustaining this expansion 
required a certain vigour, and because of the internal structures 
peculiar to their businesses, innovative management never developed. 
The meant that innovation was largely dependent on adoption of the 
Systems Approach methodology; as the volume of business multiplied 
with its attendant information flows, the manager was required to 
handle problems on a rising scale of magnitude and complexity. The 
complexity itself gave rise to practical considerations whereby 
managers were meant to replace more traditional methods of 
collecting information towards developing a more manageable and 
goal-oriented data base. This qualitative approach imposed upon 
management a certain discipline to view problems from a distance in 
order to see their form more clearly. The success of the new 
approach was dependent on monitoring detailed documentation and 
generation of related reports. Their use by senior management 
would have provided them with a closed loop system of continuous 
assessment and feedback. All departments were required to follow 
the same methods of information generation and retrieval in the
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interests of maintaining consistency. Unstructured management 
styles could not fulfil or keep pace with handling the growing volume 
of information in a meaningful way. One of the effects of 
unstructured policies in the group, was that investments was made 
in unrelated industries which ultimately prevented functional 
linkages from forming. Over the long-term, this led to a further a 
deterioration of managerial control over both human and capital 
resources, and this control was what the members of this group did 
not relinquish. The responsibility for introducing institutional 
changes in the group rested with its owner managers. However in 
this group, the intent to bring about such changes was lacking in 
conviction. The initial experiment with hiring professional managers 
at WIL (Hyderabad) was a success, demonstrated in their capturing 
a significant portion of the competitor’s share in the vegetable ghee 
and soap markets and secondly. However when they left for more 
senior positions in industry^^® it indicated that the time was ripe 
for the group’s management to pass over control to non-family 
management. Initially the success factors were part of a pre­
conceived strategy which was designed by non-family managers. 
Once they left, the owners chose not to repeat the hiring of 
professional managers or to substitute by training members from 
within their family. Instead they diverted their business acumen in
^^ ®See p. 188, for WIL managers who left for more senior 
management positions in industry.
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continuing to further their personal image rather than investing in 
changes that would glorify their businesses. In the ensuing years, 
Ali’s management strategy developed a void, which became even 
more difficult to circumvent and led to the eventual decline of the 
group investment in the light engineering sector.
In the early life of the companies, 1960-68 success remained a 
function of the owner-entrepreneurs’ first mover or monopoly status 
and political leverage and the consistency with which they pursued 
and maintained the favour of the pofiticians and bureaucrats.
In some instances, these businessmen themselves got politically 
strategic appointments. By the mid- 1970s, after nationahsation of its 
automotive assembly and vegetable g/ice plants, the only successfully 
run businesses left were where the group enjoyed monopoly power. 
This monopoly status gave them a stability which was as strong as 
its weakest link. Examples where unstructured decision-making 
were involved, bear testimony to this point. However, in an economic 
environment dominated by textiles. Packages Limited was one Ali 
Group company which was able to forge an identity of its own in an 
untraditional sector of manufacturing paper and UHT packaging 
material.
Dechne set in for this group because its managers did not adopt 
systems. Given that the pohtical environment was also unstable, 
this should not have prevented senior management from investing in
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new internal organisation systems which in itself would have been 
a capital investment, cushioning eternal shocks in the long-term. 
The management had the option to allocate its resources on 
improving its methods. The motivating factors which spurred initial 
investment and success was derived from their aspirations to know 
and be recognised in political, military, business and bureaucratic 
circles as leaders in industry. They sought this status by paying lip- 
service^^® to good management yet barely implemented its 
principles. They sought upward mobility through political contacts, 
not for expanding their businesses but for recognition as first movers 
in industry. The Ali Group’s managers remained diplomats and 
politicians first and managers second.
The Ali Group as a leading industrial family was not a passive 
recipient of State largesse, rather actively formulated and 
administered it. There were instances where it was the voice of the 
government on industrial development, a role they adopted in both 
an official and personal capacity. The underlying and unofficial 
criteria for success as seen by them was whether their income 
matched that of the landowning class. Having reached that level, the 
motivation to expand the business waned away. This was evident 
from two members of the Ali group who turned down lucrative joint 
venture proposals offered by (potential) foreign collaborators. The
^^ ®In the 1980s, Bahar Ah was a participant of the Harvard 
Business School’s Advanced Management Programme, targeted at 
imparting strategic management skills to influential practitioners.
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first was when the Japanese Toyota car manufacturers approached 
Wajid Ali in 1970 with an offer to establish a joint venture with Ali 
Automobiles (Pvt) Limited and the second was when Bahar Ali 
turned down a similar offer from the Norwegians to collaborate with 
him in erecting a paper processing facihty based in Indonesia. 
Members of the Ali Group were also content to keep an urban base 
at the cost not relocating to Rahim Yar Khan to manage their textile 
business t h e r e . D e c l i n e  set in from their inabihty to diversify 
arising from liquidity restrictions or investment in unrelated fields 
because of the unstructured pattern of planning and managing of 
their businesses. Their myopic management philosophy did not 
contribute towards empire building but rather focused on personahty 
building as the ultimate reward for their efforts. What we saw was 
a consolidation of the business image of an already dominant class 
of businessmen who won the allegiance of the country’s Premiers and 
Presidents and in instances, foreign Prime Ministers and Presidents. 
Other groups which had also participated in the run for seeking such 
favours, but later replaced them with investing in internal 
organisational systems, appeared to grow over the course of their 
business history.
^^^The Ali group’s aversion to shifting their residence to RYK 
where the first manufacturing facility the WIL was formed is also 
mentioned in D. Fieldhouse, Unilever Overseas, Groom Helm, 1978,
p. 260.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CRESCENT GROUP
Introduction
The Crescent Group commenced its business activities as traders 
of leather and hides in undivided India. The founding members were 
two brothers, Muhammad Amin and Muhammad Bashir, who formed 
a business partnership, named Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir 
Limited (MAMBL). They were assisted by another two brothers, Haji 
Muhammad Shaft and Fazal Karim. MAMBL was established as a 
private limited concern which also doubled up as managing agents 
for new group investment. After migrating from India in 1951, the 
four brothers invested in manufacturing, in cotton and its related 
products where they had a comparative advantage. By building a 
base in this fteld they were able to accumulate enough capital to 
enter non-traditional ftelds in industry. These included 
manufacturing investments made in the light engineering sector, 
such as steel processing and as ftnanciers of machinery and 
equipment required by industrial users. The group produced 12 
second generation managers, of which the more prominent in 
business were Altaf Saleem, Anjum Saleem, Ahsan Saleem, Tariq 
Shaft, Nasir Shaft, Javed Amin, Muhammad Raft and Zahid Bashir.
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section One outlines the 
early history of the group. Section Two presents its business
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development over 37 years, (1951-1988). Section Three highlights 
the management philosophy peculiar to this group and the unique 
management strategy adopted from its inception. This is explained 
through four company histories, selected for their important role in 
the group’s expansion. Section Four highlights the external 
relations of the group, in particular relations with financial 
institutions. Section Five provides insight into the group’s 
endogenous pohcies which explain its development over the long­
term. Section Six concludes with a summary of the factors which 
enabled the Crescent Group to make a relatively more defined 
transition from trading to textiles, light engineering and industrial 
finance.
4.1 Group Formation and Background^
The Crescent Group was established in 1914 in undivided India in 
Madras by Fazal Karim, who traded in hides and leather. He made 
a significant breakthrough for the business when he negotiated with 
Japanese ship owners, who transported cargo to India, to load their 
ships with leather on the return journey. This deal was deemed 
acceptable by the Japanese, particularly since the ships returned to 
Japan without any cargo, and normally the ships’ weight was kept 
stable on the seas by filling them with rocks.^ Such were the origins
^Interview with Altaf Saleem, chairman, Shakarganj Mills 
Limited, 12 December 1991 in Faisalabad. See Appendix A for 
questions asked in the interview.
Hbid.
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of industrial enterprise for this group. Fazal Karim’s two brothers, 
Muhammad Amin and Muhammad Bashir joined him in the leather 
business. In 1947, they migrated to Lahore as part of the mass 
exodus of Muslims to Pakistan and resumed trading activities in raw 
cotton, jute, sugar, cement, polyester fibre and edible oil. This 
encapsulated the business activities of the company named 
MAMBL.^ Later, in 1951 the group diversified into the 
manufacturing of the goods in which it initially traded, and the 
financial conduit for new company flotations was MAMBL. Where 
jute, viscose fibre and steel scrap were once imported for re-sale in 
the market, the group started to import them as essential raw 
materials for its own manufacturing facilities. By 1988, the 
companies managed by MAMBL had generated over 30 
independently-managed sister concerns of the Crescent Groupé, as 
private- and public-limited companies, employing 30,000 employees 
and producing a turnover of over Rs 6 biUion per annum®. The
®Mohd. is the shortened version of the name Muhammad.
^The transition from trading to manufacturing, is presented in 
the Crescent Group’s in-company document entitled, ‘The Crescent 
Textile Mills’, p. 27.
®With Crescent’s 1988 turnover of £ 214 million, it ranked with 
the circa 334th largest UK company measured by its turnover.
[See M. Allen, (ed.). The Times 1000, 1987-1988, Times Books, 
1987]. Crescent’s net assets in 1988 were £ 143 million, which was 
equivalent to the circa 255th position of UK’s largest industrial 
company ranked by the value of its net assets, [ibid]. With an 
employee strength of 30,000 at Crescent, an equivalent number 
were employed by a food manufaturer Unigate, which was the 51st 
largest UK company measured by its net assets, [ibid].
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following table provides a 37 year summary of company formation 
and expansion under the banner of the Crescent Group.
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Company
Table 4.1 
Nature o f B usiness Year Estb.
1. Mohd. Amin Mohd. Bashir 
(Pvt) Limited
2. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd.
3. Crescent Textiles Limited
4. Crescent Sugar Mills 
and Distillery Limited
5. M.D. Shams (Pvt) Limited
6. Jubilee Spinning and 
Weaving Mills Limited
7. Crescent Foundation (Pvt) Ltd.
8. Crescent Ju te  Products
9. Shakarganj Mills Limited
lO.Shams Textiles Limited
11.Crescent Board Limited
12.Shams Food Processing
13.Elite Textile Mills Limited
14.Ghulam Hussain Hidayatulla 
Mills Limited
15.Crescent Apparel (Pvt) Ltd.
16.Ujala Cotton Mills (Pvt) Ltd.
17.Crescent Cotton Products 
(Pvt) Ltd.
IS.Crescent Group Services 
(Pvt) Ltd.
IS.Crescent Group Engineering 
(Pvt) Ltd.
20.Crescent Steel & Allied 
Products Ltd.
21.Karachi Bulk Storage and 
Terminals (Pvt) Limited
22.0rescent Investment 
Bank Ltd.
23.Suraj Cotton Mills (Pvt) Ltd.
24.Crescent Business 
Management 
(Pvt) Limited
25.Pakistan Industrial 
Leasing Corporation Limited
26.Crescent Spinning Mills Ltd.
27.Crescent AGDEVCO
28.Crescent Cotton and Allied 
Factories Limited
29.Crescot Limited
30.Crescent Resins Limited
31. Crescent Marketing Limited
32.Crescent Trading Limited
33.Crescent Business 
Management (Pvt) Ltd.
34.World Class Textiles (Pvt) Ltd
Textile trading 1951
Insurance sales 1952
Textile Manufg. 1953
Sugar Manuf. 1959
Shipping Line 1959
Textile Manuf. 1959
Secondary Schools, 1965
Religious Institutions 
and Trusts
Ju te  Manufg. 1965
Sugar Manufg. 1967
Textile Manufg. 1968
Paper Board
Manufg. 1969
Food Processing 1969
Spinning Unit 1979
Ginning unit 1979
Ready made Clothes Manufg. 1980 
Textile Manufactg. 1980
Spinning Unit 1980
Engineering Utihties 1980
Consultancy Services 1980
Steel Pipes Manufg. 1983
Warehouse for 1984
edible oils
Banking Services 1984
Spinning unit 1986
Lending & Management 1986
Leasing Services 1988
(financial)
Spinning unit 1988
Removal of Water 1988
Logging & Salinity
Ginning Unit 1988
Spinning Unit 1988
Chemicals 1988
Marketing Services 1988
Textiles & Edible 1988
Oil Trading
Modaraba^ flotation 1988
& management services 
•Textiles Manufacturing 1988
^Modaraha is a joint stock company, engaged in leasing, trading and investment in shares, 
without lending by charging interest [N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), Bukhari’s 101, 1991, p. 9]. 
Source: Crescent Group, unpubhshed company documents; no place, no year.
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The section which follows, describes the formation and growth of 
the group from 1951 to 1988. It focuses upon managerial strategies 
which enabled the group to make the transition from trading to the 
manufacture of light engineering goods. Trends and features of 
managerial policy which emerge from the company histories reveal 
how this group made consistent progress and a sustained transition.
4.2 Business Development: 1951-88
Mohd Amin Mohd Bashir (Pvt) Limited (MAMBL) was 
incorporated in 1951 as the trading company for the group. It was 
involved in the domestic and international trading of raw cotton, jute, 
sugar, cement, polyester fibre, edible oils and textiles. Prior to 
migrating to Pakistan from India, MAMBL was one of the largest 
traders of leather.® It applied the experience gained from its trade 
in India by replicating it in trading activities in Pakistan. Once the 
base was set, the company formed forward linkages at an early stage 
in its history by establishing manufacturing facihties in Pakistan. 
This was achieved by the control vested in MAMBL as the managing 
agents for Crescent Group investments.^
^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
^For the managing agency system in British India, see B.R.
Tomlinson, ‘British Business in India, 1860-1970’, in R. Davenport-Hines 
and G. Jones, (eds.), British Business in Asia since 1860, Cambridge,
1989, pp. 96-100; S. Kochanek, Business and Politics in India, Cahfomia, 
1974, pp, xi, and 14. A managing agency was a cluster of legally separate 
companies operating under its own Board of Directors; its managing 
agents were usually the owners of the business group who also 
represented the commercial interests of the company which they 
represented. For example, they could hold the exclusive rights to obtain raw
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By 1952, the group had acquired 36 ginning units of which four 
were leased out by them and the remainder were used by the group 
to gin cotton. These units ginned raw cotton which was then fed as 
the raw material for the cotton spinning imits.® By 1964, the group 
had disposed all but 12 of its ginning factories.® (By 1988, MAMBL’s 
annual turnover was Rs 1648 million).^®
In 1952, the group floated its first public hmited company, the 
Prem ier Insurance Company of Pakistan Limited which 
underwrote general and hvestock insurance. The company had a co­
material for a subsidiary or to sell its product by charging it 
commission. The agents were not supposed to participate in the 
decision-making activity of such companies. However in Pakistan, 
the managing agents had exclusive control over decisions made on 
behalf of subsidiary companies, such as new investments and at 
financed equity from the managing agency's income. This created 
an overlap of interests between the agent, the subsidiary company 
and the group. With the subsidiaries’ interests becoming 
subordinate to those of the agents, the latter also became a conduit 
for undeclared subsidiary company profits and/or siphoning of 
inter company funds by the agents. For these reasons the 
managing agency system was abolished in Pakistan by Bhutto in 
his Economic Reforms Order in 1972. See Managing Agency and 
Election of Directors Order, 1972, also known as the Presidential 
Order No: 2/72, 1972.
^Interview with Altaf Salem, 12 December 1991.
^Ihid. Since MAMBL was a private limited company, it was 
not possible to accurately rank its position by the value of its sales 
as part of all private- and/or public-hmited companies in Pakistan. 
However, on a comparative scale, its sales in 1988 equalled that of 
the fourteenth largest publicly quoted company [out of 500] called, 
Millat Tractors, as given in N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), BukharVs 
101, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari and Company Limited, 1991.
^®See Crescent Group’s internal document, ‘Crescent Group’, 
Corporate Office, 1990.
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operative partnership with a foreign firm, the Zurich Insurance 
Company of Switzerland, with Premier Insurance Company of 
Pakistan representing Zurich Insurance’s Pakistani interests.
In 1953, the group made its debut in manufacturing; the Crescent 
Textile Mills Limited (CTML), a public limited company was 
formed in Faisalabad and remained the parent company of successive 
manufacturing extensions made in textiles. Its subsidiaries included 
the Jubilee Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited and Crescent Sugar 
Mills and Distillery Limited. CTML provided equity capital and 
management services for its subsidiaries and also extended loans and 
wrote off financial losses when projects failed. CTML was in the 
business of dyeing, bleaching, printing, combing, preparing, spinning 
and weaving raw cotton and synthetic fibres, fabrics, bed sheets, 
finished fabrics, cotton and polyester yam, for both domestic and 
international markets. A power generation plant was erected to 
provide energy, thus eliminating dependence on the government’s 
erratic electricity supply.^ In 1988, 21,000 new spindles were 
added to a total of 135,000 spindles and 810 looms and^^ by then 
CTML’s annual turnover was Rs 1158 million.
^^Given in, N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), Bukharins 101, Khadim Ah 
Shah Bukhari and Company Limited, 1991, page code 081160.
^^Source material used for in-company documents is available 
with the author.
^^Given in. Crescent Textile Mills Limited, Annual Report, 
1988.
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In 1959, the Jubilee Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited 
(JSWML), a private limited company was added to the group’s 
textile base in the commercial hub of Karachi. It was acquired as a 
closed-down textile mill which was originally designed to 
manufacture bed sheets, finished fabrics and cotton yarn. These 
were the same products which its parent company, CTML produced. 
In 1974, it separated from CTML and its shares were floated on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange for public subscription. In 1988, its annual 
turnover was Rs 273 million or 23 percent of CTML’s turnover and 
employed 26,600 spindles and 403 looms .Compared  to CTML, it 
had twice the number of spindles with half its looms. Spindles were 
used for spinning raw cotton to make yarn and looms converted it to 
woven cloth. With fewer looms than CTML, JSWML’s market was 
limited to the export of yam which rendered lower value added and 
so fetched a lower price than that of woven cloth. JS WML’s yam 
was also marketed by CTML. This was an instance where economies 
of scope accmed to the group.
In 1959, the group diversified its base by buying into shipping and 
sugar manufacturing. Crescent Sugar Mills and Distillery
^^Economies of scope occur when the same source for raw 
materials is used for processing more than one product lines of the 
group. Cf. A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, pp. 146- 
47.
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Limited (CSMDL)^® was formed as a private limited entity. 
Members of the Crescent Group approached the Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation (PIDC) to help set up the infrastructure of 
this mill, originally managed as a PIDC project. The group later 
purchased it from the PIDC and made it a separately located 
subsidiary of CTML. It shares were offered to the public in 1965 
when the distillery plant commenced production. The manufacturing 
facihties at CTML consisted of a sugar miU, distillery and a cotton 
spinning plant which manufactured yam. Both CSMDL and 
JS WML's textiles arm supplied yam  to CTML. CSMDL’s annual 
tumover in 1988, from sugar, alcohol and yam  sales was Rs 750 
million, making it the twenty first ranked business by value of its 
sales in Pakistan.
In its formative years, the group invested repeatedly in textiles. 
The acquisition of CSMDL’s portfolio was another instance of this 
strategy. Expansion into new industries always included a textile 
unit, as a safety valve to absorb potential losses. As a third 
generation family manager, Altaf Saleem pointed out, textiles were 
considered traditionally ‘safe’ investments which could subsidise
®^A subsidiary of Crescent Textiles Mills Limited.
^^Crescent Sugar Mills and Distillery Limited’s, sales are given 
in CSMDL, Annual Report, 1988 and N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), 
Bukhari's 101, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari and Company Limited, 
1991, which ranks it, in 1988, at twenty-first position measured by 
the sales of ah public limited companies in Pakistan.
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losses incurred in new ventures/®
M.D. Shams, a shipping line was acquired in 1959 as a step 
towards backward integration of the group’s activities. Owning their 
own high seas transportation, facilitated and generated economies for 
the group’s import and export trade. This strategy to integrate 
backwards was aimed at reducing the distribution costs of traded 
goods and imported raw material.^® In 1972, this service was 
nationalised by Bhutto, only to be returned to the Crescent Group by 
President Zia in 1980.^^
In 1965, the group ventured into another new area of production 
by establishing the country’s largest jute mill. Crescent Jute 
Products Limited (C JPL), which was organised as a public hmited 
company. CJPL was located in Faisalabad and manufactured twine, 
gunny bags, rope, hessian, cotton yarn and cotton garments. In 1988 
its annual tumover was Rs 750 million with sales stretching overseas 
to the USA and EEC.""
Textile production was still the group’s favoured area for new 
investment and in 1968 Shams Textile Mills Limited was formed.
^®Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
"^Backward and forward linkages in industry are discussed in 
A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, p. 9.
"^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
""Given in. Crescent Jute Products, Annual Report, 1988.
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Initially privately subscribed, this company went public in 1974. 
This was an addition to the group’s textile base in Faisalabad. It 
was more integrated than the other textile units in that 660 looms 
and 25,335 spindles augmented forward hnkages in the plant with 
dyeing, printing, processing and finishing facihties. In 1988 its 
annual turnover was Rs 293 million comparable to that of JSWML 
in the same year.^^ A food processing plant named Shams Food 
Processing, a private limited company was set up in 1969 as a 
subsidiary of Shams Textiles and marketed frozen food to overseas 
buyers.
Having spent the first eighteen years in traditionally risk averse 
areas of business, where agricultural raw material for textiles, sugar 
and jute production was easily accessible, the group gradually veered 
towards non-traditional fields but always including a textile facihty 
in every new venture. The country’s third paper and board mill. 
Crescent Boards Limited (CBL) was formed in 1969 as a private 
limited subsidiary of CSMDL. Both facihties were located in the 
same building at Faisalabad. The first high grade board mill in 
Nowshera was established by the PIDC in 1954, later purchased by 
the Adamjee Group in 1963. [As noted in Chapter Three, the Ah 
Group’s paper and board mill was established in 1964 which used 
straw in manufacturing board for its p a p e r ] . C B L  used a more
^^Given in. Shams Textile Mills Limited, Annual Report, 1974. 
^^See pp. 189-92, for Ali’s paper manufacturing facihty.
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refined input for pulp and board manufacturing, that is, sugar cane 
bagasse which was produced at CSMDL. This exemplified the 
Crescent Group’s strategy of vertical integration through forward 
linkages of its production facilities at CSMDL.^® CBL was the 
second plant in the world to manufacture particle board from sugar 
cane bagasse, and the first of its kind in the sub-continent.^® CBL 
produced hard, laminated and particle board and also furniture 
panels, artificial ceilings and cotton yam. Again, yam 
manufacturing remained a component of CBL’s production facihties 
in addition to paper manufacturing. This group exhibited initiative 
in broadening its industrial base yet circumvented associated risk by 
including textile production in new company flotations. In 1988, 
CBL’s annual tumover was Rs 209 milhon.^^
By 1967, the second generation of the group was ready to emulate 
its predecessors in continuing with the family tradition of expansion. 
Altaf Saleem established Shakarganj Mills Limited (SML), a 
public limited company. The equipment was purchased in 1967, and 
production commenced in 1974 for refined sugar and industrial
^®See A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, p. 9, for 
backward integration of firms; and Shakarganj Mills Limited, 
company documents for the use of sugar cane bagasse used for 
paper board production at Crescent Boards Limited.
^®See Crescent Group document, ‘Crescent Group’, unpublished. 
Corporate Office, 1990.
^^See Crescent document, unpublished. Corporate Office, 1990.
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alcohol. As with the CSMDL, this unit also tapped into forward 
linkages by utilising its by-product, sugar bagasse to feed the group’s 
particle board plant at CBL. Wherever backward or forward 
integration could be adopted, these entrepreneurs were seen to have 
done so. This particular expansion was in an area requiring 
agricultural raw material, which blended in with the group’s 
philosophy to develop industry where they could influence access to 
its raw material supply. This strategy was evident as personnel at 
SML educated local cane growers on the adoption of superior quahty 
sugar cane seed. This seed was developed by a team of scientists 
employed by Altaf Saleem at the mill’s Cane Research Centre. Once 
a better quality seed was developed in its laboratory, a trial patch 
was then grown on the mill’s premises. Satisfactory results meant 
that the pilot project was repeated for local farmers on the latter’s 
land. Larger crops of sugar cane motivated farmers to purchase their 
seed from SML. The same crop was then purchased by SML as raw 
material to process into refined sugar and industrial alcohol. In 
1988, SML’s annual turnover was Rs 600 million. It had produced 
8,66,552 tons of crushed sugarcane, which was five percent of the 
country’s output.^® SML’s value by its sugar sales in 1988 ranked
^®Sonrce: N. Memon, ‘Sugar Mill Recovery’, Pakistan 
Agriculture, April 1989, p. 22, gives sugar production statistics.
274
it at second position in Pakistan.^®
In 1979, another pubhcly quoted company was floated, Elite 
Textile Mills Limited (ETML), to spin cotton yam. By 1988, it had 
26,800 spindles with an annual turnover of Rs 164 million.^® The 
group also chose to fragment their textiles investments in separate 
companies rather than reinvesting in existing ones to avoid the 
government’s attention that they were becoming too large. The 
experience with Bhutto’s nationalisation of textile mills in 1972 made 
businessmen shy in reinvesting in existing stmctures and they 
preferred to establish legally separate companies, manufacturing 
similar products. This gave an appearance that their nature of 
business was relatively small-scale.
In 1980, the growth momentum for the group was on the upswing; 
three manufacturing facilities were added and two service-sector 
companies formed. All these additions were in the private limited 
domain of the group. The manufacturing facilities were subsidiaries 
of CJPL, situated at separate locations. They were Crescent 
Apparel Manufacturing Company (Pvt) Limited (Crescent 
Apparel), Ujala Cotton Mills (Pvt) Limited and Crescent 
Cotton Products (Pvt) Limited. Crescent Apparel manufactured
^^SML’s statisics are given in, Pakistan Sugar Mills 
Association, Annual Report, 1988. Ittefaq Sugar Mills Limited, 
was the largest, measured by the value of its sales and cane 
rushing capacity. It was owned by Mian Nawaz Sharif who 
became Pakistan’s Prime Minister in 1990.
^°Given in. Elite Textile Mills Limited, Annual Report, 1988.
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and marketed finished fabric and the others were spinning units with 
a combined total of 36,000 spindles, making their spinning capacity 
amongst the average size operating in the country/^
In 1980, two engineering companies were formed, in the service 
sector, which were Crescent Group Services (Pvt) Limited 
(Engineering Division) and Crescent Group Engineering (Pvt) 
Limited. The former was a wholly owned subsidiary owned by the 
group, providing machinery manpower and services for engineering 
and construction projects in the private- and public-sectors. 
Contracts accepted were for projects spanning land reclamation, 
construction of highways, diesel/thermal and hydel plants, chemical 
and process plants, and industrial electrification. The company also 
acted as a trading conduit for engineering goods manufactured in 
China, Europe and America which were required by Pakistani 
companies. Completed projects included reclamation of 135,000 acres 
of water-logged land through installation of 1300 kilometres of sub­
surface drains for the Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA) in Faisalabad and D.l. Khan, electrification of three textile 
mills, eight power generating stations with gas driven engines and 
a power station installed at CTML.
Crescent Group Engineering (Pvt) Limited provided construction 
and engineering services to group-owned projects and those managed
^^Given in Crescent Group, unpublished company documents; 
no year, no place.
276
by other companies in the private- and public-sectors. These services 
included conducting research, the initial planning of projects and the 
provision of civil, mechanical, electrical and chemical services from 
their pool of engineers. The formation of these companies was the 
first signal of the group’s investment in an unconventional, light 
engineering sector of industry.
By the mid-1980s the group’s base in engineering applications had 
gelled as advisors and implementors of projects contracted out to it. 
Also, the initial engineering investment had provided its owners with 
the requisite confidence for diversifying into the steel industry. This 
was achieved in 1983, when the group established Crescent Steel 
and Allied Products Limited (CSAPL), a public limited company, 
manufacturing large diameter steel pipes. These pipes were suitable 
for high pressure transmission of oil, gas, steam and water. CSAPL 
was also a downstream investment for steel produced at the Pakistan 
Steel Mill. CSAPL was recognised by the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) for adhering to their steel manufacturing 
specifications and maintaining q u a l i t y C S A P L ’s annual turnover 
in 1988, was Rs 293 million, for an annual production of 80,000 tons 
of steel pipes.
^^API, the American Petroleum Institute publish a manual for 
pipe specifications and procedures for oil and gas. CSAPL’s pipes 
were reviewed every eight months by API, and if its quality was 
deemed to be satisfactory, then the company was permitted to 
continue adopting the API logo.
^^Given in, CSAPL, Annual Report, 1988.
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Another privately listed company for the group was formed in 
1984, named Karachi Bulk Storage and Terminals (Pvt) 
Limited (KBSTL). KBSTL was formed to store group-produced and 
client’s products. It provided warehouse space for molasses and 
edible oil, both commodities imported by the group for re-sale to their 
own facilities and to other buyers. Warehouses were constructed for 
storing the group’s imports of edible oil and export of other 
commodities along with transportation within Pakistan of molasses 
produced at CSMDL. Storage capacity for molasses was 44,650 
metric tons and for edible oils 28,130 metric tons, making this 
company a major warehousing facihty in the country. In 1988, 
KBSTL’s annual turnover was Rs 151 million of which 79 percent 
constituted business generated from commodity exports.^^
President Zia, during his eleven year rule, 1977-1988, encouraged 
private-sector industrialisation by declaring a number zones as tax 
free. One such was near Karachi, used by this group to erect yet 
another textile mill. This was called Shams Cotton Mills Limited 
formed in 1986, which had 30,720 spindles for producing cotton yam. 
In 1988 its annual turnover was Rs 198 million.^® This was another 
company registered as a legally separate unit to avoid attention that 
this group had established a concentration of wealth and influence.
^^Given in Crescent Group, unpublished company documents.
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Another private limited company named Crescent Business 
Management was floated in 1986 to extend finance and monitor 
management practises of the group companies. Crescent Spinning 
Mills Limited (CSML) was also floated in 1988.
The group’s pioneering expansion into the flnancial-sector was 
made in 1988, through the formation of a pubhc limited, leasing 
company for asset financing, named Pakistan Industrial Leasing 
Corporation Limited (PILCORP). The formation of this company 
reflected the fact that the group had made the transition from 
trading and textiles to manufacturers of hght engineering goods and 
as providers of industrial finance. PILCORP had an equity 
participation from the Asian Development Bank and the Pakistan 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) at 24.6 percent 
collectively, and Crescent Group companies contributed a further 
33.67 percent. The remaining equity was raised from public 
subscription of its shares. PILCORP leased out industrial machinery, 
vehicles, computers, construction and office equipment from three to 
five years of usage by its customers. In 1988 it leased out assets 
worth Rs 150 million.^®
By 1984, 33 years since its inception, the Crescent Group had 
consolidated its business by diversifying widely into textiles, jute, 
sugar and steel manufacturing, and in the provision of financial and 
technical expertise for machinery installation and for engineering
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works. Total group turnover reached nearly Rs 6.5 billion in 1988, 
making it a major enterprise in Pakistan, measured by both the 
value of its sales and net a s s e t s . T h e  need of the hour was to 
better manage the assets of this ever growing corporate empire. This 
was realised in 1984, by the group’s first flotation of a bank named 
Crescent Investment Bank (Pvt) Limited (Cresbank). This was 
another investment in the financial-sector. Altaf Saleem commented 
on the significance given to evaluation of financial performance at 
Cresbank:
‘ We will come back after 10 years and ask you about 
profitability. Just build the bank as an institution and then 
worry about profitability’.^ ®
The bank was critical to the management of Crescent’s diverse 
portfolio; it traded in listed securities and as a broker on the call 
money market. This was the first investment bank to become 
operational in the private-sector.®® Encouraging inter company 
competition was a group policy and a tool used for bringing about 
institutional changes by bridging technology gaps. Towards the close 
of 1988, Crescent’s management was considering floating a leasing 
company on the New York Stock Exchange in the USA and in setting
®^ The [comparative] value of its net assets is given in Table 
2.15.
®®Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
®®Given in N. Husnain, et uZ, (eds.), Bukhari's 101, Khadim Ali 
Shah Bukhari and Company Limited, 1991, page code, 041040.
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up a construction company in Pakistan/®
4.3 Management Philosophy: Four Company Histories
This section uses internal company correspondence, interviews 
with family managers and their staff to reveal the management 
practices of the Crescent Group. Four company histories 
demonstrate strategy implementation and the organisational 
structure which emerged for the group as a whole. Other companies 
in the group also emulated the same policies as revealed by those 
which follow.
4.3.1 Muhammad Amin And Muhammad Bashir (Pvt) Limited 
(MAMBL)
This was the first Crescent Group company incorporated in 
Pakistan. Its chairman and managing director was appointed in 
1951, namely Muhammad Amin and Muhammad Bashir respectively, 
and the company was known by its acronym, MAMBL.^^ MAMBL 
commenced trading operations by appointing itself as the managing 
agents for the group,'^  ^ and forming a trading partnership with the
^^See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of MAMBL, 
18 September 1951, p. 1.
^%ee, managing agency agreement of MAMBL signed by the 
five directors of the group, Muhammad Amin, Muhammad Bashir, 
Mian Buksh Elahi, Haji Muhammad Shafi and Mian Gulzar 
Ahmad, in the first Annual General Meeting of MAMBL, recorded 
in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of MAMBL,
11 September 1951, pp. 1-3.
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Amritsar Swadeshi Woollen Mills Limited in 1952/^ MAMBL’s 
1,100 shares were allocated to the close family members in equal 
proportions, namely going to three brothers; Muhammad Amin, 
Muhammad Bashir, Fazal Karim and a cousin Haji Shafi, along with 
their sons, Mazhar Karim and Muhammad Saleem, and their 
respective spouses/^ Mazhar Karim was appointed as MAMBL’s 
managing director in 1954/^
A written record of the Board minutes of MAMBL was preserved 
from the first Annual General Meeting, which showed that the 
management insisted upon documentation and systematic record 
keeping. The documentation of records and related procedures which 
were initially developed at the group provided the base for the 
systematically developed procedures of the future.^® These records 
helped MAMBL to handle organisational problems more adeptly as 
the business expanded.
In 1951, the first instance of inter company nurturing occurred. 
MAMBL became the managing agents for the group’s first textile
^^The Amritsar Swadeshi partnership is recorded in the 
‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of MAMBL, 5 
September 1952, p. 1.
^^Recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ 
of MAMBL, 18 September 1951, p. 2.
^^Ibid.j 2 April 1954, p. 1.
^®For a historiography of the Systems Approach, see pp. 142-50.
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expansion of the group in the formation of the CTML/^ The onus 
of CTML’s policy making fell on its managing agents, who were also 
MAMBL’s directors.^® The managing agents arranged for borrowed 
finance for CTML, from the National Bank of India’s branches in 
Karachi and Lahore, received in staggered instalments of Rs 1 
million in 1953, Rs 0.5 million in 1954, Rs 10 million in 1955 and Rs 
6.5 million in 1956.^ ® The initial overdraft facility was used to pay 
for textile machinery imported for CTML from Germany amounting 
to £187,235 pounds sterling, which was repayable in half-yearly 
instalments within five years. The company directors also ordered 
power generators and machinery from Germany for the initial 
installation of the mill.®^
The management a t MAMBL was also cognisant of the value of its 
employees as its intangible assets. Therefore in 1957, the directors 
of MAMBL provided mill workers with annual bonuses equalhng one- 
and- a half-times, their basic salary at a time when this was not
^^See managing agency agreement of MAMBL signed by the 
five directors of the group, Muhammad Amin, Muhammad Bashir, 
Mian Buksh Elahi, Haji Muhammad Shafi and Mian Gulzar 
Ahmad, in the first Annual General Meeting of MAMBL, recorded 
in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of MAMBL, 
11 September 1951, pp. 1-3.
^®See p. 9In, for what the managing agency system stood for 
with respect to businesses.
^^Information recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board 
of Directors’ of MAMBL 21 September 1953, p. 1; 2 April 1954, p. 
1; 27 September 1955, p. 1 and 30 December 1956, p. 1].
19 January 1952, p. 2.
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standard business practice.®  ^ Rewarding employee performance 
assured them that monetary rewards were recognised and disbursed, 
commensurate with their performance.®^ This policy was also 
introduced to convey to the employees that the management was 
ready to share its profits with its workers.®® The working 
philosophy (which helped them in expanding their investments) was 
evident from the issue of bonus shares to the equity holders of 
CTML. This decision was taken by the managing agents at 
MAMBL.®^
In 1958, the Board of Directors approved a resolution to make 
CTML a public hmited company and a call was made for pubhc 
subscription of its shares. The additional equity raised was meant 
for expansion of the plant, and its new status made it an 
independent company of the group. Nurturing companies in the 
early years of their formation by keeping their status as private 
limited concerns provided the managing agents with the lead time 
needed to make them financially viable concerns. In the meantime.
30 March 1957, p. 1.
®®This is another pre-condition for the successful 
implementation of systems in an organisation. Rewarding 
employees as a means for making organisational systems more 
effective are discussed in its theoretical context on p. 159.
®®This point of view is reiterated by the directors of MAMBL in 
the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of MAMBL, 23 
August 1959, p. 11.
1 April 1964.
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the finances required for new company flotations were raised from 
the resources of MAMBL and by accessing credit from commercial 
banks. This strategy also ensured the group’s control over the 
direction of the emerging business structure within it.
MAMBL’s status as the managing agents of the group remained 
unchanged till 1972, when this system was abolished by Prime 
Minister Bhutto under Presidential Order, Part III of the Companies 
(Managing Agency and Election of Directors), 1972.^ ® Bhutto’s 
decision was rooted in the idea of social democracy and sphntering 
the concentration of power in the hands of a few businessmen. 
However, Pakistani businesses circumvented these controls by 
reappointing their managing agents as formal directors of the 
companies (still) owned by them. The Crescent Group’s strategy was 
no different and Muhammad Amin and Muhammad Bashir, along 
with the other directors of MAMBL were formally made the directors 
of CTML in 1972.^ ®
^^For the role of managing agencies in British India, see B.R. 
Tomlinson, ‘Writing History Sideways: Lessons for Indian 
Economic Historians from Meiji Japan’, Modern Asian Studies,
Vol. 19, No. 3, 1985, p. 695. Also see p. 91n, for a description on 
what the managing agency system meant and the modus operandi 
of managing agents in Pakistan.
^®Recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ 
of CTML, 18 April 1972.
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4.3.2 Crescent Textile MiUs Limited (CTML)
This company was registered as a private limited concern in 1951 
under the managing agency of MAMBL.®  ^ From the onset the 
directors of MAMBL had decided to import the machinery required 
at CTML. This conferred on CTML an immediate edge over other 
cotton manufacturers using locally manufactured weaving machines 
which produced inconsistent quality yarn. The decision taken hy 
CTML’s management to invest in sound weaving technology was 
hased on the entrepreneurs’ experience in cotton textile trading and 
manufacturing. Weaving machines which did not adhere to quahty 
specifications could hreak the thread which then led to an instant 
halt to the rest of the production.
MAMBL, as CTML’s managing agents negotiated with Union 
Matrix of West Germany, a consulting firm to advise them on the 
type of equipment to he imported, along with supervising the 
installation of their m a c h i n e r y . I n  1952, the managing agents for 
CTML decided to import power generators^® for the mill fi*om
^^Recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ 
of MAMBL, 18 September 1951, pp. 2-3.
®®Interview with Nasir Shafi, deputy chief executive, CTML, 13 
December 1991, in Faisalabad. See Appendix A.
^®Import licence No. M 009452, issued by the Chief Controller 
of Imports and Exports under the ‘Deferred Payments Scheme’, as 
recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of 
MAMBL, 21 September 1953, p. 1.
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Messrs. W. Schlaforst and Co., M. Gladbach, in West Germany.®® 
A series of loans, obtained by CTML from the Reserve Bank of 
India’s Karachi and Lahore branches, funded CTML’s early 
machinery investment. In 1953, CTML approached Messrs. W. 
Schlaforst and Co., again for procuring their equipment. This was 
finally financed by an overdraft facility of Rs 2 million, extended to 
CTML by the National Bank of India which still retained a branch 
office in Karachi.®  ^ The agreement with the German company was 
that they would receive payment in half-yearly instalments of 
£36,447.60 pound sterhng, over a five year term.®  ^ Cotton yarn 
production commenced at CTML in 1953 with the installation of 
15,120 spindles.®  ^ The following year, an additional Rs 4.5 million 
was borrowed from the Reserve Bank of India’s branch at Karachi.®"^  
This was followed up in 1955, with a further Rs 10 million borrowed 
and in 1956 Rs 6.5 million borrowed from the Reserve Bank of India’s 
Lahore branch.®® By 1958, CTML was an integrated textile unit.
®®Recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ 
of MAMBL, 19 January 1952, p. 2.
®^76icZ., 21 September 1952, p. 1.
^^Ibid. 21 September 1953, p. 1.
®%W., 19 January 1952, p. 2.
14 December 1953, p. 1.
®®76W., 27 September 1955, p. 1 and 30 December 1956, p. 1.
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spinning ginned®® cotton to produce yam, then weaving the yam  to 
make thread and finally converting it to make finished cloth which 
was then bleached and dyed or printed for the domestic and export 
market. Its spindles had also increased to 48,000. By the 1960s, 
CTML had established itself as the flagship company of the group by 
virtue of its size measured by its sales which were the highest within 
the group. Thereupon, it became the umbrella for new company 
flotations, first as private limited concerns later to be made pubhc 
limited.®^
In 1957, all CTML employees with at least three months of service, 
were entitled at year end bonus of one- and a half-month’s average 
basic salary eamed hy them.®® MAMBL’s management philosophy 
was emulated hy CTML’s management right from its onset, which 
focused on attracting and retaining its labour and executive 
employees.®® CTML’s weavers received in-company training which 
eliminated the need to send them elsewhere for developing their
®®Ginned cotton is the cotton lint which has been separated 
from the cotton seed.
®^Crescent Group companies which were sponsored hy CTML, 
were JSWML [1958], CSML [1958], CJML [1962] and STML 
[1971].
®®Recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ 
of MAMBL, 30 March 1957, pp. 1-2.
®®See company document, ‘The Crescent Textile Mills Limited,’ 
Corporate Office, 1990, p. 6.
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technical know-how/® By 1958, CTML had established itself 
sufficiently for its managing agents to make it a public limited 
concern/^ This decision was implemented in 1958 and CTML’s 
shares were offered for pubhc subscription with MAMBL retaining 
the managing agency^^ of CTML. In 1965, CTML’s management 
recruited a German manager named Bixtenstein, for managing the 
West German weaving machines and to train CTML’s workers on the 
correct manner of operating them.^®
CTML was also the first company in the group to export its 
production. Exports went mainly to the UK, Germany, Sweden, 
Benelux, USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 
Bangladesh. By 1970, its employee strength increased to 5,500 
management and non-management staff, making it a major employer 
of labour in t e x t i l e s .T h e  employees also continued to receive their 
salary and bonus even when there was a 65 day strike at CTML in 
1973.^  ^ The reason for the strike as provided by Nasir Shafi, 
commercial director of CTML, was the deleterious effect on 
businesses from Prime Minister Bhutto’s socialist manifesto which
^®Interview with Nasir Shafi, 13 December 1991.
^^Recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ 
of MAMBL, 2 December 1957, p. 2.
Interview with Nasir Shafi, 13 December 1991.
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encouraged and gave more power to the labour unions to demand 
that their rights be met by their employers/®
In 1978, Nasir Shafi, son of Muhammad Shafi was appointed the 
commercial director of CTML. He was responsible for the production 
of cotton yam  and cloth at CTML. His elder brother, Muhammad 
Anwar was the chief executive of CTML but in effect, the daily 
operating control vested with Nasir Shafi. He was keen to improve 
the production quality of cloth produced at CTML and in 1980 
introduced suggestion boxes on the shop floor for recording employee 
com pla in t s . Th i s  scheme did not prove successful. With a work 
force of nearly 4,500 workers on the shop floor and an increase in the 
scale of business, an improvement in management techniques was 
clearly required. In addition, the work force had been reduced from 
5,500 in 1970 to 4,500 in 1980 as a result of technological 
improvements in equipment design.^® The upgrading of production 
techniques at CTML, gave rise to a new class of problems, on how to 
encourage workers to maintain quality production. Nasir Shafi was 
cognisant that a change in techniques was a necessary condition for 
maintaining production quality. Therefore, in 1985 he embarked on 
a tour of Japan with the specific objective of familiarising himself
^^Given in, Arif Rana, Quality Circles at Crescent Textiles, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, LBS case # 03-366-90-
1, p. 8.
^®Interview with Nasir Shafi, 13 December 1991.
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with the management concept of Quality Circles and its two 
components, Quahty Control (QC) and Quality Assurance (QA)/^ 
Quality Circles was a management tool used to monitor and improve 
production operations in an industry. The Japanese style of 
management was to resolve work-related problems by collectively 
applying Quality Circles and implementing them through the mutual 
consent of employer and employee, via a system of Quality Control. 
Imbued with these ideas, Nasir Shafi returned from Japan to 
organise a task force at CTML, to introduce and monitor a Quality 
Circles programme. The leader of the team was Rizwan Ahmed, who 
held a post-graduate degree in Industrial Sociology. With his 
assistance, this concept was implemented at CTML by conducting in­
company lectures provided to the QA and QC coordinators, along 
with the provision of text books on the subject followed by 
presentations. After absorbing the regimen of Quality Circles, the 
coordinators formed their own circles with workers in different 
departments. These were followed by weekly meetings which lasted 
an hour and were followed by identification and resolution of a 
current problem in their division. From the communication channels 
which such methods generated, there also emerged techniques to
Quality Circles, as a management concept was developed in 
Japan in the late 1950s, based on D. McGregor’s Theory Y [the 
behavioral school of management]. Its benefits are best seen 
where the proper management style, especially employee training 
is compatible with its implementation. This debate is in M. 
Robson, Quality Circles in Action^ Gower Publishing Company 
Limited, 1984.
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resolve problems. The suggestions provided by the workers were of
particular value to the decision makers in the departments.
Commenting on decisions taken unilaterally by consensus using the
Quality Circles methodology, Rizwan Ahmed’s view were:
‘Just to have a cup of tea with a senior manager was very 
fulfilling for workers. For them the honour is more important 
than pay. Many of them kept on saying things like ‘We have 
been here for 27 years and nobody ever listened to us...” 
‘Besides we reahsed that contrary to most top managers 
perception the workers were very intelligent. It was 
surprising how well they understood the consequences for 
Pakistani companies of not being able to compete 
internationally. Also being on the shop floor all the time, they 
had practical ideas that proved to be very beneficial’.
The Quality Circles programme improved relations with labour and 
generated a company policy providing them with hfetime 
employment. The improved working conditions which ensued 
coincided with increased productivity at CTML, (see Table 4.2). 
These results also gelled in with the smooth operation of systems 
which ensured that the sub-systems were coordinated with the 
overall company mission (the Systems Approach). Nasir Shafi 
attributed the continued success of CTML to encouraging the 
‘generation of ideas fi'om below to the top’.®^ In effect, the QC 
programme at CTML incorporated the methodology used in the 
Systems Approach, which defines the boundaries of the objectives at 
hand, identifies the surrounding physical, financial and time
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constraints, and provides the alternatives which can eliminate them, 
through the performance of tasks. These tasks were in themselves 
a research model which identified relationships within the system 
which affected performance in accordance its own criteria. The QC 
exercise used brainstorming techniques to identify problems, in a 
similar manner as that prescribed by the system designers, identified 
in the Systems Approach section in Chapter One. The latter 
evaluate options at every successive step in the Systems Approach 
which includes the redefinition of the company mission at different 
levels of decision-making. By adopting QC at CTML, the older order 
(traditional approach) of production management was challenged and 
replaced with a new order focusing on qualitative excellence. 
Qualitative excellence is the synthesis of training of personnel for 
improved documentation, installation, programming and testing of 
information.
The new management programme at CTML also had a profound 
effect on the financial future of the company. The management team 
which comprised MBA graduates and textile, mechanical, electrical, 
industrial and civil engineers, provided a generahsed and holistic 
view of tackling production and managerial problems.®^ By 1988, 
CTML was exporting its entire production range and executed 
production from 90,000 spindles.^ The company records of CTML
Interview with Nasir Shafi, 13 December 1991.
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reveal that prior to the implementation of QC, the organisational 
chart was line-oriented with the cloth finishing, mechanical and 
electrical engineering and civil works managers reporting to the 
technical manager. After adopting QC at CTML, the organisational 
chart became functional with managers responsible for both line and 
staff functions, and all of whom ultimately reported to Nasir Shafi.®  ^
The technical, finance and operations functional managers were from 
the Crescent Group,^ but this did not deter CTML’s management 
from introducing new management techniques to upgrade its 
production frontiers. The other managers were non-group employees.
The company records also show a systematic record of provision of 
benefits to skilled employees such as old age pensions, annual 
bonuses equalhng five months’ annual [basic] salary and five percent 
of total profits redistributed to the workers, with an annual provision 
of five kilograms of cotton yarn and 40 meters of cloth.®® In thé 
executive cadre, approximately three employees were sent away 
every month on training courses in finance and management.®^ In 
addition, the workforce benefitted from loans provided by the
®%ee Arif Rana, Quality Circles at Crescent Textiles, Lahore 
University of Management Sciences, 1990, LBS case # 03-366-90-1, 
Exhibits 5 and 6, pp. 20-21.
®®lnterview with Nasir Shafi, 13 December 1991.
®®See, ‘The Crescent Textile Mills Limited’, unpublished 
document. Corporate Office, 1990, p. 7.
®%(Z., p. 24.
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company for the purchase of a car, motorcycle, cycle or furniture. 
The management also awarded scholarships for the education of the 
workers’ children.
Nasir Shafi had also developed an organisational structure for 
CTML. The general managers of finance, works, management and 
production operations reported directly to him. In turn these 
department heads managed eighty employees.^ The ‘Minutes of 
Meeting of the Operations Department’ focus on specific issues which 
arose in the daily execution of the mill’s activities.
CTML’s exports increased as a result of the Zia regime’s fiscal and 
monetary measures. The contributory factors were the depreciation 
of the Rupee and availability of cotton yam  at cheap r a t e s . T h e  
company maximised the benefits fi'om the exogenous environment hy 
complementing it with endogenously generated measures. The 
combination of these two factors, along with CTML’s largely export- 
oriented sales, led to an increase in its gross profits by 25 percent per 
annum since 1984.®^  Since 1986, and for three consecutive years 
thereafter, it was awarded the Export Trophy for the leading
®®Given in, CTML’s, unpublished company documents.
®^ See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Operations Department’, 
CTML, 29 November 1990, p. 2 and 22 June 1991, p. 3.
®°In 1982, the Pakistani Rupee was delinked fi^om the US 
Dollar, leading to a 25 percent devaluation by 1983. Its effects are 
discussed in D. Eglin, ‘The Economy’, in R. Nyrop (ed.), Pakistan, 
a Country Study, United States Government, 1983, p. 176.
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exporting firm in cotton exports in Pakistan.®^ In 1987, its total 
sales were Rs 886 million, which in 1988 increased to Rs 1131 million 
or 10 percent of the group’s total annual turnover. The following 
table provides CTML’s pre-tax profits and (losses):
Table 4.2 
Crescent Textile Mills Limited 
Rs (millions)
Year Pre-tax Profits
1973 25
1974 9
1975 7
1976 6
1977 8
1978 9
1979 13
1980 17
1981 15
1982 16
1983 31
1984 40
1985 50
1986 70
1987 180
1988 260
Source: Unpublished In-company document, ‘The Crescent Textile 
Mills Limited’, p. 9 and CTML, Annual Reports, 1975-89.
The above figures are the financial results of the emphasis given 
to systems and training, in employing effective management 
techniques at CTML reflected in its [improved] results in 
productivity, employee morale and in company profits, especially 
after 1985, when Nasir Shafi returned from Japan and initiated the
^^Recorded the document, ‘Crescent Textile Mills Limited’, 
unpublished document. Corporate Office, 1990, p. 10.
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QC programme at CTML. The impetus for introducing this 
programme came from his predecessors’ enthusiasm for rewarding 
employee performance, which ultimately contributed to the company’s 
expansion (on a rising scale of magnitude), over the long-term.
4.3.3 Shakarganj Mills Limited (SML)
Shakarganj Mills Limited was established in 1967, governed by a 
management agency agreement with MAMBL. The agreement 
affirmed the agents’ representation and promotion of SML’s interests 
till 1977.®^  The machinery for sugar and distillate production at 
SML was acquired in 1974 from a Dutch company, Starkvorkspur. 
The machines provided a daily sugar cane crushing capacity of 1,500- 
2,000 tons of crushed cane.®  ^ By the 1980s, SML contributed to ten 
percent of Crescent Group’s turnover. Its principal activity was the 
manufacture and sale of sugar and distillate (industrial alcohol). 
Altaf Saleem was the chief executive officer of the Company, recorded 
in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML.®®
®®See the ‘Managing Agency Agreement’ signed by 
representatives of MAMBL and SML, 1967.
®^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
®®See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 18 
January 1974 and 11 November 1978, whereby Altaf Saleem was 
appointed SML’s chief executive officer. He was given this 
authority by the directors of the company, to sign, authorise, 
execute and deliver all company documents, such as bonds, 
promissory notes, letters of credit, trust receipt forms, application 
forms, letters of hypothecation, presenting the memorandums of 
deposit of the title and mortgage deeds to the Registrar, joint stock 
companies, accepting bills drawn on the company, securing 
payments, loans, overdrafts and honouring all liabilities of the
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The company’s share-holders were joint stock companies which 
owned 46.09 percent of the shares in SML. Financial institutions, of 
which PICIC had the largest share, owned 22.63 percent, investment 
companies a further 10.01 percent, 15 percent was held hy family 
members, 5 percent by the NIT, and the remainder by the non­
institution ‘pubhc’.®® The family’s control over SML’s share holdings 
was evident from the 15 percent owned by family individuals and a 
further 46.09 percent owned by joint stock companies, all of which 
were Crescent Group companies.®^
Altaf Saleem’s foresight in keeping abreast of computerised records 
at SML led to his appointing a computer advisory service in 1976, to 
process a report on automation in the sugar industry. The 
consultancy assignment was awarded to United Bank Limited’s 
computer division. They monitored the generation of reports on cane 
purchase, the accounts payable to cane growers and accounts 
receivable from them. These results were assembled for each 
transaction, and copies were distributed to all relevant parties as
company. These powers assigned to Altaf Saleem were updated in 
1974 when his duties were extended to include the signing and 
execution of all mercantile documents, production reports, excise, 
taxation documents, and import licences, updated in the ‘Minutes 
of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 16 March 1974.
®®See N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), BukharVs 101, Khadim Ali Shah 
Bukhari and Company, 1991, page code, 101220, for the 
shareholdings of SML.
®^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
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required.®® This system speeded up the payments to growers and 
provided a computerised record of loan recoveries from farmers.
In 1981, Altaf Saleem developed a computerised accounting and 
spare parts inventory system.®® Owing to technical drawbacks in 
choosing software, this scheme was postponed till 1985. In 1985, 
Systems Limited was contacted to develop a computerisation strategy 
for SML. [Systems Limited was the software development marketing 
concern, established in 1977 by Babar Ali of the Ali Group along vdth 
another partner]. The consultants at Systems Limited identified the 
cane procurement, accounting and inventory accounting systems at 
SML as those which should be prioritised for computerisation.^®® 
In 1987, upon their recommendation, SML purchased two IBM S/36 
mainframe computers. The new system enabled the input/output 
computerisation of inventory records, particularly those pertaining to 
the finance, control and accounting departments The reports 
generated a summary of information required by the senior 
management to gauge performance in the SML’s respective 
departments.
In 1988, further improvements were made on replacing manually 
operated systems in the materials management section of the
®®Source: Arif Rana, Information Systems at Shakarganj, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, LBS case # 18-036-89- 
1, p. 5.
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company, with computerised records of transactions. In the 
manually operated system, the cane growers arrived at the factory 
premises and obtained an entry slip after verification that their 
arrival was as scheduled. This was followed hy a weighbridge which 
weighing the trolley with its enclosed cane. Upon confirmation of the 
weight, the farmer was presented with a second receipt which was 
his payment guarantee, honoured by the bank. Upon the farmer’s 
departure fi*om the factory premises, the trolley weight was again 
recorded, and the difference between its in-coming and out-going 
weight was set as the net weight of the cane supplied by the farmer. 
An employee of SML suggested that the weight of cane could be 
automatically recorded in a single transaction by installing a 
personal computer (PC) at the factory gate.^ ®^  This was 
implemented in 1988, and an IBM PC was installed which was linked 
to the mainframe lBM/36 at the finance and control department of 
SML. An additional weighbridge was also installed which eliminated 
the older method for calculating cane weight. The two weighbridges
®^^A definition of ‘business process re-engineering’, a term 
developed in the literature on management by M. Hammer and J. 
Champy, Re-engineering the Corporation, A Manifesto for Business 
Revolution, Nicholas Brealey, 1993, states that multiple business 
transactions can be combined into a single [more efficient] 
transaction. This proposal is not an original idea developed by 
them, since this concept was already proposed in the Systems 
Approach methodology, where transactions which have outlived 
their usefulness are either replaced or eliminated to meet with 
changing conditions when businesses expand. At Shakarganj Mills 
Limited, the management had proposed to reduce the time spent 
in weighing in-coming cane, by installing a computer which 
combined more than one [previously] designed transactions.
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would automatically feed the in-coming and out-going trolley weight 
into the PC, which was immediately verified for schedule and 
quantity of cane supplied by the farmer. A printed receipt of goods 
delivered was then presented to the f a r m e r . T h i s  new system 
reduced the dependence on manual systems of control where the 
chance of human error was greater. The computerised system made 
this particular transaction one that was more efficiently executed at 
SML, which was commensurate with the methodology of the Systems 
Approach where older methods are replaced by new ones to meet 
with the changing business conditions.
The management at SML also complemented their computerisation 
measures with the promotion of research and development. A Cane 
Research Institute (CRl) was formed by Altaf Saleem in 1983. °^  ^
It was located adjacent to the sugar f a c t o r y . A l t a f  Saleem’s 
vision for the CRl was to establish a piivate-sector facility for 
research in sugar te ch n o lo g y .In itia lly , this institute acquired 
sugar cane seeds from abroad, which were then tested locally for
^^^Source: Arif Rana, Information Systems at Shakarganj, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, LBS case # 18-036-89-
1, p. 10.
^^^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
io4rphis institute was renamed by Altaf Saleem as the 
Shakarganj Sugar Research Institute in 1984, recorded in the 
‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 23 February 
1984.
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their growth rate. The sugar cane output was then used for 
demonstrating to the farmers the results which could be duplicated 
on their land. A new seed variety, named F-162 was also developed 
by Professor Qureshi who was a resident scientist a t the CR1.^ °^  
The new variety won recognition from local sugar cane growers as to 
its superior cane quality. The benefits of this recognition for the 
company were two-fold. Firstly, the sugar cane growers were a 
captive market for the seeds produced at the CRl. Secondly, the 
farmers, in turn provided SML with the raw material required for 
processing sugar cane to make sugar. Financial assistance was also 
provided to farmers by SML acting as the guarantor of farmers’ loans 
obtained from the banks. The mutually cordial relations between the 
two parties benefitted SML in obtaining an uninterrupted supply of 
sugar cane from the farmers. Sugar cane was a seasonal crop and 
the factory remained operational only during the cane season. 
Therefore any interruption in the production process adversely 
affected the company’s profitability for the year. This delicate 
situation called for SML’s management to maintain cordial relations 
with the farmers, which it achieved through the process described 
above. In 1984, the directors of the company arranged facilities for 
the extension of loans by the Agricultural Development Bank of
^^^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
^^^Letter from Mian Javed Shafi, of Ittefaq Sugar Mills to Altaf 
Saleem, no ISML/RD/S-1/1744, 1 January 1988.
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Pakistan to sugar cane growers. These loans were extended against 
hypothecation (mortgage) of the sugar cane crop intended for sale to 
SML. To expedite loan disbursements to the farmers, SML’s 
management appointed a representative from their staff to negotiate 
with and represent the farmers’ interests to the bank.^^® The 
management’s foresight in assisting the farmers, by enabling them 
to access sources of institutional credit used for growing the sugar 
cane crop, paid SML dividends in an assured supply of the raw 
material and a reduction in wastage from cane processing 
d o w n t i m e . T h i s  was a critical factor in the production of an 
agricultural raw material, which was subject to constraints such as 
the vicissitudes and uncertainties of weather conditions and seasonal 
demand, the ability of the farmer to honour creditors on time and the 
government’s price ceilings on sale of primary commodities to 
manufacturers, dealers and the distributors. Professor Qureshi was 
the leader of a team whose primary objective was to invent new seed 
varieties by improving the size and quality of existing sugar cane 
seed, which were later sold to the farmers. This backward 
integration in sugar production, directly benefitted SML’s quahty of 
sugar produced. The CRl team pioneered superior methods of sugar 
cane recovery in Pakistan, through the introduction of new seed
^^%ee, ‘Shakarganj Mills Limited, Resolution by Circulation’, 
unpublished company document, signed by the director 
Muhammad Javed Amin, 24 September 1984.
lo^When the production facility was closed for maintenance.
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varieties developed in its laboratories.
Specialisation in sugar cane production was also supported by an
agricultural department at SML, which provided support facilities to
farmers who grew sugar cane. These facilities included the provision
of technical and financial assistance, the procurement of fertihser
and pesticides, operating a model farm for experiments on improving
seed varieties, estimating crop yields and acreage through field
surveys and assessing projected cane procurement capacity from the
crop y i e l d s . T h e  CRl was the only centre of its nature in the
country and received considerable praise from local sugar cane
farmers whose results spoke for themselves. A typical letter to Altaf
Saleem from a sugar mill manager read as follows:
T congratulate you and your team for the excellent work being 
done at your Cane Research Centre....you have developed a 
very good variety namely SPSG-26 which we also want to 
introduce and propagate among the progressive growers of our 
Gate area. .. Please make available one truck load of seed’.^ “
Such feedback was testimony given by the farmers to the growing 
success of the seed varieties nurtured a t the CRl. This centre also 
published a quarterly journal, called the Pakistan Sugar Journal, 
sponsored by Altaf Saleem in 1988, which provided an update on the 
government’s sugar policy and statistics of crushed cane in the
“ ®Given in, Arif Rana, Information Systems A t Shakarganj, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, LBS case # 18-036-89- 
1, 1989, p. 4.
^^^Letter from Mian Javed Shafi, of Ittefaq Sugar Mills to Altaf 
Saleem, no ISML/RD/S-1/1744, 1 January 1992.
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country.
Altaf Saleem influenced and operated the daily, routinised 
reporting system at SML. He took decisions based on daily feedback 
provided by the company’s departments. This was evident flrom the 
SML Board minutes, where be indicated bis concern for changes in 
SML’s profitabibty from the increased outlay from excise duty 
payments and bow the management could contribute their 
suggestions for reducing it.“  ^ Other issues raised in the Board 
minutes included the appointment of an independent valuer for the 
company’s plant, building and machinery and the upsurge in its stock 
price derived from regular dividend payments.
As the spokesman for the Sugar Manufacturers Association, and 
through bis representation on other panels, Altaf Saleem was able to 
address the government policy on issues, such as the excise duty 
exemption for stigar manufacturers based on sugar production 
capacity.^^^ In 1988, this association was successful in making the 
government exempt excise duty on the amount of sugar produced 
above the average production of a unit, calculated on the basis of its
^^^be ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML,
23 February 1984.
21 February 1985, gives the rate of exemption of excise 
duty on SML’s sugar output; also see, Pakistan Sugar Mills 
Association, Annual Report 1986-87, p. 1, which identifies Altaf 
Saleem on its executive committee and as vice-chairman of the 
association. This source also shows a decrease in the rate of excise 
duty paid by sugar manufacturers in 1988 over the previous year.
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production over the previous three years/^^ The duty exemption 
incentive was applicable to all sugar manufacturers and was 
designed to increase sugar production.
Management decisions initiated by Altaf Saleem also led to 
intermittent investments in a ‘Balancing Modernisation and 
Replacement’ (BMR) exercise to upgrade the machines’ cane crushing 
capacity. In 1985, an application for a cash facility was presented to 
the Alhed Bank of Pakistan Limited to extend finance to SML, under 
their BMR scheme. In 1987, Rs 8 million was allocated to SML’s 
annual budget for BMR expenditure on rollers, screens, a pressure 
filter, seven pumps, enhancing the boiler’s steam emission efficiency, 
a juice heater for energy conservation and computerised equipment 
for the laboratories.^^® In 1988, an additional Rs 300 million was 
spent on BMR of the plant which increased SML’s production 
capacity by a further 30 percent, to 60,000 tons of sugar and 40,000 
litres of alcohol per day.“ ® Another Rs 40.45 million was expended 
on improving the production capacity of the automated sugar plant. 
In 1988, a report was submitted to PICIC and the National 
Investment Trust (NIT) for provision of loan facilities to implement 
techniques for automation, tools, testing equipment, weighbridges.
“ ^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
^^ ®This is recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of 
Directors’ of SML, 22 February 1987, pp. 6-7.
, 21 February 1985, p. 3.
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cane preparation and milling equipment, a process house, spray 
pond, turbo alternators, and for housing and office buildings/^^ 
SML employed 1100 staff in 1974, who were reduced to 750 by 
1988; 450 of whom were permanent and 300 were seasonally 
employed workers, recruited during the sugar cane crushing season. 
Altaf Saleem accounted for this reduction in the work force, to the 
updating of automotive production processing of the plant design at 
SML.^ ^® The management complemented the reduction in the 
workforce by improving techniques to operate the storage tank and 
boilers at the factory. Its manually controlled levers were replaced 
by automated controls in 1988.“  ^ SML’s employees also were 
encouraged by the management to make on-the-job innovations. In 
1986, after 19 years in the sugar business, SML’s staff designed an 
evaporator with 70,000 square feet of heating surface at a cost of Rs 
20 million. The technical innovations at SML were 
complemented by systematic documentation of records which offer 
testimony to SML’s rapid expansion. The following table provides a 
ten year summary of pre-tax profits and (losses) at SML:
29 February 1988, p. 8.
^^®Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
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Table 4.3
Shakarganj Mills Limited 
(Rs millions)
Year Pre-tax Profits 
& (Losses)
1979 (12.5)
1980 (15.3)
1981 21.7
1982 45.3
1983 38.3
1984 31.0
1985 32.1
1986 23.1
1987 7.9
1988 106.4
Source: SML, Annual Reports, 1980-89.
The steady increase in profits suffered a setback in 1984, owing to 
a sudden surge in payment of excise duty to the government; in 1986- 
87, the fall in profits was caused by disputes between management 
and the workers at SML, over the payment of additional 
bonuses.
SML’s strategy of quality control for input and output was 
emulated by other companies in the group. SML was also seen to 
have introduced a Quality Circles and Quality Assurance (QC & QA), 
programme for cost and performance accountability in the 
departments. A summary of procedure manuals developed by 
Ferguson, the consultants for SML is as follows (Table 4.4):
^Discussed in Zafar Qureshi, Shakarganj Mills Limited- 
Workefs Strike (A), Lahore University of Management Sciences, 
LBS case # 05-273-89-1, p. 4.
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Table 4.4
Software Applications and Information Systems at SML
Cane Accounting System 
Grower’s Ledger 
Payment Log 
Production Planning and Control Manual 
Cane Procurement Scheduling System 
Suppliers Selection 
Purchase Ordering 
Import Licenses 
Marine Insurance 
Letters of Credit 
Expediting Export Orders 
Clearance of Goods 
Clearing Agent’s Bill 
Excess Duty Claims 
Receipt of Materials 
Inspection of Materials 
Inventory Accounting and Control System 
Interface with Accounting 
Updated record of each inventory item 
Computer Ledger Account of each dealer 
Corporate Planning and Budgetary Control Manual 
Payslips and Payroll Statistics 
Wages and Salaries 
Administration and Personnel 
Agriculture 
Operations
Finance and Accounts 
Engineering Support Services 
Materials Management 
Marketing and Sales 
General Ledger Accounting
Accounting Reports on data base structure, and 
classification of expenses and accounting 
responsibility, cost centre codes, analysis of fixed 
expenses and subsidiary ledgers 
Periodical Trial Balance 
Financial Statements 
Source: SML, company manuals, [available with the author], on QC 
& QA; ‘Corporate Planning and Budgetary Control Manual’; 
‘Production Planning and Control Manual’, Vol. 1; Cane Procurement 
Manual’, Vol. 2; ‘Materials Management Manual’; ‘Finance and 
Accounts Manual’, Vol 1; ‘Chart of Accounts’, Vol. 2; ‘Accounting 
Procedures’, Vol. 3; ‘Costing’, Vol. 4 and Treasury Management 
Manual.
309
The production department and the quality control manuals 
identified the allocation of costs by their centre of origin/^^ Such 
documentation of procedures by their departments ensured that the 
senior management’s potential to allocate responsibility to 
individuals for their actions was better organised. This system of 
accountability led to information generation a t SML, which was an 
indispensable tool for senior management in making effective 
decisions. The accountability process uncovered the performance of 
less efficient departments, which could have remained camouflaged 
by the better performance of the more efficient ones. SML’s business 
philosophy was also in harmony with the group’s overall strategy, in 
the systems adopted to monitor departmental performance and in 
making the publicly quoted companies responsible, not only for their 
own performance but in also nurturing private limited subsidiaries; 
the latter category included Crescent Business Management (Pvt) 
Limited and World Class Textiles (Pvt) Limited, which were 
subsidiaries of SML.^^^
^^ ^By adopting an information generation and retreival system 
of allocating costs to their centre of origin within SML, Altaf 
Saleem showed initiative in an industry where SML had a sizable 
niche in the Punjab [and aggregate] sugar market. The debate on 
the costs and benefits of adopting cost accounting procedures for 
small and large-scale manufacturers are given in, H. Johnson and 
R. Kaplan, Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management 
Accounting, Harvard, 1987, [especially chapter six].
^^^Given in, N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), BukharVs 101, Khadim 
Ali Shah Bukhari and Company Limited, 1991, page code, 101220.
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4.3.4 Crescent Steel and Allied Products Limited (CSAPL)
CSAPL established in 1983 and was the group’s venture in light 
engineering manufacturing. In 1985, Altaf Saleem’s brother, Ahsan 
Saleem was appointed its chief executive officer by the Crescent 
G r o u p . C S A P L  produced large diameter steel pipes^ ^® using 
hot rolled coils as the raw materiaP^® and were purchased from the 
only facility using them, the Pakistan Steel Mill. Therefore, CSAPL 
was a downstream industry of the Pakistan Steel Mill’s steel 
production. CSAPL’s initial machinery was imported from Germany; 
the machinery was exempt from incurring import duty, a facihty 
extended hy the Zia regime to industries estabhshed in designated 
tax-free zones.
Since the steel industry was an unconventional area of business, 
CSAPL had to provide its technicians with on-site training. The 
initial installation of its plant was staged in Germany, where the 
German engineers trained three CSAPL’s employees on the 
mechanics of erecting the plant in Pakistan. Once this exercise was
^ '^^Recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of 
Directors’ of CSAPL, 30 January 1985, p. 3.
^^^The pipes ranged in size from 8 inches to 86 inches. Such 
details of size and specifications are available in an in-company 
document, CSAPL, ‘Technical Data’, unpubhshed company 
document, pp. 10-11.
^^^Interview with Ahsan Saleem, 12 March 1992 in Karachi; 
Ibid, p. 1. See Appendix A.
^^^Interview with Ahsan Saleem, 12 March 1992.
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completed in Germany, the plant was dismantled and shipped to 
Karachi where the same team of engineers supervised its 
installation.^^®
The overall group strategy of quality control and monitoring of 
performance was emulated by Ahsan Saleem of CSAPL. The 
operations of CSAPL incorporated a system of Quahty Control and 
Quality Assurance. By 1988, 43 reports on QC & QA were generated 
from the personnel and production departments. These reports 
enabled management to exercise more effective control over and 
monitor costs and departmental performance.^^® Technology 
adoption was inherent in the procedures for quality maintenance 
used for the non destructive testing of pipes. This involved 
electronically testing the pipes, then subjecting them to an X-Ray, 
then hydraulically testing them at 150 percent of the test pressure 
and at 200 percent of the design pressure, and finally the pipés were 
ready for welding.^ ®® Ahsan Saleem claimed that, ‘The pipes 
produced in this factory are better than any in the world, by 50 
percent’. C S A P L  had the distinction of being awarded the API 
logo, an award of international recognition of quality production of
^^ ®See Cresbank company documents on QC & QA.
^®®Interview with Ahsan Saleem, 12 March 1992.
Ahsan’s claim could not be substantiated owing to the 
global gauge of performance which is necessitated in order to
verify it.
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Steel pipes
On training manpower located at the factory premises, CSAPL’s 
management developed a specific programme owing to the 
unconventional nature of the b u s i n e s s A h s a n  Saleem 
commented:
‘The plant was purchased in Germany and also erected there 
for a trial run there, and two or three boys were sent and they 
dismantled the plant and brought it over to Pakistan. Then 
these three engineers went to UK for training on running the 
plant’.'""
By 1988, CSAPL’s annual turnover was 25,000 tons of steel pipes. 
This investment in steel, represented a landmark for the group in 
making a sustained transition from trading in the 1950s to 
processing steel (light engineering) by 1983.
4.4 External Relations
The Crescent Group produced and marketed Pakistan’s key 
products, such as, sugar, vegetable ghee, cotton, wool and jute 
textiles in the manufacturing sector, and extended banking, leasing 
and general insurance facilities in the service sector. This group’s 
political affiliations were limited, however Muhammad Amin and his 
brothers became members of the Muslim League and the Legislative
also see unpublished in-company document, ‘Crescent 
Steel and Allied Industries Limited’, p. 8, where it is maintained 
that the API, in recognition of CSAPL’s steel quality, had 
permitted it to use the API monogram engraving on the steel pipes 
produced at CSAPL.
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Assembly in Pakistan/^® That was all. This group initially gained 
much economically through State patronage because it was the main 
beneficiary of PICIC loans in 1958-70. However political influence 
was limited.
The group’s net manufacturing assets were valued at Rs 100 
million in 1952^ ^® which increased to Rs 4,217 million by 1988. 
This group was ranked in the first ten measured by ten companies’ 
asset value firom 1968 to 1988. In 1968, it was the fourth largest 
group in terms of the net asset value and by 1974 it had become the 
second largest, a position which it maintained up to 1988.^^  ^ The 
following table confirms that the extent of State patronage was 
minimal in explaining the increase in the group’s portfolio, rather 
there were other [internal] organisational factors which were became 
increasing responsible for explaining this expansion in the long-term:
^^ ^See Z. Zaidi, ‘Aspects of the Development of the Muslim 
League Policy 1937-47’, in C. Philhps and M. Wainwright, (eds.). 
The Partition of India, Allen and Unwin, 1970, p. 253. The 
Muslim League was a political party which played a prominent 
role in realising the demand for the creation of Pakistan, [from the 
British, and later the Hindus in India].
^^®Calculated from the Crescent Group’s unpubhshed company 
documents which were prepared in 1952.
^^ ^See, L.J. White, Industrial Concentration and Economic 
Power, Princeton, 1974, pp. 60-61 and H. Haqqani, ‘Pakistan’s Top 
22 Find New Challengers’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 May 
1986, pp. 74-78.
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Table 4.5
Crescent Group Net Assets 
(Publicly and Privately Quoted Companies) 
(Rs millions)
1952 1968 1974 1985 1988
100 200(9)' 201.7(2) 435.9(3) 4,217(2)
+100% - +116% +867 %
'Numbers in parenthesis show the position of this group.
Source: For public limited companies: Crescent group, Balance 
Sheets; N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), BukharVs 101, Khadim Ah Shah 
Bukhari and Company Limited, 1991; H. Haqqani, ‘Pakistan’s 
Top 22 Face New Challenges’, Far Eastern Economic Review,
22 May 1986, p. 77 and L. White, Industrial Concentration and 
Economic Power, Princeton, 1974, p. 60 and for private hmited 
companies, ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’, and 
internal correspondence of various Crescent Group companies.
The above table shows that the group’s equity structure was not 
affected by nationalisation since the net assets in 1968 and 1974 are 
approximately the same. This group did initially access a large 
portion of PlClC’s credit, to finance its assets. However, upon closer 
examination of the evidence, the members of this group replaced 
State largesse with internally generated wealth creation made 
possible for organisational capability. The Crescent Group’s interplay 
with the bureaucracy in the initial years of its growth is evident in 
one area. Muhammad Bashir was on the Board of Directors of the 
National Steel of Pakistan Limited (NSPL), the enterprise operating 
the first and only steel mill in the country. This organisation was a
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consortium formed with the capital contributions of key industrialists 
along with the State’s s h a r e M u h a m m a d  Bashir was one of 
seven other NSPL directors, the others were also key business 
personahties/^^ The other industrialists were Ghulam Faruque 
(Ghulam Faruque Group), Wajid Ali (Ah Group) Ahmed Dawood 
(Dawood Group), A.W. Adamjee (Adamjee Group), Hamid Habib 
(Habib Group), Rafique Saigol (Saigol Group) and M.A. Rangoonwala, 
a leading businessman.^'^® Based on their founder’s experience with 
managing the affairs of the Pakistan Steel Mill, the Crescent Group 
benefitted and formed forward linkages by forming CSAPL in 1983. 
CSAPL had 20 percent of its equity contributed by a government 
financial institution, the National Development Finance Corporation 
(NDFC), which was formed to finance large-scale industry based in 
the private-sector.^^^ NDFC could influence the suitability in terms 
of selection and size of new, [large-scale industry proposals] 
presented to them by industrial entrepreneurs for financing.
^^%ee ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of 
National Steel Mills Pakistan Limited, 7 July 1965, p. 1.
[lists the names of these industrialists].
11 February 1966, p. 1., gives a list of NSPL directors.
^^ ^The NDFC was established under the National Development 
Finance Corporation Act, 1973, [Act No. XIII of 1973], as a wholly 
owned government financial institution.
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This group did initially benefit fi*om its links with the PIDC, NIT 
and PICIC/^^ fi*om which it derived considerable financial benefits. 
We will first discuss its links with the PIDC, then go on to uncover 
those it had with the NIT and PICIC. In 1959, Muhammad Amin 
was the beneficiary of PIDC’s divestiture of a sugar mill, CSMDL. 
This was the first private-sector sugar mill estabhshed in the Punjab 
province. Private-sector companies did not voluntarily invest in 
sugar mills, since it required a heavy capital outlay. The PIDC- 
established sugar mül was an attractive investment acquired by the 
group since its initial overhead costs, such as the investment made 
in its infrastructure, that is road access, machinery, electricity and 
workforce requirements was met by the PIDC. Altaf Saleem’s 
comment on CSMDL’s acquisition was that it was, ‘No real 
disinvestment by PIDC, because Crescent set it up instead of 
PIDC’.^ ^^  Altaf was referring to the group’s equity contributed to 
CSMDL and not to the heavy capital expenditure incurred by the 
PIDC in establishing this mill. In 1962, the PIDC invested in a jute 
mill, CJPL. PIDC’s equity in the mill was Rs 7 million and a further 
Rs 15.50 million was contributed by the Crescent G r o u p . I n
^^^PIClC’s financial contribution in assisting SML’s new 
investments was acknowledged by Altaf Saleem in an interview, 
12 December 1991.
^^^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
^^^Given in, PIDC, ‘Development Programme of the PIDC’, 
unpublished report, PIDC, December 1989, Annexure II, p. 65.
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1965, CJPL was sold by the PIDC to the Crescent Group for Rs 20 
million, or at less than the historical value of its financial assets 
Therefore, the sale was made at the nominal price of the investment 
made by the PIDC. The mill was acquired by the group from its 
profits made in jute manufacturing,^'^® through Ayub’s bonus 
voucher scheme introduced in the early 1 9 6 0 s . T h e r e f o r e  this 
group also benefitted from Ayub's economic policies. In 1965, the 
PIDC sold four projects for Rs 56 milhon and the sale of CJPL 
represented 36 percent of all PIDC divestitures by value, in that 
year.^ ^® The reason why this group had contributed to CJPL’s 
equity while it was owned by the PIDC, was that by 1962 the PIDC 
was running a number of units at a loss.^ '*® Therefore, in the larger 
interests of continuing with its agenda of promoting industrial 
development, the PIDC began accepting equity contributions firom the 
private-sector to finance its on-gOing projects. This was On the
p. 78.
^^ ®For the high rates of profits made through jute sales in 1958, 
compared with the relatively lower returns from cotton, sugar and 
cement sales, see G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 
1967, p. 99.
^^^Interview with Nasir Shafi, 13 December 1991; also see pp. 
78-84, on the bonus voucher scheme and its financial appeal to 
private-sector industrialists. The mechanics of the bonus voucher 
scheme are given in O. Noman, The Political Economy of Pakistan 
1947-85, Routledge, 1988, p. 38.
^^ ®Given in, PIDC, ‘Development Programme of the PIDC’, 
PIDC, unpublished report, December 1989, pp. 77-78.
^^nhid. p. 23.
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understanding that the PIDC projects partially financed by the 
private-sector would also be purchased by the latter.^ ®® The 
Crescent Group contributed to CJPL’s equity and participated in its 
management while it was under PIDC’s ownership. The project’s 
divestiture in favour of the group in 1965 showed that PIDC’s 
strategy had been successfully implemented.
The NIT was another financial institution which was obligated by 
law to invest in the shares of business groups. Reciprocally, these 
groups had to invest in NIT shares. In 1968, NlT’s portfolio was Rs 
143 million, of which Rs 94 million or 60 percent was invested in 
private c a p i t a l . T w e n t y  percent of all private capital was owned 
by our five business groups, of which Crescent represented three 
percent (of the twenty percent). Conversely, the Crescent Group 
owned Rs 4.7 milhon or 3 percent of NlT’s shares. By 1970, 
Crescent’s investment in NIT shares reduced to 1.81 percent of NlT’s 
portfolio. The following table shows Crescent investment in NIT and 
ICP shares:
pp. 23-24.
^^^Given in, L.J. White, Industrial Concentration and Economic 
Power in Pakistan, Princeton, 1974, p. 157.
^^Hbid.
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Table 4.6
Crescent Group’s Share in Shares of 
NIT I.C.P
% %
1968 3
1970 1.81 0.6
Source: National Investment (Unit) Trust, Director’s Report 
and Statement of Accounts; NIT, Annual Report, 1 July 1969 - 
30 June 1970, Karachi and Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan, Annual Report, Karachi, 1970.
Wherever NIT directors were also the owners of business groups, 
they could influence NlT’s investments in favour of their own 
businesses. The NIT was also the government’s voice in monitoring 
the business group’s organisational performance. The NIT enforced 
the government’s stipulation on appointment of company directors 
and the percentage of shares that could be owned by subsidiary 
companies in other companies of the group. Even though NIT 
investments were skewed in favour of business houses as a whole, 
they were not heavily concentrated in the assets of the Crescent 
Group. To this extent, this group as a beneficiary of State largesse 
through NlT’s patronage was low key. The following table provides 
the equity contributed by financial institutions to SML in 1971-74:
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Table 4.7
Equity Participation in  
SML 
1971-74
Shareholders Rs (miUions) %
Financial
Institution
PICIC 31.50' 22.63
ICP 8.52^ 10.01
NIT 1.50 4.71
Joint Stock Cos.
of the Crescent Group 46.09
Premier Insurance 0.93
Family members 15.00
Others 0.63
Source:^ For 1971 figures see ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of 
Directors’ of SML, 27 February 1971, p. 2; [for 1973 figures], see the 
Minutes of 16 November 1973, p. 1.
 ^ICP was the Investment Corporation of Pakistan which contributed 
to right share issues of SML, on 19 August 1971 and 8 March 1972. 
See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, of 27 
February 1971 and 16 November 1973.
N. Husnain, et aZ,(eds.), BuhkarVs 101, Khadim Ah Shah Bukhari 
and Company Limited, 1991.
The largest contributors to SML’s equity were from the sister
concerns of SML and that contributed by P I C I C . T h e  Crescent
family’s control in SML’s decision making was apparent from the
majority shares held by other Crescent companies or those directly
owned by Crescent family members in SML’s equity. The PICIC was
established in 1957, to disburse loans to and contribute to the equity
of business house investment, in order to promote new enterprise.
Its policy was partial towards lending foreign exchange to a selected
^%ee ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 6 
March 1972.
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and known group of industrialists, for those industries which had 
more predictable levels of profit returns, such as those in textiles, 
food and sugar manufacturing/®'^ Crescent had a family member, 
Zahid Faruque as one of PIClC’s 25 directors, a position held by him 
from 1972 to 1988/®® The appeal for businessmen in acquiring 
PICIC foreign currency loans was that they were extended at the 
official (and cheaper) exchange rate which favourably affected the 
recipient group’s investment portfolio.
From 1960 to 1980, the tempo of industrial investment was 
spurred by monopoly house investments in textiles, paper and sugar 
mills. The Crescent Group had manufacturing investment in all 
three industries. In 1961, the country’s total private industrial 
assets were Rs 6,500 million of which Rs 80.5 million were financed 
by loans provided by the PICIC and Rs 70.5 million were IDBP 
financed loans.^ ®® In 1958-70, of the Rs 911.4 million loans 
extended by PICIC to private industry, 13 percent was extended to 
the Crescent Group. Therefore this group was one of the main 
beneficiaries of this source for credit. The companies in this group
^®%ee G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p.
88, for partiahty in loans extended by PICIC and IDBP to 
industrialists in the 1960s.
^®®Given in, PICIC Annual Reports, 1972-88 and R. Amjad, 
Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960-1970, Cambridge, 
1982, p. 50.
®^®See G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p.
89.
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which were the beneficiaries of PICIC credit were, CTML, CSMDL, 
STML, JSWML, CBL, SML, CJPL, ETML, CSWML, Suraj Cotton 
Mills (Pvt) Limited, Ujala Cotton (Pvt) Limited, Karachi Bulk 
Storage (Pvt) Limited, and Shams Food P r o c e s s i n g . T h e  equity 
contributed by [government-owned] financial institutions in business 
group investment increased under the Presidential Order No. 2 of 
1972. This order was passed by Prime Minister Bhutto, in his 
economic reforms for industry which designated a larger share of the 
State’s involvement and investments in private industrial capital 
investment. State involvement was attended by the abofition of the 
managing agency system and the increased government 
representation on company directorship which were made 
mandatory.^®® This representation enabled this group to access 
even more credit from financial institutions, such as the PICIC 
because under Bhutto’s reforms, financial institution representation 
also increased on the Board of Directors of Crescent companies.
^^^Interview with PICIC’s executive vice president, Abdul Haq, 
2 April 1992, in Lahore. See Appendix A.
^^%ee ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 6 
March 1972, p. 2, where stated that, ‘The chairman informed the 
members that the Managing Agency of Messrs. Mohd. Amin Mohd. 
Bashir stands terminated with effect from 15 January 1972, 
according to the Companies [Managing Agency and Election of 
Directors Order, 1972]’ ’.
^^^ahab-ud-Din Shah, was a nominee from PICIC represented 
on the Board of Directors of SML, as recorded in ‘Minutes of 
Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 18 August 1981, p. 1.
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By 1976, PICIC and IGF ownership of Crescent Group shares rose 
considerably/®® Also the percentage of shares held by the public 
in Crescent companies increased. This group circumvented Bhutto’s 
directive to float further shares to the public by offering them to 
other companies in the group, since the ‘public’ also included other 
companies of the group, the ICP, insurance companies and banks. 
Under Bhutto’s industrial reforms, the number of company directors 
were increased to include representatives from government-owned 
financial institutions.^®^ SML responded by reappointing a family 
member, Haji Muhammad Shafi, a brother of Muhammad Amin of 
MAMBL on its Board of Directors. Nominees of PlClC were also 
represented on its Board. ^ ®^ The SML Board minutes also specified 
conditions set by PIC 1C that SML’s Board of Directors required 
equity contributions from pubhc limited companies; CSMDL’s 
management, being a public subscriber to SML’s shares, agreed to 
extend a bridge financing facility for SML’s expansion programme.
i®OThe increase is documented in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the 
Board of Directors’ of SML, 22 March 1976.
®^^ An example follows of how the government influenced 
Crescent Group businesses, in particular that of SML: Under the 
new Presidential Order 2/72, 1972, [of Bhutto], the ICP as 
shareholder and surveillance arm of the government charged a fee 
of half percent or Rs 10 million from SML, for professional 
assistance and examination of its projects in 1973. This was a 
statutory payment imposed by the government on private-sector 
businesses.
^®%ee ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML 18 
August 1981, indicating PlClC’s representation on the SML’s 
Board of Directors.
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This reinforced the group’s stance (discussed earlier) on adopting a 
policy of nurturing financial support from companies within the 
group. When CSAPL was floated, SML invested Rs 3 million in its 
s h a r e s . B y  1988, PICIC’s nurturing of this group had matured 
when the group formed PILCORP, an industrial leasing company 
floated by the group, which had up to 24 percent of its equity owned 
by PICIC. Therefore from being a financier, PICIC became a major 
shareholder in Crescent investments.^®'^ From 1958 to 1970, the 
Crescent Group’s share in loans extended by PICIC and IDBP to 
them was as follows:
Table 4.8 
Foreign Elxehange Loans Obtained by the Crescent Group 
1958-1970
PICIC % of IDBP % of
Rs millions Total Rs millions Total
117.76 13 0.68 0.2
Total
loans
disbursed 911.43 375.55
Source: R. Amjad, ‘Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960- 
70’, Ph.D thesis. University of Cambridge, 1977, p. 268.
^®®Documented in, ‘Resolution by Circulation’ an unpublished 
document, SML, 22 September 1984, signed by the company 
secretary, Mirza Muhammad Khan and a director, Muhammad 
Javed Amin.
^®^ Given in, N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), BukharVs 101, Khadim 
Ali Shah Bukhari and Company Limited, 1991, page code, 041100.
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From 1969 to 1987, SML received a further Rs 50.5 million in local
currency and US $ 2,00,449 in foreign currency from PICIC as
follows: Table 4.9
Loans received from PICIC by SML 
(Rs millions)
Year PICIC
loans
1969 15
1971 3
1972 3.9
1985 28.6
Total 50.5
Source: For 1969, see ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ 
of SML, 23 June 1969, p. 1.; for 1971 figures see ‘Minutes of Meeting 
of the Board of Director’s of SML, 27 February 1971, p.2.; for 1972, 
recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of 
SML, 22 November 1972, p. 1.; and for 1985, the figures are recorded 
in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 21 
February 1985, pp. 2-3.
So when Altaf Saleem commented that: ‘We have not participated 
in privatisation schemes because of [the] stigma of favouritism’, 
his statement requires qualification, in that the group kept a low 
profile with their political associations but gained leverage by 
influencing PIDC and PICIC policy at a senior level, to provide the 
group with favours from which it initially benefitted. In fact, this 
group by-passed the need to solicit political favours by initially 
appointing family members on PICIC’s Boards of Directors. This 
policy was also gradually replaced by developing its organisational
^^^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
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systems which enabled the group to sustain its rapid transition from 
trade to light engineering manufacturing.
Although the Crescent Group was not the first to set up a textile
mill, it became the largest proponent in textiles. Altaf Saleem’s
views on the relative success of his group was from:
‘Group failure can occur because they [Crescent] are not 
thrown out with individual failure [of businesses]’.^®®
He qualified the above statement, that when other groups wavered 
in their plans to expand from the fear of further nationalisation by 
Bhutto, Crescent persisted in developing its businesses regardless of 
the political and economic climate of the country. This strategy was 
consistently followed even though some of their businesses were 
nationalised by Bhutto in 1972. These were the 12 cotton ginning 
factories, the ‘life insurance’ portion of Premier Insurance Company 
Limited, and their shipping line, M.D. Shams (Pvt) Limited. The 
losses which ensued from nationalisation of its business were 
circumvented by a consistent policy of consolidating the group’s base 
in textiles. The group did not suffer further nationalisation of its 
industry and it continued to invest in textiles in order to finance 
leasing and steel-based manufacturing companies later on through 
the capital accumulated from its pioneering investments.
Commenting on the tapping of sources of finance for floating new 
companies in the group Altaf Saleem commented: ‘Financial
^®®Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
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institutions of Crescent cannot go to the same financial institutions 
for borrowing’/®^  This meant that Crescent companies could not 
borrow fi'om financial-lending companies within the group, [but they 
could raise equity from its sister concerns]. This practice was 
proposed by members of the Crescent Group to discourage any 
misdemeanours from occurring in the form of loan default or loans 
being written off through family consent. Crescent’s management 
philosophy provided it with a cushion against the higher risks which 
accompany rapid portfolio expansion. Its grand strategy directed its 
future investment and PICIC’s continued support of new group 
investment became an incidental factor for enabling group expansion. 
By virtue of its management’s business acumen, it operated in an 
exogenous environment similar to the Ali Group, but responded 
differently in its endogenous strategy, targeted at expansion. In 
expending its resources on addressing internal problems, this group 
maximised its return on business investment with more ease than 
groups which did not adopt internal organisational systems.
Members of this group pride themselves on their leaders’ prudent 
business vision. From the evidence available, it seems that this 
group did benefit fi^om State patronage in its initial years but later 
on, its rapid expansion was a function of managerial capabihty, 
rather than State patronage. This was because Crescent did not 
depend on the government for implementing its expansion in the
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long-term. During Ayub's regime, when other business groups were 
receiving concessions, the Crescent Group also benefitted from factors 
in the exogenous environment, but the consolidation of its business 
was achieved from innovating endogenously developed procedures.
4.5 Management Strategy: Endogenous Systems for Business 
Development
Management practices peculiar to this group enabled it to make 
the transition to light engineering manufacturing. A significant 
factor contributing here was its policy of nurturing subsidiaries in its 
formative years, which were made public upon their reaching 
maturity. The Crescent Group’s management felt that the parent 
company would act as a shock absorber in the event of losses 
occurring in its new companies.^®® On minimising losses associated 
with risk, Altaf Saleem commented that the group, ‘won’t  go into any 
business w^here the goverhmeht is the only buyer’. This 
philosophy bore fniit in the 1980s, when the group’s investment 
matured and it estabhshed its own steel facility. The transition from 
trading to processing steel was bridged from 1951 to 1983.
The policy of nurturing subsidiaries was evident in CTML which 
nurtured JSWML and CSMDL by contributing to their equity as
isspor example, CTML was a textiles manufacturing facility 
and vdthin which new company flotations were registered. There 
were also other textile companies in the group which contributed 
to the equity of newly estabhshed subsidiaries. These textile 
companies were MAMBL, CTML, CSMDL or CJPL.
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private limited concerns, until they became public bmited 
c o m p a n i e s . A l s o ,  Crescent Boards Limited was a subsidiary of 
CSMDL. CJPL nurtured Ujala Cotton Mills (Pvt) Limited and 
Crescent Apparel (Pvt) Limited. All subsidiaries were initially 
formed as private bmited companies wbicb later offered its shares to 
the general p u b l i c . E x a m p l e s  of the bolding company’s financial 
contribution to develop its subsidiaries companies emerged as follows 
when in 1974 CTML invested Rs 4.9 milbon on SML’s building, land, 
vehicle, furniture, electricity, office equipment and bicycles for the 
e m pl oyee s . A ls o  some family members active in the group, were 
present on SML’s Board of Directors; Haji Muhammad Sbafi; Mazbar 
Karim, the son of Muhammad Amin; Zabid and Kbabd Bashir, both 
sons of Muhammad Bashir, and Muhammad Rafi.
Financial support provided to by sister concerns to other companies 
within the group was as follows: In 1972, under Bhutto’s
Presidential Order, SML was required to float a further 8.5 miUion 
shares to the p u b l i c . F r o m  this, 0.15 mibion shares or 1.8
^^%ee pp. 268-80, for when Crescent companies became public 
limited.
^^ ^Tbe decision for the parent company nurturing subsidiaries 
was also recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of 
Directors’ of SML, 6 March 1991.
^^ ^An example of this point is evident in ‘Minutes of Meeting of 
the Board of Directors’ of SML, 18 January 1974, wbicb records 
the appointment of family members on its Board of Directors.
i^See the Presidential Order No: 2/72, 1972, on Bhutto’s 
industrial reforms.
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percent were offered to CSMDL as its public subscriber, 0.25 million 
shares or three percent were purchased by the ICP, 0.02 million or
0.2 percent shares were purchased by United Bank Limited, 0.01 
million shares or 0.1 percent each, were bought by the Eastern 
Federal Union Insurance Company Limited, Commerce Bank 
Limited, New Jubilee Insurance Company Limited, and Muslim 
Insurance Company Limited. Another 0.15 million shares or 1.8 
percent were underwritten by the (then defunct) managing agents 
but still active parent company of the group, MAMBL. The balance 
of its share-holdings were offered to the general pubhc. In 1975, 
CTML purchased CJPL and JSWML shares valued at Rs 23,663 and 
Rs 44,869 respectively.^^® In 1975, CTML offered 2,64,000 shares 
that it owned in SML, to the chief executive officer of CJPL.^^® By 
1977, sister concerns of SML, included JSWML, CTML, CSMDL and 
MAMBL which had extended loans in staggered amounts of 11.5 
percent, 11.5 percent, 13 percent and 10 percent to SML, 
respectively. In another instance in 1980, CTML transferred its
^^ ®See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of CTML, 
5 November 1975, p. 3.
^^ ®See offer letter written by the chief executive officer, CTML, 
Muhammad Anwar his counterpart at CJPL, no: AO- 128A201, 30 
October 1975.
^^ ^See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 3 
May 1977, indicating the proportion of loans extended by sister 
companies to SML.
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shares to Cresbank was a publicly subscribed company,
and other companies of the group owned significant number of its 
shares: CJPL, CSMDL, JSWML, CTML and SML. Crescent’s sister 
concerns owned 11.5 million shares in CTML.^ ^® The ownership 
structure of Crescent Group shares expose that even after Bhutto’s 
attempt to reduce industrial concentration in the hands of a few 
families, this group was able to circumvent this by offering a large 
portion of its publicly shares to sister concerns of the group.
The pioneering entrepreneurs of this group preferred to expand in 
new industries only if a textile unit was part of the new expansion. 
Later, the group expanded in industries for which they had originally 
acted as advisors; an instance being their role as advisors to the 
National Steel of Pakistan, to which CSAPL became a contractor for 
executing major steel manufacturing projects.^ ®®
Crescent’s management also formed forward arid backward 
linkages in its industrial investment when the opportunity to do so 
was ripe. Cresbank was formed when the group’s sales exceeded Rs 
6 billion; a t CTML a dyeing and finishing section was added to its
^^ ®See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of CTML, 
22 April 1980, p. 1.
^®°Group diversification and investment in new businesses was 
evident from the records of SML, as recorded in the ‘Minutes of 
Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, Annexure ‘A’ New 
Articles to be Incorporated in Memorandum of Association’, 25 
May 1987.
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existing spinning and ginning facilities. This new addition to CTML 
supplied the raw material required at other spinning and finishing 
units of the group as well as to the public. Then at SML, industrial 
alcohol was produced as a by-product of sugar cane processing in 
manufacture sugar. Alcohol was then conserved through the 
installation of an alcohol manufacturing plant at SML. This was a 
backward integration facility for sugar cane processing at SML. 
Further backward integration was implemented by utilising sugar 
cane bagasse (used for alcohol production) to also produce particle 
board. SML’s management, namely Altaf Saleem pioneered this idea 
of conversion from sugar cane to particle board and it was later 
replicated at 400 other sugar factories in the country. In the 
production of sugar at CSMDL, its by-product sugar cane bagasse 
was used as raw material for CBL in the production of particle board. 
Another inter-company hnkagé was made with acquiring a shipping 
line, M.D. Shams, to facilitate sea transportation of commodities in 
which the group traded.
From 1974 to 1988, after the spate of nationalisation was over, the 
group continued to invest in cotton textiles and formed ten new 
companies, namely the JSWML, ETML, Ghulam Hidayatulla Mills 
Limited, Ujala Cotton Mills Limited, Crescent Cotton Products (Pvt) 
Limited, Suraj Cotton Mills (Pvt) Limited, CSML, Crescent Cotton 
and Allied Factories Limited, Crescot Limited and Crescent Trading
^Interview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
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Limited/®^ Altaf Saleem claimed that the group’s abihty to 
maintain the original vision of expansion originated from, ‘checks and 
balances built into the system, therefore any chief executive officer 
cannot beat the system’. Group diversification and investments 
in new businesses were pressing issues discussed in the records of 
SML.^^ In 1987, its management expressed its intent to invest in 
over 30 new i n d u s t r i e s . T h i s  group also included foreign equity 
participation at a much later stage, after their textile base was 
entrenched.
Another route adopted by this group in estabhshing new businesses 
was to purchase ‘sick’ mills. These mills were declared ‘sick’ by the 
government owing to their state of bankruptcy. Usually the sick unit
^®^he chronology of their inception as Crescent Group 
companies is presented on pp. 265-80.
^®^ See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of SML, 22 
April 1982, with details of the intended new industrial 
investments as follows: The directors agreed to incorporate new 
areas of business activity as dealers of leather, waterproof 
material, floor cloths; manufacturers and machinery importers for 
silk weaving, spinning, cotton ginning, weaving and spinning, 
importers and exporters of textile fabrics, pharmaceutical, surgical 
and scientific apparatus; traders and manufacturers of steel 
convertors, iron masters, coke manufacturers, miners, smelters, 
tinplate makers, iron founders; in the resale, exchange, 
repurchase, mortgage of land, building, machinery, engines; sellers 
of insecticides, agricultural products, fungicides, agricultural 
chemicals, petrochemicals, automobiles, automotive parts, 
fertilisers; erect ghee manufacturing plants, dairy products, juices, 
colours, dyes, enamel, and all types of construction material based 
on cement and gypsum.
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came with its obsolete machinery and technology. Once the group 
had benefitted from PIDC sales it changed over to purchasing units 
which were already installed, albeit declared ‘sick’. The onus for 
turning the ‘sick’ units’ production facilities around, rested with the 
new owners. Three ‘sick’ units were purchased by the group. The 
first was the JSWML, intended for manufacturing cotton yam, when 
the group purchased it in 1959. It was subsequently made into a 
profitable venture, manufacturing finished fabrics and bed sheets by 
1972. In 1974, it was made a public limited company and the 
shareholders demonstrated their confidence in the profitability of the 
company by purchasing its shares. The second ‘sick’ unit acquired by 
the group was the Ghulam Hussain Hidayatulla Mills Limited, a 
ginning factory purchased in 1979. The third ‘sick’ unit purchased 
by the group was Elite Textile Mills Limited, in 1979. It too was 
converted into a profit centre for the group. Purchase o f‘sick’ units 
by this group demonstrates that its owners had the confidence to 
invest in a loss-making concern and turn it into an economically 
viable enterprise. An attendant factor which made the owners invest 
in ‘sick’ units, was that they were located in industries where the 
group was already established, and also where the members of the 
Crescent group had become seasoned businessmen. This contributed 
to the reduction of the degree of risk involved in such acquisitions 
and represented another area where the group maintained a 
competitive edge over other industrial concerns in similar areas.
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Another strategy followed by the group was in initially contributing 
to the equity of a PIDC concern which was later purchased outright 
by the group. Again this strategy was more economical than 
purchase of a PIDC unit as a completely new investment. By 
initially contributing to the equity of PIDC financed mills, generated 
economies for the group, when it was purchased by it. This was 
because in the initial period of investment, the overhead and related 
investment expenditure was met by the PIDC. Since the PIDC was 
a brain child of the government, it had access to credit and 
iiLfrastructure facilities that private ownership could not easily 
subscribe to.^ ®® The PIDC units acquired by the group were the 
CSMDL and CJPL. After the 1960s, this group avoided approaching 
the government for outright concessions. Rather they purchased 
‘sick’ or PIDC units. In both instances, someone else had made the 
initial investment which was then acquired by Crescent. Initially 
this group did maintain links with bureaucrats at PICIC and the 
PIDC for expectant favours beneficial to its investments.
By the 1980s, the group’s risk averse behaviour in new investments 
changed; they began investing in new areas of business. These 
included leasing and finance companies, and steel manufacturing 
units, such as the CSAPL, established in 1983 and PILCORP,
®^®See the PIDC charter under the ‘Act of Federal Legislation, 
No XLV of 1950’ [revised in 1962] by President Ayub, when certain 
industries were transferred by the PIDC to the Provincial 
governments by ‘Ordinance No, XXXVl of 1962’, 1 June 1962.
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established in 1988. The other factor which differentiated its 1980s 
policies from the ones practised earlier, was that new companies 
were directly floated as pubhc limited companies. The management 
felt it no longer needed to subject the new businesses to the test of 
time that it took to make them profitable. This was unlike the 
group’s practice in the 1960s to first keep new flotations as private 
limited and once their credibihty was established, then float them as 
public hmited concerns.
This group’s philosophy was to initially look inwards and to then 
steadily leam  and assimilate business techniques in new fields. It 
was after three decades of the group’s formation, that its members 
were prepared to invest in less famihar areas of business, such as in 
the light engineering sector and in financial markets. The 
management philosophy of the group, reiterated by Altaf Saleem, was 
in first nurturing subsidiaries and then creating inter company 
competition, with each unit being independently managed. This 
made each unit a cost centre with its own methods and 
documentation procedures. Altaf Saleem’s comment on encouraging 
other firms in the group to emulate this philosophy was, ‘Crescent 
Textiles in 38 years has not ever missed a dividend’. T h e
^®^lnterview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991. A comment 
was also made by Tariq Shafi on the group’s philosophy of inter­
company competition, reported by H. Santora, ‘Coming Into Their 
Own’, Business Today^ March 22 - April 6, 1992, pp. 42-53 as 
follows: ‘We have been able to hold the flock together because of 
the value systems imbibed fi'om our parents. They believed in 
doing things together’ ’.
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philosophy of nurturing subsidiaries was made part of the group’s 
grand strategy because it was one way of reacting to keep the 
business within the family. The group members provided insurance 
by adhering to what they knew best: textiles manufacturing. Inter­
company competition was an extension of the Chinioti community’s 
penchant to maximise profits a factor which was not restricted to 
them alone as a group. It was only in the 1980s that they moved in 
a different direction. Their internal organisational strategy worked 
and this group became more forward looking, in that Crescent risked 
entering unconventional areas of business and yet diversified and 
became larger than the other groups studied.
4.6 Conclusion
The Crescent Group was the first in Pakistan to manufacture and 
sell textiles, both locally and overseas and this flair for commerce 
provided it with an advantageous start. It diversified rapidly from 
a base in sugar, jute and textiles manufacturing to downstream 
production of steel pipes and setting up shipping, leasing and 
investment companies. In the 1960s, the group accessed government 
financial institutions for servicing of its credit needs. PICIC’s credit 
facility proved most beneficial. However by the 1980s, credit 
worthiness with multinational hanks assumed greater significance for 
raising corporate loans. These hanks, such as the American Express 
Banking Corporation (Pak) Limited, and Citibank (Pak), had more 
exacting criteria for extending credit, than the financial institutions
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of the 1960s, such as the PICIC and PIFCO. It was during the 
1980s, that the Crescent Group was successful in making its entry 
into steel manufacturing.
After 1967, the economic edge gained by Crescent was due to the 
initiative shown by its owners to reorganise its internal procedures 
which gave it an edge in entering new areas of business over other 
industrial leaders who continued to only seek the State’s patronage 
to expand their business. The transition made from trade to 
investments in the light engineering was a response to its senior 
management’s motivation to consolidate its holdings. This group’s 
focus remained on functional specialisation such as plant expansion 
and modernisation, technology improvement and the hiring of 
professional managers. Collectively, these contributed to the growth 
of the enterprise, especially after 1965. This group invested in 
SyStematised procedures from within (ehdogehoiis factors propelhiig 
expansion) which generated quantifiable information. The pre­
condition for generating systematised reports was a clearly defined 
objective and criteria for evaluating alternate routes to achieve that 
objective where corrective action was enacted upon swiftly through 
a controlled feedback system. Such methods better explained the 
causal relationship between decisions made and its effects. The early 
records of MAMBL and CTML stand testimony to this approach. 
Other Crescent company records also showed that its management 
was interested in resolving managerial problems. SML’s Board
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minutes were a detailed study of the daily running of its business, 
where problems were resolved through QA & QC techniques. This 
group were concerned to address and resolve issues through such 
methods. It kept a systematic record of its Board minutes from 1951, 
initially maintained by Muhammad Amin.^ ®® The effective 
management practices in this group developed as a response to 
market forces in initially meeting the demand for textiles which 
enabled Crescent to become the second largest group, measured by 
the value of its assets in 1988.
An underlying factor for it not continuing to seek State largesse 
was financial. Pakistan was a new country which had seen 
considerable pohtical instabihty in its first decade. Ten Presidents 
and Prime Ministers came and went from 1951 to 1959. Such 
beginnings were likely to make the risk averse industrialist even 
more cautious in proclaiming his political affiliations, lest an 
opposing political party assumed power. Therefore, the statements 
of Altaf Saleem and Tariq Shafi that they prided themself in not 
canvassing for favours from politicians was rooted in their risk 
averse behaviour. However, in the absence of their continued  
support of political regimes, the group was forced to develop its own 
internal organisational systems to expand. This was the main factor 
which enabled them to sustain external shocks from nationalisation.
^^See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of 
MAMBL, 1951-1970.
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the devaluation of the currency, and the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. 
All said and done, Crescent’s third generation left an indehble mark 
on the business landscape of Pakistan. Family members on its 
several Boards of Directors or at senior management positions 
remained amenable to suggestions on improving organisational 
procedures. Thus, for this group famüy presence reinforced efficient 
management practices.
The common denominator between the groups studied so far was 
that they all either began as cotton textile traders or went directly 
into production in a cotton-based industry. Cotton remains 
Pakistan’s staple cash crop and the backbone of the economy, hence 
these groups specialised in textile ginning, spinning, weaving and 
finishing processes. The difference between the Crescent Group 
compared with others is that it branched off on a tangent, not 
seeking short-cuts to its expansion. Informally, it became known as 
the professional in its field or the ‘cotton kings’,^®® who were 
forward looking entrepreneurs. Since they did not continue to seek 
State privileges, they were protected from the vicissitudes of 
government policy and instead could concentrate upon handling the 
teething problems when entering new markets and finding their own 
level in industry. To a large extent, their five companies which also 
exported its production provided the group with an insurance against 
local fluctuations of demand in the economy. These companies were
^®^lnterview with Altaf Saleem, 12 December 1991.
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ETML, CJPL, MAMBL, CTML and Shams Textile Mills Limited.
Another factor contributing to the group’s stability was that the 
fear of nationahsation did not prevent them from continuing 
investing in manufacturing industry. Therefore when Bhutto 
nationalised the ‘life’ section of their insurance business along with 
the shipping line and ginning factories they swiftly recovered as a 
group. At this juncture they prided themselves on not having 
succumbed to individual failure in one industry because of 
nationalisation, which could have become a catalyst for group failure 
as a whole, as did happen with the Fancy and Valika Groups based 
in Sind.^ ^® Members of the Crescent group were not rural 
landlords, nor did they feel threatened by the power vested in the 
landed elite, rather they focused on converting their gains made from 
trade into manufacturing industry. As the new industrial elite, their 
drive to succeed was not impaired by illusions of an illustrious past.
The development of internal organisational systems mainly 
assisted this group to make a smooth transition as textile barons to 
manufacturers of light engineering goods. The presence of family 
managers who were seen to be producing results through the 
attendant training of their permanent manpower, led to an increase 
in the output, sales, profits and size of the group. To maintain this 
momentum. Crescent managers produced internally generated.
^^^Ihid. The Fancy and Vahka Groups were prominent until 
Bhutto’s nationalisation of industry destroyed their industrial 
base, after which its entrepreneurs refused to invest in Pakistan.
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systematised and routinised reporting systems (initially 
unconsciously and then consciously), which enabled cause and effect 
relationships to be quantified, analysed and costs and responsibihties 
appropriated to departments and their managers. The impetus for 
introducing these institutional changes was vested with the owner 
managers of this group. Through effective systems applications, 
which involved a breakdown of project expenses and budget by its 
numbers, they enabled better administrative accountabihty. 
Decisions made on the basis of systematic processing of information 
lead to self sustaining growth which improved the group’s access to 
sources of raw material, adoption of new technology and machine 
upgrade necessary to keep abreast in a changing environment. This 
enabled the group’s transition under conditions that set its industrial 
base.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE GHULAM FARUQUE GROUP
Introduction
This chapter centres on the evolution of manufacturing investment 
(1964-88) made by Ghulam Faruque Group, henceforth called the 
Faruque Group. Its business interests were represented in of four 
provinces in Pakistan: Sind and the NWFP. (This is the first group 
in this study which had its manufacturing facihties concentrated 
largely in the NWFP). The Faruque family made its foray into 
manufacturing industry in 1964 as a post-independence family, which 
made their settlement into a new milieu more difficult than those 
business families which had began as traders in pre-partition India. ^  
The group traded in commodities and produced and marketed goods 
such as carbon brushes, mechanical seals, carbon bearings, electrical 
inserts, crushed sugar, cement, airconditioning equipment, overhead 
electrical transmission lines, electric cables, grid stations and
^See M. Lieberman and D. Montgomery, ‘First-Mover 
Advantages’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, 1988, pp. 41- 
58, where they analyse the business advantages and disadvantages 
accruing to pioneering industrialists. One of the advantages of 
being a late-starter in industry arose firom process technology 
leakages from the pioneers to the second-movers. However, both 
first- and second-movers benefit equally from government 
subsidies, in enabling them to take-off in their field of 
specialisation. The latter condition when studied in the context of 
Faruque investment, articulated through its owner’s connections, 
enabled him through the experience he had gained in 
administering licences to others who were first-movers in industry 
to also help in setting up his own industry.
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electrification projects for installing cement and textile mills and for 
State-owned projects, such as the Ordnance Factory and the country's 
airports.^ In the service sector, it provided fireight and after sales 
service on airconditioning equipment manufactured by the group.
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section One provides the 
group’s formation and background, the early aspirations of its 
founder Ghulam Faruque, and his career as a bureaucrat which 
preceded the formation and investments of his group. The 
ramifications of his earher career will be seen in the establishment 
of a series of quoted and unquoted companies in the group.^ 
Section Two provides an overview of the group’s activities, and 
examines whether its initial manufacturing investments coincided 
with any landmarks in the founder’s career as a bureaucrat who had 
originally benefitted from State largesse. Section Three comprises 
Selected Company histories, analyses the decision-making process and 
asks whether management practices facilitated expansion of the 
group’s investments into related product lines. Section Four 
analyses the external relations of the group and its founder’s dealings 
with the government, which provided Ghulam Faruque with the 
impetus to initiate business house investments. The section 
examines how far his personality affected the diversification of the
%ee ‘Faruque Group of Companies’, unpublished company 
document; no year, no place.
^The Faruque Group comprised nine private and pubhc limited 
companies.
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Faruque Group’s activities. Section Five outlines the Group’s 
management strategy and the structure which emerged as a 
consequence of managerial decision making. Section Six provides 
a conclusion.
The focus of this chapter provides the reader with an overview of 
Ghulam Faruque’s political leverage which helped him to tap into 
opportunities to initiate his business. Consolidation of Faruque 
investment was dependent on the information reporting channels 
developed through the accessing of information and the use made of 
it by managers to diversify their business interests. Where the 
information reporting channels accurately identified the location of 
problems within departments, and were then followed up by 
managers taking appropriate remedial action, then the effects of such 
decisions on the company’s structure will be reviewed accordingly.
5.1 Group Formation and Background
Ghulam Faruque, chairman of the Faruque Group was of Pathan 
origin.^ In 1940, his career commenced with his appointment as a 
transport adviser to Tata Iron and Steel Works Limited in India. In 
1944, in recognition of his services he was made an Officer of the 
Order of the British Empire. He served as general manager of East 
India Railways from 1946 to 1948. After migrating to Pakistan he 
served the bureaucracy as secretary. Ministry of Industries in 1948-
'^Pathan denotes a native of the North West Frontier Province.
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49, and as the chairman of the Cotton and Jute Boards in 1949-52.® 
He was appointed the first chairman of the Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation (PIDC), a position which he held in 1952- 
58.® In 1952-62, Rs 49 million was invested by the PIDC in projects 
located in Ghulam Faruque’s native province, the NWFP. Rs 5 
million or ten percent of PIDC projects in the NWFP were initiated 
by Ghulam Faruque himself in 1952-58.^ While a t the PIDC, 
Ghulam Faruque played a key role in encouraging business leaders 
to buy PIDC’s business assets.® The PIDC charter permitted the 
sale of its industrial assets to the private-sector at par [face]
®His membership of the Jute Board is in, Wajid Ali to J. L. 
Mailman, Pal Blade Company, 43 West, 57th Street, New York, 
N.Y., 3 June 1950 and Wajid Ali to Ghulam Faruque, 10 May 
1950. Wajid Ali advised Mailman that Ghulam Faruque, had 
expedited the delivery of Pal Blade imports through the power 
conferred on him as the secretary. Ministry of Industries.
®The PIDC Act of 1950, Order # C 7 P - 9/17/62, approved by 
the Minister of Industries and Natural Resources, Government of 
Pakistan [Industries Division], gave executive powers to its 
chairman, executive officer and four directors on its Board of 
Directors to supervise PIDC investments. In 1962, Ghulam 
Faruque also briefly served as the Governor of [former] East 
Pakistan. For further insight into the politics of his appointment 
and dismissal as PIDC’s chairman see, H. Feldman, From Crisis to 
Crisis, Pakistan 1962-1969, Oxford, 1973, pp. 170-172.
^See PIDC, ‘Development Programme of the PIDC’, 
unpublished report, PIDC, 1989, p. 2.
®Ghulam Faruque’s dealings with other business personalities 
included those with Wajid Ali and Muhammad Bashir [Ali and 
Crescent Groups respectively].
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valuation of its shares.^ On the whole, asset values increased from 
the time of construction to the time of sale. The purchasers of such 
units benefitted by buying at par. The valuation of net assets of an 
on going PIDC project was calculated on a formula approved^® by 
the Minister of Industries. However, as chairman of PIDC, Ghulam 
Faruque had the freedom to influence this calculation in his favour 
which facilitated PIDC sales to his associates in industry, [such as 
the sales made to the Crescent Group].“  Ghulam Faruque had 
assumed the chairmanship of PIDC after his appointment as 
secretary, Ministry of Industries. This provided a continuing link to 
his influence on the criterion for valuation of PIDC’s net assets. 
While he was PIDC’s chairman, Ghulam Faruque benefitted 
personally as well, by purchasing the Sarhad Bank fi*om the NWFP 
government in 1958.^^
^This was provided cover by the PIDC charter under the ‘Act of 
Federal Legislation, No XLV of 1950’ [revised in 1962] by 
President Ayub, when certain industries were transferred by the 
PIDC to the Provincial governments by ‘Ordinance No, XXXVl of 
1962’, 1 June 1962.
^^Information given in PIDC, ‘Development Programme of the 
PIDC’, unpublished report, PIDC, 1989, p. 35.
^^Ghulam Faruque’s powers while he served as PIDC’s 
chairman are documented in PIDC, ‘Development Programme of 
the PIDC’, unpublished report, 1989, p. 35.
^^The purchase of this bank by the Faruque Group is 
documented in R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in 
Pakistan, 1960-1970, Cambridge, 1982, p. 48.
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In 1958 Ghulam Faruque’s career turned to the defence industry, 
with his appointment as the chairman of the Ordnance Factory. This 
was the sole arms and ammunition manufacturing fadhty in 
Pakistan. From 1958 to 1961, he also acted as the chairman of a 
State monopoly, the Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA), which was the country's sole supplier and generator of 
electridty. In 1962, he became the governor of East Pakistan. 
Ghulam Faruque’s career as a bureaucrat continued even after his 
group had made its debut in manufacturing industry in 1964. In 
1965-67, he graduated to the position of Minister for Commerce and 
Defence and was instrumental in expediting the import documents 
required by Wajid Ali to instal the first safety razor plant in the 
c o u n t r y . G h u l a m  Faruque then turned to politics. In 1970 an 
elected member of the National Assembly representing his native 
constituency in the NWFP at the time of General Yahyah’s Martial 
Law regime. His political career continued after the election of
^^The Ali Group commenced razor blade imports in pre­
partition India; they were appointed the sole agents for the 
American Safety Razor Corporation of New York, USA. In 1948 
the Treet Safety Razor Blade Corporation (Pvt) Limited was 
incorporated as a private limited trading concern in Pakistan, with 
a paid up capital of Rs 1.5 million. This was mentioned as an 
historical introduction of the Ah Group’s interests in blade 
manufacturing, in a letter from Wajid Ali to G. Faruque, secretary. 
Ministry of Industries, Pakistan, 25 March 1952; also see letter 
from Wajid Ali to Ghulam Faruque, Secretary, Ministry of 
Industries, 25 March 1952, informing him of the significance of 
this company in being able to meet the country’s entire demand of 
30 million razor blades annually. The Ali group’s interests in 
blade manufacturing are referred on pp. 213-18.
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Bhutto’s government, he became Minister of Finance, Planning and 
Development, Industries and Labour, Government of NWFP in 1972- 
73. His political appointments continued in General Zia’s regime 
when he was made an ‘appointed representative of the people’ in the 
Federal Cabinet in 1981. General Zia’s appreciation of Faruque’s 
acumen demonstrated itself in another high level appointment 
offered to the latter in 1983, as the chairman of a government-owned, 
credit-lending institution, the Investment Corporation of Pakistan 
(ICP). He also remained an unopposed elected candidate to the 
NWFP Senate until 1988.
By the close of 1988, Faruque had invested in nine manufacturing 
and service-sector industries, of which three were under the umbrella 
of pubhcly quoted and six were private companies. (See Table 5.1). 
The group also had plans to diversify into airconditioner assembly, 
Ceinént bag production and the provision of leasing sendees for new 
industrial plants.
^^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992 in Karachi. See 
Appendix A for questions asked in the interview.
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Table 5.1
Faruque Industrial Investments, 1964-88
Company Nature of Business Year
Estb.
1. Sarhad Bank Banking services 1958
2. Faruque (Pvt) Limited. Parent company 1964
3. Greaves Cotton (Pvt) Ltd. Construction services, 1964^
sale and servicing of 
electrical equipment
4. Mirpurkhas Sugar Sugar Production 1964
Mills Limited
5. Greaves Carbon (Pvt) Ltd. Electrical Equipment 1965^
Manufacturing
6. Associated Constructors Construction Services 1970
(Pvt) Ltd.
7. Greaves Cotton Airconditioning Services 1975 
Air conditioning (Pvt) Ltd.
8. Cherat Cement Company Ltd.Cement Production 1981
9. Maersk Line Agency Shipping Line 1988^
(Pvt) Limited
 ^The year in which Faruque acquired this company from its previous 
owner.
 ^Acquired in this year from a multinational company, Crompton 
Parkinson Limited, a company originally estabhshed in the UK in 
1949. The biography of its British founder, Brian Bowers Crompton, 
an electrical equipment manufacturer, is given in, D. Jeremy, (ed.). 
Dictionary of Business Biography , Vol. 1, Butterworths, 1984, pp. 
835-38.
 ^This was a subsidiary of Maersk Line Agency incorporated in 
Denmark.
Source: Faruque Group, ‘Faruque Group of Companies’, unpublished 
company document; no year, no place.
5.2 Business Development: 1964-88
This section focuses on Faruque investments, in the period 1964- 
88, highlighting the policies which directed its investments in trading 
and hght engineering. The group’s origins were rooted in its first 
generation owner’s vision, drive and motivation to establish a 
business empire. This ambition was lent strength from the fact that
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Ghulam Faruque was a seasoned bureaucratie with strong political 
affiliations. He first acquired the Sarhad Bank from the NWFP 
government/^ which also provided him with secure access to 
finance. He then established the first private hmited company of the 
group, Faruque (Pvt) Limited in 1964. Unlike the Crescent Group, 
where the parent company provided both equity and management 
support for its subsidiaries through the umbrella of the managing 
agency system, Faruque (Pvt) Limited provided sponsorship capital 
for newly floated ventures in the group. It was also the trading arm 
for commodities manufactured by other subsidiaries in the group, and 
acted as a cushion for absorbing their financial losses. The first 
manufacturing facility of the group was an investment made in 
Greaves Cotton (Pvt) Limited (GCPL) in 1964. This company 
was originally formed in undivided India in 1859 by two British 
engineers who in 1948 shifted to and registered the company in 
Pakistan. In 1964, Faruque bought a majority of its shares. GCPL 
represented a company of engineers, merchants and contractors who 
specialised in the sale and servicing of engineering equipment used 
for earth-moving and construction activities.^® The company had 
also diversified into electrical and mechanical construction. As a
^®The source for this information on the acquisition of the 
Sarhad Bank by the Faruque Group is given in R. Amjad, Private 
Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960-1970, Cambridge, 1982, p. 
48.
^®Given in ‘Faruque Group of Companies’, unpublished 
company document; no year, no place.
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trading company, it dealt in metals and chemicals. Some of the 
projects contracted out by the government to GCPL were for rural 
and urban electrification.
In 1964, the Faruque Group decided to invest in a sugar mill and 
Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited which was set up in the town of 
Mirpurkhas in Sind. It was established as a public limited company. 
Its initial daily production capacity was to crush 1,500 tons of sugar 
which by 1987 had increased to 3,500 tons of crushed sugar per day.
In 1965 the group bought the foreign equity shareholding of 
Crompton (Pak) Limited’s investments in Greaves Carbon 
Products (Pvt) Limited. As the new owners, this investment 
represented a move towards backward integration; in the ownership 
of production facilities of carbon lubricating rings, bearings and 
brushes, electrical inserts and mechanical seals, all used in the 
installation of grid and power stations.
So far, three companies were simultaneously established in 1964: 
GCPL, Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills limited and Faruque (Pvt) Limited. 
Another company. Associated Constructors (Pvt) Limited was 
floated as a private limited concern in 1970. In 1975, the group’s 
management established Greaves Cotton Airconditioning (Pvt) 
Limited for the design, erection, maintenance and servicing of 
airconditioning, heating and ventilating systems intended for 
industrial use. This company also had the capabihty to instal 
equipment for special applications, such as for humidity and
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temperature control of laboratories, sterile airconditioned 
environment, for hospitals and its body scanning units and 
pharmaceutical and computer laboratories. Some of its more 
significant projects completed by 1988, were for a 100 tons of air- and 
water-cooled airconditioners for a multinational, pharmaceutical 
factory, Beecham (Pak) Limited located in Karachi, a 30 horsepower 
water-cooled chiller and cooling tower for supplying chilled water to 
the anodising plant of Pakistan Cables Limited, at Karachi, a 10 and 
15 horsepower airconditioning unit installed for an operating theatre, 
a body scanner and intensive care unit installed at the Liaqat 
Memorial Hospital at Karachi, a 168 ton chilled water system at 
another multinational, pharmaceutical factory, Johnson and Johnson 
(Pak) Limited and a further 30 projects completed of a similar 
magnitude.
Commensurate with its basic expertise in the construction and 
engineering industry, the Faruque Group established a cement 
manufacturing company in 1981 called Cherat Cement Company 
Limited (CCCL). This was a public limited venture located in 
Nowshera in the NWFP. The raw material required for cement 
manufacturing was largely limestone, which was available in ample 
quantities of 400 million tons in the Cherat hills where the factory 
was located. The designed daily production capacity of the plant was 
1,100 tons of cement, which was increased to 1,400 tons per day by
354
1988 through the process of Balancing Modernising and 
Rehabilitation (BMR) of machines. This was the first cement plant 
in Pakistan producing high grade B.S.S. 12/1983 cement.^® In 1988, 
this group became the Pakistani agents of a Danish shipping line 
called Maersk Line Agency (Pvt) Limited. It operated cargo 
liners serving Pakistan and North Africa, the UK, the Continent, 
North America and the Gulf States.
5.3 Selected Company Histories
Section 5.3 provides an introduction to an analysis of the internal 
organisational systems which evolved at GCPL and CCCL. These 
companies were chosen to provide a support function to the 
mainstream business activity of the group in construction services 
and to characterise the company culture adopted by its chief 
executives.
The following two sections analyse the management practices at 
two manufacturing concerns of the group which represent its leading 
areas of manufacturing investment. Information about their 
organisational strategy was derived from minutes of meeting of 
various functional area departments and from company 
correspondence and interviews with Ghulam Faruque’s two sons, 
Muhammad Faruque and Zahid Faruque, and a non-family manager, 
Muhammad Akram. The first company discussed is GCPL, as 
follows.
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5.3.1 Greaves Cotton (Pvt) Limited (GCPL)
GCPL was formed in 1859 in Bombay as a partnership owned by 
two British engineers. These engineers directed their acumen 
towards manufacturing electrical equipment. After the creation 
of Pakistan, the Faruque family acquired a 20 percent stake by 
investing Rs 3 million in the company in 1964. A further Rs 7 
million of GO PL’s shares were acquired by the Faruque Group in 
1969, when its annual profits peaked at Rs 400,000 per annum.
It became the flagship company of the group, with a paid-up capital 
of Rs 10 milhon in 1969. Under the Faruque management, GCPL 
initiated by trading in imported equipment^^ used for erection of 
construction equipment which was then leased out to industrial users 
of m a ch in e ry .T he  company also traded and specialised in the sale 
and servicing of imported engineering equipment used earth-moving 
and construction projects. By the mid-1960s, the Company had 
diversified, through backward integration into manufacturing its own 
electrical and mechanical construction equipment. These were 
cranes, diesel generating and pumping sets, air compressors and 
steam turbine machines required to instal sugar and textile mills.
^^Interview with Muhammmad Akram, chairman, Mirpurkhas 
Sugar Mills Limited, 3 March 1992, in Karachi. See Appendix A.
^^Interview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992, in 
Karachi.
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By 1971, the company integrated forwards by servicing the 
equipment that was produced at GCPL and sold to other industrial 
users. In 1979, the company's strategy to consolidate its business led 
to its participation in joint venture construction projects with British 
and Japanese c o m p a n i e s . T h i s  was realised through jointly 
entering into turnkey contracts, for which GO PL’s expertise in the 
field was forthcoming, especially in the implementation, installation 
and servicing of related equipment. The company’s foreign links also 
extended to two large-scale construction contracts fulfilled in Saudi 
Arabia for a 380 KV and 110 KV overhead transmission line 
constructed from Yanbu to Medina, and Al-Mussajid to Badr 
respectively, collectively covering a distance of 200 miles. The 
Saudi Arabian projects were supervised by a German consultancy 
company, Lahmeyer International, which was selected by Faruque’s 
management. In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, GCPL had also collaborated 
with Fujikura Limited, a Japanese company, to construct an oil-filled 
cable, spanning 38 miles of territory.^^ In the domestic market, 
WAPDA was GO PL’s prime client, a liaison which reached finition 
in 1974, 16 years after Ghulam Faruque was appointed WAPDA’s 
chairman. Ghulam Faruque had maintained his bureaucratic and
^^Given in, ‘Faruque Group of Companies’, unpublished 
company document, no year, no place.
^Hhid.
357
political links, across three regimes which enabled GCPL to act as a 
major contractor to WAPDA. In 1974, the first WAPDA contract was 
for a 500 KV line from Tarhela to Khushah, covering 116 miles of 
rugged terrain. Till then, this was financially the most lucrative 
project for GCPL, which fetched Rs 100 million as fees paid to the 
company.^® The second WAPDA contract awarded to GCPL was in 
1979, for a 500 KV over head transmission line from Faisalabad to 
Ghazi Ghat, covering a distance of 180 miles. The third WAPDA 
contract was for instalhng a transmission line from Sahiwal to 
Multan, which covered 101 miles of terrain. In 1986, GCPL invested 
through backward integration in erecting its own electrical sub­
stations which fed electricity to the main power line grid stations also 
installed by GCPL. By 1988, it had completed projects which ranged 
from erection, installation and testing of over 20 large contracts 
located at different centres in the country.^^ Projects completed by 
GCPL, were the installation of overhead electrical transmission lines, 
capable of generating up to 500 kilowatts (KV) of electricity, laying 
of underground transmission lines, capable of transmitting upto 380 
KV of electricity, installation of large pump irrigation facility and as 
suppliers of raw material required for civil engineering works. For 
underground transmission cable laying, the company had generated 
business overseas as well as locally. Just on rural electrification
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projects alone, GCPL had completed over 15 large-scale cable laying 
contracts for installation of oil, sugar and jute mills (including, for 
the Crescent Group’s Crescent Sugar Mills Limited) and other 
electricity supplying cables for industrial and home consumption.^® 
In the process the company had contributed to easier access of 
electricity at rural locations, used in the mechanisation of 
agriculture. As claimed by Muhammad Faruque, the chairman of 
GCPL, ‘we are the second to third largest electrical contracting 
business in Pakistan’.^ ®
Because of the extended distance between project locations, GCPL 
hired 50 percent of its labour on a contractual basis, who were mostly 
foremen and other workers. The remaining 50 percent were the 
permanent sales and engineering staff of GCPL. The engineers were 
largely recruited from Peshawar University in the NWFP, seventy 
percent of whom usually left the company soon after undergoing 
training in engineering. This was because of the company’s nature 
of business required a predominantly temporary component of labour, 
and its management did not feel the need to invest in devising 
training manuals and procedures to retain its temporary engineering 
staff. For example, in 1979, the Saudi Arabian-based projects 
involved hiring of 800 temporary workers.®® Documentation of
®®Interview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992.
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training procedures contributes to an organisational memory of skills, 
and since Ghulam Faruque had cultivated his foresight and had 
invested in forward planning of his businesses by integrating its 
investments at an earlier stage in his career, GCPL also benefitted 
from his guidance and was able to circumvent the deleterious effects 
of not concentrating on training its permanent staff, and yet 
successfully investing in light engineering. The Systems Approach 
advocates that managers should apply their foresight when making 
decisions so that the outcome is a more effective one. This foresight 
was cultivated by Ghulam Faruque before he became an industrial 
entrepreneur, through his professionahsation of experience gained as 
a bureaucrat. This also concurs with our earlier statement made in 
Chapter One, that regardless of the pohtical environment or of 
ownership patterns, if systems are adopted they will enable a 
transition frOm trading to light engineering production. Ghulam 
Faruque had unconsciously adopted the tenets of the Systems 
Approach while he was PIDC’s chairman, demonstrated by him 
sending his staff®^  on training assignments in order to better 
manage PIDC-owned units. Muhammad Faruque also took pride in 
his educational background in electrical engineering, which he 
claimed had contributed to a better understanding in solving the 
technical problems which arose when executing electrical engineering
®^Interview of Muhammad Akram, 3 March 1992. See 
Appendix A.
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p r o j e c t s . G C P L ’s problems were reviewed in the monthly 
meetings designed as a forum for heads of departments to review and 
take action on the previous week’s operations. The overall progress 
made by GCPL in extending its local contracts to overseas locations, 
indicated its management’s more global approach, open to capturing 
business wherever the opportunity to do so presented itself. This 
was an outcome of GCPL’s management strategy demonstrated by 
looking beyond its domestic frontiers and in capturing overseas 
businesses (which were not captured by the Ah Group entrepreneurs, 
because of their lack of vision). This strategy at GCPL also captured 
the essence of the Systems Approach which advocates managers to 
look beyond the boundaries set by older management systems (when 
the scale of business is small) to change its strategy accordingly 
when the scale of its business increases.
5.3.2 Cherat Cement Company Limited (CCCL)
This section evaluates the internal organisational policies of CCCL. 
This company was chosen for perusal, since it was one of the two 
public hmited companies of the group, and because the management 
practices adopted by Zahid Faruque, were very different from those 
used by his brother Muhammad Faruque at GCPL.
In 1981 CCCL was incorporated as a cement manufacturing facihty 
located in Nowshera with its regional office in Peshawar. This 
company was formed as a response to the encouragement provided
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to private-sector industry in Zia’s industrial policy, which gave a five- 
year tax holiday to new cement plants estahhshed in designated 
zones within the country. The Faruque management responded by 
establishing CCCL as the country’s first facihty owned by the 
private-sector. It also benefitted from the export duty concessions 
provided to cement manufacturers in Zia’s industrial policy, by being 
the first company to export its cement.^^
Zahid Faruque, assumed responsibility for managing the plant as 
its director in 1987.^  ^ He recalled that CCCL’s plant location was 
chosen for its proximity to 400 milhon tons of limestone rock 
formation, first discovered by him while he was on an aerial tour of 
the terrain in 1981.^ ® Limestone was the raw material used for 
cement manufacturing.^® CCCL’s cement plant required only 40,000 
tons of limestone for maintaining its annual cement production 
capacity. Seventy five percent of CCCL’s raw materials 
requirements, other than limestone rock were imported.®^ The
^^See Ministry of Industries, Industrial Policy Statement^ 
Government of Pakistan, June 1984, pp. 5-32 and Zia’s speech 
Government of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of 
the Army S ta ff and Chief Martial Law Administrator, Address to 
the Nation, Headquarters of the Chief of Army Staff, 25 June 
1978, p. 10.
^^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
^Hhid,
^^Ibid.
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plant’s original production capacity was designed at 300,000 tons per 
annum, which increased to 410,000 ton per annum by 1985, and to 
511,000 tons per annum by 1988.^ ® CCCL was the second largest 
cement manufacturing facility in the country and faced few, if any, 
barriers to selling all of its production, in the domestic and export 
market. Its cement was purchased locally by large construction 
companies for building works such as hydro-electric dam building 
and the construction of roads and city airports. GCPL was one of its 
customers, since CCCL’s formation was a move towards backward 
integration of the group’s construction facility. Its major share­
holders were the ‘public’, which owned 50 percent of the shares. 
(Since insurance companies and Bankers’ Equity Limited which 
extended credit to CCCL, also included the ‘public’, they owned 86 
percent of CCCL’s shareholdings vested with the public).^® Thirty 
three percent of CCCL’s shares were owned by members of the 
Faruque Group and the remainder were owned by financial 
institutions.^^ It was the first cement plant originating from the 
private-sector, after the State monopoly held by Zeal Pak Cement on
^^The ‘public’ is the individual and institution which purchases 
shares in a new company flotation after it advertises that it is now 
being made a public limited company.
^^Given in, N. Husnain, et al, (eds.), BukharVs 101, Khadim Ah 
Shah Bukhari and Company, 1991, page code, 13100 and an 
interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
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cement sales for almost a decade. CCCL’s sales for 1988 were Rs
471.4 million.'^  ^ By the close of 1988 four additional cement plants 
were established in the private-sector.
By 1988, cement was sold through CCCL’s certified dealers who 
earned commission on every bag sold by them to industrial and 
domestic consumers. The cement was processed by applying the 
clinker and crusher machines to the raw materials A large 
portion of these machines was imported and technical assistance for 
installation and operating them was provided by CLE, a French- 
based company which processed petroleum and also had a cement 
manufacturing division.^"  ^ Imported spare parts for the machines 
included those required for stacker accessories, apron feeders, drive 
units, cast iron pipes, gate valves, copper cables, welded cement, 
compressed air tanks, electric motors for the cooler, cables and 
Switchboard accessories, dry battery elements and fillings and fuel oil 
preparation equipment.^®
"^^ Given in CCCL’s, Annual Report^ 1989.
^^See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Production Department’, of 
CCCL, 3 November 1986, where the stages in cement 
manufacturing are given.
^^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
^®For further details on machinery imports under bill of lading 
number 501924, 17 December 1983, see the ‘Installation 
Certificate’, prepared by Amir Muhammad Marwat, assistant 
collector. Government of Pakistan, Office of the assistant 
controller. Central Excise Division, Peshawar.
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Labour relations appeared to be the recurring area of concern for 
CCCL’s management. CCCL employed 200 permanent workers, with 
a further 70 employed on contractual terms who were required for 
operating the packing unit; a further 30 were involved in site 
maintenance and an additional 400 employees were permanent 
recruits occupying management positions in the personnel and 
executives cadre located at the head office in Karachi."^ ® Company 
correspondence and production department minutes frequently refer 
to instances of strained employee-management relations, which were 
raised but seldom resolved effectively by the management. Other 
recurring issues which were presented to CCCL’s management 
originated from faults in the technical department, that is in the 
frequent break down of factory equipment and machinery at the kiln 
site and the failure of senior management to attend to administrative 
bottle-necks in the production department.^^ Administrative delays 
in communications between the head office at Karachi and the 
factory site in Nowshera were omnipresent issues raised in the 
company correspondence between employees and senior management. 
For example, in 1986 an employee of the company sent a letter to 
CCCL’s administration manager at Nowshera complaining that since 
the former’s appointment in 1980 he had not been issued with an
^^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
^^Recorded in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Production 
Department’ of CCCL, 1986-1989.
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appointment letter. This incident reflected the relaxed attitude of 
CCCL’s senior management in not properly recording employee 
tenure, which was reinforced by the time taken by the employee to 
raise this issue.'^ ® In response to his query, the administration 
manager at Nowshera told CCCL’s financial controller, Akbarali 
Pesnani a t the head office in Karachi, that in fact no such 
appointment letter had been issued to the complainant and 
instructed him to issue a letter with retrospective effect.^  ^ This 
incident suggests an attitude of indifference towards adopting a 
systematic approach of record-keeping, which was fuelled by the 
secure niche CCCL had made in the domestic cement market. This 
incident was characteristic of senior management’s inertia in 
addressing internal organisational problems quickly, and also lends 
credibility to this study’s premise that those businesses which 
commenced production with an assured and secure market for its 
products, albeit through State patronage, required organisational 
systems to sustain long-term growth. In 1986, when the above 
misdemeanour was reported, CCCL had been established for five 
years, and therefore was a relatively young company within the 
Faruque Group. Its director chose not to emulate Ghulam Faruque’s 
management style to develop an integrated base upon which to
^®See letter from M. Shafiq Khattak to CCCL’s administration 
manager, 8 April 1986.
^®See letter from CCCL’s administration manager to CCCL’s 
financial controller, no: LOF-32/203/254, 14 April 1986.
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expand his business.
Similar instances of mismanagement at CCCL were evident from 
the administration manager’s memos sent to Akbarah Pesnani a t the 
Karachi head office. These memos show regular cause for concern by 
the Nowshera and Peshawar based staff that the management at 
head office did not resolve matters promptly. In 1986, he addressed 
a letter to Akbarali Pesnani requesting him not to send letters 
destined for the staff at the Nowshera office together in the same 
envelope as those addressed to Zahid Faruque , s ince  this method 
allowed open access to their mail. This open access system, condoned 
by Zahid Faruque, was probably a device used to control rather than 
delegate the channels of information retrieval and dissemination. 
The initial perusal of the mail by Zahid Faruque led to delayed action 
taken on matters mentioned in the correspondence, which at times 
required the urgent attention of its addressee. Since these issues 
languished till the indirect method of routing the mail reached its 
addressee, it led to ineffective decision making by those who were 
made accountable for their ensuing misdemeanours. This scenario 
which was encouraged by Zahid Faruque, was indicative of his lack 
of trust in his employees’ intentions and was one cause of the rising 
tension between them, even though when asked to comment on the 
preferred style of management at CCCL, Zahid Faruque claimed that
^®See letter from CCCL’s administration manager to Akbarali 
Pesnani, no: ACF-36/804/1431, 22 October 1986.
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he preferred a structure which delegated responsibility to 
individuals.®^
Similar factors also had a bearing on recurrent labour strife at the 
Nowshera factory. Lightly dismissing labour strife as an issue 
meriting discussion, Zahid Faruque claimed that turbulence in labour 
relations was there at all times and this itself justified its 
existence.®^ He did not elaborate on this point other than saying 
that:
‘The major flaw in labour laws is that 25 percent of 
outsiders®^ can be office bearers, therefore they are a source 
of trouble’.®^
This indifferent attitude could not be the vehicle for improving 
worker relations at CCCL. The issue of in coming also mail 
continued unabated into 1988 when CCCL’s general manager wrote 
again to Akbarali Pesnani, reminding him of the latter’s intent to 
ease employee relations with its senior management, by not opening 
the official and personal mail intended for the Nowshera-based 
employees.®® This letter shows that in spite of relatively mundane
®^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
®^Bhutto’s reforms introduced the representation of non­
company trade union leaders who arbitrated between management 
and its employees in times of strife.
®%id.
®®See letter from the CCCL’s general manager to Akbarali 
Pesnani, no: GCF/13/325, 8 February 1987.
368
issues raised in the correspondence between the decision makers at 
the head office and factory employees, it in fact was a symptom of an 
underlying problem; in this case the distrustful attitude of Zahid 
Faruque towards the rapid dissemination of information to his 
employees, which must have had deleterious effects on organisational 
performance in the long-term. In the context of labour-management 
relations, this attitude was to have its spin off in a growing order of 
magnitude for CCCL’s internal management systems. The noticeable 
absence of correspondence relating to strategy formulation, raised by 
decision makers or by the workers, indicated senior management’s 
complacency towards the need to disseminate information. In the 
long-term, it affected the company’s structure as directed by its 
senior management. However, according to Zahid Faruque, the only 
influence the management at the head office exerted over the 
factory’s administrative affairs was in the preparation of the monthly 
budget.^® This perception at head office was that it exercised 
partial control over the factory employees, a perception not shared by 
the employees themselves. This anomaly also found its parallel at 
CCCL’s NWFP-based management. An instance of a discord between 
personnel at the two locations within this province occurred in 1988. 
The administrative records of the Nowshera factory were filed and 
managed at its regional office at Peshawar. There too, the financial 
accountant at Peshawar, sent a letter of complaint to the sales
®®lnterview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
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accountant based at Nowshera demanding an explanation as to how 
three employees had been reimbursed their medical expenses in 
excess of the authorised hmit. The financial accountant stressed the 
need for maintaining ‘proper’ records to avoid a repetition of such 
mistakes.®^ Other incidents of strained relations between senior 
management and its employees, whether labourers or executive staff, 
were evident firom this bilaterally fuelled communication gap where 
the management took the initiative in showing the way. The low 
priority given to workers’ welfare was evident from the fact that a 
workers’ participation fund formed in 1987, seven years after the 
company’s formation.^® [When compared with the Crescent Group, 
whenever a new company was floated, its management promptly 
introduced a workers’ welfare fund]. A telex sent by a family 
manager, Shehryar Faruque to Akbarali Pesnani read as follows:
‘Please expedite approval [of| grant [for] compensatory leave.
Individuals concerned are clamouring for early sanction’.^ ®
The hand written comments by the addressee on this telex, 
indicate his surprise as to the series of events that had brought this 
situation to a head. This also showed that the communications
^^See letter from CCCL’s financial accountant to CCCL’s sales 
accountant, no: CCCL/JJ/3220, 14 June 1988.
^^Information provided in an inter office memo titled ‘Office 
Order’, signed by the general manager of CCCL, Zaka-ud-din, 14 
December 1987.
®^ See telex from Shehryar Faruque to CCCL’s administration 
manager, 18 June 1988.
370
network was weak, across CCCL’s offices, especially with regard to 
the approval and delivery of documents originating firom the head 
office. This rift was not addressed in CCCL’s Board minutes, but 
was rather addressed through emergency telex services sent on an ad 
hoc basis. Similar complaints by the factory employees and directed 
a t the head office staff appear in another telex from Shehryar 
Faruque to Akbarali Pesnani.®® In it, Shehryar voiced his concern 
over the delayed arrival of an income tax exemption certificate 
required by him to file his annual tax returns. Even though these 
examples of disgruntled employee complaints may be evident in any 
company, some of which may even have effective systems, the fact 
was, that at CCCL, ‘management by crisis’ was the only form of 
management practised by its senior managers. There was no 
evidence found that at CCCL, an alternate, more effective 
organisational system co-existed with the ad hoc system of 
management. If a better system had existed, it would have emerged 
in the perusal of CCCL’s records.
At CCCL, there was no written record relating to dealer 
agreements. This was brought to light in a telex sent by CCCL’s 
marketing and sales manager to the head office in a review of 
commissions paid out to the dealers by competitors in 1988.®^  The
®®See telex from Shehryar Faruque to Akbarali Pesnani, 8 July
1988.
®^ See telex from CCCL’s sales manager to the head office, 11 
March 1988.
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management at CCCL had fixed sales targets for the sales officers 
who monitored sales made through their dealers. Zahid Faruque 
revealed that the sales officers sent copies of their booked orders with 
dealers to the factory premises which were then consolidated for 
despatch to the head office.®^  No evidence of these copies was found 
and if they existed, they were certainly not used as a data base for 
the perusal and written feedback of confirmed orders communicated 
to the management at the head office.
Another example of CCCL’s ‘management by crisis’ as directed by 
its senior management, was in an inter office memo issued by 
Shehryar Faruque to the sales of f icers , in which he warned and 
reprimanded them that their employment would be terminated if 
sales fell short of the company’s target.®"^  This ultimatum indicated 
that there was an internal organisational problem which required a 
solution, probably not directly originating from the sales officers’ 
inept performance (the content or in this instance the location of the 
problem), but from their low morale to deliver (which was the form 
of the problem). The problem identification lay in CCCL’s overall 
strained relations with its staff at large (which was again a form of
®^ See letter from Shehryar Faruque to CCCL’s field officers, no: 
CCCL/PSH/S.A/ASM/0020, 4 July 1989.
®^Annual sales targets were available in an inter-office memo, 
from Shehryar Faruque to all CCCL field sales officers. No. 
CCCL/PSH/S.A./ASM/0020, 4 July 1988.
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the same problem). There was no evidence of brain storming or
feedback forums initiated by senior management, to resolve
difficulties faced by the sales officers in fulfilling their targets.
Shehryar Faruque’s ultimatum to the sales officers appeared to be a
measure of last resort which was not preceded by discussions where
the form of the problem might be addressed to resolve this issue.
Zahid, when asked to comment on measures taken by his team to
obtain information from his managers in order to develop a more
effective reporting system, responded as follows:
‘Sales officers have regular weekly meetings, marketing 
officers have regular weekly meetings, there are daily and 
weekly meetings in the factory of all officers, with copies sent 
to head office at Karachi’.®^
These meetings were organised without following them up with 
remedial action in the hght of the issues which they brought to the 
fore. On studying CCCL’s correspondence, the only evidence of 
written communication was in the production department’s weekly 
meetings as discussed above where no organisational procedures 
were discussed.
Recurrence of the detached relations between head office managers 
and personnel at the factory premises in Nowshera continued 
unabated into 1988. The issues, which were raised from either 
direction, focused on complaints vis-a-vis daily operating control. The 
head office management appeared to take routine decisions on behalf
® I^nterview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
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of the factory staff This was exemplified in another telex sent by 
Akbarali Pesnani to CCCL’s executive marketing manager at 
Peshawar, Aslam Faruque,®® informing him that a special 
marketing magazine on the cement factory could be pubhshed 
directly by him by disregarding certain inputs awaited from the 
factory staff The factory staff preferred to refer decisions to head 
office, in view of the anticipated back lash if they made decisions 
independently. A letter to Akbarah Pesnani from Muhammad 
Maqsood Khan, the senior vice president and circle executive, marked 
‘confidential’, confirmed that even factory personnel such as Aslam 
Faruque, (a member of the Faruque family), preferred to abdicate 
responsibility of major decisions in favour of the senior management 
based at the head office. The letter referred to the negotiation of 
terms with the cement dealers, where Aslam preferred the head 
office-based management to initiate the negotiations, which was 
perceived by him to be the ‘correct’ channel of communication.®® 
Therefore, there was no independent spokesman (or an inbuilt 
management system) to represent and resolve problems at the 
factory premises.
®®Aslam Faruque was a member of the Faruque family.
®^ See telex from Akbar Pesnani to Aslam Faruque, 7 March 
1990.
®®See letter from Muhammad Maqsood Khan to Akbarah 
Pesnani, no: COP/DEV/RAK/89/-1885, 13 February 1988.
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The administrative system also required fine tuning for monitoring 
and achieving production targets. CCCL’s production department 
was managed by departmental heads with all senior engineers 
reporting to them. The minutes of meeting of the production 
department are testimony to numerous breakdowns of machinery and 
repair work arising from lack of technical maintenance. In many 
instances these meetings were also used as a platform to cover issues 
ranging firom machinery repairs to personnel grievances. While this 
was the expected forum to air production grievances, no record was 
found of follow up action taken on the issues raised in these 
meetings. From one such record, the attention of senior production 
officials was drawn to the need to acquire a resin for an X-ray 
analyser which stabilised electricity voltage fluctuations. In addition, 
the issue of coating the new kiln burner zone which had weakened 
was raised. The final issue raised in this meeting was the need to fill 
a vacancy for a fabricator mechanic for the auto workshop.®^ From 
the records of another meeting, the frequent interruption in the 
production assembly line caused by electricity voltage fluctuations 
was raised as an i s s u e . B y  1987, the cement plant experienced 
frequent electricity surge owing to the high temperature conditions
®®See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Production Department’, of 
CCCL, documented by Muhammad Ali, co-ordination manager, 23 
November 1986.
^^Documented in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Production 
Department’ of CCCL, 30 November 1986.
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in the motor bearings. This was another problem for CCCL’s 
management to resolve/^ since the cause for the temperature surge 
over the recommended level could not be ascertained. After an 
investigation, the over-heating of the motor was attributed to its 
consumption of extra current from the electricity supphed by 
WAPDA. To this effect, the engineers kept making recommendations 
to CCCL’s senior management to lodge a complaint with WAPDA, 
which does not appear to have been successfully negotiated from the 
documented e v i d e n c e . T h e  conveyer belt was also prone to 
disconnecting from its mains and the calibration of the weigh feeder 
at the raw mill also showed a deviation of four percent from the 
recommended specification.^^
The kiln, where the cement bricks were baked, represented a 
critical juncture in the cement production process. It was also an 
area characterised by frequent breakdowns and calls for repair. 
In 1988, after two years of regular performance but with no attempts 
to modernise the hearth through research and development (R&D),
^^Ibid., 28 June 1987, p. 1., and 2 August 1987, p. 1.
^^Ibid. 11 October 1987.
^^Ibid., 13 September 1987.
^^Ibid., 11 January 1987, p. 1., 4 January 1987, p. 1., 14 March 
1987, p. 1., 15 March 1987, p. 1., 7 April 1987, p. 1., 31 May 1987, 
p. 1., 2 November 1987, p. 2. and 20 December 1987, p. 1.
376
it broke down/® In spite of the computerised monitors installed, the 
kiln was not operating smoothly. Zahid Faruque commented on the 
computerisation programme at CCCL: ‘We have computerised kiln 
control therefore there is no margin for human error’.^ ® In another 
comment on computerised monitoring of operations, Zahid Faruque 
commented: ‘Everything is computerised and as a result we have the 
lowest energy consumption for cement plants in Pakistan’.^  ^
Justifying the benefits of computerisation he also commented that 
with the research and development of production processes at CCCL, 
it had reduced fuel and energy consumption by 25-30 percent for the 
rolling cement unit, and the cement grinding clinker which used steel 
spherical balls for grinding the cement had also been replaced by the 
more energy efficient hydraulic roller presses. Zahid Faruque 
claimed that, ‘we will be the second company in the world to have 
this [energy efihcient] t e c h n o l o g y T h e  new technology was 
intended to reduce energy consumption by up to 30 p e r c e n t . T h e  
only area where a technique for upgrading technology was seen to 
have been introduced at CCCL, was in the scanner at the factory.
^^Ihid., 11 June 1988, p. 1. 18 June 1988, p. 1., and 19 
December 1988, p. 1.
^®lnterview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
'^ nud.
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which scanned each hrick, and monitored the temperature variations 
in the kiln. Any deviation from the recommended temperature 
caused the bricks to collapse which they infact did as recorded 
above.*®
Furthermore, hmited attention was given to the retention of 
company records at CCCL. The availabihty of such records 
contribute to an organisational memory, which is the data base of 
information available for the group to review past decisions made by 
its predecessors in order to study their impact on subsequent 
performance, with the additional benefit of hindsight. An related 
incident occurred in 1987, when CCCL’s general manager at 
Nowshera requested the financial controller at Karachi to advise the 
former on a final date, after which all incoming and outgoing telex 
records could be incinerated.*^ The company’s policy on this seemed 
to be to retain records for up to three years at the head office after 
which they were destroyed.*^
The overall management strategy of this company was directed by 
Zahid Faruque. He did not feel the need to address conflicts which 
arose between the senior management and the more junior staff of
*®See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Production Department’ at 
CCCL 11 June 1988, p. 1. 18 June 1988, p. 1., and 19 December 
1988, p. 1.
*^See letter from CCCL’s general manager to CCCL’s financial 
controller, no: GCF/13/324, 7 February 1987.
*^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
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CCCL. This stance was encouraged by the fact that his company 
marketed a product for which demand did not fall short of supply. 
CCCL had a monopoly of cement sales in the NWFP because it was 
the only plant located there, and it was not economical for other 
cement manufacturers located further south to pay for transporting 
cement to this province. CCCL’s records indicate that only more 
immediate issues rectifying production bottlenecks were addressed, 
but there was little to indicate that there was a long-term strategy 
targeted at CCCL’s business development in the cement industry. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, by the close of 1988, Zia’s 
government had approved the installation of four new cement plants 
in the private-sector which would certainly affect CCCL’s monopoly 
in cement sales in the NWFP.
5.4 External Relations 
From 1964 to 1988, Ghulam Faruque’s successively maintained 
proximity to Ayub, Bhutto and Zia provided him with a political 
environment in which to reahse his expansionist blueprint for 
forming new investments for the group. Faruque was a beneficiary 
and overseer of State largesse to other businessmen, across these 
three political regimes. When the exogenous factors which enabled 
initial group investments were replaced in Ghulam Faruque’s 
prudent business sense, it helped him to increase his group’s net 
manufacturing assets fi'om Rs 37 million in 1968 [at 42nd position], 
to Rs 1313.21 million by 1988, which moved the group up to the
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thirteenth position.®  ^ However, by 1988 the Faruque Group was 
relatively young group with 24 years of business activity compared 
with other groups studied. All the other groups studied expanded too 
rapidly in the initial phase, and it was only after at least 30 years of 
business activity, that the benefits (from adopting) or disadvantages 
(from not adopting) internal organisational systems come to the fore.
Ghulam Faruque’s personahty was that of a seasoned bureaucrat,
adept at making an industrial investment in the large-scale
manufacturing sector, which was directed by him to reach fimition.
According to Papanek:
%.. Ghulam Faruque ... was a strong-willed, powerful 
individual who made rapid decisions, saw them carried out 
and worried about government rules, procedures or approvals 
only afterwards, if at all. He was prepared to take substantial 
risks, smothered opposition by the combination of ability and 
ruthlessness and thought constantly in terms of growth and 
expansion’.®"^
His career took off in the early 1960s, initially as the chairman of 
FIDO and then of other parastatals. The FIDO was established 
under the 1950 Act with its capital underwritten as a development 
loan fi'om the federal to the provincial g o v e r n m e n t s T h e  loan
®^A breakdown of Pakistan’s largest 43 houses, by the value of 
their net manufacturing assets, is provided in L. White, Industrial 
Concentration, 1974, pp. 60-61.
^^ G. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 95.
®^ See FIDO, ‘Development Programme of Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation,’ unpublished report, FIDO, December
1989.
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repayment was incumbent upon sale of its units to the private-sector. 
However the actual sales were not tendered or advertised; rather 
acquisition was made on the basis of personal contacts of the buyers 
with the PIDC officials. By 1960, PIDC had initiated projects with 
assets of Rs 850 million, with its own equity contribution of Rs 600 
million. Would-be entrepreneurs came forward with liquidity sums 
of Rs 20-30 million for investing in PIDC-initiated ventures. By 
1960, the total capital outlay on PIDC projects exceeded Rs 1,048 
million, of which private investment owned Rs 280 million or had a 
27 percent share. As chairman of PIDC, Ghulam Faruque was also 
able to tap credit sources and government licences which benefitted 
his own business, especially in accessing loans disbursed by the 
lending institutions to private-sector investors, such as himself.®® 
He achieved this by duplicating his efforts in directing investments 
for other businessmen by also establishing his own industrial empire. 
As a businessmen, he used the expertise he had acquired in the 
installation of sugar mills, by establishing the Faruque Group’s, 
Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited in 1964. The Sarhad Bank was also 
bought by him from the NWFP government in 1958. It had Rs 5 
million as its paid up capital and a further Rs 5 million as its equity. 
By 1970 it had Rs 20 million as its deposits,®  ^and had extended Rs
®®Interview with Muhammad Akram, 3 March 1992.
®^ The source for this information is in R. Amjad, Private 
Industrial Investment in Pakistan, Cambridge, 1982, p. 48.
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7.1 million in loans and advances to individuals and institutions.^ 
Its shares traded at Rs 15 on the Stock Exchange, a premium of 50 
percent over the Rs 10 per share par value when sold to Ghulam 
Faruque. This represented a sale below its market value when 
banks with similar equity holdings also had their shares quoted at 
Rs 15 per share, on the Stock Exchange®® To the extent that the 
Sarhad Bank’s share value was understated for arriving at a sale 
price payable by Ghulam Faruque, this transaction comprised a rent- 
seeking activity, which had also enabled other chosen industrialists 
to benefit fi*om the government’s pohcy of partiahty in privatising 
industry.
When Ghulam Faruque served as the Minister of Commerce, 
Education and of the Cotton Board in 1951, he counselled other 
industrialists in the setting up of new industry. In a letter to Wajid 
Ali (Ali Group), Faruque requested that the son-in-law of the 
Pakistani High Commissioner to India be provided with training in 
the cotton export business.®® Such favours were granted on mutual 
grounds, a relationship which was reinforced by those businessmen 
holding directorships of the country’s sole steel mill association, the 
National Steel of Pakistan Limited (NSPL). This was a consortium
®®Source of shares of other comparable banks quoted on the 
Stock Exchange are available in Dawn, 5 January 1960, 5 January 
1961 and 5 January 1962.
®®See letter from Ghulam Faruque to Wajid Ali, 27 March 1951.
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of eight large industrialists with equity participation from the 
government.®^ The industrialist directorships which overlapped 
with all other group members included in this study, were Wajid Ali 
(Ali Group) Ahmad Dawood (Dawood Group) and Muhammad Bashir 
(Crescent Group). These industrialists wielded their financial muscle 
to procure credit for NSPL from overseas and from the director- 
industrialists themselves, who were equity participators in NSPL. 
One such instance was a loan of Rs 493,600 extended by Wajid Ali to 
the project. The loan was financed by an Ali company, Ali 
Automobiles (Pvt) Limited.®  ^ Shortly after this loan was finalised, 
Wajid Ah was summoned (as a representative of NSPL) to London by 
Ghulam Faruque, to participate in loan negotiations with Schnieders 
of France.®  ^ Not only did these business personalities espouse the 
cause of the NSPL but were also appointed by Ghulam Faruque on 
the Board of Directors of a Faruque company, Mirpurkhas Sugar 
Mills Limited. These ones relevant for purposes of this study were 
Muhammad Bashir (Crescent Group) and Ahmad Dawood (Dawood
®^ The consortium members were listed in the ‘Minutes of the 
35th Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of NSPL, 12 September 
1967, in Karachi.
®^Recorded in the ‘Minutes of the 35th Meeting of the Board of 
Directors’ of NSPL, 12 September 1967, at the office of A.W. 
Adamjee, Adamjee House, Mcleod Road, Karachi, p. 2.
®^ See telex from Ghulam Faruque to Waheed Adamjee in 
Karachi, [a director of NSPL], advising him to convey this message 
to Wajid Ali, # LONDON 82 26 1202 FI/50, 27 September 1967.
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Group) who served from 1965 to 1968/^ Their directorships (on 
Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited’s Board) coincided with their active 
involvement with the NSPL till 1968, after which they failed to get 
re-elected.^®
On the foreign front, Faruque, while acting on behalf of the 
interests of the NSPL, frequently corresponded with the Secretary to 
the Ministry of Industries, negotiating loans, licences and foreign 
technical assistance required to launch this steel mill.®® Faruque 
gained preferential access to the then secretary, on the grounds that 
the former held the same position earlier. This meant that since 
Ghulam Faruque had served as secretary to the ministry of 
Industries in 1948-49, he would have been given preferential access
®^ 8^ee Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited, Annual Reports, 1965-
68 .
®®The directorships are given in Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills 
Limited, Annual Reports, 1969-88.
®®See letters from Ghulam Faruque to the Secretary, Ministry 
of Industries and Natural Resources, [Industries Division], 
Rawalpindi, No: SDA-p-15, 8 October 1964, updating him on 
negotiations with Mr. Hill, Vice President Engineering, National 
Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh, USA; also see letter from Ghulam 
Faruque, Sanatorium Richmond, Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, to 
S. Shafqat, NSPL, Karachi, 8 September 1967, advising him to 
convey to the other directors of the NSPL that he was optimistic 
that a loan of US $ 20-30 million was forthcoming from the East 
German representatives of their government; see the ‘Minutes of 
Meeting of the Board of Directors’ of NSPL, 12 September 1967, 
pp. 1-2, for Ghulam Faruque’s negotiations with an Austrian firm, 
Voest which was a prospective equity participant in the NSPL and 
of negotiations with other foreign firms, such as the Skoda of 
Czechoslovakia and Sofresid of France. The latter had expertise in 
designing and installing a steel plant at Dunkirk.
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on the grounds of this camaraderie. To this effect, he was appointed 
the chief executor in negotiating with European officials and banks 
for financial assistance to make the steel mill a fully operational and 
viable project.®  ^ Copies of all high level negotiations with foreign 
creditors and the NSPL staff were forwarded to Faruque. In 1967, 
a letter from Shafqat Ali to Faruque confirmed that credit to the tune 
of US $ 250 million appeared to be forthcoming for the steel mill 
from Schneiders, which was a French steel processing company. 
In another letter, Faruque briefed the Pakistani Finance Minister on 
the status of credit negotiations of NSPL with the heads of European 
steel boards, banks and government officials, to the following 
effect:®®
‘... the position is that against an approximate total 
requirement in foreign exchange of [US] $ 163 million, 
Schneiders have in hand offers totalling over [US] $ 180 
million’.^®®
Schneiders had the financial support of the Banque de Paris in 
France and so had the leverage to tap into the large scale credit
®^Ghulam Faruque’s status as the chief negotiator was evident 
from the correspondence of NSPL. One such letter fi*om Shafqat 
Ali of the NSPL to all directors of NSPL, 26 September 1967, CM 
(0-65, provides a summary of Ghulam Faruque’s negotiations 
with the Schnieders in London.
®®See letter from Shafqat Ali to Ghulam Faruque dated 16 
October 1967.
®®See letter from Ghulam Faruque to N.M. Uquaili, Minister 
for Finance, Karachi, 30 December 1967.
'®®/6irf.
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requirements of the NSPL, serviced by the French bank/®^ The 
French negotiators to the NSPL were active supporters of NSPL and 
entered into regular negotiations with both Faruque and Wajid 
Ali/""
Faruque’s influence on the NSPL’s pohcy making board was also
reflected in his other foreign hnks, such as the negotiations he had
with Eximbank officials in Washington D C., USA, for a loan required
by the NSPL. To this effect, Welk Eximbank [who was an Eximbank
family member employed at a senior position at this bank],
communicated a telex to Ghulam Faruque, which follows/""
‘His Excellency Ghulam Faruque Minister of Commerce, care 
Comdivis Rawalpindi. My best estimate now is that your 
presence here is probably not required until formal aid and 
bank decision on loan made and detailed discussions on 
provisions of credit agreement require guarantees etc taken 
stop This is not likely to be before end of August if ah goes 
well Regards
"^^See letter from Ghulam Faruque to Shafqat a senior official 
in the Ministry of Industries, informing him on the content of such 
negotiations, 15 August 1967, p. 2.
^""The Schneider management’s interest in involving Wajid Ali 
in their high level meetings on the future of NSPL were 
highlighted in a telex sent by Ghulam Faruque from London to 
the Karachi office of NSPL, LONDON LG 69 19 1309, 20 
September 1967, in which Wajid Ali was cautioned to be prepared 
for his departure for London, in case he was summoned for by 
Schneider himself.
"^"Also see letter, preceding this telex sent from T.E. 
Rangoonwalla of the National Steel of Pakistan to all NSPL’s 
directors, informing them on the telex enclosure, no: EXlM-4, 
dated 20 July 1965.
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,  104Welk Eximbank’.
At the level of the State, Faruque’s close relationship with Ayub 
can be seen in a letter he wrote to the Finance Minister, Mohammad 
Shoaib, in which he provided a progress report on the affairs of 
NSPL:
‘At my last meeting with the President, he made detailed 
enquiries with regard to the progress of National Steel...1 gave 
the President full details and informed him that we were 
hoping that there would be a satisfactory settlement of the 
case and that we were utilising the good offices of National 
Steel of U.S.A..I informed the President that we hoped that he 
would honour the National Steel of Pakistan by laying the 
foundation stone of this great project and it was expected that 
it would take place about the end of December 1964. The 
President said that he would be at our disposal...’.^®®
Ghulam Faruque’s intimacy with Ayub paid dividends and 
coincided with the initial group i n v e s t m e n t s . I n  1964 alone the 
group floated three companies; Faruque (Pvt) Limited, GCPL and 
Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited. From 1974 to 1979, GCPL was 
awarded three major construction contracts it implemented in Saudi 
Arabia, which materialised from the links which Faruque had with
io4rphis telex from Welk Eximbank [of the Eximbank] to 
Ghulam Faruque, [undated but on record] shows that Faruque as 
a representative of NSPL, was negotiating with Eximbank officials 
for a loan.
^°%ee letter from Ghulam Faruque to Muhammad Shoaib, no: 
SDA(P)-15, 17 October 1964.
®^®To quote S. Kochanek, [in Interest Groups and Development 
in Pakistan, Oxford, 1983, p. 271], ‘By the late 1960s, however 
business had become so closely identified with Ayub that when the 
regime came under attack, so did the business’ ’.
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the higher echelons in the Pakistani ministries, both in his capacity 
as a bureaucrat and political figure. In 1964, Ghulam Faruque also 
spearheaded the first independent National Press Trust for the 
c o u n t r y . H e  was appointed by Ayub to lead the National Press 
Trust which was an autonomous subsidiary of the Ministry of 
Information and B r o a d c a s t i n g . C o n t r o l  of the press by an 
industrialist such as himself, lent itself well to favourable reviews 
published of the achievements of business group personahties.^^® 
The Trust’s decision makers were the business group industrialists 
discussed in this study, who had also contributed to the equity of this 
organisation.^^^ Ghulam Faruque also obliged Ayub, by publishing 
favourable reviews on him, mentioned in the pubhcations owned by 
the National Press Trust. Faruque’s influence over the 
publications owned by the trust, was evident from a letter he sent to 
Wajid Ali:
^^^Ghulam Faruque’s associations with Ayub are documented in 
H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1973, pp. 23 and 60.
^^^Ibid.; also see letter from Ghulam Faruque to Wajid Ali [Ali], 
no: NPT/GF, 27 June 1970, p. 2, explaining him the status of the 
National Press Trust.
io9This information is available in H. Feldman, From Crisis to 
Crisis, Oxford, 1973, on p. 61.
^^^Ihid., pp. 63-64.
^^^Ibid., p. 60.
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The need for an independent National Press with its 
objectives as mentioned above^^  ^ was a notion, in one form 
or another, in the minds of a number of thinkers in the 
country... It took its concrete shape as the fulfilment of a 
mission on the part of some friends and myself... 1 became a 
member of the Committee and thus one of its principal 
organisers...
Faruque’s non-family personal assistant at the FIDO was 
Muhammad Akram who served him loyally, to be rewarded in 1970 
for his past services, in his appointment as the director of a Faruque 
company, Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited. Muhammad 
Akram’s association with Faruque overlapped with the latters’ 
appointment on the Cotton and Jute Board in 1949-52. Akram’s 
career took off when he was appointed a director of PIDC after East 
Pakistan seceded from Pakistan in 1971.^^  ^ In 1972, he was 
appointed the managing director of Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited
^^^hese objectives contained in the same letter from Ghulam 
Faruque to Wajid Ali, no: NPT/GF, 27 June 1970, p. 1., were as 
follows:
‘Whereas the Settlers have a feeling of responsibility as 
citizens and are desirous of establishing, helping and 
encouraging the promotion of sound and healthy journalism 
with a truly national outlook, untainted by parochial, 
partisan or sectarian inclinations, so as to contribute to the 
making of the Press a truly objective and effective 
instrument for the furtherance of unity, solidarity, integrity 
and prosperity in the various spheres of national hfe...’ ’.
^^ ^See letter from Ghulam Faruque to Wajid Ali no: NPT/GF,
27 June 1970, p. 1.
^^^Given in Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited, Annual Report, 
1970.
^^^Muhammad Akram’s career appointments are documented in 
Dawn, 1 January 1994, p. 8.
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and the chairman of Associated Constructors (Pvt) Limited. [These
appointments were initiated and endorsed by Ghulam Faruque].
Other Faruque directorships occupied by Akram were a t GCPL,
Faruque (Pvt) Limited and Associated Constructors (Pvt)
L i m i t e d . A k r a m  perceived his contribution to the country’s
industrialisation through his services rendered at the PIDC:
Tt passed through my hands. We did not have any skills. 
There were no B.Com’s^ ^^  available for our accounts. We got 
hold of an old Goanese who worked for BOAC.^^  ^ The first 
M.Com M a s t e r s ^ I  recruited after several years. We 
recruited a team of people trained in every field, chemical, 
mechanical engineering. We would recruit them and send 
them abroad for training and then they would come back by 
the time the erection of the project was taking place’.
Muhammad Akram was also a representative of the Pakistan 
Sugar Mills Association. This was a zonal committee of sugar 
manufacturers, who organised had themselves as an association 
representing their interests to the government. Its executive 
committee comprised seven members, one of whom was Altaf Saleem 
(Crescent Group). Additionally, there were three zonal committees
^^^B.Com is the Bachelor of Commerce degree.
^^^BOAC was the acronym for British Overseas Airways 
Corporation.
^^^M.Com was the Master of Commerce degree.
^^^Interview with Muhammad Akram, 3 March 1992.
^^ ^See Pakistan Sugar Mills Association, Annual Report, 1989,
p. 11.
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representing the interests of sugar manufacturers based in the 
provinces. In 1970-72, Akram acted as the chairman of this 
association and in 1988 was elected the regional chairman for its 
Zonal Committee, in Sind.^^  ^ This organisation gathered and 
compiled data on sugar prices and its production. It also presented 
in its annual report, the allocation in the national budget for any 
exemptions in duty provided to the sugar industry. Since the 
Management of Pakistan Sugar Mills Association was the voice of all 
registered sugar manufacturers, bringing their grievances to the 
g o v e r n m e n t , i t  published its activities in its Annual Report, 
which was accessible to the public.
Furthermore, with publicly quoted companies there was a 
requirement to float 50 percent of the shares to government-owned 
financial institutions, such as the National Investment Trust (NIT). 
The NIT, through its share ownership of business group shares, also 
became an equity participant in Faruque investments. Through this 
mechanism, the NIT also represented the government’s voice, in 
monitoring business group performance. In 1968, NlT’s portfoho was 
Rs 143 million, of which Rs 94 million or 60 percent was invested in
^^^Given in, Pakistan Sugar Mills Association. Annual Report 
1981, Islamabad, 1982, p. 1 and Dawn, 1 January, 1994, p. 9.
^^^The grievances of sugar manufacturers are given in W. 
Kazmi, ‘Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills, a Dramatic Turn’, Pakistan and 
Gulf Economist, 23-29 June 1990, p. 35.
‘^^Hhid., pp. 13-18.
391
private capital, and 20 percent of all private capital was owned by 
our business groups. Its investment in Faruque share-holdings was 
Rs 286,000 in 1970 which constituted 0.30 percent of NIT 
investments in business groups’ portfolio in this year. Conversely, 
the Faruque Group owned 1.43 percent of NIT shares in 1970.
Zia’s industrial pohcy allowed excess cement capacity to be 
exported, and this had the effect of generating savings in freight 
costs. CCCL exploited this situation, since it no longer incurred 
transportation costs from Nowshera to its domestic customers, 
located 1,100 miles south in Karachi. Till Zia introduced the new 
export measures, the government had remained one of CCCL’s prime 
customers, and by doing so had presented CCCL with an assured 
domestic market in cement. With the Faruque Group, the strategy 
of permitting the government to be its main customer reduced its 
risk because of its owner’s contacts with senior politicians. However, 
there was one recorded instance when government policy had an 
adverse affect on the profitability of a Faruque company, GCPL, 
when in 1985-86 the government awarded WAPDA’s electrification 
contract to GCPL’s Chinese competitors. Because GCPL relied 
heavily on government orders, the loss of this contract meant 
substantial financial losses for the company. The experiment 
with the Chinese project, and the subsequent cancellation of the 
order with GCPL, eventually led to financial losses incurred by
^^ I^nterview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992.
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WAPDA as well, because the Chinese did not fulfil their contractual 
obligation, which cost the government US $ 4 bilhon, in sunk costs 
already expended on this project/^® This disaster typified the risk 
to the private-sector, when the government contracted out large-scale 
projects to them. A possible reason for losing the order, as quoted by 
Mohammad Faruque was the, ‘everchanging government dealings 
[policies] and figuring out their impact on investment 
opportunities’. H e  meant that business-govemment relations 
were constantly changing which also affected GCPL’s profits in 1985- 
86. He reiterated, however that group diversification was only 
possible when there was an overlap of government policies with that 
of business i n t e r e s t s . H e  meant that government support was 
a prerequisite for the private-sector to grow.
In 1986, this breakdown in business-govemment relations for 
GCPL’s management, occurred at a time when they felt that they 
had a stranglehold over the bureaucratic and political machinery. 
Therefore this experience was an eye opener for them, in that 
reliance on the government for its favours especially where large 
contracts were involved, also carried with it attendant risks in the 
event of failure. Earlier on, the management at GCPL had 
circumvented risk, by looking inwards and forming Greaves
128Ibid.
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Airconditioning (Pvt) Limited in 1975 in order to acquire an assured 
source of raw materials required for GCPL’s construction needs. The 
formation of CCCL in 1981 was also a step towards backward 
integration from GCPL’s point of view, to meet with another assured 
source for obtaining cement used in its construction activities. 
Overall this group’s alliance with the government, on an on-going 
basis proved financially lucrative for the group members. 
Muhammad Faruque perceived that in his line of business the 
government’s support assisted in maintaining barriers of entry for 
would-be aspirers in the construction industry. These barriers were 
mainly high operating costs and the difficulties in finding an assured 
market in construction and related industries.
Ghulam Faruque successfully used his control networks with 
various political and bureaucratic figures to further his economic 
aims. He was ahead of other groups which initiated investments in 
textiles manufacturing whereas the Faruque Group invested directly 
in light engineering and continued to do so for a quarter of a century. 
This pattern of industrial investment initiated by Ghulam Faruque 
was because of his experience gained in the managing of new 
businesses, firstly for others and then for his own group’s 
investments. His business experience came from organising the 
installation of machinery to sale of the product in the market. This 
was only possible because of State-directed nurturing of Faruque, as 
a bureaucrat who had the power to oversee and implement large-
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scale industrial investments. This background gave him the leading 
edge as an entrepreneur who carried his experience over to managing 
Faruque investments.
5.5 Management Strategy 
The Faruque Group’s initial management strategy was to invest in 
industries that it had previously installed for its clients, such as 
sugar and textile mills and the laying of electricity transmission 
lines. The group’s management initially leased out its imported 
equipment to industrial users of machinery, and later specialised 
in the installation of imported electrical plants and equipment used 
in the construction of factories for other industrial consumers. Once 
they had gained their expertise in instalhng imported equipment for 
others, they started assembling and manufacturing the equipment 
used for construction and electricity cable laying. Once their 
manufacturing base was set, they strengthened their management 
strategy by integrating production functions. This was implemented 
by backwards vertical integration of its facilities, when it formed 
Greaves Carbon (Pvt) Limited, which produced the raw materials 
GCPL used in manufacturing its steel-based equipment. Under the 
Faruque management, GCPL was initially floated as a concern 
trading in imported equipment which was re-sold in the domestic 
market. A portion of these imports were also consumed in the initial
^^ I^nterview with Muhammad Akram, 3 March 1992.
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machinery installed at GCPL in 1964/^® By the late 1960s, trading 
in imported machinery was completely replaced a t GCPL by the 
backward integration of manufacturing its own electrical and 
mechanical construction equipment, mostly consumed in the 
production needs of other Faruque companies. The owner managers’ 
initiative in investing in the hght engineering industry was lent 
strength by the successive additions made to GCPL’s manufacturing 
facihties in related areas. By 1971, GCPL’s facilities were extended 
to servicing of the equipment installed for other manufacturers in 
industry. In 1986, GCPL had integrated backwards again by 
erecting electrical sub-stations which fed electricity in to the main 
power line grid stations owned by WAPDA. Another example of 
backward integration, was when GCPL accessed electrical technology 
made available by Greaves Carbon (Pvt) Limited in 1965. This 
company provided GCPL with carbon brushes, electrical motors, 
textile machinery and related carbon products, as the raw material 
used in manufacturing electrical installations at GCPL. By 1988, 
GCPL had an authorised capital of Rs 10 million with a further paid- 
up capital of Rs 1 million. Faruque’s integrated business 
strategy made it a prominent, electrical projects contractor.
The group’s initial management strategy was to acquire the
^^^Interview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992.
^^^Given in ‘Faruque Group of Companies’, unpublished 
document; no date.
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majority shares of foreign companies owned by British investors in 
Pakistan. This provided the group with a ready base on which to 
build its future investments. One strategy for expansion was to 
acquire established companies, preferably with foreign equity 
participation and then to purchase a majority stake. For example, 
Greaves Carbon Products (Pvt) Limited was originally owned by 
Crompton Parkinson (Pak) Limited which had its parent company in 
the UK, called Crompton Parkinson Limited formed in 1949. In 
1965, Greaves Carbon (Pvt) Limited acquired a majority holding and 
in doing so set up a base in the electrical industry by producing the 
raw materials required by GCPL’s machinery manufacturing facihty. 
GCPL was made another Faruque investment in 1965 when it 
purchased the majority shares of its British owners who were in the 
electricity contracting business. Till 1984 it still had foreign 
investment which changed when this group purchased the remaining 
20 percent of its foreign share-holding. These shares were valued at 
Rs 600,000 as the Faruque Group’s equity which was increased by a 
further Rs 100,000 in 1988.^^^
In tune with the group’s preference to integrate functions,
Greaves Airconditioning (Pvt) Limited used steel alloys manufactured 
by GCPL, in manufacturing its airconditioning equipment. Greaves 
Cotton Airconditioning (Pvt) Limited provided the support facihties 
of servicing, erection and maintenance of the airconditioning
^^ I^nterview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992.
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manufacturing facilities at Greaves Airconditioning (Pvt) Limited. 
Another example of integrating functions, was to manufacture their 
own cement at CCCL, which provided the raw material to erect grid 
stations and instal electrification projects executed by GCPL. CCCL 
was initially established through the equity contributed by its sister 
concerns, GCPL and Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited. In 1984, 
CCCL itself was to integrate backwards into manufacturing 
equipment and spare parts used to make refectory bricks. By 1986, 
the management had spent Rs 160 milhon annually on its brick 
imports, and 75 percent of CCCL’s bricks were still imported by 1987. 
When asked to comment on his group’s criterion for a successfully 
run business, Zahid Faruque responded that it was measured by its 
higher profits of Rs 65 million in 1988 compared with its closest 
rival. Zeal Pak Cement’s profits at Rs 8.5 million. Since 90 percent 
of CCCL’s sales were made through dealers coupled with an assured 
niche it had in the domestic cement market, Zahid Faruque believed 
[erroneously] that its profits base was secure and assured, and that 
this stability allowed them to compete with other cement 
manufacturers on technological terms as well.
By the mid-1970s, the group’s brief experience of construction and 
related services had provided its management with the confidence 
required to enter into joint venture contracts with foreign partners.
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In 1979, GCPL’s collaborated with British and Japanese 
co mp an i e s , b y  entering in to turnkey contracts with them, where 
GCPL provided its expertise in the implementation, installation and 
servicing of the equipment. The group members actively sought 
foreign investment but at the same time did not have to compete 
internationally for the award of these construction contracts.
In the domestic market WAPDA was GCPL’s main client, a liaison 
which reached fruition through an association which commenced in 
1958 with Ghulam Faruque’s appointment as the chairman of 
WAPDA, and was realised in three large domestic construction 
contracts which were awarded by WAPDA to GCPL in 1974-79. In 
1974, the first, was for a 500 KV line from Tarbela to Khushab, 
covering 116 miles of rugged terrain. TiU then, this was financially 
the most lucrative project, which fetched Rs 100 million for the 
c o m p a n y . T h e  second contract in 1979, was for a 500 KV over 
head transmission hne firom Faisalabad to Ghazi Ghat, covering a 
distance of 180 miles; the third, for a similar facility, was from 
Sahiwal to Multan, covering a distance of 101 miles. This company’s 
strategy remained fuel and technology efficient in an environment 
where other manufacturers had faded out owing to increasing costs
^^^Given in, ‘Faruque Group of Companies’, unpublished 
company document.
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and an inability to recover from or circumvent the risks incurred/^® 
CCCL’s management strategy related to employee welfare was an 
area representing a recurrent problem. On his company’s strategy 
on grooming its employees, Zahid Faruque mentioned the dismissal 
of, ‘one or two individuals who did not prove up to the mark’.^ ®^ He 
felt that the information feedback system was effective in so far as 
booked orders for sales and production targets were recorded on the 
computers and all reports were sent on to him. He perceived the 
working environment to be clean and comfortable and the company 
to be a good pay m a s t e r s . H e  also justified the positive ‘public’ 
image cultivated by CCCL’s management since they had installed an 
electronic precipitator which controlled emissions from its cement 
p l a n t . H o w e v e r ,  an instance occurred in 1988, which proved to 
the contrary which involved the selection of a V-belt suppher by 
CCCL’s mechanical manager. The supplier was known by CCCL’s 
management to have supplied counterfeit V-belts to the company and 
a motion was proposed to blacklist the supplier for future orders. 
However the mechanical manager agreed to do so only for V-belt 
orders but continued to place orders with the same supplier for other
^^^Interview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992. 
^^^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
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types of conveyer b e l t s I n  doing so, he made an exception of the
supplier’s misdemeanour which confirmed that unprofessional
practices were prevalent at CCCL. However, Zahid Faruque’s
claimed that his management style set CCCL apart from its
competitors in that:
‘Everything here is computerised and as a result [we] have 
[the] lowest energy consumption for [a] cement plant in 
Pakistan, or the highest profit margin per ton of cement’/^^
The success of the computerisation programme at CCCL’s factory
had its merits in helping information dissemination but did not
necessarily demonstrate an effective management style. Zahid
Faruque’s opinion on the factors which contributed to the success of
his business were threefold namely:
‘Ninety percent sales with dealers, computerisation and good 
management [which] knows where we stand and can compete 
in technology’.
Zahid’s opinion of a successfully managed business was based on 
the existence of the requisite tools which assisted the implementation 
of orders, but does not explain how the management used these tools 
to improve organisational systems. The tools on their own cannot 
produce appropriate results, rather it is in how they are used and to
^^%ee ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Production Department’ of 
CCCL, 22 May 1988, p. 1.
^^^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
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fulfil which objective, by the managers (either effectively or 
inefiectively) that makes the difference between appropriate or 
inappropriate management practices.
As was the custom in the Ali and Crescent Groups, the Faruque 
Group had family members who owned substantial shares in its 
publicly subscribed concerns. In 1988, as far as overlap of family 
members or from subsidiary companies within the groups was 
evident, 33 percent of CCCL’s share-holdings rested with family 
members and 43 percent with financial institutions and insurance 
companies and the remaining 21 percent with the (non-financial 
institution) public. By 1988, the share-holding structure at 
Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited was 32 percent vested with family 
members, 42 percent with NIT and ICP, 5 percent with insurance 
companies, 10 percent with financial institutions, 10 percent with 
joint-stock companies and the remaining 1 percent with other non­
group foundations.
The management at CCCL had addressed the issue of in built 
succession by appointing its third generation members through 
induction into senior management positions at CCCL; Azam Faruque, 
who was Zahid’s son, was made the coordination manager in 1988; 
two nephews of Zahid Faruque, Shehryar and Aslam Faruque were 
appointed the product and executive marketing managers
^^^Given in, Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited, Annual Report, 
1989.
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respectively in 1988/^^ Additional company directors of CCCL 
were also monopolised by family presence in the appointment of 
Aslam and Shehryar F a r u q u e T h e r e  were minimal non-family 
managers located at the factory premises and it was evident from 
this structure that it was designed to maintain family control, which 
according to Zahid Faruque’s perception was not the case, ‘we don’t 
believe in government designations - too many chiefs and no 
Indians’/^ ®
As a whole, built-in succession or the grooming of non-fgimily 
individuals for senior management positions was not forthcoming in 
this group. The sole exception to this was the appointment of 
Muhammad Akram as a director of Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills in 1970 
who was later appointed as its managing director in 1974.^ ^® He 
was considered by the Faruque family to be a confidant of Ghulam 
Faruque. Muhammad Akram’s views on the significance of company
^^ ^See letter from Azam Faruque to Ghulam Muhammad, 
GCPL, Khyber View Plaza, Sarhad Road, Peshawar, 21 September 
1988, where the former’s designation was specified. Aslam 
Faruque’s designation as the executive marketing manager was 
documented in a letter sent by Muhammad Maqsood Khan, senior 
vice president of the group, to Akbarali Pesnani, no: 
COP/DEV/RAK/89/-1885, 19 February 1988.
^^ ^See a draft signed on 12 September 1988 by the executive 
director, Zahid Faruque for a resolution to appoint company 
directors who could operate the Muslim Commercial Bank account.
^^^Interview with Zahid Faruque, 9 March 1992.
^^ ®Given in, Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited, Annual Report, 
1970, p 1.
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correspondence as a resource which assisted in devising its strategy 
was not positive, since he felt that all the relevant facts were 
available in the balance sheets, ‘this is how we were given 
information at This attitude showed that he had not gone
through a process of professionalisation of his experience (explained 
in the Systems Approach methodology) and preferred to apply the 
older management style he used while serving at the PIDC. He was 
adamant that the process of growth could not be effectively revealed 
from company correspondence, rather its correct source was the 
balance sheet of the c o m p a n y T h e  balance sheet was in any 
case available, by government statute for all shareholders and 
members of pubhc to peruse through and its inherent information on 
company activities was usually doctored. Muhammad Akram’s 
reluctance to expand upon other sources, which could he relied upon 
for gauging his company’s management strategy, were effectively 
blocked by his non-concihatory stance in providing further insight 
into the management practices at Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited, 
or in being able to analyse the impact of modem management 
methods (if at all existing) in this company.
The only recorded occasion when non-family employees exceeded 
family members in senior decision-making roles at Famque was at 
GCPL’s construction project in Saudi Arabia, which entailed
^^^Interview with Muhammad Akram, 3 March 1992.
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employing an additional 800 temporary staff and workers. The 
foreign location of this project necessitated employing a large 
component of non-family management, who were relocated overseas. 
In Muhammad Faruque’s opinion, the management policies at GCPL 
encouraged delegation and decentralisation of responsibihties.^"^® 
His management team mostly comprised of engineers who were line 
managers with few individuals involved in performing staff 
f u n c t i o n s . F o r  updating production processes at GCPL he first 
commissioned the support of a selection committee, which comprised 
of members from the Faruque Group, and then proceeded to 
implement the c h a n g e s . T i m e l y  decision making as seen by him 
was in the prompt receipt of reports to the senior management 
reviewed in the monthly meetings of the Board of Directors. 
Muhammad Faruque viewed his style of management as
^^^Interview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992.
^^°Line functions are situational and ad hoc addressing work 
methods; staff functions synthesis the management function and 
address the standardisation of skills and output. This concept is 
discussed in considerable detail with regard to management 
structures in H. Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organisations, 
Prentice Hall International, Inc., 1979, pp. 186 and 192-93, and by 
C. Myers and J. Turnbull, ‘Line and Staff in Industrial Relations’, 
in J. Litterer, Organisations: Structure and Behaviour, John Wiley, 
1963, pp. 308-316. Also see J. Yates, Control Through 
Communication, Baltimore, 1989. The Systems Approach 
methodology addresses the standardisation of procedures, across 
hierarchies, in upward and downward business communication 
through an iterative process.
^^^Interview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992.
^^Hhid.
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constructive, especially when GCPL was successful in obtaining three 
important contracts in 1974 for the construction of the Tarbela- 
Khushab and- Lahore transmission lines, valued at Rs 100 million 
and Rs 230 million respectively/^^ These contracts indicated 
proved financially lucrative in a specific year emanating from factors 
in the exogenous environment. It also showed the group’s 
dependence on the government in obtaining lucrative contracts but 
did not provide the basis of an effective internal organisational 
system explaining success in business. As with the case with his 
brother, Zahid Faruque’s style of management, Muhammad Faruque 
too rehed more on verbal communication, or through facsimile 
transmission of inter group communication, than on documented 
company records and p r o c e d u r e s . O n  the training of managers 
at GCPL, Muhammad Faruque conceded that for every 12 engineers 
recruited by GCPL firom Peshawar University, at least seven would 
leave the company for better job prospects else where. This 
explained the small proportion of permanent staff both in line and 
staff functions employed at GCPL.
The Faruque Group opted for developing its investments in the 
light engineering sector from its onset without going through the 
earlier [teething] stages of investing in primary or intermediate goods
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production as Faruque i n v e s t m e n t s T h e y  were able to do this 
by virtue of their late entry into an area of business where they had 
already gained expertise through observation and in extending advice 
to other industrialists, when the latter were setting up a base in 
textiles manufacturing/^® While other groups, such as Crescent, 
were expanding their base in textiles, Faruque had started 
manufacturing and assembling the machines used to process primary 
commodities into finished goods, such as machinery used by sugar 
and cement manufacturers and electricity suppliers. No doubt 
Ghulam Faruque’s experience in managing PIDC projects from their 
onset to completion, and in the issuing of permits for the same (when 
he was Secretary, Ministry of Industries), was a viable substitute for 
any experience he would have gained through trial and error, were 
he to have invested in industry from his personal resources without 
any prior knowledge of how to operate capital-intensive, technical 
plants. Ghulam Faruque the bureaucrat-tumed-industrialist, was 
familiar and experienced in the organisational procedures involved 
in the implementation of machinery installation required for 
industrial use, and this enabled him to foresee, recognise and invest 
in meeting the demand for engineering goods at a time when Ayub’s
®^®See W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 3rd. ed., 
Cambridge, 1990, pp. 4, 9 and 52.
®^®See M. Lieberman and D. Montgomery, ‘First Mover 
Advantages’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, 1988, pp. 41- 
58.
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industrialisation programme was on the upswing. In 1959-63, a 
ready demand for machines in a new market dominated by the 
demand for consumer goods (which needed machines to process them 
into saleable commodities), circumvented the need for this group to 
first process primary commodities before themselves becoming 
producers of light engineering goods. Capital goods demand was 
artificially induced by the government in the capacity generated by 
PlDC-led units which became available for sale to the private-sector 
by I960.'""
To minimise their risk the group members, at the same time also 
kept cordial relations with the government, so to maintain their 
access to an assured market for its goods and services related to 
large construction projects. Ghulam Faruque’s previous connections 
with various government officials, cultivated while he was a senior 
bureaucrat, served well in assisting him to obtain the necessary 
licences for the formation of Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited in 
1964. This was implemented a t a time when the group’s 
management was in the business of installing machinery for sugar 
mills for its industrial clients. Throughout Faruque’s history, the 
government played a multifaceted role for them; firstly as Ghulam 
Faruque’s employer, secondly as a facilitator of licences for PIDC and
'""Details of PIDC projects established and then sold to the 
private-sector from 1955-1989, are available in PIDC, 
‘Development Programme of the Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation’, PIDC, unpublished report, 1989, p. 77-78.
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Faruque investment, (for PIDC projects executed under the direction 
of Ghulam Faruque) and thirdly by cementing this bond bilaterally, 
by making the government its main customer.
5.6 Conclusion
This group had a similar history to the Ali Group, in that its 
founder, Ghulam Faruque was a prominent figure through his role 
as a policy maker who articulated the design of new industrial 
investments, at a time when few individuals were given the 
opportunity to do so. During Ayub's regime, his successful career in 
politics and as a bureaucrat provided him with the impetus to 
conceptuahse launching his own group of companies. Ghulam 
Faruque, as WAPDA’s chairman was able to tap into other senior 
bureaucrats and pohticians’ working agenda on a regular basis. Most 
of Faruque investments in electrical engineering works and 
construction activities were integrated and inter-related. Since it 
was a relatively late-mover compared with its predecessors in 
initiating business house investments as a whole, the Faruque Group 
was able to absorb more lucidly fi*om the implementation logistics 
attendant to assisting the initial investments of other pioneering 
industrialists. To this extent, this group’s members did not undergo 
the same teething problems of learning skills in the managing of its 
light engineering goods investments, as was the case in other groups
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studied so Its management strategy of direct engineering
investments in the 1960s, was cushioned from the fact that Ghulam 
Faruque had acquired the necessary expertise in managing such 
investments even though they were not originally owned by him. 
Because of Ghulam Faruque’s expertise in setting up light 
engineering industries for others, he displayed confidence in himself 
opting for light engineering investments, without necessarily gaining 
prior experience in the traditionally popular and less risk averse area 
of textiles manufacturing. This strategy enabled a relatively late- 
mover in industry, to catch up with his predecessors in the making 
of his group’s business history. One of the spin off effects of being a 
late-mover in industry, was that members of the Faruque Group 
capitalised on becoming first-movers in higher value-added industry, 
such as the assembly and installation of transmission lines for dams, 
roads and related works. This led the value of the group’s net assets 
to rapidly rise from 42nd position in 1968, to thirteenth position by 
1 9 8 8 . Therefore, from its inception the group’s potential to 
supersede other groups in the rate of increase of the value of its net 
assets, was achieved over a shorter period, by virtue of the higher 
returns that capital goods investments in higher order industries
^%ee M. Lieberman and D. Montgomery ‘First-Mover 
Advantages’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, 1988, pp. 42- 
43, for entry barriers to and advantages of being a late-starter in 
industry.
^^ ^See Table 2.15 for a comparative presentation of business 
group net assets.
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perpetrate.
On its personnel policies, CCCL was faced with internal strife, 
labour disputes and a management lacking the drive to take remedial 
action in resolving its internal issues. Zahid’s inertia to resolve them 
emanated from the secure base that CCCL had in the cement 
market. As with the other groups studied so far, the secure base was 
initially a necessary condition to direct government concessions 
needed for empire building but was not a sufficient condition to 
sustain, consolidate and expand the business in later years. As in 
the case of GCPL, the dependence on government contracts reversed 
its profitability into losses^ ®®, in a year when a major contract was 
awarded to its competitors. This showed that for pioneering 
businesses, (as with CCCL’s formation). State patronage remained an 
effective stimulator of the business ethic but not necessarily a 
reliable patron for its business development in the long-term. From 
other groups studied, this patronage did not alone sustain 
development in the long-term, rather it had to be supplanted by 
internal organisational systems to sustain it. By 1988, CCCL had to 
face four new competitors in cement manufacturing and marketing, 
and it would surely have required a change in its management 
practices to meet the challenge posed to it through the change in 
market conditions.
leoThe loss for GCPL was incurred in 1985, conveyed to the 
author in an interview with Muhammad Faruque, 15 March 1992.
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In Ghulam Faruque’s case, it was his dealings with people and 
situations when he was an administrator of industrial investments 
that familiarised him with the effective managing of business. He 
was then able to carry his inventory of knowledge over to managing 
Faruque Group investments. Therefore, as an entrepreneur he 
succeeded in sustaining the Faruque Group’s investments in light 
engineering, because he had received the necessary training in 
effective internal organisational systems, even though it initially 
happened when he was not the leader of a business group.
412
CHAPTER SIX 
THE DAWOOD GROUP
Introduction
The Dawood Group family commenced their business activities in 
undivided India in the 1920s. Its members traded in spices, 
foodstuff, cotton yam  and vegetable oil. The Dawood family were a 
community originating from Bentwa in India. Prior to migrating to 
Pakistan in 1947, they invested in manufacturing while continuing 
with their interests in trade. This chapter analyses the development 
of the Dawood Group and the complexion of its investment over 39 
years (1949-1988) of its business history in Pakistan. Section One 
provides the early history of the Dawood Group. Section Two 
provides an overview through an historical account of the group’s 
manufacturing investment from 1949 to 1988. Section Three 
presents three case studies of selected Dawood Group companies, 
which reveal the management practices of its managers and their 
effects on the investment patterns which emerged. Section Four 
deals with external relations. It addresses the interplay of political 
and economic power wielded by key business personalities in the 
Dawood Group, derived from their close association with President 
Ayub and other bureaucrats. It shows how this liaison initially 
translated itself into a network of controls and economic benefits for 
the group. These benefits were used by the group leaders to direct
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the country’s economic resources towards the creation of their 
businesses, such as through accessing import and manufacturing 
licenses, tax hohdays, bonus vouchers, and discounted rates of foreign 
exchange. Section Five analyses the specific rent-seeking activities 
of members of the Dawood Group, through their association with 
those in the higher echelons in the government. These activities 
reveal that energy consumed on such activities were not replaced by 
effective internal organisational systems which ensure long-term 
growth. Section Six presents the management strategy adopted by 
those members of this group in positions of responsibihty. Section  
Seven concludes that the group members orchestrated the transition 
to fight engineering production only where new internal 
organisational systems were adopted.
6.1 Group Formation and Background 
The Dawood Group initiated its trading and manufacturing 
investment in undivided India. At an early age, its first generation 
entrepreneur Ahmad Dawood, was entrusted with the charge of his 
younger brothers whom he inducted into business. He initiated his 
career in Bombay as a dealer of cotton and rayon yam  and went on 
to import and export the same commodities.^ Ahmad Dawood was 
more ambitious than his brothers and went to great lengths to 
transform their collective status as traders, to becoming a recognised
^Given in, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’, unpublished company 
document; no place, no year.
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and articulate member of Pakistan’s business elite. His endeavours 
were not in vain and the following table stands testimony to the 
rapid rise of the Dawood Group from its origins to the close of 1988, 
when group turnover peaked at Rs 3,300 million.^
^Given in Bhojani and Sanotra, ‘Coming Into Their Own’, 
Business Today, March 22 - April 6 1992, pp. 42-52.
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Table 6.1
Dawood Industrial Investments, 1948-88 
Company Nature of Business Year Estb.
1.Dawood Corporation (Pvt) Ltd.
2.Dawood England (Pvt) Ltd.
3.Dawood Industries (Pvt) Ltd.
4.Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd.
6.Dawood Petroleum Ltd. 
T.Burewala Textile Mills Ltd.
5.Kamaphuli Paper Mills Ltd.
9.Lawrencepur Woollen 
Mills Limited
10.Central Insurance
11.Dawood Foundation (Pvt) Ltd.
12.National Mines Ltd. 
IS.Karnaphuli Rayon &
Chemicals Ltd.
14.Dawood Jute Mills Limited
15.Dilon Ltd.
16.Dawood Hercules Ltd.
17.Dawood Shipping Company Ltd. 
IS.Descon Engineering (Pvt) Ltd.
19.Transpak Corporation Limited
Importing agency 1948
Brokerage house 1949
Managing Agents 1951
Woven and Finished 1951 
Cloth and Yam 
Marketing Cmde oil 1959 
Ginned and Spinned 1959 
Cotton
Paper Manufacturingl959 
Woollen Cloth 1960
Manufacturing 
Insurance 1960
Charitable Trust 1961
Coal Mining 1961
Rayon Fibre 1967
20.Lahore Cycle Industry 
(Pvt) Ltd.
21.Baluch Engineering Works
22.Delta (Pvt) Ltd.
23.Dawood Yamaha Ltd.
24.Crescent Pak Soap 
Industries Ltd.
25.Sulfina (Pvt) Ltd. 
26.United Refiigerators Ltd.
Jute 1967
Nylon Yarn 1968
Fertiliser, (Urea) 1968 
Shipping Services 1968 
Consultancy Services 1977 
Manufacturing 1984 
& Trading in 
Detergent &
Gas Appliances
Cycle Manufacturingl985
Engineering Works 1985 
Unsaturated 1986
Polyester and Alkyd 
Resin Manufacturing 
Motor Cycle Assemblyl988 
Soap Manufacturing 1988
Sulphuric Acid 1988
Airconditioner and 1988 
Refrigerator Assembly
Source: Dawood Group, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’, unpubhshed 
and undated company document; no place, no year.
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The following section presents an historical account of the 
evolution of the Dawood Group.
6.2 Business Development: 1948-88 
The Dawood Group’s trading origins were in spices and foodstuffs 
in undivided India. By the 1930s, the group’s first company was 
established, under the banner of M Siddique and Co., trading in 
cotton yam  imports from Japan. This activity continued until the 
Second World War.^ By the 1940s, the company had 17 offices 
scattered over British India, from Amritsar in the north to Madras 
and Calcutta in the south. All branches were managed by family 
members. In 1946, the group made its entry into manufacturing 
industry and invested Rs 7.5 million in establishing a cotton ginning 
unit, an oil mill and a ghee mill, located at Bombay, Madras and 
Calcutta respectively.^ The ginning mill ginned 100 bales of cotton 
per day and the oU mill cmshed 15 tons of groundnuts per day. The 
ghee mül, trading as United Vegetables Manufacturers Limited, 
crushed 10 tons of oil per day.^ This was the first group in this 
study which entered manufacturing industry prior to the group 
members’ migration to Pakistan. In 1947, the turmoil presented by
^Interview with Razak Dawood, managing director. Delta (Pvt) 
Limited, Lahore Cycles (Pvt) Limited and Descon (Pvt) Limited, 26 
October 1991, in Lahore. See Appendix A for a list of questions 
asked in the interview.
^Interview with Haji Muhammad Ghani, son of Haji Abdul 
Ghani, 8 March 1992 in Karachi. See Appendix A.
^Ihid,
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partition to both Muslims and Hindus alike, also made for the mass 
exodus of the Dawood community to Karachi in Pakistan. Upon 
emigrating, the group’s leader, Ahmad Dawood determined to 
continue trading in cotton. His two brothers, Suleman and Siddique 
were given the responsibility of managing respectively the 
sales/accounts and procurement/finances of the business.® The three 
brothers were assisted in exercising their daily duties by three 
managers: Ah Muhammad and Abdul Ghani, who were family 
members and Aziz Moon, a non-family manager of the group. Abdul 
Ghani was the technical adviser to the group, keeping them informed 
about the benefits of adopting new technology. In 1947, Ahmad 
Dawood travelled to Britain and was successful in obtaining credit 
from the Chartered Bank in Oldham, UK, assisted by a British 
official named Jeifer, who organised the requisite finance required for 
trading in cotton.^ In 1948, once the group had established itself in 
a new milieu in Pakistan, it formed Dawood Corporation (Pvt) 
Limited, a private hmited concern in Karachi.® This company was 
to become the parent company of the group and specialised in
^Interview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
^Ihid. The Memon community had commercial finks with 
British companies in undivided India, and this is given in S. Levin, 
‘The Upper Bourgeoisie from the Muslim Commercial Community 
of Memons in Pakistan, 1947 to 1971’, Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, 
March 1974, p. 234.
^Interview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
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importing cotton yam  from Oldham, for re-sale in Pakistan.® This 
company was also the managing agent for the group’s investment 
and helped to set up future Dawood industries. By the close of 1988 
it was also involved in the sale of fertiliser and insecticide and 
provision of plant protection services.^® In 1949, Dawood England 
(Pvt) Limited was formed in the UK, specifically to obtain credit to 
finance the sale of British finished cotton in Pakistan. Dawood 
England (Pvt) Limited were the brokers (agents) for Ralli Brothers 
and Volkart Brothers in the UK;“  raw cotton yam  was purchased 
on their behalf in undivided India by the Dawood brothers which was 
then exported to Britain, where it was re-exported to Pakistan in its 
finished form.^^ Ahmad Dawood was based in the UK while his 
brothers managed the trading partnership from Pakistan. At the 
same time, the cotton ginning and ghee mills in India were sold and 
the proceeds from their sale were used to provide venture capital for 
Dawood investment in Pakistan. This group also successfully
^Ibid.
^®Given in, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’, unpublished company 
document; no place, no year.
“ The Ralli Brothers and Volkart Brothers agents for cotton 
and machinery sale who had trading interests in undivided India 
since the early 1900s.
^^Interview with Haji Muhammad Ghani, 8 March 1992.
^^Till 1948 there was open trade between India and Pakistan, 
after which diplomatic relations were [temporarily] severed. This 
is given in B.R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860- 
1970, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 165 and 170.
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obtained the requisite import licences, which were not freely 
accessible to all those holding aspirations to set up industry in 
Pakistan.
In 1949, seven sons of the three Dawood brothers were sent to the 
UK and USA for further e d u c a t i o n . T h e y  were to return to 
positions of responsibility in managing Dawood companies. By 1950, 
Ahmad Dawood also returned to Pakistan to initiate a business 
dynasty; in 1951, Dawood Industries (Pvt) Limited and Dawood 
Cotton Mills Limited were established, the latter in Landhi as a 
public limited company involved in spinning and weaving cotton. 
Dawood Cotton MiUs Limited was a mill which operated with 25,000 
spindles [which by 1988 had been increased to 100,000 spindles]. Its 
facihties were fully integrated to include weaving, dyeing, bleaching 
and finishing facilities all located within the same unit.^^ Dawood 
Cotton Mills Limited was managed by eight directors, six of whom 
were from Dawood and two were non-family directors. By 1988 the 
paid-up capital of this unit was Rs 45 million and annual turnover 
was Rs 400 milhon.^® In 1952, the export sales of spun cotton at 
Dawood Cotton Mills Limited met with an up swing, when the 
Korean war provided Pakistani cotton exports with a niche in the
^^Interview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
^^Interview with Haji Muhammad Ghani, 8 March 1992.
% ee Introducing Dawood Group’, unpublished company 
document, no place, no year and Dawood Cotton Mills, Annual 
Report, 1989.
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Korean market for cotton textiles. Dawood Cotton Mills Limited was 
the selling arm of Dawood Industries (Pvt) Limited. Over the next 
17 years, a large portion of which covered Ayub’s political era, the 
group members invested in nine additional manufacturing/service 
industries; in 1959, a public limited concern, which was a cotton 
textile mill, the Burewala Textile Mills Limited was acquired, for 
Rs 100 per share, from the Punjab Industrial Board through Ahmad 
Dawood’s contacts with the director of this organisation, l.H. 
Usmani.^^ At the time of purchase the market value of its quoted 
shares was Rs 130 per s h a r e . T e c h n i c i a n s  from the Dawood 
Cotton Mills Limited were loaned out to organise a team at Burewala 
Textile Mills Limited. The unit was designed for 500 looms and 
26,000 spindles and the ginning machines were imported from the 
USA. This plant had other manufacturing facilities operating under 
its umbrella, namely an oil mill, a vegetable oil plant and a poultry 
feed processing unit.^^ By 1988 there were 66,000 spindles and the 
company had a paid up capital of Rs 37 million and its combined 
sales from all the products had reached Rs 530 million.^® The 
Kam aphuli Paper Mills Limited was acquired from the Pakistan 
Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) in 1959, through Ahmad
^^Interview with Haji Muhammad Ghani, 8 March 1992.
^^Company document, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’. 
^°Given in, Burewala Textile Mills, Annual Report, 1989.
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Dawood’s close contacts with the Nawab of Kalabagh, an individual 
quite assertive in Pakistani pohtics.^^ The mill had a capacity for 
producing 100 tons of paper per day and was acclaimed as South 
Asia’s largest paper producing mill at the time.^^ In 1959, Dawood 
Petroleum  Limited was formed as a marketing company supplying 
crude oil to government-owned oil refineries in the country.^^ In 
1960, the purchase of the Lawreneepur Woollen and Textile 
Mills (Pvt) Limited, from the Pakistan Co-operative Society was 
an outcome of the close connection of Ahmad Dawood with the 
Nawab of Kalabagh.^^ This manufacturing facility was organised 
as a co-operative society with the Nawab of Kalabagh as its chief 
patron and its sale to Ahmad Dawood was made at a time when the 
mill’s was facing financial losses, hence Ahmad Dawood purchased 
it a t an economically low price which was at par value of its
^^The Nawab of Kalabagh’s political stature is given in H. 
Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, pp. 56, 109 and 190.
^^This reference to size was documented in S. Levin, ‘The 
Upper Bourgeoisie from the Muslim Commercial Community of 
Memons in Pakistan, 1947 to 1971’, Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, March 
1974, p. 237; also see, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’, unpublished 
company document, no place, no year.
^^See unpublished company document, ‘Introducing Dawood 
Group’, no place, no year.
^^The Nawab of Kalabagh’s stint as chairman of the PIDC and 
the Governor of West Pakistan is given in H. Feldman, From 
Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, p. 56.
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shares.^® The wool scouring and finishing machinery was for the 
mill was imported from Japan.^® By 1988, Lawreneepur Woollen 
and Textile Mills had a paid-up capital of Rs 27 million.^^ In 1960, 
the Central Insurance Company was also added on to the group’s 
investments as a public limited flotation on the Stock Exchange. The 
company offered insurance services for fire, marine and accidents. 
In 1988 its paid-up capital was Rs 4 million.^® The Dawood 
Foundation and National Mines (Pvt) Limited were floated in 
1961, the former a charitable trust and the latter, a company 
involved in coal mining. The Kamaphuli Rayon Mills Limited 
and the Dawood Jute Mills Limited were estabhshed in 1967. 
Both were joint venture projects with a Japanese company called 
Asahi, who contributed 10 percent of the equity.^^ The rayon 
manufacturing plant was reputed to be the world’s largest rayon fibre 
manufacturing unit using bamboo as its raw material.^® By 1968,
^^Interview with Aziz Moon, executive director, Dawood 
Corporation (Pvt) Limited, 17 January 1994, in Karachi. See 
Appendix A.
^^Interview with Haji Muhammad Ghani, 8 March 1992.
^^See, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’, unpublished company 
document, no place, no year.
^^Interview with Aziz Moon, 17 January 1994.
^^Given in, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’, unpublished company 
document and S. Levin, ‘The Upper Bourgeoisie from the Muslim 
Commercial Community of Memons in Pakistan, 1947 to 1971’, 
Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, March 1974, pp. 231-243, on the industrial 
history of Memons from the 12th century onwards, which he
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three further additions were made to the group’s investments in the 
formation of the following: a nylon processing plant with a capacity 
to process 20,100 tons of nylon yam  per year was set up in 1968, 
called Dilon (Pvt) Limited. By the close of 1988, Dilon (Pvt) 
Limited’s paid-up capital was Rs 10 milhon and its annual sales 
turnover was Rs 95 million.^^ In 1968, Dawood Hercules Limited 
was established (as another foreign joint venture collaboration, on 
this occasion with Hercules Incorporated of the UK).^  ^ Hercules 
Incorporated was a subsidiary of the chemicals section of Dupont, an 
American conglomerate. Dawood owned 40 percent equity in Dawood 
Hercules Limited, and Hercules Incorporated owned a further 40 
percent, with 10 percent sponsored by the International Finance 
Corporation and the remaining 10 percent owned by the general 
public. By 1988, its paid-up capital was Rs 139 million and sales
unveils through their commercial occupation in undivided India.
^^See unpublished company document, ‘Introducing Dawood 
Group’ and Dilon Limited, Annual Report, 1989.
^^DHL was formed with foreign equity collaboration with 
Hercules, UK in 1968, for the manufacture and sale of urea in the 
Punjab province. It was one of the existing two private-sector and 
multinational fertiliser plants in the country, the other one being 
Exxon Chemicals (Pvt) Limited, also formed in 1968. According to 
Ahsan Raza, [the finance and administration manager of Dawood 
Hercules Limited from 1969 to 1982], interview, 30 March 1992, 
Exxon Chemicals (Pak) Limited’s management assisted the 
Pakistan government in the exploration and tapping of gas fields 
in the Sind, where its manufacturing facility was located. 
However, Dawood Hercules’ fertiliser plant located in the Punjab, 
had a history of erratic gas supply which was more highly priced 
for them by the government than what they charged from Exxon 
Chemicals (Pvt) Limited.
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were Rs 950 million.^^ In the same year, the group also formed the 
Dawood Shipping Company Limited.
The Kamaphuli Paper Mills Limited and Kamaphuli Rayon Mills 
Limited were lost by the group when East Pakistan seceded from 
West Pakistan in 1971.^  ^ This loss was followed by the 
nationalisation of Dawood Petroleum Limited, as part of Bhutto’s 
socialist reforms, as well as the ‘life insurance’ section of the group’s 
insurance business. This led to the Dawood Group concentrating on 
their business activity in (West) Pakistan.
After a pause of a few years during which the group’s management 
adopted a risk averse stance of not making any further investments, 
they made a comeback in manufacturing industry, albeit in new 
areas. In 1977 an engineering consultancy and construction company 
was floated called Descon Engineering (Pvt) Limited which 
represented an investment made in the light engineering sector. The 
Transpak Corporation, a public limited concern was floated in 
1984 to manufacture detergents and trade in gas appliances and 
foodstuff. [By the close of 1988 its paid-up capital was Rs 5 million
^^Unpublished company document, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’ 
and Dawood Hercules Limited, Annual Report, 1989.
"^^ These three manufacturing facilities were located in [former] 
East Pakistan and according to Razak Dawood, [interview 26 
October 1991], though there was no official estimate of the loss 
incurred, his rough estimate of the loss for the Dawood Group, 
amounted to Rs 70 million. According to R. Amjad, ‘Private 
Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 1960-1970’, Ph.D thesis. 
University of Cambridge, 1977, p. 263, in 1970, the Dawood Group 
had Rs 311.8 million invested as in its net assets in East Pakistan.
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and annual sales were Rs 120 million].^® The Lahore Cycle 
Industry (Pvt) Limited and Baluch Engineering Works were 
formed in 1985, for the manufacture and assembly of bicycles and 
provision of engineering consultancy services respectively. Purchase 
of the bicycle unit was another investment in the light engineering 
sector, which had synergy with the engineering facilities offered by 
Descon (Pvt) Limited. The cycle unit was a comprehensive unit, 
purchased from a private party to manufacture 60,000 bicycles 
annually. Delta (Pvt) Limited was floated for manufacturing 
unsaturated polyester and alkyd resin in 1986 and four further 
companies were floated in 1988 specialising in home appliances, 
refrigerators and motor cycle assembly plants and enlisted onto the 
group’s investments.
6.3 Selected Company Histories 
The case studies which follow are selected from the Dawood 
Group’s private limited companies, namely Descon Engineering (Pvt) 
Limited, a company extending construction and related consultancy 
services; Lahore Cycle Industries (Pvt) Limited, manufacturing 
bicycles and Delta (Pvt) Limited, manufacturing resins. These 
companies were selected on the grounds that there was no obhgation 
to reveal their management practices to the public and so plausibly 
provide an insight into the internal organisational systems adopted
^^See Tntroducing Dawood Group’, unpublished company 
document and Transpak Corporation Limited, Annual Report, 
1989.
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by its entrepreneurs.
6.3.1 Descon (Pvt) Limited (Descon)
Razak Dawood was the managing director of Descon from the 
company’s inception in 1977. Its head office was in Lahore with a 
regional office in Karachi. Descon’s provided mechanical and 
electrical engineering and construction projects. It specialised in the 
design, installation, pipe-laying, fabrication and commissioning of 
construction projects.^® The company owned cranes, bulldozers, 
excavators, vending machines, generators, earth moving equipment, 
most of which were imported by Descon (unlike Greaves Cotton [Pvt] 
Limited [Faruque Group] which manufactured its own earth-moving 
e q u i p m e n t ) . I t  also offered spedahsed construction services which 
encompassed the preparation of feasibility studies, arranging for 
manufacturing licences and assisting its clients in all phases of the 
project’s implementation and execution. Technology transfers from 
foreign to local projects were supplanted with integrated design and 
engineering expertise provided by Descon’s engineers. Projects 
normally took up to two years from inception to completion.^® 
Descon’s main clients were the government, as was the case with
®®lnterview with Amin Latif, Descon’s general manager, 3 
March 1992 in Karachi. See Appendix A.
®®Given in, ‘Descon’, unpublished company document.
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Greaves Cotton (Pvt) Limited (GCPL) of the Faruque Group.^® By 
1982, Descon’s management had capitahsed on the construction boom 
in the Middle East by capturing major contracts located there. 
However, in 1982-86, Descon lost 90 of its technical staff to Middle 
Eastern employers who were able to pay them higher salaries.
By the end of 1988, Descon had completed over 20 domestic and 
overseas projects. The ones completed in Pakistan were those for 
Attock Refinery Limited, ICI Polyester Plant, Pakistan Steel MiUs 
Corporation, National Logistics Cell, LPG Refinery, Pakistan 
Oilfields Limited, National Refinery Limited, Pak-Arab Refinery 
Limited, Burewala Textile Mül’s extension and for fertihser 
manufacturing facihties.^^ Most of Descon’s local contracts were 
concentrated in northern Sind and southern Punjab, which included 
work done on the Mangla dam (the world’s largest earth filled dam) 
and other contracts awarded to them by the government. Wherever 
it was feasible. Descon subcontracted parts of its construction 
projects to smaller companies speciahsing in specific engineering 
services. Compared with Greaves Cotton (Pvt) Limited of the 
Faruque Group, Descon was a late-mover as a provider of 
services in the construction industry and subcontracted specialised
^®See pp. 395-97, for a comparison with GCPL.
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requirements.^^ However, as with Greaves Cotton (Pvt) Limited, 
Descon had also successfully tapped into the foreign markets, as seen 
in projects awarded to them by Construction International Inc., USA; 
CTS, Italy; Industrial Import and Export Company, Romania; Howe 
Baker Engineers Limited, USA; Simchem, USA and CTIP, Italy 
Razak Dawood, as Descon’s managing director, was responsible for 
the two divisions operating under his company’s umbrella: Descon 
Engineering (Pvt) Limited, and Descon (Pvt) Limited, the latter 
providing the hardware, engineering and manufacturing facilities to 
Descon Engineering (Pvt) Limited.^^ The engineering division 
addressed mainstream logistics of construction and plant design 
whereas the manufacturing division addressed the process logistics 
of plant installation and its layout, as well as the recruitment of 
design engineer speciahsts in vessels, pipe laying, and in structural, 
electrical and instrumentation f i e l d s . T h i s  strategic division of 
functions between the two companies orchestrated by Razak Dawood, 
was reminiscent of Suleman and Siddique Dawood’s management 
style at Dawood Cotton MiUs Limited, where they separated the 
production function on the one hand, and grouped all other functions
^^Given in, ‘Descon’, unpublished company document; no place, 
no year.
Interview with Amin Latif, 3 March 1992.
^^Given in, ‘Descon’, unpublished company document.
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under the supervision of senior management on the other hand.
Descon hired up to 3,000 workers on contract, as and when the 
need to do so arose, which limited more long-term labour problems 
from arising. The nature of temporary training labour at Descon was 
based on informal techniques. Weekly reports were generated from 
project managers at their location which were then sent on to the 
regional office at Karachi. Razak Dawood had four general managers 
reporting to him in the functional area of finance, mechanical project 
management, electrical and instrumentation project management and 
engineering project management.^® It appears that till 1981, there 
was no designation for a marketing manager, an activity which was 
performed by Razak Dawood himself. However with an increase in 
the size of business, a marketing manager’s position was created in 
1982, along with one for an overseas project manager and a technical 
director was appointed in 1985. By 1988, all the project managers 
were managing an array of staff; from technical managers in the 
design, computing, fabrication of machines, to those in materials 
management and civil engineering w o r k s . T h e s e  additions to the 
team were made from the rising scale of business, achieved through 
a widening of Descon’s base in through the technical expertise offered 
to the agriculture and electronics industries. By 1988, Descon had 
272 management staff of which 142 were qualified in technical areas
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and 16 were in general management/^
Amin Latif was a non-family the general manager at Descon’s 
regional office in Karachi/® He was assisted hy two managers who 
occupied the business development and project managers positions 
respectively. Other non-family managers at Descon, Karachi, 
included the engineering director, and a senior general manager who 
was an engineer by qualification.'^® Even though this staff was 
located at Karachi, they reported to the senior management based at 
Lahore. This was part of Razak Dawood’s company strategy to keep 
decision-making centralised and vested in him. Most transactions at 
Descon were computerised and closely monitored, which assisted 
administrative accountability since expenses were charged to their 
project accounts and not to the regional or head office’s overhead 
expenses. According to Amin Latif, this was only made possible by 
computerising all operations at Descon.®® Amin Latif also felt that 
Razak Dawood’s management style was commendable in that the 
accounting system proposed and engineered by the latter was based 
on numbers®^ assigned to every on-going project.®  ^ This method
^^Interview with Amin Latif, 3 March 1992. 
^Ibid.
^nUd.
^^Ihid.
®^Since a project was identified by its number, it assisted in 
better monitoring and control of expenses and budgets.
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ensured accountability in separating the overhead and variable 
project costs, which were accurately charged to their project numbers 
as and when the expenses were incurred.®^ This system also 
enabled more realistic budget allocation and its subsequent approval 
from senior management, since they were based on accountable and 
justifiable criteria. Descon’s annual sales in 1988 were Rs 200 
million.
Razak Dawood’s initial style of management was fairly similar to 
that of the first generation members of his family, in that a number 
of functional area responsibilities were vested within one individual; 
himself. Till 1985, Descon’s finance manager was also accountable 
for procurement, administration and personnel management.®^ 
However with an increase in the size of the business on a rising scale 
of magnitude. Descon was reorganised along more functional 
reporting channels. Razak Dawood felt that this reorganisation had 
not been to the company’s best advantage: ‘we actually took the 
decision to decentralise, and I tell you it was a wrong decision’.®®
^Hbid.; also see Descon’s documents titled ‘Project No., Weekly 
Progress Report’ and ‘Project Cost Analysis Report’, both of which 
were intended for the project manager’s perusal at the Lahore 
head office.
®^ Interview with Amin Latif, 3 March 1992.
®^lnterview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
®®Information conveyed by Razak Dawood in an unpublished 
speech to the MBA [class of 1994], Lahore University of 
Management Sciences, 12 February 1992.
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Razak Dawood’s perception that the decision itself was a bad one 
stemmed from the fact that 1987 and 1988 were badly managed year 
for the business, when most project managers made their own little 
kingdoms and hid their division’s profit margins from Descon’s senior 
management. That is why Razak Dawood felt that the decision to 
decentralise was demonstrated as counterproductive to the initial 
rationale which initially directed it. This however, did not support 
the fact that the decision to decentralise operations was in itself an 
ineffective one, rather it showed that the company did not have an 
effective system of control and checks where more than one person 
could access the same information and monitor output. Such checks 
and control could have been introduced in an information reporting 
system organised on the principles of the Systems Approach. In this 
approach, managers are expected to fulfil their designated tasks 
using a holistic approach to gather data in order to identify problems 
to lead to an implementation criteria, which is a process built into 
the methodology of this approach itself.
6.3.2 Lahore Cycle Industries (Pvt) Limited (LCD 
The LCl was formed in 1985 as a private limited concern, for the 
assembly and sale of bicycles. Purchase of this unit was a move into 
the hght engineering sector, which had synergy with the engineering 
facilities already extended by Descon. The LCl was an integrated 
unit purchased from its previous owner, with a designed production 
capacity of 60,000 bicycles annually. LOI had four main competitors
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who were more experienced than members of the Dawood Group in 
the fabrication, execution and managing of bicycle assembly. 
Therefore when its ownership changed hands, a team of six engineers 
were hired by Descon to manage the bankrupt company. According 
to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Industries, the bicycle 
demand was expected to peak at 1 million bicycles by 1992.®® 
Therefore, entering into this area of production appeared to be a 
lucrative opportunity which was captured hy Razak Dawood in 
acquiring LCl.
LCl’s bicycles were designed using imported technology from 
Hercules Incorporated of the UK. Since the foreign suppliers were 
also partners in another Dawood investment, it enabled Descon to 
easily buy the rights for Hercules’ patented technology and its related 
manufacturing patents.®^ Ten Hercules engineers were sent from 
the UK to Lahore to help set up the plant. These bicycles were 
supposed to be technologically superior in quality than those 
manufactured by other local producers. An additional advantage of 
the investment made in LCl, was that there was no government price 
control on bicycles and that in a sellers market, its demand in 1985 
was more it supply.®® In 1989, the sales price per bicycle was fixed
®®Given in ‘Descon’, unpublished company document.
®^ This is given in A. Rana, BMX CYCLES (A), Lahore 
University of Management Sciences, 1989, LBS case # 03-332-89-1,
p. 2.
®®m&
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at Rs 1,200 which provided the company with a projected gross 
margin of 15 percent, provided it sold a minimum of 48,000 bicycles 
per year.^®
In 1988, the company faced production constraints on the delivery 
of steel and plastic rimmed bicycles to its marketing department.®® 
To accommodate the pressure on the production department to 
expand its output, the factory premises were expanded to twice its 
capacity, at a cost of Rs 8 million in 1988; a further Rs 1.2 million 
was spent on production assembly hne units, and an enamel painting 
unit was also purchased for Rs 1.5 million.®  ^ By the close of 1988, 
the company employed 240 full time staff and 120 contract labour 
who were paid an average salary of Rs 1,700 per month.
LCl was annexed to the group’s business at the initiative of Razak 
Dawood at a time when other engineering companies in the group 
provided consultancy services which specialised in executing 
commissioned construction projects. This investment in LCl, was 
part of an integrated strategy evolved and directed by Razak 
Dawood, who consciously advocated that the companies managed by 
him should have synergy. This strategy continued into 1986, when 
Delta (Pvt) Limited was formed, which constructed fittings and
®®Given in, A. Rana, BMX CYCLES (A), Lahore University of 
Management Sciences, 1989, LBS case # 03-332-89-1, p. 1.
®%W.
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fixtures used in household interiors and outdoor sports complexes.
6.3.3 Delta (Pvt) Limited (Delta)
Delta (Pvt) Limited was formed in 1986, in technical collaboration 
with Reichold, to manufacture unsaturated polyester and alkyd resin. 
Its managing director was Razak Dawood. The resin industry was 
characterised by low entry barriers articulated through low capital 
installation costs and low brand loyalty among customers. Resin was 
a chemical which was used to manufacture fibre glass, which was 
also the raw material used in assembling bath tubs, automobile 
components, boats, furniture and sports goods. However, the 
management was faced with a problem of not adequately tapping into 
these markets adequately. Its closest rival, BASF (Pak) Limited, a 
German multinational in Pakistan had captured a much larger share 
of the market owing to cash incentives offered by BASF (Pak) 
Limited’s management to the dealers through whom the resins were 
sold to the ultimate consumers. The following table shows the 1986- 
88 sales of Delta and of its main rival, BASF (Pak) Limited.
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Table 6.2
Year BASF sales Delta sales
(Metric Tons)
1986 144 35
1987 198 176
1988 300 231
Source: S. Ali, et al, ‘Progress Report, Delta (Pvt) Limited’, 
Lahore University of Management Sciences, unpublished 
report, 1989.
In 1986, BASF (Pak) Limited had captured 80 percent of the 
market, derived mainly from its first-mover position in the domestic 
market.®^ Delta’s market share was 19 percent, with a small 
percentage of the demand met through resin imports. BASF (Pak) 
Limited’s parent company in Germany provided its Pakistani 
subsidiary with technical support which was not matched by Delta’s 
technical capabilities. Delta’s management had also not recruited or 
trained its sales force who were not quahfied chemical engineers. 
Also BASF (Pak) Limited had diversified into manufacturing other 
types of resins, leaving behind them a trail where Delta’s product 
range offered more limited varieties. Three apparent causes for
®^A description of the advantages and disadvantages accruing 
to pioneering industrialists are given in M. Lieberman and D. 
Montgomery, ‘First-Mover Advantages’, in Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 9, 1988, pp. 41-58.
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Delta limited variety of products were, the lack of in-house Research 
and Development (R&D) facihties, the lack of technical information 
provided to its dealers who sold Delta products to the end-users, and 
that Delta’s management did not keep a record of who their 
customers were, or of their preferences for which category of resins 
they required. The company’s sales force lacked the technical 
education and formal qualifications in chemical engineering, a 
necessary prerequisite required for them to educate their customers 
on the benefits of buying resins. Therefore it was not surprising that 
BASF (Pak) Limited, which had qualified staff had captured a much 
larger share of the resins market. At Delta, on each occasion when 
a particular customer query had emerged it had to be routed to its 
R&D department for resolution, and this procedure led to continuous 
delays in meeting the customers’ orders. The management’s 
ineptitude was evident from hiring unqualified sales officers, who 
through their technical ignorance could not familiarise themselves 
with the product specifications of the goods they were selling. This 
misdemeanour was compounded when the management also did not 
maximise damage control by publishing literature on resin 
specifications, which would have guided their sales force to address 
customer requirements. Also Delta’s product line was narrow and 
economies of scope in process production were not adopted for 
producing the additional [related] varieties of chemicals which BASF
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(Pak) Limited was already doing.®^  Most of Delta’s sales were made 
on the personalised contact of the sales officers with the dealers and 
this hampered accessing a potentially larger network of dealers 
selling Delta products, covering a wider segment of the market.
This case study was an example of how an ineffectively managed 
organisational system, hindered the development of a strategy which 
could have been used to capture the competitor’s market share, as 
well as to carve a niche in a branded product market. Although 
Delta was managed by Razak Dawood, whose management style was 
more effective, demonstrated in the changes he proposed at Descon 
and LCl, he chose to adopt a different strategy in managing Delta. 
Since strategy is directed by the decision-makers, it can only reflect 
how management chooses to conduct it.
^^Economies of scope in process production, such as for hquid 
chemicals or oil production are given in A. Chandler, Scale and 
Scope, 1990, pp. 23-29, increase volume and lower costs in greater 
magnitude than economies of scale, because process production 
combines new production processes [of related goods] by using 
existing facilities to produce, market and distribute related 
products.
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6.4 External Relations
This group entered manufacturing industry in Pakistan, by the 
kick start given to them through the liaison®  ^ of its pioneering 
entrepreneurs with Ayuh and the Nawah of Kalahagh.®® The latter 
was FIDO’s chairman in 1959. This liaison directly benefitted 
Dawood through its acquisition of three industrial units, the 
Kamaphuli Paper Mills, purchased from the FIDO in 1959, and the 
Burewala Textile Mills from the Ministry of Industries, Government 
of Punjab in 1959. The former was purchased by Dawood for Rs 65.9 
million after FIDO had invested Rs 120 mülion®® in establishing the 
mill. This constituted 17 percent or the second largest FIDO sale 
made till 1959, measured by the value of FIDO’s industrial assets. 
The Burewala Textile Mill’s sale in favour of Dawood was assisted 
Ahmad Dawood’s contacts with I.U. Usmani, the director of the 
Punjab Board of Industries. The group acquired the Lawrencepur 
Woollen Mills (Pvt) Limited in 1960, another transaction approved by 
the Nawah of Kalabagh who used his leverage as FIDO’s chairman 
to do enable this sale. When this sale was made to Dawood, the 
Kamaphuli Paper Mills Limited also had the Nawah of Kalabagh as
®^ The privileged position of the Dawood Group as a leading 
industrial group is conferred on them in S. Kochanek, Interest 
Groups and Development, Oxford, 1983, p. 298.
®^ The Nawab’s title and status is given in H. Feldman, From 
Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, p. 56.
^^Information given in G. Papanek, Pakistanis Development, 
Harvard, 1967, p. 93.
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its managing agent, and so its sale to Dawood was also met with 
relative ease. It was originally set up a t the initiative of the PIDC 
in 1953 and sold at par value of its shares®  ^ to Dawood six years 
later.®® The Dawood family were industrialists who knew those on 
the Board of Directors of PIDC, and became the beneficiaries of its 
sales at economically attractive rates. The PIDC sales to private 
industrialists were not open to the public and those with the contacts 
acquired them.®®
Ahmad Dawood was the founder and doyenne of his group, and his 
proximity to Ayuh paid dividends for the initial group investments. 
The bonus voucher scheme also assisted Dawood in accumulating 
capital used to finance the purchase of its initial investment, through 
the group’s profits made in jute manufacturing.^® However this 
scheme did not significantly boost exports, since the export base was
®^lnterview with Aziz Moon, 17 January 1994.
®®The sale of PIDC units to the private-sector industrialists is 
given in PIDC, ‘The Development Programme of the Pakistan 
Industrial Development Corporation’, unpublished report, 1989, p. 
63.
®®Further information on the criterion of sale of PIDC units is 
given in R. Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan, 
1960-1970, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 188-208.
^®See Table 2.3, for jute and paper exports made in the 1960s 
through the bonus voucher scheme. Pakistan’s jute manufacturing 
as a percentage of its world production are given in State Bank of 
Pakistan, Bulletin: State Bank of Pakistan, January 1965, 
Government of Pakistan, 1965, p. 14; Ibid., July 1966, pp. 62-63.
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already high before the introduction of this scheme/^ but it did 
contribute towards the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few 
industrialists who were its main beneficiaries.
Ahmad Dawood’s links with the higher echelons in the government 
were also evident fi"om the fact that he introduced Ayub’s son, Gohar 
Ayuh, into business and also in the support Ahmad Dawood extended 
him in setting up Ghandhara I n d u s t r i e s . F o r  other strategic 
appointments, Ahmad Dawood was made chairman of NIT in 1965- 
88;^  ^ Ahmad Dawood was not the only member of his group to 
access Ayuh and hold positions of national importance. Suleman and 
Siddique Dawood, both supported Ahmad Dawood’s stake in the 
Settler’s Trust which was spearheaded by Wajid Ah of the Ali 
g r o u p . I n  1962, Ayuh became increasingly dependent on the
^^An analysis of exports by investment sectors is given in A.R. 
Kamal, ‘Sectoral Growth Rates and Efficiency of Factor Use in 
Large-Scale Manufacturing Sector in West Punjab’, Pakistan 
Development Review, Winter 1976, Vol. XV, No: 4, p. 349.
^^Gohar Ayub’s managing directorship of Ghandhara Industries 
is documented in H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, 
pp. 305-306; and Gohar Ayub’s induction into the corporate arena, 
with Ahmad Dawood as his benefactor, was conveyed in an 
interview with Ahsan Raza, 30 March 1992; also see S. Kocahnek, 
Interest Groups and Development in Pakistan, Oxford, 1983, pp. 
209- 210, where Ahsan Raza’s claim is substantiated.
^^Given in, NIT Annual Reports, 1965-88.
^^The Settler’s Trust comprised of members who led the 
National Press Trust. The membership list of the Settlers’ Trust 
is available in the ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Settlers’, 9 March 
1970 at the premises of the National Press Trust [an organisation 
which was chaired by Ghulam Faruque (Faruque Group)].
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financial resources of wealthy businessmen to fund the 1964-1965 
elections/® For political appointments, Siddique Dawood was made 
the treasurer of Ayub's political party, the Muslim league in 1962 as 
well as the Finance Secretary of its Karachi division/® In 1964, 
Siddique was elected to the National Assembly. Herbert Feldman 
reviews Ayub’s political party, the Muslim League as one which he 
carefuUy controlled through a process of patronage and coercion. 
This proximity to the Ayuh paid dividends, especially for the initial 
Dawood investment,^® especially as the prime beneficiary of PIDC 
divestitures.^®
^®Ayub gained power in 1958 through a mihtary coup d'etat, 
and changed the vahdity of his power base from military-rule to 
Presidential rule by holding the 1965 elections. For the legitimacy 
of this act see the debate in, H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, 
Oxford, 1972, pp. 68-84.
^®Siddique Dawood’s pohtical afifihations are presented in S. 
Levin, ‘The Upper Bourgeoisie from the Muslim Commercial 
Community of Memons in Pakistan, 1947 to 1971’, Asian Survey, 
Vol. XIV, March 1974, p. 242 and Siddique Dawood’s induction 
into party politics by Ayub, is given in S. Kochanek, Interest 
Groups and Development, Business and Politics in Pakistan, 
Oxford, 1983, p. 209.
^^For Ayub’s inroad into the political arena through party 
support, see H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, p.
55.
®^To cite S.Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development in 
Pakistan, Oxford, 1983, p. 271, ‘By the late 1960s, however 
business had become so closely identified with Ayub that when the 
regime came under attack, so did the business’ ’.
^®See PIDC, ‘Development Programme of Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation,’ PIDC, unpublished report, December 
1989.
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Continuing with the power and influence of members of the 
Dawood Group, Ahmad Dawood was on the Board of Directors of the 
National Steel of Pakistan (NSPL). This was a consortium of eight 
large industrialists with equity participation from the government.®^ 
The other industrialists directors of NSPL who are addressed in this 
study, were Wajid Ali (Ali Group), Muhammad Bashir (Crescent 
Group) and Ghulam Faruque (Faruque Group). Ahmad Dawood’s 
prominent position in pohtics and through his personal association 
with Ayub also led to his arrest (along with other senior industriahst) 
in 1972, when Bhutto nationalised industry which was followed with 
its attendant realignment of voters’ powers on company Board of 
Directors.®^ Other industrialists arrested with Ahmad Dawood, 
included General Habibullah, both in their capacity as industrialists 
and particularly so because of their proximity to Ayuh; General 
Habibullah more so, because of he was closely related to Ayub. The 
passports of all senior industrialists were also confiscated on Bhutto’s 
order. According to Razak Dawood, at the time of nationalisation 
Bhutto’s planning minister, Mubashir Hasan announced that, ‘if 
these businessmen do not behave, we will hang them by the lamp 
posts’ ’.®^ This adverse and threatening climate towards the
®^ See ‘Minutes of the 35th Meeting of the NSPL Board of 
Directors’, 12 September 1967 in Karachi.
®^ See Presidential Order no: 2/72, 1972.
®^lnterview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
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promotion of private enterprise, led to a decline in overall private 
investment, and the rate of increase of Dawood’s net assets remained 
relatively unchanged from 1974 to 1985.®^  These reforms truncated 
the controlhng links between the managing agents and the 
businesses which they managed, which was replaced by a system of 
cumulative voting which considerably increased the smaller share­
holders’ prerogative in business group decision-making.*^ When the 
managing agency system was abolished, no company could sell its 
produce exclusively to another company within the same group. This 
restriction was circumvented by the businessmen forming multiple 
'dummy’ companies which could, without detection, just as easily 
purchase the entire produce of another company operating within the 
group.** Therefore, in practice the old order was not be replaced by 
Bhutto’s new decree, especially if the management was resistant to 
adapting to the changed circumstances and sold their produce 
through the same channel, albeit using ‘dummy’ companies.**
**See Tables 2.7 and 2.9 for the declining trend in overall 
private industrial investment, immediately after nationalisation of 
industry and Table 6.5 for Dawood Group’s net assets.
*^This new arrangement apphed to all private-sector 
businesses, as conveyed by Razak Dawood in an interview, 26 
October 1991.
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6.5 Rent Seeking Activity
The interplay of economic power and political influence was evident 
from members of the Dawood Group who had political and economic 
characteristics which provided them with an edge over other 
industrial aspirers in re-establishing and resuming their business 
interests in Pakistan after migration. Establishing political contacts 
with Ayub cemented Dawood access to the country’s available 
resources and infrastructure. On Ayub’s partiality towards 
conferring political appointments to businessmen, Feldman felt that 
Ayub created his own government party, which he carefully 
controlled through a process of patronage and coercion.®^
Control networks were the influence and power used by these 
business personahties, to acquire assets and also to prevent other 
aspiring businessmen in doing the same. These rent-seeking benefits 
accrued to select industrialists in the 1960s and Dawood was no 
exception, where rent-seeking manifested itself in government 
patronage in providing it with import licences and discounted foreign 
exchange, which benefitted only a handful of recipients and not 
society.®® Any windfall gains accruing to the Dawood’s elite 
entrepreneurs were mostly diverted towards the owner-entrepreneurs 
personal accounts, rather than ploughed back into the firms, or used
®^ See H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Pakistan 1962-69, 
Oxford, 1972, pp. 14, 16-20 and 24-32.
®®See L. White, Industrial Concentration, Princeton, 1974, pp. 
156 and 183.
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for the expansion and diversification of their business.®^ Ahmad 
Dawood sought rent through the political appointments which reaped 
him financial benefits in a personal and business capacity; in 
allocating loans and receiving import licences to initiate his 
businesses as well as in acquiring PIDC and Punjab Board of 
Industries managed mills at discounted prices.
Ahmad Dawood played a dual role of simultaneously representing 
NIT’s interests in Dawood investment (as a NIT director from 1965- 
as well as himself being an equity holder in Dawood 
investment. Therefore this group’s eligibility for NIT’s credit line 
was not necessarily preceded by an objective evaluation of Dawood 
investment. This was another instance of State largesse promoting 
early industrialisation in business group investments. The continuity 
of such policies over the decade 1958-68, stultified the impetus for 
members of this group to develop performance criterion of their own 
violation. The following table depicts the Dawood Group’s share in 
NIT and ICP investments:
®®For a comparative analysis on rent-seeking behaviour 
articulated in Indian and Turkish businesses, see A. Krueger,‘The 
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society', in The American 
Economic Review, June 1974, pp. 291-303; for the case of the 
Dawood entrepreneurs’ aversion towards reploughing company 
profits for enhancing their business investment, the comments by 
Ahsan Raza in an interview, 30 March 1992, which are 
documented in this chapter.
^°N1T Annual Reports, 1965-88.
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Table 6.3
Dawood Groups’ Share in Investments of 
NIT I.C.P.
Group 1970 %
Dawood 6.95 26.3
Source: (a) National Investment (Unit) Trust, Director's 
Report and Statement of Accounts, 1st, July 1969 - 30th, 
June 1970, 1970, (b) Fourth Annual Report, 1970, 
Investment Corporation of Pakistan, 1970.
Of further importance were the links that these monopoly houses 
had with the Board of Directors of the Pakistan Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation (PICIC), a large financial institution 
extending foreign currency credit to i n v e s t o r s P I C I C  was 
established in 1957 to disburse funds in the form of loans and equity 
investments in newly fioated business house shares. The appeal for 
acquiring PICIC foreign currency loans was that they were extended 
at the official (and cheaper) exchange rate, usually at 1/2 percent
®^ The Chief Economist, Mahbub ul Haq in a news report 
published in the daily. Morning News, 29 March 1973, Karachi, 
was quoted to have said, ‘For all practical purposes, the 22 
families had become by 1968 both the planning commission and 
the ministry of finance for the private sector. They preempted 
most investment permits, import licences, foreign credits and 
government patronage because they controlled or influenced most 
of the decision-making forums, handing out such permissions. 
They had virtually established a strong hold on the system and 
were in the position to buy out any new entrepreneurs’ ’.
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lower interest rates offered by other financial institutions.®^ This 
favourably affected the recipient group’s plans to expand its 
investments. One of the main beneficiaries of PICIC’s credit was the 
Dawood Group, a facility expedited to it through Ahmad Dawood’s 
PICIC directorship fi'om 1972 to 1988.®^  This led to the decision­
makers of PICIC allocating the highest percentage of its credit to 
businesses owned and controlled by one of its directors.®^ The 
following table shows loans extended to the Dawood Group by credit- 
lending institutions:
Table 6.4
Foreign Exchange Loan Obtained by the Dawood Group
1958-1970 
(Rs millions)
Group PICIC % of IDBP % of
Total Total
Dawood 123.58 13 3.37 0.90
Total loans 
disbursed
(1958-70) 911.43 374.55
Source: R. Amjad, ‘Private Industrial Investment in 
Pakistan, 1960-1970’, Ph.D. thesis. University of 
Cambridge, 1977, p. 263.
®%ee State Bank of Pakistan, Bulletin, State Bank of Pakistan, 
State Bank of Pakistan, August 1971, p. LXXII.
®^PICIC Annual Reports, 1972-88.
®"^ See PICIC, Annual Report 1970.
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From 1958 to 1970, the Dawood Group was the highest single
recipient of PICIC’s credit, not just among the four groups studied
here, but from within the country. This was one of many significant
occasions when the control networks employed by the members of the
Dawood Group did work to their economic advantage, at a time when
most other industrial aspirers were unable to access the sources of
industrial credit which buttressed empire building for the future.
6.6 Management Strategy
In the initial years of the group’s formation, the cotton industry
where the group’s initial investments were made, was a sellers’
market. Members of the Dawood Group capitalised on this
opportunity provided by the potential demand in the textile industry
where they already had gained expertise as traders. According to
Razak Dawood:
‘Memons^® had much more than today, in that we are 
basically traders. We have gone through this enough times 
over now. If you prepare a feasihihty study and go into a 
project based on a feasibility study, you never leam as much 
about that business as if, if you are in the trade, if you are 
deahng in the business, if you are trading in it, you know the 
size of the market, you know this, you know what the products 
are that are required, you know the geographical qualities, you 
know a lot more. So it is easier to get a job into trading and 
then to move backwards into industry. You know one of the 
strengths of the Memons was the ability to know and
®®For a description and importance of the Memon as a 
prominent businessman, statesman and political figure, see S. 
Levin, ‘The Upper Bourgeoisie From the MusHm Commercial 
Community of Memons in Pakistan, 1947-1971’, Asian Survey, Vol. 
XIV, March 1974, pp. 231-243.
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understand trading’.®®
All managers situated at the group’s manufacturing sites reported 
directly to the senior management located at Dawood Corporation 
(Pvt) Limited and Dawood Industries Limited in Karachi. According 
to Haji Muhammad Ghani, the management team were organised 
around human resource management principles which were 
developed by him.®^  The organisational structure of each unit was 
functionally arranged to reflect of its departments’ activities. 
Initially, Razak Dawood’s management style also drew on that 
adopted by Haji Muhammad Ghani, in that the engineering division 
at Descon addressed mainstream logistics of construction and plant 
design whereas the manufacturing division addressed the logistics of 
plant installation and its layout as well as the recruitment of design 
engineer specialists in vessels, pipe laying, and in structural, 
electrical and instrumentation fields.®®
Razak Dawood conceded that initially in the 1950s, most of the key 
decisions regarding their group’s activities were made informally, in 
the car journeys back and forth firom their grandmother’s house and 
the office, or over lunch appointments. Suleman Dawood, who was 
the sales manager of Dawood Corporation (Pvt) Limited, had a
®®lnterview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991. 
®^lnterview with Haji Muhammad Ghani, 8 March 1992. 
®®Given in, ‘Descon’, unpublished company document.
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peculiar style of assessing the merit of doing business with a 
potential client; by first judging the incumbent’s sales pitch over the 
telephone, and it followed up by observing the gait of the salesman 
when he was in the process of walking over to Suleman Dawood’s 
desk at the of f i ce .Suleman Dawood, on a daily basis also opened 
all incoming mail at the office, which was a condition replicated by 
Zahid Faruque at CCCL. [However, by the 1970s, Suleman Dawood 
no longer directed management practices of his group, whereas Zahid 
Faruque did so into the 1980s]. Suleman Dawood also kept a daily 
summary of any dialogue with a potential or existing salesman along 
with a record of any transactions which had been mutually agreed. 
At the end of each day, this summary was passed on to the group’s 
leader, Ahmad Dawood. This mechanism ensured Ahmad Dawood’s 
control over the daily activities a t Dawood Corporation (Pvt) Limited. 
In its initial years, the group members attempted to integrate 
functions within the same operating unit. For example, technicians 
from Dawood Cotton MiUs Limited were loaned out to organise a 
team at Burewala Textile Mills Limited. The latter also had other 
manufacturing facilities operating under its umbrella, namely an oil 
mill, a cooking oil plant and a poultry feed processing unit.^ ®®
^^Interview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
^^^Given in, ‘Introducing Dawood Group’, unpublished company 
document.
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Razak Dawood explained that his management style had evolved 
by emulating his predecessors’ ‘hands on’ strategy to familiarise 
themselves with the company practices. Compared with Babar Ali’s 
(Ali Group) style of management, Razak Dawood said that, ‘Some 
people are not hands on. Babar Ali just wants the summary’. 
Razak Dawood also expressed his preference for a ‘hands on’ style of 
management, over that of centralised decision making where the 
senior management only received summarised reports from 
departments as an the sole input used for decision making. His self­
professed, ‘hands on’ style made him more sensitive to the needs of 
the market and led to the implementation in 1961, to two proposals 
initiated by him. He approached Ahmad Dawood to obtain his 
consent on firstly wanting the woollen cloth produced at Lawrencepur 
Woollen MiUs Limited to be [higher] priced at Rs 19 per yard, when 
similar products were priced at Rs 7 per yard by the company’s 
nearest competitor. Secondly, Razak Dawood also presented Ahmad 
Dawood with an advertising proposal budgeted targeted at Rs 80,000. 
Since members of the Dawood Group had up till then not expended 
any funds on advertising their products, this request from Razak 
Dawood, topped up with the higher sales price that he had requested 
for Lyla,^ ^"  ^was met with considerable resistance. However, Razak
^Interview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
^®^his was the brand name, given to womens’ woollen cloth 
manufactured at Lawrencepur Woollen MiUs Limited.
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Dawood did succeed in having his own way in getting the advertising 
budget approved, and his sales launch was successful when Lyla 
became a popular material for ladies’ winter suiting in the market. 
Thereafter, Razak Dawood did not face further resistance from the 
group’s senior management in getting his advertising budgets 
approved. The launch of Lyla was a novel idea, in that woollen 
material used for womens’ clothing in Pakistan, had not been 
experimented with before.
In the following years, Razak Dawood’s ‘hands on’ style of 
management matured when the Descon’s project managers generated 
weekly reports which were sent to the head office. Even though the 
project staff was located at Karachi, they were ultimately responsible 
to the senior management based at Lahore. This in fact reflected 
Razak Dawood’s strategy to keep decision making centralised and 
vested ultimately with him. According to Amin Latif who was 
Descon’s general manager at Karachi, Razak Dawood’s management 
style was commendable in that the accounting system proposed and 
engineered by the latter was based on specific numbers assigned to 
each on-going p r o j e c t . B y  assigning numbers to all costs, this 
method ensured accountability, by separating the overhead and
^°^Interview with Amin Latif, 3 March 1992; also see Descon’s 
documents, ‘Project No., Weekly Progress Report’ and ‘Project Cost 
Analysis Report’, which were intended for perusal by the project 
manager at the head office.
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variable project c o s t s T h i s  system apparently enabled a (more) 
realistic budget preparation and eased its subsequent approval from 
senior management, since it was based on justifiable expenses.
Most transactions at Descon were computerised and closely 
monitored, but upon closer examination it was revealed that Razak 
Dawood’s management style, from 1977 onwards regressed to that of 
his predecessors, in that a number of functional area responsibihties 
at Descon became vested in one individual, namely himself. Until 
1985 Descon’s finance manager was also accountable for 
procurement, administration and personnel m a n a g e m e n t , a n d  
with the rising scale of business Razak was forced to reorganise 
responsibility along functional lines. Razak was to regret this 
decision since he felt that it encouraged the concealment rather than 
the dissemination of information by the department heads. He 
argued that the point of departure for good management was in the 
‘delegation’ of the technical, marketing and finance authority to 
senior management at head office. This attitude begged the question 
that how was it that a company could be effectively managed from 
long distance, and that too by senior management who preferred to 
apply more informal methods of communication as their basis for 
decision making?
^^^Interview with Amin Latif, 3 March 1992. 
^^^Interview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
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Dawood Hercules Limited (DHL) was managed by Ahmad Dawood
and his son, Hussain Dawood. DHL had a less well defined
organisational structure than that designed at Descon. In the 1970s,
Razak Dawood was briefiy appointed at DHL’s factory premises to
assist in managing the afiairs of the plant. Based on his experience
there, he commented on the overall style of management:
‘Was our method of running good? 1 would say, excellent. All 
the people running factories were concerned with production. 
Technical decisions, marketing and finance were controlled by 
the head office. Since Dawood Corporation was involved in 
selling, it was a big marketing department [for the group]
Ahmad, Suleman and Siddique Dawood were not formally trained 
in modem management techniques or in technical expertise, and 
neither did they attempt to remain abreast of technological 
developments in the fertiliser and cloth manufacturing 
i n d u s t r i e s . T h i s  deficiency by their not having adopted systems 
(whether consciously or unconsciously) was also not remedied by 
management in employing technical advisers or professional mangers 
to fill the technology and management gap at DHL. It also appears 
from the above quotation, that as in the Ali Group the Dawood 
management felt that the production requirements justified the 
presence of an on-site manager, but the demands of other functional
^^^These three individuals had not formally completed their 
secondary school education, a fact conceded to by Razak Dawood in 
an interview, 26 October 1991.
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areas could easily be managed by family members based at the head 
office, and so did not justify appointing professional managers. When 
the scale of business was small, there was no reason to believe that 
family managers could not have performed ‘just as well’ as hired 
professional managers; however with expansion, the informal and 
older approach could not keep abreast with the information demands 
that the new order placed upon the management.^®® The Dawood 
Group members at DHL did not plough back the capital needed to 
expand their business, such as for example, plant expansion, 
modernisation, technology improvement and the hiring of 
professional managers, all of which afiected the successive growth of 
the enterprise. An example of ineffective management practices at 
DHL are found in the following example. At DHL, Hercules 
Incorporated (UK) and the Dawood Group entered into a joint 
venture contract in which the Hercules management would assist in 
the construction and management of the factory, upon payment of a 
fee by Dawood, an amount arrived at mutually. Until the Hercules’ 
management had the power of veto on decisions, the management 
strategy at DHL was directed according to the pattern developed by 
Hercules’ parent company, Dupont in the USA.^ ®® Razak Dawood’s 
second appointment in the Dawood Group was at DHL where he
®^®The justification for changing management attitudes 
accompanying a rise in the scale of businesses, is discussed on pp. 
145-48.
^®®lnterview with Ahsan Raza, 30 March 1992.
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reported to Ahmad Dawood. At the time, Razak had returned from 
the USA with a degree in Business Administration from Columbia 
University, and he chose to agree with the on-site Americans on their 
particular style of managing the company. However, this affinity 
with the Americans proved to be unacceptable behaviour for Razak’s 
cousin, Hussain, who then forced Razak to tender his resignation 
from the company. The other Dawood member on the 
management team was Siddique Dawood, did not challenge (whether 
voluntarily or not) the management strategy directed by the Hercules 
staff. However, Hussain and Ahmad Dawood accepted the 
American’s advice only grudgingly because they distrusted them from 
the beginning.^^^ According to Ahsan Raza who was the finance 
and administration manager of Dawood Hercules Limited in 1969-82, 
Ahmad Dawood’s views on employee status was that there were only 
two kinds of employees: family members; and employees hired by the 
Dawood management. No individual fell in between the two 
categories.^^ The implication was that Ahmad treated family 
managers differently from non-family managers. Raza also felt that 
any advantage accruing to DHL’s performance through the Rs 1,250
^^ A^ point conceded by Razak Dawood in an interview, 26 
October 1991.
^^ I^nterview with Ahsan Raza, 30 March 1992.
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million spent on the Balancing, Modernising and Rehabilitation 
(BMR) of machines was not properly utilised on upgrading machine 
capacity by Ahmad and Hussein Dawood/^^ He corroborated this 
by saying that after the BMR exercise was completed, the plant 
continued to operate at its (former) daily production capacity of 1,100 
tons of fertiliser/^® He ascertained from this that either the correct 
technology had not been applied or that the management was not 
committed to updating the machines’ capacity performance/^® He 
also complained that in his role as finance manager, he was subject 
to constant pressure from the Dawood management to modify the 
profit figures to suit their requirements/^^ This pressure was 
effectively imposed on him, derived from the government’s stipulation 
that if fertiliser manufacturers wished to remain eligible for 
government subsidy, then they had to declare an annual profit of a 
minimum of 15 percent (it seems that this was regardless of the 
means employed). Dawood’s management adhered to this stipulation 
by declaring only 15 percent profit annually and any profit made in 
excess of the declared value, was not depicted in DHL’s balance 
sheet. Ahsan Raza also felt that if the members of the Dawood
118Ibid.
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Group had not been so distrustful of the American managers, DHL 
could have grown to up to five times its size of what it was when the 
company was formed in 1968/^® This managerial inertia inhibited 
the company's expansion. According to Razak Dawood this attitude 
was,
‘...at a very painful cost to the company. Not that we lost 
money; more than half the family was not ready to accept 
delegation of authority’.
While Razak Dawood was at DHL, he advised the Dawood 
management, that if they were apprehensive that the Americans 
would siphon off funds from the company, then they should have 
considered setting up ‘proper’ controls to prevent this eventuahty 
from occurring. His perception here was that the American 
managers were not acting professionally, whereas Ahsan Raza 
claimed that in fact the reverse was a more accurate depiction of the 
correct state of affairs at the company. It was when Razak’s services 
were terminated^^^ at DHL that he proceeded to form his own 
company, called Descon (Pvt) Limited, (Descon) where he could 
exercise his style of management. With the ideas he had assimilated 
from his business school education, he proceeded to manage Descon 
on more ‘professional’ hnes.
^^^Interview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991. 
^^^Interview with Ahsan Raza, 30 March 1992.
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Dawood investment in new industry during the Zia era brought 
with it an increase of 515 percent in net manufacturing assets. (See 
Table 6.5):
Table 6.5
Dawood Group Net Assets (Publicly and Privately  
Quoted Companies) (Rs millions)
Group 1968 1974 1985 1988
Dawood^ 558 (1) 767.8 (1) 800 (2) 3,432 (3)
37.5 % 4 % 329 %
 ^ Numbers in parenthesis indicate the position of the
group in terms of the value of its net assets in the year 
under consideration.
Source: Balance Sheets of all groups; N. Husnain et al, 
(eds.), Bukhari's 101, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari and 
Company Limited, 1991; H. Haqqani, ‘Pakistan’s Top 
22 Face New Challengers’, Far Eastern Economic 
RevieWy 22 May 1986, p. 77 and L. White, Industrial 
Concentration and Economic Power, 1974, p. 60.
The Dawood Group was at first position from 1968 to 1974, 
measured by the value of its net assets, though it fell to third by 
1988. During the 1980s, the Dawood group diverted its investments 
towards the food and toiletries industry. This broadening of its base 
was the result of two factors. Firstly, the second generation members 
of Dawood who had to be provided with jobs upon completing their 
studies a b r o a d . Sec ond l y ,  the Zia era brought with it a return
^^^Razak Dawood obtained the degree of Master of Business 
Administration, from Columbia University, USA; his cousin, 
Faruque Dawood earned a Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering from 
the USA and Rafique Dawood obtained a degree from Harvard 
University, USA, with two cousins who also returned to work for
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in business confidence which and was reflected in the Dawood Group 
expansion in 1988 into sulphuric add, home appliances, chemicals 
and refidgerators and an increase in its net manufacturing assets. 
Whatever advantage the Dawood members initially gained through 
their trading activity, was soon neutralised (compared with the rise 
of the Crescent Group) once the scale of their business increased and 
other variables became increasingly responsible for the direction 
taken of future investment of this group. The Dawood Group 
members’ attitude towards adopting modem management methods 
was exemplified as follows. When Razak Dawood was asked as to 
what was the most significant factor leading to the success of the 
Dawood Group, he responded unequivocally, ‘Ahmad Dawood’. 
Razak conceded that the Dawood Group were in a privileged position 
in the 1950s and 1960s, to access import licences, largely owing to 
Ahmad Dawood’s links with the higher echelons in the 
government. This showed that all decision-making powers were 
vested in one individual and attention was not paid to developing an 
organisational memory of systems for its posterity. In response to 
another query on how did Razak Dawood as a manager, differentiate 
organisation problems, in their content as against their form, he
the family business, upon returning with diplomas from Western 
universities.
^^^Interview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1992.
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responded that dealings with the government were the most time 
consuming i s s u e s T h i s  response did not address the question 
asked, most probably due to the respondent not fully comprehending 
the question.
Another Dawood company where systematic management was 
lagging behind was at Delta (Pvt) Limited; the management had not 
recruited a sales force who were qualified chemical engineers at a 
time when its closest rival, BASF (Pak) Limited had diversified into 
manufacturing other categories of resins when Delta’s product range 
offered limited varieties. Also Delta lacked R&D facilities and 
technical information required by its dealers.
On foreign equity participation in Dawood, initially in 1949, 
Dawood England was formed in the UK, specifically to obtain credit 
to finance the sale of British finished cotton in Pakistan. Dawood 
England were the brokers (agents) for Ralli Brothers and Volcart 
Brothers in the UK. Raw cotton yarn was purchased on their behalf 
in undivided India by the Dawood brothers which was then exported 
to Britain, where it was re-exported to Pakistan in its finished 
form.^ ^® Ahmad Dawood was based in the UK while his brothers 
managed the trading partnership from Pakistan. Then the Dawood 
Jute Mills Limited and Kamaphuli Rayon Mills Limited, was 
established in 1967. These were both joint ventures with 40 percent
^^®lnterview with Haji Muhammad Ghani, 8 March 1992.
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of its equity contributed by Asahi, a Japanese company. These were 
followed by DHL, a joint venture collaboration with Hercules 
Incorporated (UK) in 1968, with Hercules contributing to the equity 
as well as providing its own trained manpower which was 
permanently based at DHL.
The group’s management strategy appeared to be opportunistic 
where they capitahsed on incentives without developing a coherent 
management strategy, which explains why Razak Dawood at times 
chose to adopt effective organisational systems and on other 
occasions did not. However, the group did benefit fi*om its second 
generation managers bringing with them ideas of foreign 
collaboration of capital. The second generation of the group 
continued with its predecessors’ experiments in collaborating with 
foreign capital, which was evident in Yamaha of Japan for motorcycle 
assembly, with Hercules Incorporated (UK) for fertiliser 
manufacturing and with engineering companies that implemented 
Descon’s projects. Other joint ventures included that with Meiji 
biscuits and powdered milk manufacturers of Japan and the 
Mitsubishi company of Japan for the assembly of airconditioners and 
refrigerators. Then, similar to Greaves Cotton (Pvt) Limited 
(Faruque group). Descon tapped into the foreign markets 
demonstrated in projects subcontracted to them by Construction 
International Inc., USA; CTS, Italy; Industrial Import and Export 
Company, Romania; Howe Baker Engineers Limited, USA; Simchem,
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USA and CTIP, I t a l y T h e n ,  LCI bicycles were designed using 
imported technology from Hercules Incorporated (UK) which allowed 
Descon to buy the rights for Hercules’ technology patents and related 
manufacturing r i g h t s T e n  Hercules engineers were sent from 
the UK to Lahore to help set up the DHL plant. Delta (Pvt) Limited 
was also formed in 1986, in technical collaboration with Reichold, to 
manufacture unsaturated polyester and alkyd resin. By the close of 
1988, there were 15 second generation members of the Dawood 
Group in charge of business in textiles, fertiliser, general trading, 
engineering services, home appliances, electrical appliances, 
chemicals, food, motorcycle and refrigerator assembly. The branch 
of the group specifically spearheaded by Razak Dawood had made a 
transition from investment in trading to light engineering, due to the 
effective management style that he chose to adopt in running his 
companies.
6.7 Conclusion
By the late 1960s, the splintering of the links with those that 
commanded political influence was attended by no endogenous 
organisational systems for the Dawood Group to fall back upon. 
Initially the Dawood Group had a comparative advantage over others 
in being experienced textiles traders. Ayub’s son, Gohar Ayub was
^^^Given in, ‘Descon’, unpublished company document.
^^^Given in, A. Rana, BMX CYCLES (A), Lahore University of 
Management Sciences, 1989, LBS case # 03-332-89-1, p. 2.
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inducted into business by Ahmad Dawood, who assisted Gohar in 
establishing an automobile assembly plant named Ghandhara 
I n d u s t r i e s T h i s  proximity to Ayub also paid dividends especially 
for the initial Dawood manufacturing investment. Being of trading 
origins, these businessmen felt that manufacturing did not require 
a new approach to conducting business. Therefore from the 
beginning, investment in internal organisational systems was not 
considered by senior members of Dawood as an option. After 
migrating to Pakistan, they continued to trade in cotton, the 
country's major export. Since they were one of the first business 
families in Pakistan to enter the textiles business they felt that 
handling the manufacturing business did not need a reorientation in 
the procedures to be followed. This meant that the old order of 
conducting business was not effectively replaced by the new order 
which should accompany a rise in the scale of business.
Systems application involve a breakdown of project expenses and 
budgets by numbers, whereby all activities related to the project are 
accounted and allocated. If this system does not exist, then 
management cannot keep abreast of or consohdate their business 
effectively when its size increases dramatically. With an increase in 
size, decisions are supposed to be made on the basis of systematically 
recorded information and not on ad hoc criteria. One of the effects
^^%ee H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, Oxford, 1972, pp. 
305-6, Appendix B, for wealth acquired by Gohar Ayub while his 
father was the President of Pakistan.
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of not adopting internal organisational systems was evident at Delta 
(Pvt) Limited, where there were only two main resin manufacturers 
in an industry where entry barriers were also low and yet Delta’s 
management could not capture a significant share of its domestic 
market. However, where Razak Dawood chose to adopt internal 
organisational systems, such as at Descon and LCI, he was able to 
make it to the cutting edge of technology which earned him 
substantial financial rewards in the light engineering sector.
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CONCLUSION
I
In this thesis I have undertaken an empirical study of four 
Pakistani business houses, over approximately 40 years of their 
business history. At the micro level, this study has highlighted the 
effects of adopting improved organisational systems on the ability of 
these businesses to make the transition from trading to light 
engineering goods production, particularly when the influence of 
macro imperatives no longer directed long-term investment patterns. 
This research examined investments made by both the publicly and 
privately quoted companies within the groups. In this way, it differs 
from previous studies of Pakistani business groups. The inclusion of 
private limited company records enriched this study to the extent 
that the pioneering entrepreneurs initiated business house 
investment through such companies, whose Board minutes were not 
made available to researchers or any member of the public. 
Wherever access to private limited firms’ records is denied, both 
researchers and practitioners alike lack significant insights into the 
strategies adopted in managerial decision-making.
The conclusions reveal three kinds of investment pattern which 
emerged as a consequence of the decisions taken by the pioneering 
entrepreneurs. No one pattern was exclusive to a particular group 
or companies across the same group. The juxtaposition of 
investments which emerged in an environment where all business
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houses were initially recipients of State Largesse was as follows. 
Firstly, there were those business houses where their owners were 
unable to make the transition, because a substantial reduction in 
State largesse was not replaced by adopting internal organisational 
systems to increase investments. The Ali Group and some companies 
within the Dawood Group are prominent examples. Secondly, there 
were those groups whose owners did not continue to aspire for or to 
receive State largesse, yet were able to make the transition driven 
from adopting internal organisational systems. The Crescent Group 
and certain companies within the Dawood Group are examples. 
Thirdly, there was one group whose owner initially directed State 
benefaction to other industriahsts including himself, and later when 
his own group was formed he (consciously) adopted a planned 
strategy of diversification, which helped sustain the transition to 
investments in light engineering. This was evident in the Faruque 
Group.
This research also attempted to separate the effects of exogenous 
factors affecting early business group development from endogenous 
factors (whether consciously or unconsciously applied), with the latter 
regarded as being a necessary condition for sustaining a transition 
to investments made in light engineering in the long-term. It was 
imperative to separate the effects of two the conditions, in order to 
isolate the impact of the owners’ decisions on the direction of their 
groups’ investment, as distinct from those initially derived from
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State-sponsored industrialisation. The endogenous factors (or the 
lack thereof) highlighted the origins of organisational reform by 
assigning the ultimate responsibility to the business group owners for 
the direction of their investment. The dynamic factor in affecting the 
transition were improved management practices, here expressed in 
terms of the Systems Approach methodology. Such an approach 
encouraged successful backward and forward integration. This 
research also analysed whether in the 1980s these businessmen had 
been able to build on the assets accumulated via economic and 
financial favours from the government in the 1950s.
II
These business groups benefitted equally from the initial exogenous 
factors directing business group investment. Most of Pakistan’s 
modern industry formed after 1947 contributed to the country’s 
industrial development articulated through its pioneering 
entrepreneurs. Ayub’s pohcies and the inflow of foreign aid which 
preceded the spurt in manufacturing industry in the mid-sixties 
engendered the flourishing of business house investment. With the 
formation of the PIDC and Ayub-led industriahsation, the boundaries 
between public policy and private-sector investment objectives also 
became blurred. When this was not accompanied by adopting 
internal organisational systems, the value of the business groups’ net 
manufacturing assets remained at the same position or fell in the 
long-term. This was evident in the Ali Group and in some companies
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in the Dawood Group respectively. In the early life of these 
corporations, 1960-68, success remained a function of the owner- 
entrepreneurs’ political leverage and the consistency with which they 
pursued and maintained the favour of the politicians and 
bureaucrats. However in the long-term, the growth of non-productive 
activities in the group influenced the growth of the potentially 
productive. This was reflected in the differing patterns of business 
house investment across the groups. The deleterious effect of the 
non-productive activities was alleviated, where older methods of 
information retrieval and dissemination were replaced by application 
of method study [the process of information reporting and retrieval, 
with the objective to either improve or eliminate a process or 
procedure] to solve organisational problems. In the Ah and Dawood 
Groups, managers paid lip-service to the new methods of information 
retrieval, which in practice was not applied and so prevented the 
adoption of improved organisational systems. The verbal tribute paid 
by the Ah Groups’ senior managers to modem management practices 
was not enacted in the companies managed by them. This was 
exacerbated when the absence of the requisite administrative 
capability to link control to the execution of decisions led them to 
fight shy of possible diversification. Members of the Ah Group 
appeared to emulate the high-consumption lifestyle of the land­
owning class in as close a manner as possible and prior capital 
accumulation was not used to finance company mergers or vertical
471
and horizontal integration. As a result they failed to concentrate on 
consolidating the group’s investment in the light engineering 
industry at a time when it was possible to do so. Once they 
perceived they had gained the status of rural landlords, their 
motivation to expand their business gradually languished.^ Wajid 
and Amjad Ali’s close haison with all Pakistani Heads of State from 
1951 to 1971, provided them with a platform to achieve influence 
that was commensurate with the power of the landowning class.^ 
This aspiration to emulate rural landlords could not be the platform 
for a well directed business plan. Rather it deterred Wajid Ali and 
his family from retaining professional managers within the group, 
managers who might well have introduced improved internal 
organisational systems.
Investors in Pakistan’s business houses did not derive their wealth 
from feudal relationships. Rather they were traders motivated by a
^The first agricultural investment made by Ali Group were in two 
farms located in pre-partition India, called the Palakmati Farms 
Limited and Gohar-i-Taj Industrial and Agricultural Farms Limited. 
The group also invested in sheep purchased from a prominent 
landlord, Khizar Hayat Tiwana, and in a poultry farm with 30,000 
birds; the farm was jointly owned by four members of the Ali Group. 
Another attempt to invest in agriculture involved the purchase of 
agricultural land for a dairy farm called Kabirwala Dairies, which 
supplied fresh milk for processing at another Ali Group concern, 
Milkpak.
^In Britain, a study of the elite railway executives and how they 
gained upward mobility from entry level recruitment to senior 
management positions is given in, T. Gourvish, ‘A British Business 
Elite: The Chief Executive Managers of the Railway Industry, 1850- 
1922’, Business History Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Autumn 1973, pp. 
293-301.
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desire to emulate the economic and political position of their feudal 
lords. The industrial enterprises which thus emerged were initially 
large-scale, and thrived in an environment of incentives and 
opportunities. However, a closer examination of the pohcies adopted 
by the industrial pioneers reveals a fundamental conservatism in 
their ideas about business management, a constraint deriving from 
their economic origins as traders. Even if they were willing to adopt 
improved internal organisation systems, they remained influenced by 
the desire to achieve the lifestyle of rural landlords. On the other 
hand, those entrepreneurs who recognised that better business 
opportunities were there for them to tap into, responded by initially 
assimilating the package of incentives offered to them by the State 
and replacing them with internal organisational systems. They did 
not compromise the gains made from their earlier occupation as 
traders, by dissipating them on personal glorification. For example. 
State incentives did not prevent the Crescent Group entrepreneurs 
from adopting internal organisational systems (initially done 
unconsciously and then consciously), in contrast with members of the 
Ali Group, who chose not to adopt them. Crescent were first movers 
in textiles and were also able to maintain their head start over other 
aspiring textile industrialists through a continuous process of 
consolidation and expansion of investment. This was demonstrated 
as follows. In its initial years, the Crescent Group’s access to high- 
level bureaucrats was later effectively converted into diversifying
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investments in light engineering production. One contributory factor 
was the contacts made hy the group’s founder, Muhammad Bashir, 
who was on the Board of Directors of the National Steel of Pakistan 
(NSPL), an enterprise operating the first and only steel mill in 
Pakistan. Based on Muhammad Bashir’s working experience with 
other businessmen on the Board, and in managing the aûairs of the 
steel mill. Crescent henefitted and formed forward linkages by 
forming an engineering utihties company. Crescent Group Services 
(Pvt) Limited in 1980 (28 years after the group’s formation) and 
Crescent Steel and Allied Products Limited in 1983. The former 
provided construction and engineering services to group-owned and 
public sector projects. These services included research, project 
planning and engineering advice (civil, mechanical, electrical and 
chemical). The formation of these Crescent companies represented 
an investment in an unconventional, light engineering sector of 
industry.
The NSPL was a consortium of key industrialists,^ among whom 
were Wajid Ali (Ali Group), Ghulam Faruque (Faruque Group), 
Muhammad Bashir (Crescent Group), Ahmad Dawood (Dawood 
Group) and another key industrialist, Rafique Saigol, whose group
^See ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors of National 
Steel Pakistan Limited’, 7 July 1965, p. 1., which lists the names of 
these industrialists, and of 11 February 1966, p. 1, for the complete 
list of its directors.
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was not included in this study/ Another forum where these 
businessmen met was the National Press Trust, formed in 1964 as a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting. Led hy Ghulam Faruque, this was a consortium of 
eight large industrialists with equity participation from the 
government. The industrialists included Wajid Ali, Ahmad Dawood 
and Muhammad Bashir. Control of the press by an industrialist 
such as Ghulam Faruque encouraged favourable reviews of his 
achievements as well as those of President Ayub.
The interplay of economic power and political influence was evident 
in all the groups studied. Dawood enjoyed political advantages over 
Crescent by having the ear of the President, while having the same 
economic advantage as Crescent through a base in textiles trading. 
The Crescent Group possessed economic characteristics which gave 
them an edge over the Ali and Faruque Groups, but this was 
counterbalanced hy the latter’s political advantage over the others, 
in having the ear of the President and senior bureaucrats. The 
commercial training of members of the Ali, Crescent and Dawood 
Groups helped them to re-establish their business interests in 
Pakistan fairly quickly after partition. Establishing political 
connections with Ayub cemented Dawood and Ali’s access to the
^This was the Saigol Group, which was omitted from this study 
since its pioneering entrepreneurs only agreed to be interviewed, and 
refused to provide documentary evidence on their group’s history. 
See Appendix A for the questions asked in the interviews.
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country’s available resources and industrial infrastructure. 
Government restrictions imposed on economic activities forced 
aspiring recipients of State patronage to compete for concessions and 
in this process rent-seeking occurred.® In 1959-63, a ready demand 
for machines in a new market with both consumer and (artificially 
created) capital goods demand by the PIDC, circumvented the need 
for the Faruque Group to first gain experience of manufacturing 
consumer and intermediate goods, before making its entry into light 
engineering manufacturing. The market for capital goods was 
initially created and serviced by the PIDC and then by the Faruque 
Group’s investment in fight engineering. Throughout Faruque’s 
history, the government assisted it in various ways; first as an 
employer; secondly as a facilitator of licences for Ghulam Faruque-led 
PIDC projects, and then the Faruque Group’s own investments; and 
thirdly as the group’s main customer.
Ayub’s industrial policies also provided easy money for investors, 
a t a time when the class structure was forming in the new Pakistan. 
Key personalities within these business houses established a personal 
rapport with the higher echelons in politics enabling the former to 
access venture capital with the full support of the bureaucracy. In 
instances, a major segment of business activity was apportioned
®A more detailed explanation of how societies in India and Turkey 
sought rent-seeking privileges which produced a loss to society, see 
A. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’, in 
The American Economic Review, Issue 64, 1974, pp. 291-303.
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towards reinforcing this network, at the expense of a more sustained 
and institutionalised programme within the departments and 
subsidiaries of the business groups. The upper echelon in business 
henefitted and remained dominant political and economic forces, 
while the position of the less privileged remained weak, both in a 
relative and absolute sense. The State’s economic assistance was 
also evident from the some of the PIDC-led investments acquired hy 
the Crescent and Dawood Groups. Although Ghulam Faruque was 
the chairman of PIDC from 1952 to 1958, it was the connections 
which Ahmad Dawood enjoyed with its next chairman, the Nawab of 
Kalabagh, that produced the financially most lucrative sale made by 
the PIDC to a private-sector buyer, when the Dawood Group acquired 
the Kamaphuli Paper Mills in 1960 for Rs 46 million.®
All the groups studied here had equal opportunity to initially 
access a similar amount of discounted finance and to Ayub’s political 
help in promoting new industry. Financial institutions, such as the 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) 
which extended foreign exchange loans, were more often than not 
used by the entrepreneurs to amass personal wealth.^ From 1958 
to 1970, the Dawood and Crescent Groups were the country’s highest 
recipients by value of credit allocated by them hy PICIC; they
®See Table 2.10 for PIDC sales to business groups.
^See Table 2.14 for the allocation of credit to these groups.
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collectively received 26 percent of its credit.® The magnitude of 
PlClC’s credit received by these groups coincided with Ahmad 
Dawood (Dawood Group) holding a PICIC directorship from 1958 to 
1988 and Muhammad Bashir (Crescent Group) from 1962 to 1971. 
The difference lay in the fact that the conservative members of the 
Dawood Group were on the whole unable to make the transition to 
a modem corporation, whereas the Crescent Group demonstrated its 
capability by processing steel by the close of this study.
With the formation of the National Investment Tm st (NIT), the 
share of each group in NIT’s investments ranged from 0.96 percent 
to 6.95 percent in 1970, with the Dawood Group having the largest 
share by virtue of it being the only group whose owner, Ahmad 
Dawood had a NIT directorship (1965-88). Again, Ahmad Dawood 
took the group into manufacturing, but he was not an advocate of 
improved internal organisational systems, as was evident from the 
management practices directed by him at Dawood Hercules Limited.
In spite of the success of new investment by the Ah and Dawood 
Groups derived from their association with Ayub, the management 
policies adopted by the Crescent Group took it from the number nine 
position in 1968 to the number two position (measured by the size of 
net manufacturing assets) in 1974 and 1988.® In the 1970s, the
^Ibid.
®See Table 2.15 for a cross section of business group assets from 
1968 to 1988.
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value of the Ali Group’s net assets declined and its position fell, while 
the Crescent Group’s net assets and its position, both increased. 
Even though the Faruque Group was a late-starter, its net assets 
increased from 1968 to 1988 at the highest rate. Being a late-mover 
in its own-group investments, compared with Dawood and Ali, the 
Faruque management showed more initiative in investing in areas 
where their predecessors did not venture. This was because Ghulam 
Faruque had gained management experience while he was an 
administrator of PIDC-led investments and sales. Therefore, he 
carried with him his experience as an administrator to initiate and 
consolidate own-group investment. This also concurs with our earlier 
statement that regardless of ownership structures, if an 
administrator adopts internal organisational systems, he creates the 
conditions for a sustained transition from investments in trading to 
light engineering production. In Ghulam Faruque’s case, he gained 
his initial administrative experience as a bureaucrat and successfully 
transposed it into diversi^ng Faruque investment.
In the Dawood case, the continuing collusion between business 
interests and sources of finance, splintered a modem management 
strategy. This group’s position, measured by the value of its net 
manufacturing assets fell from number one in 1968 to number three 
in 1988. Adoption of the Systems Approach strategy would have 
imposed administrative accountability accompanied by its inherent 
standardisation of new methods and procedures. It would also have
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reduced rent-seeking means from only maximising profits by insisting 
that they also introduce methodical techniques of inventory and cost 
management, to expand the business. Followers of the old kind of 
management where manual ledger systems and piece-meal solutions 
to problems prevailed, were observed in Ali and in most companies 
of Dawood, where its owners henefitted personally from State 
support. The comfort given by State support prevented the Ali and 
Dawood entrepreneurs from introducing improved organisational 
systems. However, it did not prevent the Crescent and Faruque 
entrepreneurs from adopting systems. In Pakistan, therefore. State 
patronage when not replaced by adopting internal organisational 
systems, was the largest single influence discouraging the transition 
from investments made in trading to light engineering production.
I ll
The adoption of endogenous organisational factors became 
increasingly responsible for directing business group transition from 
investments made in trade to light engineering. Of aU the groups 
studied, Faruque and Crescent made the most sustained transition. 
Descon was the only company in the Dawood Group, that specialised 
in steel-processing equipment. However, Descon’s owner, Razak 
Dawood was exceptional among his family in adopting a more 
forward looking management strategy. This is why he decided to 
invest in steel-based manufacturing in the first place. Faruque made 
the transition, because its owner had gained the expertise in
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managing large-scale steel investments while he was PIDC’s director, 
and had carried with him his expertise to establish a base in steel for 
his group. The Faruque Group’s direct entry into light engineering 
industry was a function of Ghulam Faruque’s experience in the 
managing of new investment in this sector, which later provided him 
with the edge and confidence required to innovate, without 
undergoing prior trials in investing in risk-prone (unconventional) 
areas of industry. The risk averse strategy was more appropriate in 
describing the management philosophy of the Crescent Group which 
moved into light engineering (though more tentatively). The Faruque 
management showed risk aversion only in its sales to the government 
which provided it with a stable market for its products. This 
strategy of permitting the government to be its main customer was 
different from that practised at Crescent, where its management 
followed a policy of selling to a wider base of customers, preferably 
excluding the government. This was because Crescent was using its 
resources to consolidate its investments and chose to be risk averse 
in the industries in  which it invested rather than in who their 
customers were.
The Faruque Group was able to make a transition, inspite of not 
adopting systems at one of its companies, the Cherat Cement 
Company Limited (CCCL). Ghulam Faruque’s forward looking 
approach was not emulated by his son, Zahid Faruque in managing 
CCCL. At CCCL, the relations between the employees and
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management were largely strained. One example of this was when 
Shehryar Faruque issued a memorandum to CCCL’s sales officers in 
which he warned them that their services would be terminated if 
sales fell short of the company’s target. According to the Systems 
Approach methodology, the form of the problem was a serious 
concern of industrial relations at CCCL which required a solution. 
There was no evidence of brain storming or feedback forums used by 
senior management to resolve difficulties faced by the employees in 
fulfilling their targets. When CCCL’s management practices are 
compared with those used at Crescent’s Crescent Textile Mills 
Limited, it becomes evident that in the latter there existed a system 
of Quality Assurance and Quality Control, which was a platform used 
by employees to voice their grievances. These examples where 
management directed strategy, provide insights to why Crescent 
made a more sustained transition than Faruque in hght engineering 
production.
As was customary in all groups, Faruque appointed younger 
members of the family to senior management posts in its companies. 
At CCCL, Zahid Faruque’s son Azam, was appointed as the co­
ordination manager,^^ and Zahid’s two nephews, Shehryar and 
Aslam were appointed as product and executive marketing managers 
respectively. The directors’ positions at CCCL were also monopolised
^°The co-ordination manager was responsible for liaising between 
senior and junior staff at CCCL.
482
by the family, with the appointment of Aslam and Shehryar Faruque. 
There were very few non-family managers at the factory, (and this 
structure was designed as such in Zahid’s style). The Ali Group, like 
Faruque, was also a family concern with close knit ties. Initially 
they did hire professional managers, who eventually left for more 
responsible positions elsewhere. They did so because the group 
followed a system where it had abdicated responsibility to them, 
instead of delegating it. Structural changes consequent on the 
adoption of new technology were also lacking and the dependence on 
salaried managers was no substitute for an adequate organisational 
system with procedures. The Systems Approach dictates that 
management precepts which have outlived their usefulness need to 
be replaced with the tenets of the approach itself. In the Ali Group, 
inertia encouraged a host of misdemeanours which reached 
unmanageable proportions. Ownership and control were not 
separated, and the professional managers who were initially 
recruited were not replaced. The owners’ resistance to change was 
also a consequence of their monopoly power and lack of 
administrative accountability, whether to their salaried managers or 
to any panel within the exogenous environment. Organisational 
procedures were there to be adopted for those that chose to do so. 
The adoption of new procedures and specifically modem management 
systems helps enterprises to absorb the increased workload which 
increasing size imposes on management. The Ah Group did not
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follow the Systems Approach. (In the Chandlerian model 
companies have to make the three-pronged investment in 
innovation/technology, scale of production and distribution and 
management, all of which need a set of conditions (a system) to 
sustain them). Salaried managers at Ali were appointed for 
specialised tasks and after they left family control revived. The 
owners of the Ali Group diverted resources used for their personal 
glorification and acknowledged the need to respond positively to the 
situation. This need was expressed in the following example. On a 
comparative note, Babar Ali of the Ali Group, who had started the 
company Systems (Pvt) Limited, did not himself make use of its 
software development proposals. However Altaf Saleem of the 
Crescent Group chose to do so. In 1985, Saleem asked Systems (Pvt) 
Limited, to develop a computerisation strategy for Shakarganj Mills 
Limited (SML). The consultants identified cane procurement, 
accounting and inventory accounting systems as the priority areas for 
computerisation. By 1987, upon their recommendation, SML 
purchased two IBM S/36 mainframe computers. The new system 
enabled input/output computerisation of inventory records and those 
pertaining to the finance, control and accounting departments. The 
reports generated summary information required by the senior 
management to gauge performance in their respective fields and also
^^See A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Harvard, 1990, p. 17.
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reduced the number of tasks performed per transaction/^ This 
enabled, SML to reduce its costs and expend the amount saved 
elsewhere in the company.
Another comparison between the Ali and Crescent Groups’ 
management practices was reflected in the raw material they used 
in their respective paper manufacturing facilities. The Ali Group’s 
paper and board mill was established in 1964. As noted in Chapter 
Three, it used straw in manufacturing board for its p a p e r . T h e  
Crescent Group’s, Crescent Board Mills Limited (CBL), used a more 
refined input for pulp and board manufacturing, sugarcane bagasse, 
which was produced at another Crescent company. Crescent Sugar 
Mills and Distillery Limited (CSMDL). This is a good example of the 
Crescent Group’s strategy of backward vertical integration of 
production facilities at CBL.^  ^ CBL produced hard, laminated and 
particle board and also furniture panels, artificial ceihngs and cotton
^^The reduction in the number of tasks performed per operation 
was an idea firs t proposed by the proponents of the Systems 
Approach methodology given in S. Optner, (ed.). Systems Approach, 
Penguin, 1973, and not by the business process re-engineering model 
for businesses as proposed by M. Hammer and J. Champy, Re­
engineering the Corporation, A  Manifesto for Business Revolution, 
Nicholas Brealey, 1993, in which they restate the Systems Approach 
theory by propagating that in order to remain successful, businesses 
need to reinvent themselves by doing away with older procedures for 
new ones.
^^See pp. 189-92, for the Ali Group’s paper manufacturing facility.
"^^ See A. Chandler, Scale and Scope, 1990, p. 9, for backward 
integration of firms; and Shakarganj Mills Limited, unpublished 
company documents for the use of sugarcane bagasse used for paper 
and board production at CBL.
485
yam.
The Ali and Famque Groups were first movers in a number of 
industries; the former in razor blades, milk packaging, processing of 
Ultra High Temperature (UHT) milk, motor car, motor cycle and 
television assembly and in manufacturing packaging material in a 
fully integrated plant; the latter were first movers in the constmction 
of earth moving and related equipment. Over time, the Ali 
management became complacent about systems applications, which 
were essential for sustaining its long-term development.^® The 
Board minutes contain little to suggest that managerial strategy was 
ever discussed. The Ali Group’s first mover business became 
segments of a corporate dynasty, and once they reached a certain size 
failed to develop further. The Crescent Group were also first movers, 
in textiles, where they integrated textile manufacturing facihties to 
an extent not seen in Pakistan before. However, unlike the Ali 
Group, they were able to maintain the benefits of having a head start 
over other pioneering entrepreneurs in textiles, by consolidating their 
holdings through a planned philosophy which predominantly included 
adopting internal organisational systems. This enabled the Crescent 
Group’s transition to light engineering production. The members of 
the Dawood Group were the first in this study who commenced
^®For more details on Pakistani elite entrepreneurs, see L. White: 
Industrial Concentration, Princeton, 1974, pp. 150-55 and 
PIDC, ‘Development Programme of the PIDC, unpublished report, 
PIDC, 1989, p. 4.
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production prior to migrating to Pakistan. Most of Descon’s 
contracts, managed by Razak Dawood, were concentrated in northern 
Sind and southern Punjab, which included work done on the Mangla 
dam (the world’s largest earth filled dam) and other contracts 
awarded by the government. Compared with Faruque’s Greaves 
Cotton (Pvt) Limited (GCPL), Descon’s approach was very different. 
It was a late mover in the construction industry whereas GCPL had 
a head start over Descon by 13 years, and that too after it had 
initially gained experience through first leasing out and then 
manufacturing and using its own construction equipment to generate 
business in the construction industry. Because of Ghulam Faruque’s 
head start over others in organising industry, by 1971, GCPL 
manufactured its own earthmoving and construction equipment. 
However, like GCPL, Descon by 1977 had ‘caught up’ and it owned 
(imported) earth-moving and construction equipment and it had also 
successfully tapped into the foreign markets through several projects 
awarded to them by European and American companies.^® The 
sales arm of the Dawood Group was the unquoted parent company, 
Dawood Industries (Pvt) Limited, whose owners had a t their 
discretion the power to appropriate the group’s profits in an 
unaccountable manner till Bhutto’s reforms reduced the scale of this 
practice. The Dawood Group was unable to embrace the idea of
^®See, ‘Descon’, unpublished company document of the Dawood 
Group; no place, no year.
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‘scientific management’ as a tool for the planned reconstruction of its 
businesses.
Members of the Ali Group also initiated manufacturing industry in 
Pakistan, simultaneously with the Dawood Group, but only after 
partition in 1948. With the Ali Group, and within certain companies 
of the Dawood Group, the initial incentives provided by the State 
which led to the subsequent accumulation of private industrial 
capital, were not utilised for company mergers and vertical and 
horizontal integration of functions. Rather the proceeds from short­
term profits were used for personal consumption. Here the 
government’s initial favours became a substitute for expending 
resources on modernisation and expansion based on a system 
designed to meet with changing conditions. Industry was initially 
heavily protected as such, and this protection was not replaced by 
opening up their markets globally in the Ali Group. This is evident
^^Scientific management in the context of this study means in 
order to develop a new system, ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses are given for 
every organisational procedure. In the USA, scientific management 
generated a new hierarchy of technicians based on scientific 
principles of management directed to operational and first 
supervisory levels proposed by F. Taylor, Tke Principles of Scientific 
Management, W. Norton, 1967. His management theory viewed the 
organisation as an atomistic concept of mechanical precision rather 
than as organic or socially-oriented. A critique of Taylor’s ‘scientific 
management’ model of shop floor production techniques which was 
essentially designed to maximise the employers’ economic gain rather 
than to increase workers’ welfare, is given in R. Fitzgerald, British 
Labour Management and Industrial Welfare, Groom Helm, 1988, pp. 
4-8. Taylors’ simplistic view was also challenged by the behavioral 
school analysts who focused on the institutional approach of 
managing people and management by objectives.
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from the refusal of Babar Ali and Wajid Ali to enter into a joint 
venture contract with the Norwegians for a erecting a packaging 
unit, and with the Japanese Toyota company for motor car assembly 
respectively. In the Ali Group, the indirect controls on the market 
(one example of in c h r^  control being the inability of competing 
owners of milk processing units to obtain a licence from the 
government to manufacture tetrahedral paper, similar to that 
produced by Tetrapak), henefitted the larger firms of the group, while 
smaller inefficient firms had their true performance camouflaged by 
cross-subsidisation. Comparing his style of managing with that of 
Babar Ali’s of the Ali Group, Razak Dawood said that, ‘Some people 
are not hands on. Babar Ah just wants the summary'.
In all the groups, the family unit was the pivotal point of reference 
for decision making. Included in the group’s assets were commonly 
owned assets with other firms in the group. The ownership patterns 
of share capital largely determined the controlling power of the 
group. The hiradari^^ system of recruitment and reward 
determined management practices and career paths in these groups, 
as did more informal and subtle bonds which thrived on kinship. 
These recurrent patterns reduced efficiency since kinship patterns
^®lnterview with Razak Dawood, 26 October 1991.
^^Biradari denotes a common caste, extended family or 
community.
^^Kinship bonds originate and are reinforced by claiming descent 
from a common family or caste.
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based on family and caste which determined careers in the Ali and 
Dawood Groups did not lend themselves to pioneering management 
techniques. Throughout the period under study professional 
management remained low key if not entirely absent in these two 
groups.
IV
Ayub was the vehicle for the industrial transformation of Pakistan. 
During his ten years of rule, he aimed to develop a corporate 
infrastructure with the hope that Pakistani businesses would take 
off. All he did, ofcourse, was provide externally generated financial 
incentives to aid business start-ups. The onus to complement this 
with internally generated measures to sustain long-term growth 
rested with the owner entrepreneurial class, a challenge which was 
largely neglected by them. Ayub’s industrial policies produced a 
buoyant investment climate which generated only exogenous 
conditions for the promotion of initial growth in these businesses. 
Although the Planning Commission tried to prevent it, these pohcies 
created an industrial base in Pakistan which was dominated by a few 
very wealthy entrepreneurs.^^
An internal organisational system in management science, may be 
defined as a set of processes that veers towards rectifying the form
^^See Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan, Government 
of Pakistan, p. v., where it is stated, by the head of the commission 
that, Tt will be our firm policy, therefore, to prevent excessive 
concentration of income and wealth in the hands of a few...’.
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of a problem so that problems do not recur in the same from. This 
approach is institutional and dynamic, emphasising standardisation 
of procedures (over output). Standardistaion of output requires many 
vertically integrated units reporting to a centralised data base, and 
where there is less control over employees to permit decentralisation 
of functional management, (rather than standardisation of skills, as 
proposed by F. Taylor’s classical approach to horizonatally integrated 
and static management structures). The Systems Approach proposes 
that it is the procedure that should be standardised because it 
affects every functional and divisional hierarchy created by 
managers. In a more tangible sense, just as Chandlerian process 
[scope] economies in production address a different set of conditions 
than their counterpart in scale [content] economies of production, we 
can also make a similar distinction between the differing conditions 
which either address the process of an organisational problem or its 
content. For example the effect of employee training on better 
production quality or the economic benefits of [new] computerised 
ledgers which saves time spent on their interpretation are addressing 
the process of a problem. Such processes (organisational methods) 
have an holistic effect on developing more accurate measures to 
gauge the effectiveness of decisions taken set against the alternative 
options. The organisation’s internally generated, routinised reporting
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system^^ stimulates the recognition of cause and effect 
relationships, which enables better quantification and analysis by 
those made responsible to do so within departments and across 
companies in the groups. The causal relationships improve the 
quality of decisions in that their predictive value complies more 
closely with the actual outcome. The closeness of this fit enables 
business groups to expand investment through institutionahsing 
their training procedures, which can then increase output, sales, 
profits and ultimately, the size of the groups’ net manufacturing 
assets in light engineering. Internal organisational systems generate 
information which has seen itself through the rigours of detailed 
record-keeping, proves to be a better vehicle for making accurate 
predictions. Detailed records of transactions ensure that in a given 
context, causal relationships between the decisions taken can be 
assigned more plausibly to their effects, and that relationships can 
be quantified, analysed and responsibilities allocated to managers 
and to departments of origin. Information recording and generation 
facilities lead to a predictable extension of the business groups’ 
investments. These internal organisational factors prevent internal 
atrophy from finally consuming the organisational structure because 
the managers have remained abreast with adopting new
^^Intemal, routinsed reporting systems and its impact on 
management decision-making are given in J. Yates, Control Through 
Communication^ John Hopkins, 1989 and P. Temin, (ed.). Inside the 
Business Enterprise, Chicago, 1991.
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management styles as the scale of their business increases. The 
impetus for introducing such institutional changes rested with the 
owner managers of our business groups. In the case of Ah and 
Dawood, they largely ignored taking corrective action to rectify this 
atrophy. The hiring of professional management, as especially those 
(consciously) trained in the tenets of the Systems Approach, could 
have repaired the damage done. However, the owner managers in 
these groups chose to spend their time cultivating their personal 
wealth rather than investing in changes that would glorify their 
businesses. The managers of the Ali and Dawood Groups paid hp- 
service to the adoption of systematic management, which in practice 
was seldom apphed, whether consciously or unconsciously. The 
outcome was that these groups failed to produce an organisational 
memory of skills through the training of employees, who could have 
imparted their skills iteratively, to other less experienced managers 
operating in dramatically different situations. However, the absence 
of the requisite administrative capability to link control with the 
execution of decisions led to a dampener effect on possible 
diversification of the Ali and Dawood investments in light 
engineering. Any apparent gains, were compromised by the personal 
capital accumulated by a few businessmen within these groups. This 
failure of vision could not enable the transition in Ali and in certain 
companies within Dawood. Crescent portrayed similar historical 
characteristics found in Dawood; however Crescent then branched off
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on its own, not seeking short-cuts to success and became known as 
professionals and forward looking entrepreneurs in business 
management. Since its owners did not continue with the earber 
trend to seek State patronage, they were better able to manage the 
‘teething’ problems of entry into new markets and swim their way 
out of bottlenecks, individually. Therefore Crescent made a 
sustained transition to light engineering production, driven by its 
internal organisational systems.
These leading industrial families (namely members of the Ali and 
Dawood Groups) were not passive recipients of the benefits of 
government policy, they initially actively formulated and 
administered them. The ease with which they initially accessed 
discounted finance were not replaced by adopting internal systems 
and procedures to ensure self-sustaining growth in the future. 
Wherever such systems were adopted, the group(s) was able to 
overcome obstacles to its own self-perpetuating growth. The Ali and 
Dawood groups’ ‘easy’ acquisition of assets were not replaced by 
adopting systems, which encouraged production and organisational 
inefficiencies.^^ Had they chosen to act otherwise, it would have led 
to a buoyancy propelling self-perpetuating growth within the groups. 
In instances, the increase in size of the business with a decrease in
^^See the Ali Group’s external relations, pp. 221-55. The 
theoretical context is given in P. Schoderbek, ‘Design of Management 
Systems’, in P. Schoderbek, (ed.). Management Systems, John Wiley, 
1967, pp. 109-111.
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State patronage, ultimately altered the conditions that had made the 
initial businesses viable. The beneficiaries of Ayub’s trade 
liberahsation policies in the Ali and Dawood Groups were unable to 
absorb and transfer these benefits to industry in the long-term. 
Ayub, as the stalwart of industriabsation, spurred initial business 
bouse investments but was not responsible for their future growth.
For the Dawood Group, the growth surge was later accompanied 
by the traditional sub-continental malaise of family sub-divisions of 
the group’s assets. Preceding these sub-divisions, the group bad also 
suffered the splintering of its assets, at the bands of nationalisation. 
By not replacing the losses which incurred, by investing in internal 
organisational systems, these conditions became the reasons why 
long-term growth was not sustained within certain companies of the 
Dawood Group. The group’s initial expansion was a function of 
exogenous economic policies but thereafter, as also seen in the Ali 
Group, they dispensed with the need to supplant them with internal 
organisation systems, a necessary condition to sustain the transition 
from trading to light engineering. They chose to make the 
government a crutch for the absence of an inner strategy for the 
group’s expansion. For the Ali and Dawood Groups, the repercussion 
of a constant neglect of internally generated systems manifested 
itself in outmoded systems which could not provide the leading edge 
for incisive organisational leadership. Attempts to solve problems by 
traditional methods of management, reinforced by a centralised
495
decision-making structure, was not consistent with the tenets of the 
Systems Approach. A failure to recognise this is the main deterrent 
to its adoption and thereby perpetrated the use of traditional 
management methods. Where the transition to light engineering 
goods production occurred, as in the Crescent and Faruque Groups, 
it was mainly a consequence of the businessmens’ prudence and 
vision which engendered a systematic approach to enhancing their 
investment portfolio.
Throughout the 1960s, the concentration and ownership of capital 
and industrial wealth were issues having far-reaching political 
consequences. The government’s liberal credit line to a few 
industrialists helped in substantive, if temporary capital formation. 
The transient nature of capital accumulated, stemmed from proxy 
State industrialisation using exogenous economic propellants to 
develop businesses. These propellants initially made the owners 
unaccountable for their actions while at the same time successful in 
increasing their groups’ net assets. Adoption of endogenous 
organisation factors enforces an ethic which redefines authority 
without separating it from responsibility. In order to sustain growth 
through the rising magnitude of capital formation, organisation 
strategy also needs redefinition. Wherever this was applied, the ‘one 
off economic favours of the government were gradually but effectively 
replaced by a sound organisational strategy more conducive to 
buoyant expansion.
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The case study chapters which preceded this conclusion provide 
support for the assertion that the Systems Approach methodology has 
explanatory power in an historical setting. There clearly was a 
linkage between its application and predictable patterns of 
investment within the business groups. Upon closer examination of 
the policies adopted by the owner managers, it was revealed that in 
the long-term, groups which chose to rem ain  most ‘rentier’ were 
least likely to adopt new management systems, and the least ‘rentier’ 
that were the most enterprising in their internal changes. Adoption 
of new management systems, could have cushioned the blow received 
by groups from macro economic set backs, such as nation 
splintering,^^ the devaluation of the Rupee and the nationalisation 
of industry, all of which could have been negotiated through effective 
internal systems of management and control. Therefore surrogate 
industrialisation stimulated by State-led institutions only achieved 
the planners’ objectives in the short-run and in the start-up phase of 
businesses. In most instances, the absence of improved 
organisational systems, in the long-term, deprived Pakistan’s 
industrialisation of the necessary institutional linkages required to 
cement business effort in achieving a conglomerate stature.
^^The break away of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in 1971.
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Cherat Cement Company Limited, 1989.
Crescent Jute Products, 1988.
Crescent Steel and Allied Products Limited, 1988.
Crescent Sugar Mills and Distillery Limited, 1988.
Crescent Textile Mills Limited, 1973-89.
Dawood Cotton Mills, 1989.
Dawood Hercules Limited, 1989.
Dilon Limited, 1989.
Elite Textile Mills Limited, Annual Report, 1988.
Investment Corporation of Pakistan, 1970.
Milkpak Limited, 1981-88.
Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited, 1965-89.
National Investment Trust, 1965-88.
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INTERVIEWS WITH CURRENT AND EX-EMPLOYEES, 
FAMILY MANAGERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND
NON-GROUP MANAGERS
a. The Wazir AU Group
Shahid Ali
Executive Director
Treet Corporation (Pvt) Limited
72-B Kot Lakhpat
Lahore
Nosher Nama 
Ex-Managing Director 
Ali Automobiles Limited 
6 Mary Road, Bath Island 
Karachi
Fakir Syed Aijazuddin 
Chairman
International General Insurance 
Lahore
Syed Yawar Ah
Managing Director
Milkpak Limited
40-A Zafar Ali Road, Gulberg-V
Lahore
M Hanif Rajput
Finance Manager & Company Secretary
Milkpak Limited
40-A, Zafar Ali Road, Gulberg-V
Lahore
Javed Aslam 
Marketing Manager 
Packages Limited 
Amirsidhu 
Lahore
b. The Crescent Group
Altaf Saleem
Chief Executive Officer
Shakarganj Mills Limited & PILCORP
Toba Road
Jhang
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Ahsan Saleem
Chief Executive Officer
Crescent Steel and Allied Products Limited
9th Floor, SIDCO Avenue Centre
264 R. 1. Lines
Karachi
Anjum Saleem 
Chief Operating Officer 
Crescent Cotton Products 
Habib Bank Building 
Circular Road 
Faisalabad
Zaheer A Sheikh 
PILCORP
4th Floor, PAAF Building 
P. O. Box 2287 
Kashmir Road 
Lahore
Zahid Aslam
General Manager (Operations)
The Crescent Textile Mills Limited
Sarghoda Road
Faisalabad
c. The Ghulam Faruque Group
(Late) Muhammad Akram 
Managing Director 
Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited 
Modem Motors Building 
Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road 
Karachi
Zahid Faruque
Executive Director
Cherat Cement Company Limited
3rd. Floor, Modern Motors Building
Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road
Karachi
Muhammad Famque 
Chairman
Greaves Cotton (Pvt) Limited 
2nd. Floor, Modem Motors Building 
Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road 
Karachi
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d. The Dawood Group
Razak Dawood 
Managing Director 
DESCON
Akhavan House, 38-Davis Road 
Lahore
M Amin Latif
General Manager
Descon Engineering (Pvt) Limited
5th Floor, Dawood Centre
Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road
Karachi-4
Suleman Dawood 
Chairman
Dawood Corporation (Pvt) Limited 
Dawood Centre
Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road 
Karachi-4
Haji Muhammad Ghani
Finance Manager
Dawood Corporation (Pvt) Limited
2nd Floor, State Life Building
LL Chundrigar Road
Karachi
Aziz Moon
Executive Director
Dawood Corporation (Pvt) Limited
Dawood Industries (Pvt) Limited
3rd Floor, Dawood Centre
Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road
Karachi-4
Ahsan Raza
Ex-Finance Director
Dawood Hercules Chemicals Ltd
Lahore
e. The Atlas Group [not included] 
Yusuf Shirazi
Chairman
Atlas Group of Companies 
8th Floor, Adamjee House 
LL Chundrigar Road 
Karachi
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Talha Saad 
Production Manager 
Atlas Honda Limited 
F/36, Estate Avenue 
Karachi
Khalid Jilani
General Manager Technical 
Atlas Batteries Limited 
D/181, Central Avenue
5.1.T.E 
Karachi
M Kizilbash 
General Manager
Allwin Engineering Industries Limited 
15th Mile, National Highway 
Landhi 
Karachi
Mohammad Naib 
Manager Administration 
Atlas Autos 
F/36 Estate Avenue
5.1.T.E.
Karachi 75350
f. Saigol Group (not included)
Naseem Saigol 
Chairman
Saigol Computers (Pvt) Limited
Egerton Road
Lahore
Tariq Saigol 
Chairman
Kohinoor Textile Mills Limited
42-Lawrence Road
Lahore
Iqbal Saigol 
Chairman
Saitex Spinning Mills Limited
19-K Gulberg 11
Lahore
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Jalees Abidi 
Export Manager 
Kohinoor Trading (Pvt) Limited 
1st Floor
12 Mandviwala Chambers
Talpnr Road
Karachi
S. I. H. Zaidi 
Executive Director 
Saigols (Pvt) Limited 
6 Egerton Road 
Lahore- 54000
g. The Lakson Group (not included)
Sultan Lakhani
Chief Executive Officer 
Lakson Group 
Lakson Square 
Sarwar Shaheed Road 
Karachi- 74200
Zulfiqar Lakhani 
Managing Director 
Colgate-Palmolive (Pak) Limited 
Lakson Square 
Sarwar Shaheed Road 
Karachi- 74200
h. Government and Semi-Govemment Officials 
PIDC
Bilal Farooqi
Chairman
PIDC
PIDC House
Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road 
Karachi
PICIC
Khurshid Marker 
(Honorary) Chairman 
PICIC 
6th Floor
State Life Building No. 1 
LL Chundrigar Road 
Karachi
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Abdul Haq
Executive Vice President 
PICIC
19 Davis Road 
Lahore
NDFC
Talat Behzad 
Manager NDFC 
2nd Floor
Finance and Trade centre 
Shahra-e-Faisal 
P.O.Box No. 5094 
Karachi
i. Non-group Managers
Ahmed Allawala 
Chairman
EMMAY Associates (Pvt) Limited 
F-109/1
Kehkeshan, Clifton 
Karachi
Masood Hasan
[Ex- Managing Director, WIL],
Managing Director
EMMAY Associates (Pvt) Limited
90 A, Canal Park
GuIberg-2
Lahore-54660
Zia Shafi Khan 
Director 
Habib Group 
Karachi
Imtiaz Mehdi
Ex-Commercial Manager, WIL 
90 A, Canal Park 
Lahore-54660
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
For Chief Executive Officers and Department Heads of Family 
Controlled Business
1. When was your family business 
established/registered?
2. When did it go public?
3. Is it a family owned business?
4. In wbieb city (India/Pakistan)?
5. Who were the family pioneers: 
a t inception?
6. When were non-family members’ recruited 
at decision making levels:
at inception 
by 1950 
by 1970 
by 1980 
by 1987?
7. Wbat was the family members equity contribution?
at inception 
by 1960 
by 1970 
by 1980 
by 1987?
8. Why did you go in for manufacturing/industry 
trade/service and export sectors?
9. Wbicb factors provided you with this edge 
to invest in the above at the time you did?
10. Wbat was the equity of this company:
at inception 
by 1960 
by 1970 
by 1980 
by 1987?
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11. What component of expenditure was spent 
on machinery imports under licence?
12. Did you benefit firom the bonus voucher scheme?
13. At the time of investment, did you visuahse speciahzation only in 
the original industry? If yes - what constraints did you visuahse 
would not make expansion viable in other industries?
14. How many employees were there:
at inception 
by 1960 
by 1970 
by 1980 
by 1987?
15. How much equity was contributed by you and the debt 
component?
16. What labour problems and union (CBA) dealings has the company 
encountered?
17. How much has been the labour turnover of permanent 
and temporary workers?
18. How many family members were in management positions:
at inception 
by 1960 
by 1970 
by 1980 
by 1987?
19. Where were non family members introduced at a decision-making 
level?
at inception 
by 1960 
by 1970 
by 1980 
by 1987?
20. Wbat were the means for monitoring and control of professional 
managers, in order to obtain information and develop a reporting 
system on them?
21. Wbat productive measure were introduced to monitor 
disbursements, and control misdemeanours, through supervision?
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40. If you rely on written communication, are your records filed by:
a) department of origin/destination
b) decision makers file
c) master file?
41. How far dated are the written file records?
42. Is there a consistency in their format or does each employee 
report arbitrarily?
43. Was expansion into related or other field successful?
44. If you - who took over the management of the newly acquired 
enterprise?
45. To what causes do you attribute an increase in profits 
in successive years?
46. What is your sales turnover?
47. Do you have procedural manuals? If so, what mechanism is used 
to update them?
48. Are there systems and procedures operating in your company?
49. What is your idea of Research and Development (R&D)?
50. Has R&D generated market expansion? If yes, how?
51. What role does size and technology play in innovation?
52. Has technology adoption led to expansion of your business. If so, 
was it backwards, forwards or both?
53. Have your made any innovation in technology or machines. If so, 
how many years after start up?
54. Are most of your raw materials imported?
55. What is the time lag between negotiation and loan sanctioning/ 
dealing with government approvals?
56. What is your company’s capital-output ratio?
57. Is there an inventory build up?
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58. Are there production bottlenecks idle capacity and surplus labour 
accumulation, in any of your business? If yes, owing to wbicb 
factors, such as market information or demand?
59. Wbat is your firm’s marketing strategy?
60. Wbat is your projected market strategy?
61. How did nationalisation affect your company’s performance?
62. Wbat policies of the government bave bad a negative influence on 
your industries and wbicb ones bave been helpful?
63. When did you start using computers? For wbat type of work are 
they used?
64. Did you ever have to change structure for strategy?
65. How do you influence functional managers and coordinate tbeir 
activities?
66. Why do family business persist in Pakistan?
67. Wbat issues are most time consuming for our business leaders?
68. Wbat criteria helps diversification?
69. How helpful was the import licensing policy for procurement of 
machines? Did you obtain the licence from:
a) loan through PICIC
b) cash licence
c) any other source; specify?
70. Do you think that your group is in a better position in acquiring 
licences from the government than:
a) multinationals
b) other business groups
c) any other entity
d) more than one of the above; specify?
71. How do you find the opportunity to apply for a bcence from the 
government:
a) By approaching the government formally
b) By approaching the government informally
c) On your initiative
d) As a response to competitor’s action
e) Any combination of the above; specify?
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85. Does your firm conduct a formal analysis of its major competitors, 
including their control over the distribution channels?
86. Viewing space and distance, which of the following factors are 
significant for industry location and continuity:
a) proximity to raw materials
b) plenty of land
c) proximity to information
d) production costs
e) pollution discharge costs by locating a factory away 
from cities?
87. In your organization, which of the following accrue production 
economies:
a) labour intensive in cheap labour areas
b) technology intensive in high wage areas
c) economies of scale derived fi*om high demand?
88. Did you company expand from:
a) benefits of already being large
b) takeovers and merges
c) nationalisation?
89. Any strategic decisions in your organization fi*om brainstorming 
techniques?
90. How do you distance yourself from distracting stimuli (the 
content) to observe the broader view picture (the form) of a 
problem?
91. Do you send your managers on courses to outside institutions for 
functional or management training? Any benefits accruing?
92. What is the process of accountability in your organization. Do 
you distinguish between administrative and legal accountability?
93. What is your organizational structure. Is there an informal or 
formal reporting channel?
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